A pre-registered, multi-lab non-replication of the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE).

The Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) is a well-known demonstration of the role of motor activity in the comprehension of language. Participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences by producing movements toward the body or away from the body. The ACE is the finding that movements are faster when the direction of the movement (e.g., toward) matches the direction of the action in the to-be-judged sentence (e.g., Art gave you the pen describes action toward you). We report on a pre-registered, multi-lab replication of one version of the ACE. The results show that none of the 18 labs involved in the study observed a reliable ACE, and that the meta-analytic estimate of the size of the ACE was essentially zero.

Extraordinary claims, extraordinary evidence? A discussion.

Roberts (2020, Learning & Behavior, 48[2], 191-192) discussed research claiming honeybees can do arithmetic. Some readers of this research might regard such claims as unlikely. The present authors used this example as a basis for a debate on the criterion that ought to be used for publication of results or conclusions that could be viewed as unlikely by a significant number of readers, editors, or reviewers.

Beyond Statistical Ritual: Theory in Psychological Science.

More than 40 years ago, Paul Meehl (1978) published a seminal critique of the state of theorizing in psychological science. According to Meehl, the quality of theories had diminished in the preceding decades, resulting in statistical methods standing in for theoretical rigor. In this introduction to the special issue Theory in Psychological Science, we apply Meehl's account to contemporary psychological science. We suggest that by the time of Meehl's writing, psychology found itself in the midst of a crisis that is typical of maturing sciences, in which the theories that had been guiding research were gradually cast into doubt. Psychologists were faced with the same general choice when worldviews fail: Face reality and pursue knowledge in the absence of certainty, or shift emphasis toward sources of synthetic certainty. We suggest that psychologists have too often chosen the latter option, substituting synthetic certainties for theory-guided research, in much the same manner as Scholastic scholars did centuries ago. Drawing from our contributors, we go on to make recommendations for how psychological science may fully reengage with theory-based science.

Bayesian inference for psychology. Part II: Example applications with JASP.

Bayesian hypothesis testing presents an attractive alternative to p value hypothesis testing. Part I of this series outlined several advantages of Bayesian hypothesis testing, including the ability to quantify evidence and the ability to monitor and update this evidence as data come in, without the need to know the intention with which the data were collected. Despite these and other practical advantages, Bayesian hypothesis tests are still reported relatively rarely. An important impediment to the widespread adoption of Bayesian tests is arguably the lack of user-friendly software for the run-of-the-mill statistical problems that confront psychologists for the analysis of almost every experiment: the t-test, ANOVA, correlation, regression, and contingency tables. In Part II of this series we introduce JASP ( http://www.jasp-stats.org ), an open-source, cross-platform, user-friendly graphical software package that allows users to carry out Bayesian hypothesis tests for standard statistical problems. JASP is based in part on the Bayesian analyses implemented in Morey and Rouder's BayesFactor package for R. Armed with JASP, the practical advantages of Bayesian hypothesis testing are only a mouse click away.

Bayesian inference for psychology. Part I: Theoretical advantages and practical ramifications.

Bayesian parameter estimation and Bayesian hypothesis testing present attractive alternatives to classical inference using confidence intervals and p values. In part I of this series we outline ten prominent advantages of the Bayesian approach. Many of these advantages translate to concrete opportunities for pragmatic researchers. For instance, Bayesian hypothesis testing allows researchers to quantify evidence and monitor its progression as data come in, without needing to know the intention with which the data were collected. We end by countering several objections to Bayesian hypothesis testing. Part II of this series discusses JASP, a free and open source software program that makes it easy to conduct Bayesian estimation and testing for a range of popular statistical scenarios (Wagenmakers et al. this issue).

Correction to 'A Bayesian bird's eye view of 'Replications of important results in social psychology'.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160426.].

A Bayesian bird's eye view of 'Replications of important results in social psychology'.

