A myeloid program associated with COVID-19 severity is decreased by therapeutic blockade of IL-6 signaling.

Altered myeloid inflammation and lymphopenia are hallmarks of severe infections. We identified the upregulated EN-RAGE gene program in airway and blood myeloid cells from patients with acute lung injury from SARS-CoV-2 or other causes across 7 cohorts. This program was associated with greater clinical severity and predicted future mechanical ventilation and death. EN-RAGEhi myeloid cells express features consistent with suppressor cell functionality, including low HLA-DR and high PD-L1. Sustained EN-RAGE program expression in airway and blood myeloid cells correlated with clinical severity and increasing expression of T cell dysfunction markers. IL-6 upregulated many EN-RAGE program genes in monocytes in vitro. IL-6 signaling blockade by tocilizumab in a placebo-controlled clinical trial led to rapid normalization of EN-RAGE and T cell gene expression. This identifies IL-6 as a key driver of myeloid dysregulation associated with worse clinical outcomes in COVID-19 patients and provides insights into shared pathophysiological mechanisms in non-COVID-19 ARDS.

Effect of Financial Bonus Size, Loss Aversion, and Increased Social Pressure on Physician Pay-for-Performance: A Randomized Clinical Trial and Cohort Study.

Importance: Despite limited effectiveness of pay-for-performance (P4P), payers continue to expand P4P nationally. Objective: To test whether increasing bonus size or adding the behavioral economic principles of increased social pressure (ISP) or loss aversion (LA) improves the effectiveness of P4P. Design, Setting, and Participants: Parallel studies conducted from January 1 to December 31, 2016, consisted of a randomized clinical trial with patients cluster-randomized by practice site to an active control group (larger bonus size [LBS] only) or to groups with 1 of 2 behavioral economic interventions added and a cohort study comparing changes in outcomes among patients of physicians receiving an LBS with outcomes in propensity-matched physicians not receiving an LBS. A total of 8118 patients attributed to 66 physicians with 1 of 5 chronic conditions were treated at Advocate HealthCare, an integrated health system in Illinois. Data were analyzed using intention to treat and multiple imputation from February 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. Interventions: Physician participants received an LBS increased by a mean of $3355 per physician (LBS-only group); prefunded incentives to elicit LA and an LBS; or increasing proportion of a P4P bonus determined by group performance from 30% to 50% (ISP) and an LBS. Main Outcomes and Measures: The proportion of 20 evidence-based quality measures achieved at the patient level. Results: A total of 86 physicians were eligible for the randomized trial. Of these, 32 were excluded because they did not have unique attributed patients. Fifty-four physicians were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups, and 33 physicians (54.5% male; mean [SD] age, 57 [10] years) and 3747 patients (63.6% female; mean [SD] age, 64 [18] years) were included in the final analysis. Nine physicians and 864 patients were randomized to the LBS-only group, 13 physicians and 1496 patients to the LBS plus ISP group, and 11 physicians and 1387 patients to the LBS plus LA group. Physician characteristics did not differ significantly by arm, such as mean (SD) physician age ranging from 56 (9) to 59 (9) years, and sex (6 [46.2%] to 6 [66.7%] male). No differences were found between the LBS-only and the intervention groups (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] for LBS plus LA vs LBS-only, 0.86 [95% CI, 0.65-1.15; P = .31]; aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS-only, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.64-1.42; P = .81]; and aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS plus LA, 1.10 [95% CI, 0.75-1.61; P = .62]). Increased bonus size was associated with a greater increase in evidence-based care relative to the comparison group (risk-standardized absolute difference-in-differences, 3.2 percentage points; 95% CI, 1.9-4.5 percentage points; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: Increased bonus size was associated with significantly improved quality of care relative to a comparison group. Adding ISP and opportunities for LA did not improve quality. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02634879.

National Representativeness Of Hospitals And Markets In Medicare's Mandatory Bundled Payment Program.

In 2016 Medicare implemented its first mandatory alternative payment model, the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) program, in which the agency pays clinicians and hospitals a fixed amount for services provided in hip and knee replacement surgery episodes. Medicare made CJR mandatory, rather than voluntary, to produce generalizable evidence on what results Medicare might expect if it scaled bundled payment up nationally. However, it is unknown how markets and hospitals in CJR compare to others nationwide, particularly with respect to baseline quality and spending performance and the structural hospital characteristics associated with early savings in CJR. Using data from Medicare, the American Hospital Association, and the Health Resources and Services Administration, we found differences in structural market and hospital characteristics but largely similar baseline hospital episode quality and spending. Our findings suggest that despite heterogeneity in hospital characteristics associated with early savings in CJR, Medicare might nonetheless reasonably expect similar results by scaling CJR up to additional urban markets and increasing total program coverage to areas in which 71 percent of its beneficiaries reside. In contrast, different policy designs may be needed to extend market-level programs to other regions or enable different hospital types to achieve savings from bundled payment reimbursement.

