The positivity bias in aging: Motivation or degradation?

The question of an emotional memory enhancement in aging, and of a positivity bias in particular, has been the subject of numerous empirical studies in the last decade. However, the roots of such positive preference are not yet well established. Partisans of a motivation-based perspective contend with those arguing that positivity is related to a cognitive or neural degradation. The aim of this study was to introduce some elements concerning positivity effect in aging. We compared immediate (i.e., immediate recall) versus delayed (i.e., delayed recall and recognition) emotional memory performance in 38 young adults, 39 old adults, 37 very old adults, and 41 Alzheimer's disease patients. Moreover, we manipulated the encoding instruction: Either participants received no particular processing instruction, or they had to process the material in a semantic way. The results indicated that the positivity bias is most likely to occur in individuals whose cognitive functions are preserved, after long retention delay, and in experimental conditions that do not constrain encoding. We concluded by highlighting that although these findings seem to be better in line with the motivation, rather than the degradation, perspective, they do not fully support either theory. (PsycINFO Database Record

Self-reference effect on memory in healthy aging, mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease: Influence of identity valence.

The self-reference effect (SRE) has been shown to benefit episodic memory in healthy individuals. In healthy aging, its preservation is acknowledged, but in Alzheimer's disease (AD), the jury is still out. Furthermore, there has yet to be a study of the SRE in amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI). As self-reference implies subjective self-representations, and positive information enhance memory performance, we set out to examine the effects of 1) material and 2) identity valence on the SRE across the early stages of AD. Twenty healthy older individuals and 40 patients (20 diagnosed with aMCI and 20 diagnosed with mild AD) performed a memory task. Participants had to judge positive and negative personality trait adjectives with reference to themselves or to another person, or else process these adjectives semantically. We then administered a recognition task. Participants also completed a questionnaire on identity valence. Among healthy older individuals, the SRE benefited episodic memory independently of material and identity valence. By contrast, among aMCI patients, we only observed the SRE when the material was positive. When self-referential material was negative, patients' performance depended on the valence of their self-representations: negative self-representations correlated with poor recognition of negative self-referential adjectives. Finally, performance of patients with mild AD by condition and material valence were too low and inappropriate to be subjected to relevant analyses. The persistence of an SRE for positive adjectives in aMCI suggests the existence of a positivity effect for self-related information, which contributes to wellbeing. The absence of an SRE for negative adjectives, which led aMCI patients to dismiss negative self-related information, could be due to low self-esteem. These results corroborate the mnenic neglect model and point out the importance of the psychoaffective dimension in patients with aMCI, which could constitute a major factor for the preservation of their self-esteem and self-related memory.

The semantic and episodic subcomponents of famous person knowledge: dissociation in healthy subjects.

Fifty-two subjects between ages 40 and 79 years were administered a questionnaire assessing their ability to recall semantic information about famous people from 4 different decades and to recollect its episodic source of acquisition together with autonoetic consciousness via the remember-know paradigm. In addition, they underwent a battery of standardized neuropsychological tests to assess episodic and semantic memory and executive functions. The analyses of age reveal differences for the episodic source score but no differences between age groups for the semantic scores within each decade. Regardless of the age of people, the analyses also show that semantic memory subcomponents of the famous person test are highly associated with each other as well as with the source component. The recall of semantic information on the famous person test relies on participants' semantic abilities, whereas the recall of its episodic source depends on their executive functions. The present findings confirm the existence of an episodic-semantic distinction in knowledge about famous people. They provide further evidence that personal source and semantic information are at once distinct and highly interactive within the framework of remote memory.