We applied three Bayesian methods to reanalyse the preregistered contributions to the Social Psychology special issue 'Replications of Important Results in Social Psychology' (Nosek & Lakens. 2014 Registered reports: a method to increase the credibility of published results. Soc. Psychol.45, 137-141. (doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000192)). First, individual-experiment Bayesian parameter estimation revealed that for directed effect size measures, only three out of 44 central 95% credible intervals did not overlap with zero and fell in the expected direction. For undirected effect size measures, only four out of 59 credible intervals contained values greater than [Formula: see text] (10% of variance explained) and only 19 intervals contained values larger than [Formula: see text]. Second, a Bayesian random-effects meta-analysis for all 38 t-tests showed that only one out of the 38 hierarchically estimated credible intervals did not overlap with zero and fell in the expected direction. Third, a Bayes factor hypothesis test was used to quantify the evidence for the null hypothesis against a default one-sided alternative. Only seven out of 60 Bayes factors indicated non-anecdotal support in favour of the alternative hypothesis ([Formula: see text]), whereas 51 Bayes factors indicated at least some support for the null hypothesis. We hope that future analyses of replication success will embrace a more inclusive statistical approach by adopting a wider range of complementary techniques.

Bayesian analysis of factorial designs.

This article provides a Bayes factor approach to multiway analysis of variance (ANOVA) that allows researchers to state graded evidence for effects or invariances as determined by the data. ANOVA is conceptualized as a hierarchical model where levels are clustered within factors. The development is comprehensive in that it includes Bayes factors for fixed and random effects and for within-subjects, between-subjects, and mixed designs. Different model construction and comparison strategies are discussed, and an example is provided. We show how Bayes factors may be computed with BayesFactor package in R and with the JASP statistical package. (PsycINFO Database Record

Opportunity for verbalization does not improve visual change detection performance: A state-trace analysis.

Evidence suggests that there is a tendency to verbally recode visually-presented information, and that in some cases verbal recoding can boost memory performance. According to multi-component models of working memory, memory performance is increased because task-relevant information is simultaneously maintained in two codes. The possibility of dual encoding is problematic if the goal is to measure capacity for visual information exclusively. To counteract this possibility, articulatory suppression is frequently used with visual change detection tasks specifically to prevent verbalization of visual stimuli. But is this precaution always necessary? There is little reason to believe that concurrent articulation affects performance in typical visual change detection tasks, suggesting that verbal recoding might not be likely to occur in this paradigm, and if not, precautionary articulatory suppression would not always be necessary. We present evidence confirming that articulatory suppression has no discernible effect on performance in a typical visual change-detection task in which abstract patterns are briefly presented. A comprehensive analysis using both descriptive statistics and Bayesian state-trace analysis revealed no evidence for any complex relationship between articulatory suppression and performance that would be consistent with a verbal recoding explanation. Instead, the evidence favors the simpler explanation that verbal strategies were either not deployed in the task or, if they were, were not effective in improving performance, and thus have no influence on visual working memory as measured during visual change detection. We conclude that in visual change detection experiments in which abstract visual stimuli are briefly presented, pre-cautionary articulatory suppression is unnecessary.

Default "Gunel and Dickey" Bayes factors for contingency tables.

The analysis of R×C contingency tables usually features a test for independence between row and column counts. Throughout the social sciences, the adequacy of the independence hypothesis is generally evaluated by the outcome of a classical p-value null-hypothesis significance test. Unfortunately, however, the classical p-value comes with a number of well-documented drawbacks. Here we outline an alternative, Bayes factor method to quantify the evidence for and against the hypothesis of independence in R×C contingency tables. First we describe different sampling models for contingency tables and provide the corresponding default Bayes factors as originally developed by Gunel and Dickey (Biometrika, 61(3):545-557 (1974)). We then illustrate the properties and advantages of a Bayes factor analysis of contingency tables through simulations and practical examples. Computer code is available online and has been incorporated in the "BayesFactor" R package and the JASP program ( jasp-stats.org ).

What Are the Odds? Modern Relevance and Bayes Factor Solutions for MacAlister's Problem From the 1881 Educational Times.

In 1881, Donald MacAlister posed a problem in the Educational Times that remains relevant today. The problem centers on the statistical evidence for the effectiveness of a treatment based on a comparison between two proportions. A brief historical sketch is followed by a discussion of two default Bayesian solutions, one based on a one-sided test between independent rates, and one on a one-sided test between dependent rates. We demonstrate the current-day relevance of MacAlister's original question with a modern-day example about the effectiveness of an educational program.