Persistence and Drivers of High-Cost Status Among Dual-Eligible Medicare and Medicaid Beneficiaries: An Observational Study.

Background: Little is known about the persistence of high-cost status among dual-eligible Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, who account for a substantial proportion of expenditures in both programs. Objective: To determine what proportion of this population has persistently high costs. Design: Observational study. Setting: Medicare-Medicaid Linked Enrollee Analytic Data Source data for 2008 to 2010. Participants: 1 928 340 dual-eligible Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries who were alive all 3 years. Measurements: Medicare and Medicaid payments for these beneficiaries were calculated for each year. Beneficiaries were categorized as high-cost for a given year if their spending was in the top 10% for that year. Differences in spending were then examined for those who were persistently high-cost (all 3 years) versus those who were transiently high-cost (2008 but not 2009 or 2010) and those who were non-high-cost in all 3 years. Results: In the first year, 192 835 patients were high-cost. More than half (54.8%) remained high-cost across all 3 years. These patients were younger than transiently high-cost patients, with fewer medical comorbidities and greater intellectual impairment. Persistently high-cost patients spent $161 224 per year compared with $86 333 per year for transiently high-cost patients and $22 352 per year for non-high-cost patients. Most of the spending among persistently high-cost patients (68.8%) was related to long-term care, and very little (<1%) was related to potentially preventable hospitalizations for ambulatory care-sensitive conditions. Limitation: Potential misclassification of preventable spending and lack of detailed clinical data in administrative claims. Conclusion: A substantial majority of high-cost dual-eligible beneficiaries had persistently high costs over 3 years, with most of the cost related to long-term care and very little related to potentially preventable hospitalizations. Primary Funding Source: Peterson Center on Healthcare.

Association of Hospital Participation in a Medicare Bundled Payment Program With Volume and Case Mix of Lower Extremity Joint Replacement Episodes.

Importance: Medicare's Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative for lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR) surgery has been associated with a reduction in episode spending and stable-to-improved quality. However, BPCI may create unintended effects by prompting participating hospitals to increase the overall volume of episodes paid for by Medicare, which could potentially eliminate program-related savings or prompt them to shift case mix to lower-risk patients. Objective: To evaluate whether hospital BPCI participation for LEJR was associated with changes in overall volume and case mix. Design, Setting, and Participants: Observational study using Medicare claims data and a difference-in-differences method to compare 131 markets (hospital referral regions) with at least 1 BPCI participant hospital (n = 322) and 175 markets with no participating hospitals (n = 1340), accounting for 580 043 Medicare beneficiaries treated before (January 2011-September 2013) and 462 161 after (October 2013-December 2015) establishing the BPCI initiative. Hospital-level case-mix changes were assessed by comparing 265 participating hospitals with a 1:1 propensity-matched set of nonparticipating hospitals from non-BPCI markets. Exposures: Hospital BPCI participation. Main Outcomes and Measures: Changes in market-level LEJR volume in the before vs after BPCI periods and changes in hospital-level case mix based on demographic, socioeconomic, clinical, and utilization factors. Results: Among the 1 717 243 Medicare beneficiaries who underwent LEJR (mean age, 75 years; 64% women; and 95% nonblack race/ethnicity), BPCI participation was not significantly associated with a change in overall market-level volume. The mean quarterly market volume in non-BPCI markets increased 3.8% from 3.8 episodes per 1000 beneficiaries before BPCI to 3.9 episodes per 1000 beneficiaries after BPCI was launched. For BPCI markets, the mean quarterly market volume increased 4.4% from 3.6 episodes per 1000 beneficiaries before BPCI to 3.8 episodes per 1000 beneficiaries after BPCI was launched. The adjusted difference-in-differences estimate between the market types was 0.32% (95% CI, -0.06% to 0.69%; P = .10). Among 20 demographic, socioeconomic, clinical, and utilization factors, BPCI participation was associated with differential changes in hospital-level case mix for only 1 factor, prior skilled nursing facility use (adjusted difference-in-differences estimate, -0.53%; 95% CI, -0.96% to -0.10%; P = .01) in BPCI vs non-BPCI markets. Conclusions and Relevance: In this observational study of Medicare beneficiaries who underwent LEJR, hospital participation in Bundled Payments for Care Improvement was not associated with changes in market-level lower extremity joint replacement volume and largely was not associated with changes in hospital case mix. These findings may provide reassurance regarding 2 potential unintended effects associated with bundled payments for LEJR.

