When experts matter: Variations in consensus messaging for vaccine and genetically modified organism safety.

Does consensus messaging about contested science issues influence perceptions of consensus and/or personal beliefs? This question remains open, particularly for topics other than climate change and samples outside the United States. In a Spanish national sample (N = 5087), we use preregistered survey experiments to examine differential efficacy of variations in consensus messaging for vaccines and genetically modified organisms. We find that no variation of consensus messaging influences vaccine beliefs. For genetically modified organisms, about which misperceptions are particularly prevalent in our sample, we find that scientific consensus messaging increases perception of consensus and personal belief that genetically modified organisms are safe, and decreases support for a ban. Increasing degree of consensus did not have consistent effects. Although individual differences (e.g. a conspiratorial worldview) predict these genetically modified organism beliefs, they do not undercut consensus message effects. While we observe relatively modest effect sizes, consensus messaging may be able to improve the accuracy of beliefs about some contentious topics.

How orientations to expertise condition the acceptance of (mis)information.

This review explores psychological barriers to the acceptance of expert guidance. Specifically, the constructs of epistemic overconfidence, institutional distrust, anti-expert sentiments, anti-establishment orientations, science populism, and conspiracist worldviews are jointly considered as orientations to expertise. I review the state of the literature on their origins, prevalence, and effects on misinformation endorsement and acceptance of corrections. Addressing these psychological barriers requires building trust in institutions, backed by transparent communication and the involvement of community-based, non-expert messengers. As the review synthesizes disparate research strands, it underscores the need for future studies to compare, validate, and consolidate different orientations to expertise, understand causal relationships, and explore generalizability to diverse contexts.

Correlates of support for international vaccine solidarity during the COVID-19 pandemic: Cross-sectional survey evidence from Germany.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many residents of high-income countries (HICs) were eligible for COVID-19 vaccine boosters, while many residents of lower-income countries (LICs) had not yet received a first dose. HICs made some efforts to contribute to COVID-19 vaccination efforts in LICs, but these efforts were limited in scale. A new literature discusses the normative importance of an international redistribution of vaccines. Our analysis contributes an empirical perspective on the willingness of citizens in a HIC to contribute to such efforts (which we term international vaccine solidarity). We analyse the levels and predictors of international vaccine solidarity. We surveyed a representative sample of German adults (n = 2019) who participated in a two-wave YouGov online survey (w1: Sep 13-21, 2021 and w2: Oct 4-13, 2021). International vaccine solidarity is measured by asking respondents preferences for sharing vaccine supplies internationally versus using that supply as boosters for the domestic population. We examine a set of pre-registered hypotheses. Almost half of the respondents in our sample (48%) prioritize giving doses to citizens in less developed countries. A third of respondents (33%) prefer to use available doses as boosters domestically, and a fifth of respondents (19%) did not report a preference. In line with our hypotheses, respondents higher in cosmopolitanism and empathy, and those who support domestic redistribution exhibit more support for international dose-sharing. Older respondents (who might be more at risk) do not consistently show less support for vaccine solidarity. These results help us to get a better understanding of the way citizens' form preferences about a mechanism that redistributes medical supplies internationally during a global crisis.

Vaccine attributes and vaccine uptake in Hungary: evidence from a conjoint experiment.

BACKGROUND: In an ongoing public health crisis, the question of why some people are unwilling to take vaccines with particular attributes is an especially pertinent one, since low rates of vaccination mean that it will take longer for many nations to exit the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. METHODS: In this article, we conduct a pre-registered conjoint experiment in Hungary (N = 2512), where respondents were asked about their attitudes towards hypothetical COVID-19 vaccines whose characteristics varied across a number of attributes. RESULTS: Results indicate that vaccine attributes matter for the likelihood of uptake when it comes to the prevalence of severe side effects, efficacy and country of origin. Moreover, we find that our pre-treatment measure of institutional trust moderates the effect of our treatment, as differences in vaccine attributes are larger for those with robust levels of institutional trust compared to those with weaker levels. CONCLUSION: Our findings suggest that institutional trust matters when it comes to understanding the relationship between vaccine attributes and likelihood of uptake.

Partisanship and anti-elite worldviews as correlates of science and health beliefs in the multi-party system of Spain.

