SARS-CoV-2 Prevalence on and Incidence after Arrival in Travelers on Direct Flights from Cape Town, South Africa to Munich, Germany Shortly after Occurrence of the Omicron Variant in November/December 2021: Results from the OMTRAIR Study.

The highly transmissible SARS-CoV-2-variant B.1.1.529 (Omicron) first appeared in South Africa in November 2021. In order to study Omicron entry to Germany, its occurrence related to incoming airline travel, symptomatology and compliance with entry regulations and recommendations, we conducted a cross-sectional study, followed by a retrospective cohort study among passengers and crew on 19 direct flights from Cape Town, South Africa, to Munich, Germany, between 26 November and 23 December 2021. Travelers were mandatorily PCR-tested on arrival and invited to complete an online questionnaire. SARS-CoV-2-prevalence on arrival was 3.3% (n = 90/2728), and 93% were Omicron. Of the passengers, 528 (19%) completed the questionnaire. Among participants who tested negative on arrival, self-reported SARS-CoV-2-incidence was 4.3% within 14 days, of whom 74% reported a negative PCR-test ≤ 48 h before boarding, 77% were fully vaccinated, and 90% reported wearing an FFP2/medical mask during flight. We found multiple associations between risk factors and infection on and after arrival, among which having a positive-tested travel partner was the most noteworthy. In conclusion, PCR testing before departure was insufficient to control the introduction of the Omicron variant. Additional measures (e.g., frequent testing, quarantine after arrival or travel ban) should be considered to delay virus introduction in such settings.

Analysis of seven SARS-CoV-2 rapid antigen tests in detecting omicron (B.1.1.529) versus delta (B.1.617.2) using cell culture supernatants and clinical specimens.

PURPOSE: Omicron is rapidly spreading as a new SARS-CoV-2 variant of concern (VOC). The question whether this new variant has an impact on SARS-CoV-2 rapid antigen test (RAT) performance is of utmost importance. To obtain an initial estimate regarding differences of RATs in detecting omicron and delta, seven commonly used SARS-CoV-2 RATs from different manufacturers were analysed using cell culture supernatants and clinical specimens. METHODS: For this purpose, cell culture-expanded omicron and delta preparations were serially diluted in Dulbecco's modified Eagle's Medium (DMEM) and the Limit of Detection (LoD) for both VOCs was determined. Additionally, clinical specimens stored in viral transport media or saline (n = 51) were investigated to complement in vitro results with cell culture supernatants. Ct values and RNA concentrations were determined via quantitative reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-qPCR). RESULTS: The in vitro determination of the LoD showed no obvious differences in detection of omicron and delta for the RATs examined. The LoD in this study was at a dilution level of 1:1,000 (corresponding to 3.0-5.6 × 106 RNA copies/mL) for tests I-V and at a dilution level of 1:100 (corresponding to 3.7-4.9 × 107 RNA copies/mL) for tests VI and VII. Based on clinical specimens, no obvious differences were observed between RAT positivity rates when comparing omicron to delta in this study setting. Overall positivity rates varied between manufacturers with 30-81% for omicron and 42-71% for delta. Test VII was only conducted in vitro with cell culture supernatants for feasibility reasons. In the range of Ct < 23, positivity rates were 50-100% for omicron and 67-93% for delta. CONCLUSION: In this study, RATs from various manufacturers were investigated, which displayed no obvious differences in terms of analytical LoD in vitro and RAT positivity rates based on clinical samples comparing the VOCs omicron and delta. However, differences between tests produced by various manufacturers were detected. In terms of clinical samples, a focus of this study was on specimens with high virus concentrations. Further systematic, clinical and laboratory studies utilizing large datasets are urgently needed to confirm reliable performance in terms of sensitivity and specificity for all individual RATs and SARS-CoV-2 variants.

In Vitro Rapid Antigen Test Performance with the SARS-CoV-2 Variants of Concern B.1.1.7 (Alpha), B.1.351 (Beta), P.1 (Gamma), and B.1.617.2 (Delta).

Rapid antigen tests (RATs) are an integral part of SARS-CoV-2 containment strategies. As emerging variants of concern (VOCs) displace the initially circulating strains, it is crucial that RATs do not fail to detect these new variants. In this study, four RATs for nasal swab testing were investigated using cultured strains of B.1.1 (non-VOC), B.1.1.7 (Alpha), B.1.351 (Beta), P.1 (Gamma), and B.1.617.2 (Delta). Based on dilution series in cell culture medium and pooled saliva, the limit of detection of these RATs was determined in a laboratory setting. Further investigations on cross-reactivity were conducted using recombinant N-protein from seasonal human coronaviruses (hCoVs). RATs evaluated showed an overall comparable performance with cultured strains of the non-VOC B.1.1 and the VOCs Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Delta. No cross-reactivity was detected with recombinant N-protein of the hCoV strains HKU1, OC43, NL63, and 229E. A continuous evaluation of SARS-CoV-2 RAT performance is required, especially with regard to evolving mutations. Moreover, cross-reactivity and interference with pathogens and other substances on the test performance of RATs should be consistently investigated to ensure suitability in the context of SARS-CoV-2 containment.