Is There a Free Lunch in Inference?

The field of psychology, including cognitive science, is vexed by a crisis of confidence. Although the causes and solutions are varied, we focus here on a common logical problem in inference. The default mode of inference is significance testing, which has a free lunch property where researchers need not make detailed assumptions about the alternative to test the null hypothesis. We present the argument that there is no free lunch; that is, valid testing requires that researchers test the null against a well-specified alternative. We show how this requirement follows from the basic tenets of conventional and Bayesian probability. Moreover, we show in both the conventional and Bayesian framework that not specifying the alternative may lead to rejections of the null hypothesis with scant evidence. We review both frequentist and Bayesian approaches to specifying alternatives, and we show how such specifications improve inference. The field of cognitive science will benefit because consideration of reasonable alternatives will undoubtedly sharpen the intellectual underpinnings of research.

Model comparison in ANOVA.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA), the workhorse analysis of experimental designs, consists of F-tests of main effects and interactions. Yet, testing, including traditional ANOVA, has been recently critiqued on a number of theoretical and practical grounds. In light of these critiques, model comparison and model selection serve as an attractive alternative. Model comparison differs from testing in that one can support a null or nested model vis-a-vis a more general alternative by penalizing more flexible models. We argue this ability to support more simple models allows for more nuanced theoretical conclusions than provided by traditional ANOVA F-tests. We provide a model comparison strategy and show how ANOVA models may be reparameterized to better address substantive questions in data analysis.

The Peer Reviewers' Openness Initiative: incentivizing open research practices through peer review.

Openness is one of the central values of science. Open scientific practices such as sharing data, materials and analysis scripts alongside published articles have many benefits, including easier replication and extension studies, increased availability of data for theory-building and meta-analysis, and increased possibility of review and collaboration even after a paper has been published. Although modern information technology makes sharing easier than ever before, uptake of open practices had been slow. We suggest this might be in part due to a social dilemma arising from misaligned incentives and propose a specific, concrete mechanism-reviewers withholding comprehensive review-to achieve the goal of creating the expectation of open practices as a matter of scientific principle.

Calibrated Bayes Factors Should Not Be Used: A Reply to Hoijtink, van Kooten, and Hulsker.

Hoijtink, Kooten, and Hulsker ( 2016 ) present a method for choosing the prior distribution for an analysis with Bayes factor that is based on controlling error rates, which they advocate as an alternative to our more subjective methods (Morey & Rouder, 2014 ; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009 ; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011 ). We show that the method they advocate amounts to a simple significance test, and that the resulting Bayes factors are not interpretable. Additionally, their method fails in common circumstances, and has the potential to yield arbitrarily high Type II error rates. After critiquing their method, we outline the position on subjectivity that underlies our advocacy of Bayes factors.

Improving the analysis of routine outcome measurement data: what a Bayesian approach can do for you.

Since recent decades, clinicians offering interventions against mental problems must systematically collect data on how clients change over time. Since these data typically contain measurement error, statistical tests have been developed which should disentangle true changes from random error. These statistical tests can be subdivided into two types: classical tests and Bayesian tests. Over the past, there has been much confusion among analysts regarding the questions that are answered by each of these tests. In this paper we discuss each type of test in detail and explain which questions are, and which are not, answered by each of the types of tests. We then apply a test of each type on an empirical data set and compare the results. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Continued misinterpretation of confidence intervals: response to Miller and Ulrich.

Miller and Ulrich (2015) critique our claim (Hoekstra et al., Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21(5), 1157-1164, 2014), based on a survey given to researchers and students, of widespread misunderstanding of confidence intervals (CIs). They suggest that survey respondents may have interpreted the statements in the survey that we deemed incorrect in an idiosyncratic, but correct, way, thus calling into question the conclusion that the results indicate that respondents could not properly interpret CIs. Their alternative interpretations, while correct, cannot be deemed acceptable renderings of the questions in the survey due to the well-known reference class problem. Moreover, there is no support in the data for their contention that participants may have had their alternative interpretations in mind. Finally, their alternative interpretations are merely trivial restatements of the definition of a confidence interval, and have no implications for the location of a parameter.