In a national sample of 5087 Spaniards, we examine the prevalence of 10 specific misperceptions over five separate science and health domains (climate change, 5G technology, genetically modified foods, vaccines, and homeopathy). We find that misperceptions about genetically modified foods and general health risks of 5G technology are particularly widespread. While we find that partisan affiliation is not strongly associated with any of the misperceptions aside from climate change, we find that two distinct dimensions of an anti-elite worldview-anti-expert and conspiratorial mindsets-are better overall predictors of having science and health misperceptions in the Spanish context. These findings help extend our understanding of polarization around science beyond the most common contexts (e.g. the United States) and support recent work suggesting anti-elite sentiments are among the most important predictors of factual misperceptions.

Stamping the vaccine passport? Public support for lifting COVID-19 related restrictions for vaccinated citizens in France, Germany, and Sweden.

During theCOVID-19pandemic,manycountries implementedrestrictionsto limit the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (e.g. travel restrictions and lockdowns).One path to loosening restrictions is to do so selectively only for vaccinated individuals (e.g. by implementing vaccine passports domestically or as a prerequisite for international travel).Setting different rules based on people's vaccination statusis howevera contentious issue among health policy experts, government officials, and the public. Our analysis focuses on the levels and correlates of public support for the lifting of restrictions for the vaccinatedin April 2021, i.e. at a time when restrictions were in place and aselective lifting of these restrictions just for the vaccinatedwas debated in Europe.We use representative quota samples of the populations of France (N = 1,752), Germany (N = 1,759), and Sweden (N = 1,754). We find that a slight plurality support lifting restrictions for the vaccinated in France and Germany but not in Sweden. Vaccine hesitancy emerges as strong predictor of opposition to such a policy. Additionally, individuals who are already vaccinated (in France and Germany) and who are higher in risk-seeking express more support for the lifting of restrictions for the vaccinated. We discuss implications for the debate on vaccine passports.

Which vaccine attributes foster vaccine uptake? A cross-country conjoint experiment.

Why do people prefer one particular COVID-19 vaccine over another? We conducted a pre-registered conjoint experiment (n = 5,432) in France, Germany, and Sweden in which respondents rated the favorability of and chose between pairs of hypothetical COVID-19 vaccines. Differences in effectiveness and the prevalence of side-effects had the largest effects on vaccine preferences. Factors with smaller effects include country of origin (respondents are less favorable to vaccines of Chinese and Russian origin), and vaccine technology (respondents exhibited a small preference for hypothetical mRNA vaccines). The general public also exhibits sensitivity to additional factors (e.g. how expensive the vaccines are). Our data show that vaccine attributes are more important for vaccine preferences among those with higher vaccine favorability and higher risk tolerance. In our conjoint design, vaccine attributes-including effectiveness and side-effect prevalence-appear to have more muted effects among the most vaccine hesitant respondents. The prevalence of side-effects, effectiveness, country of origin and vaccine technology (e.g., mRNA vaccines) determine vaccine acceptance, but they matter little among the vaccine hesitant. Vaccine hesitant people do not find a vaccine more attractive even if it has the most favorable attributes. While the communication of vaccine attributes is important, it is unlikely to convince those who are most vaccine hesitant to get vaccinated.

The politics of vaccine hesitancy in Europe.

BACKGROUND: Vaccine hesitancy threatens public health. Some evidence suggests that vaccine hesitancy in Europe may be linked with the success of populist parties, but more systematic analysis is needed. METHODS: We examine the prevalence of individual-level vaccine hesitancy across the European Union (EU) and its association with political orientations. We also analyze whether success of populist parties is linked with vaccine hesitancy and uptake. We draw on individual-level Eurobarometer data from 2019, with a total of 27 524 respondents across the EU. We also rely on national and regional-level populist party vote shares. Finally, for a time-series analysis, we rely on aggregated populist party support as measured in the European Social Survey waves 1-9 (2002-18), and national immunization coverage rates from the WHO from 2002 to 2018. RESULTS: While vaccine hesitancy is confined to a minority of the population, this group is large enough to risk herd immunity. Political orientations on a left-right dimension are not strongly linked to vaccine hesitancy. Instead, vaccine hesitancy is associated with anti-elite world views and culturally closed rather than cosmopolitan positions. CONCLUSIONS: Vaccine hesitancy is not only present in all EU member states but also maps on broader dimensions of cultural conflict. Hesitancy is rooted in a broader worldview, rather than misperceptions about health risks. Pro-vaccine interventions need to consider the underlying worldview, rather than simply targeting misperceptions.

Association of vaccine hesitancy and immunization coverage rates in the European Union.