[Air and maritime transport during the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany: challenges for the public health service]. / Flug- und Schiffsverkehr während der COVID-19-Pandemie in Deutschland: Herausforderungen für den Öffentlichen Gesundheitsdienst.

COVID-19 has been challenging our society since January 2020. Due to global travel, the new coronavirus has rapidly spread worldwide. This article aims to provide an overview of the challenges in implementing measures in the air and maritime transport sector from the perspective of the German Public Health Service (Öffentlicher Gesundheitsdienst, ÖGD). Significant events and measures for air and maritime transport between January and August 2020 were selected. Lessons learned are discussed.During the COVID-19 pandemic, the ÖGD has been operating in a field of tension between the dynamics of scientific knowledge, political decision-making, social acceptance and consent.There are specific challenges at points of entry such as airports and seaports. These include staff shortages and the need to implement measures with a high organisational effort at very short notice such as health authority passenger checks carried out on aircraft, the establishment of test centres at points of entry and control of compliance with quarantine measures. Aggravating the situation, passenger lists, which are necessary for effective contact tracing, are often not available or incomplete. There is also a lack of digital tools for contact tracing but also, for example, the exchange of personal data within the ÖGD. Further difficulties in outbreak management arise from the cramped conditions on board ships and from the potential psychological stress on crew members and passengers, which have not yet been sufficiently considered.In view of all these challenges, it is paramount to strengthen the German Public Health Service in general and at points of entry and to intensify the exchange between the national, federal state and local levels.

Investigation of a COVID-19 outbreak in Germany resulting from a single travel-associated primary case: a case series.

BACKGROUND: In December, 2019, the newly identified severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in Wuhan, China, causing COVID-19, a respiratory disease presenting with fever, cough, and often pneumonia. WHO has set the strategic objective to interrupt spread of SARS-CoV-2 worldwide. An outbreak in Bavaria, Germany, starting at the end of January, 2020, provided the opportunity to study transmission events, incubation period, and secondary attack rates. METHODS: A case was defined as a person with SARS-CoV-2 infection confirmed by RT-PCR. Case interviews were done to describe timing of onset and nature of symptoms and to identify and classify contacts as high risk (had cumulative face-to-face contact with a confirmed case for ≥15 min, direct contact with secretions or body fluids of a patient with confirmed COVID-19, or, in the case of health-care workers, had worked within 2 m of a patient with confirmed COVID-19 without personal protective equipment) or low risk (all other contacts). High-risk contacts were ordered to stay at home in quarantine for 14 days and were actively followed up and monitored for symptoms, and low-risk contacts were tested upon self-reporting of symptoms. We defined fever and cough as specific symptoms, and defined a prodromal phase as the presence of non-specific symptoms for at least 1 day before the onset of specific symptoms. Whole genome sequencing was used to confirm epidemiological links and clarify transmission events where contact histories were ambiguous; integration with epidemiological data enabled precise reconstruction of exposure events and incubation periods. Secondary attack rates were calculated as the number of cases divided by the number of contacts, using Fisher's exact test for the 95% CIs. FINDINGS: Patient 0 was a Chinese resident who visited Germany for professional reasons. 16 subsequent cases, often with mild and non-specific symptoms, emerged in four transmission generations. Signature mutations in the viral genome occurred upon foundation of generation 2, as well as in one case pertaining to generation 4. The median incubation period was 4·0 days (IQR 2·3-4·3) and the median serial interval was 4·0 days (3·0-5·0). Transmission events were likely to have occurred presymptomatically for one case (possibly five more), at the day of symptom onset for four cases (possibly five more), and the remainder after the day of symptom onset or unknown. One or two cases resulted from contact with a case during the prodromal phase. Secondary attack rates were 75·0% (95% CI 19·0-99·0; three of four people) among members of a household cluster in common isolation, 10·0% (1·2-32·0; two of 20) among household contacts only together until isolation of the patient, and 5·1% (2·6-8·9; 11 of 217) among non-household, high-risk contacts. INTERPRETATION: Although patients in our study presented with predominately mild, non-specific symptoms, infectiousness before or on the day of symptom onset was substantial. Additionally, the incubation period was often very short and false-negative tests occurred. These results suggest that although the outbreak was controlled, successful long-term and global containment of COVID-19 could be difficult to achieve. FUNDING: All authors are employed and all expenses covered by governmental, federal state, or other publicly funded institutions.