Comparison Of Hospitals Participating In Medicare's Voluntary And Mandatory Orthopedic Bundle Programs.

We analyzed data from Medicare and the American Hospital Association Annual Survey to compare characteristics and baseline performance among hospitals in Medicare's voluntary (Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative, or BPCI) and mandatory (Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model, or CJR) joint replacement bundled payment programs. BPCI hospitals had higher mean patient volume and were larger and more teaching intensive than were CJR hospitals, but the two groups had similar risk exposure and baseline episode quality and cost. BPCI hospitals also had higher cost attributable to institutional postacute care, largely driven by inpatient rehabilitation facility cost. These findings suggest that while both voluntary and mandatory approaches can play a role in engaging hospitals in bundled payment, mandatory programs can produce more robust, generalizable evidence. Either mandatory or additional targeted voluntary programs may be required to engage more hospitals in bundled payment programs.

Has development assistance for health facilitated the rise of more peaceful societies in sub-Saharan Africa?

Growing evidence suggests that health aid can serve humanitarian and diplomatic ends. This study utilised the Fragile States Index (FSI) for the 47 nations of the World Health Organizations' Africa region for the years 2005-2014 and data on health and non-health development aid spending from the United States (US) for those same years. Absolute amounts of health and non-health aid flows from the US were used as predictors of state fragility. We used time-lagged, fixed-effects multivariable regression modelling with change in FSI as the outcome of interest. The highest quartile of US health aid per capita spending (≥$4.00 per capita) was associated with a large and immediate decline in level of state fragility (b = -7.57; 95% CI, -14.6 to -0.51, P = 0.04). A dose-response effect was observed in the primary analysis, with increasing levels of spending associated with greater declines in fragility. Health per-capita expenditures were correlated with improved fragility scores across all lagged intervals and spending quartiles. The association of US health aid with immediate improvements in metrics of state stability across sub-Saharan Africa is a novel finding. This effect is possibly explained by our observations that relative to non-health aid, US health expenditures were larger and more targeted.

Characteristics and spending patterns of high cost, non-elderly adults in Massachusetts.

BACKGROUND: Given that health care costs in Massachusetts continue to grow despite great efforts to contain them, we seek to understand characteristics and spending patterns of the costliest non-elderly adults in Massachusetts based on type of insurance. METHODS: We used the Massachusetts All-Payer Claims Database (APCD) from 2012 and analyzed demographics, utilization patterns and spending patterns across payers (Medicaid, Medicaid managed care, and private insurers) for high cost patients (those in the top 10% of spending) and non-high cost patients (the remaining 90%). RESULTS: We identified 3,712,045 patients between the ages of 18-64 years in Massachusetts in 2012 who met our inclusion criteria. Of this group, 8.5% had Medicaid fee-for-service, 11.1% had Medicaid managed care, and 80.3% had private insurance. High cost patients accounted for 65% of total spending in our sample. We found that high cost patients were more likely to be older (median age 48 vs 40, p<0.001), female (60.2% vs. 51.2%, p<0.001), and have multiple chronic conditions (4.4 vs. 1.3, p<0.001) compared to non-high cost patient patients. Medicaid patients were the most likely to be designated high cost (18.1%) followed by Medicaid managed care (MCO) (13.9%) and private insurance (8.6%). High cost Medicaid patients also had the highest mean annual spending and incurred the most preventable spending compared to high cost MCO and high cost private insurance patients. CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS: We used 2012 claims data from Massachusetts to examine characteristics and spending patterns of the state's costliest patients based on type of insurance. Providers and policymakers seeking to reduce costs and increase value under delivery system reform may wish to target the Medicaid population.

Provider-Offered Medicare Advantage Plans: Recent Growth And Care Quality.

Hospitals and health systems are increasingly offering their own insurance products, a type of consolidation known as "vertical integration." The relationship between plan-provider vertical integration and quality of care has not been examined extensively or over time. We created a new data set of all vertically integrated Medicare Advantage contracts operating in the period 2011-15 and tracked their characteristics and quality over time. While the percentage of vertically integrated contracts increased slightly between 2011 and 2015, the percentage of all Medicare Advantage enrollees in them declined from 24.4 percent to 22.0 percent. Vertically integrated contracts generally were of higher quality than other contracts, with the largest differences related to enrollee satisfaction. These findings provide the first detailed, longitudinal look at vertically integrated Medicare Advantage plan enrollment and quality.