While previous studies have validated vaccine hesitancy scales with uptake behavior at the individual level, the conditions under which aggregated survey data are useful are less clear. We show that vaccine public opinion data aggregated at the subnational level can serve as a valid indicator of aggregate vaccine behaviour. We use a public opinion survey (Eurobarometer EB 91.2) with data on vaccine hesitancy for the EU in 2019. We link this information to (subnational) regional immunization coverage rates for childhood vaccines - DTP3, MCV1, and MCV2 -- obtained from the WHO for 2019. We conduct multilevel regression analyses with data for 177 regions in 20 countries. Given the variation in vaccine hesitancy and immunization rates between countries and within countries, we affirm the valuable role that surveys can play as a public health surveillance tool when it comes to vaccine behavior. We find statistically significantly lower regional vaccine immunization rates in regions where vaccine hesitancy is more pronounced. Our results suggest that different uptake rates across subnational regions are due, at least in part, to differences in attitudes towards vaccines and vaccination. The results are robust to several alternative specifications.

Overconfidence in news judgments is associated with false news susceptibility.

We examine the role of overconfidence in news judgment using two large nationally representative survey samples. First, we show that three in four Americans overestimate their relative ability to distinguish between legitimate and false news headlines; respondents place themselves 22 percentiles higher than warranted on average. This overconfidence is, in turn, correlated with consequential differences in real-world beliefs and behavior. We show that overconfident individuals are more likely to visit untrustworthy websites in behavioral data; to fail to successfully distinguish between true and false claims about current events in survey questions; and to report greater willingness to like or share false content on social media, especially when it is politically congenial. In all, these results paint a worrying picture: The individuals who are least equipped to identify false news content are also the least aware of their own limitations and, therefore, more susceptible to believing it and spreading it further.

A digital media literacy intervention increases discernment between mainstream and false news in the United States and India.

Widespread belief in misinformation circulating online is a critical challenge for modern societies. While research to date has focused on psychological and political antecedents to this phenomenon, few studies have explored the role of digital media literacy shortfalls. Using data from preregistered survey experiments conducted around recent elections in the United States and India, we assess the effectiveness of an intervention modeled closely on the world's largest media literacy campaign, which provided "tips" on how to spot false news to people in 14 countries. Our results indicate that exposure to this intervention reduced the perceived accuracy of both mainstream and false news headlines, but effects on the latter were significantly larger. As a result, the intervention improved discernment between mainstream and false news headlines among both a nationally representative sample in the United States (by 26.5%) and a highly educated online sample in India (by 17.5%). This increase in discernment remained measurable several weeks later in the United States (but not in India). However, we find no effects among a representative sample of respondents in a largely rural area of northern India, where rates of social media use are far lower.

Shifting medical guidelines: Compliance and spillover effects for revised antibiotic recommendations.

RATIONALE: Experts have recently argued that guidelines to take the full course of antibiotics are due for revision, instead recommending that patients stop when they feel better. It is unknown how communicating revised guidelines from medical experts about how long to take a course of antibiotics will affect beliefs, behavior, and trust in guidelines more generally. OBJECTIVE: This study seeks to understand how revisions to long standing advice impacts the beliefs, behavior, and trust toward such guidelines from medical experts. METHOD: In a pre-registered experiment, we use a national sample of UK participants (N = 1,263) to test the effects of a message that reverses the prior full-course guideline (versus a status quo message to take the full course). We also test a secondary intervention that emphasizes that medical guidance and evidence may change over time. RESULTS: Early stoppage messages significantly shifted personal beliefs and perceived expert consensus about early stoppage (a shift of 16%, 95% CI: 13.8% to 17.9%, p <.001) and behavioral intent (a shift of 19%, 95% CI: 15.3 to 21.8%, p < .001) in the intended direction. Yet, the new guideline also slightly decreased acceptance of uncertainty about future guidelines (a decrease of 2%, 95% CI: 0.2% to 3.1%, p = .022) and general intention to comply with other guidelines in the future (a decrease of 6%, 95% CI: 2.6% to 8.4%, p < .001); it did not affect perceptions of medical researchers' or doctors' credibility or respondents' epistemic efficacy. Prior belief about early stoppage did not moderate receptivity to messages. Notably, though, we also find receptivity to early stoppage messages was contingent on deference to experts. We find no effect of a secondary intervention that emphasizes that medical guidance and evidence may change over time. CONCLUSIONS: Overall, our findings suggest the (U.K.) public is likely to accept new guidelines that change long standing advice to take a full course of antibiotics. While respondents show wariness about further future revisions, these data do not show that changing guidelines undermines trust in the experts that produce them.

Proximity (Mis)perception: Public Awareness of Nuclear, Refinery, and Fracking Sites.

Whether on grounds of perceived safety, aesthetics, or overall quality of life, residents may wish to be aware of nearby energy sites such as nuclear reactors, refineries, and fracking wells. Yet people are not always accurate in their impressions of proximity. Indeed, our data show that only 54% of Americans living within 25 miles of a nuclear site say they do, and even fewer fracking-proximal (30%) and refinery-proximal (24%) residents respond accurately. In this article, we analyze factors that could either help people form more accurate perceptions or distort their impressions of proximity. We evaluate these hypotheses using a large national survey sample and corresponding geographic information system (GIS) data. Results show that among those living in close proximity to energy sites, those who perceive greater risk are less likely to report living nearby. Conversely, social contact with employees of these industries increases perceived proximity regardless of actual distance. These relationships are consistent across each site type we examine. Other potential factors-such as local news use-may play a role in proximity perception on a case-by-case basis. Our findings are an important step toward a more generalizable understanding of how the public forms perceptions of proximity to risk sites, showing multiple potential mechanisms of bias.

High-status lobbyists are most likely to overrate their success.

Overconfidence helps individuals reach higher status within social groups by making them seem more competent regardless of objective ability, so this bias may be especially prevalent among status-oriented members of elite communities. Based on this premise, we explore whether lobbyists in the USA misperceive their success. Using models that (1) control for legislative outcome when predicting self-assessed policy success and (2) compare self-assessed policy success on specific proposals against the average success reported by all lobbyists working on the same side of an issue, we identify systematic tendencies to overrate achievements. Lobbyists with higher incomes, who reside in Washington, DC, USA, have congressional experience and who engage in a broader range of activities are more likely to overrate their success. Public interest group lobbyists tend to underestimate success. We conclude that political elites are subject to the same biases as others when evaluating their performance, and these biases may be largely status-driven.

Conversion messages and attitude change: Strong arguments, not costly signals.

A conversion narrative recounts the process that led the speaker to reject one belief for a different, usually incompatible, alternative. However, researchers know little about whether, when, and, if so, how such messages affect audience attitudes about controversial science. Using a general US population-sample experiment, we assessed the attitudinal impact of three versions of a statement by Mark Lynas, an environmental activist who converted from opposing to championing genetically modified crops. Participants were exposed to (1) a one-sided pro-genetically modified message by Lynas, (2) a two-sided pro-genetically modified message in which Lynas indicates but does not detail his conversion, or (3) a two-sided pro-genetically modified message in which Lynas explains the process that prompted his conversion. We find that his conversion messages influenced attitudes by way of perceived argument strength, but not speaker credibility. This finding implies such messages induce greater elaboration, which may lead to durable attitudes that predict behavior.

Not Just Asking Questions: Effects of Implicit and Explicit Conspiracy Information About Vaccines and Genetic Modification.

While conspiracy ideation has attracted overdue attention from social scientists in recent years, little work focuses on how different pro-conspiracy messages affect the take-up of conspiracy beliefs. In this study, we compare the effect of explicit and implicit conspiracy cues on the adoption of conspiracy beliefs. We also examine whether corrective information can undo conspiracy cues, and whether there are differences in the effectiveness of corrective information based on whether a respondent received an explicit or implicit conspiracy cue. We examine these questions using a real-world but low-salience conspiracy theory concerning Zika, GM mosquitoes, and vaccines. Using a preregistered experiment (N = 1018: https://osf.io/hj2pw/), we find that both explicit and implicit conspiracy cues increase conspiracy beliefs, but in both cases corrections are generally effective. We also find reception of an explicit conspiracy cue and its correction is conditional on feelings toward the media and pharmaceutical companies. Finally, we find that examining open-ended conspiracy belief items reveals similar patterns, but with a few key differences. These findings have implications for how news media cover controversial public health issues going forward.

Immune-Modified Response Evaluation Criteria In Solid Tumors (imRECIST): Refining Guidelines to Assess the Clinical Benefit of Cancer Immunotherapy.

Purpose Treating solid tumors with cancer immunotherapy (CIT) can result in unconventional responses and overall survival (OS) benefits that are not adequately captured by Response Evaluation Criteria In Solid Tumors (RECIST) v1.1. We describe immune-modified RECIST (imRECIST) criteria, designed to better capture CIT responses. Patients and Methods Atezolizumab data from clinical trials in non-small-cell lung cancer, metastatic urothelial carcinoma, renal cell carcinoma, and melanoma were evaluated. Modifications to imRECIST versus RECIST v1.1 included allowance for best overall response after progressive disease (PD) and changes in PD definitions per new lesions (NLs) and nontarget lesions. imRECIST progression-free survival (PFS) did not count initial PD as an event if the subsequent scan showed disease control. OS was evaluated using conditional landmarks in patients whose PFS differed by imRECIST versus RECIST v1.1. Results The best overall response was 1% to 2% greater, the disease control rate was 8% to 13% greater, and the median PFS was 0.5 to 1.5 months longer per imRECIST versus RECIST v1.1. Extension of imRECIST PFS versus RECIST v1.1 PFS was associated with longer or similar OS. Patterns of progression analysis revealed that patients who developed NLs without target lesion (TL) progression had a similar or shorter OS compared with patients with RECIST v1.1 TL progression. Patients infrequently experienced a spike pattern (TLs increase, then decrease) but had longer OS than patients without TL reversion. Conclusion Evaluation of PFS and patterns of response and progression revealed that allowance for TL reversion from PD per imRECIST may better identify patients with OS benefit. Progression defined by the isolated appearance of NLs, however, is not associated with longer OS. These results may inform additional modifications to radiographic criteria (including imRECIST) to better reflect efficacy with CIT agents.

How (Not) to Talk on Twitter: Effects of Politicians' Tweets on Perceptions of the Twitter Environment.

Politicians' Twitter habits can vary considerably. Those who choose to use may do so as part of a broad discussion community or as a one-to-many broadcaster. Because each user sees a different mix of tweets, a politician seen by one user as interacting with the public may be seen by another as engaging in one-way communication, potentially prompting different evaluations of the politician, the ongoing discussion, or even Twitter itself. This study uses an experiment to test the effects of different engagement and framing styles in politician tweets on evaluations of the politician, other discussants, and Twitter itself. Findings suggest that politicians who use Twitter to broadcast, rather than engage with other users, not only receive worse evaluations themselves but that the negative evaluation carries over to other users discussing the same topics, as well as to evaluations of the utility of Twitter as an information source. This effect is attributed to intramedium interaction, in which reactions to one aspect of a multimedia object carry over to other aspects of the same object.

Intramedium Interaction and the Third-Person Effect: How Partisans Respond to YouTube Ads and Comments.

As digital media technologies have evolved and become more powerful, the prevalence of mixed-media content-that is, content that mixes multiple media such as text and video-has increased considerably. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than YouTube, now the Web's third most trafficked site. YouTube provides for video sharing in an environment otherwise dominated by textual titles, descriptions, and comments. As such, it is an ideal venue in which to examine the impact of intramedium interaction on message evaluation. This study uses a survey experiment to test first-person and third-person evaluations of campaign ads from the Obama and Romney campaigns, and the comments posted about them on YouTube, using two real ads and one set of fake comments. Findings suggest that partisan perceptions of the manipulated ads transfer to the constant comments, and that the contextual cue of the YouTube environment reciprocally impacts partisan evaluation of the ads themselves.

A phase II, multicenter, open-label, 3-cohort trial evaluating the efficacy and safety of vismodegib in operable basal cell carcinoma.

BACKGROUND: Vismodegib is approved for treatment of advanced basal cell carcinoma. OBJECTIVE: We sought to characterize vismodegib efficacy and safety in operable basal cell carcinoma. METHODS: Patients with new, operable, nodular basal cell carcinoma received vismodegib (150 mg/d) followed by excision and Mohs micrographic surgery to ensure clear margins. Cohort 1 received vismodegib for 12 weeks; cohort 2 received vismodegib for 12 weeks, then 24 weeks of observation before excision; and cohort 3 received vismodegib for 8 weeks on/4 weeks off/8 weeks on. RESULTS: In all, 24 patients enrolled in cohort 1, and 25 in cohorts 2 and 3. Complete histologic clearance was achieved by 42%, 16%, and 44% of patients in cohorts 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Muscle spasms (76%), alopecia (58%), and dysgeusia (50%) were the most frequent adverse events (AEs). Five (7%) patients discontinued treatment because of an AE. AE reversibility was evaluated in cohort 2 with 24 weeks of observation after treatment discontinuation. LIMITATIONS: Nonrandomized, small cohort sizes, and short observation durations for some patients are limitations. CONCLUSION: Primary efficacy end points were not met (predefined complete histologic clearance rate: >50% in cohorts 1 and 3; >30% in cohort 2). Safety was comparable when dosed continuously versus intermittently. Posttreatment reversibility of vismodegib-related AEs was demonstrated.