Obesity and diffusion-weighted imaging of subcortical grey matter in young and older adults.

Obesity and hypothalamic inflammation are causally related. It is unclear whether this neuroinflammation precedes or results from obesity. Animal studies show that an increase in food intake can lead to hypothalamic inflammation, but hypothalamic inflammation can create a feedback loop that further increases food intake. Internal and external factors mediate patterns of food intake and how it can affect the hypothalamus. Measures of water diffusivity in magnetic resonance imaging of the brain such as fractional anisotropy (FA), mean diffusivity (MD), radial diffusivity (RD), axial diffusivity (AD) are associated with grey matter inflammation. Here, we investigated how those measures are associated with obesity-related variables in groups of young and older adults. We found relationships between decreased diffusivity and obesity markers in young adults. In older adults, obesity and comorbidities were also related to significant changes in diffusivity. Here, diffusivity was strongly associated with body mass index (BMI) and blood levels of C-reactive protein (CRP) in multiple subcortical regions, rather than only the hypothalamus. Our results suggest that diffusivity measures can be used to investigate obesity-associated changes in the brain that can potentially reflect neuroinflammation. The connection seen between subcortical inflammation and obesity opens the conversation on preventative interventions needed to reduce the effects of obesity at all stages in life.

Worth the Work? Monkeys Discount Rewards by a Subjective Adapting Effort Cost.

All life must solve how to allocate limited energy resources to maximize benefits from scarce opportunities. Economic theory posits decision makers optimize choice by maximizing the subjective benefit (utility) of reward minus the subjective cost (disutility) of the required effort. While successful in many settings, this model does not fully account for how experience can alter reward-effort trade-offs. Here, we test how well the subtractive model of effort disutility explains the behavior of two male nonhuman primates (Macaca mulatta) in a binary choice task in which reward quantity and physical effort to obtain were varied. Applying random utility modeling to independently estimate reward utility and effort disutility, we show the subtractive effort model better explains out-of-sample choice behavior when compared with parabolic and exponential effort discounting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that effort disutility depends on previous experience of effort: in analogy to work from behavioral labor economics, we develop a model of reference-dependent effort disutility to explain the increased willingness to expend effort following previous experience of effortful options in a session. The result of this analysis suggests that monkeys discount reward by an effort cost that is measured relative to an expected effort learned from previous trials. When this subjective cost of effort, a function of context and experience, is accounted for, trial-by-trial choices can be explained by the subtractive cost model of effort. Therefore, in searching for net utility signals that may underpin effort-based decision-making in the brain, careful measurement of subjective effort costs is an essential first step.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT All decision-makers need to consider how much effort they need to expend when evaluating potential options. Economic theories suggest that the optimal way to choose is by cost-benefit analysis of reward against effort. To be able to do this efficiently over many decision contexts, this needs to be done flexibly, with appropriate adaptation to context and experience. Therefore, in aiming to understand how this might be achieved in the brain, it is important to first carefully measure the subjective cost of effort. Here, we show monkeys make reward-effort cost-benefit decisions, subtracting the subjective cost of effort from the subjective value of rewards. Moreover, the subjective cost of effort is dependent on the monkeys' experience of effort in previous trials.

Studying neural responses for multi-component economic choices in human and non-human primates using concept-based behavioral choice experiments.

Realistic, everyday rewards contain multiple components, such as taste and size. However, our reward valuations and the associated neural reward signals are single dimensional (vector to scalar transformation). Here, we present a protocol to identify these single-dimensional neural responses for multi-component choice options in humans and monkeys using concept-based behavioral choice experiments. We describe the use of stringent economic concepts to develop and implement behavioral tasks. We detail regional neuroimaging in humans and fine-grained neurophysiology in monkeys and describe approaches for data analysis. For complete details on the use and execution of this protocol, please refer to our work on humans Seak et al.1 and Pastor-Bernier et al.2 and monkeys Pastor-Bernier et al. 3, Pastor-Bernier et al.4, and Pastor-Bernier et al.5.

Worth the work? Monkeys discount rewards by a subjective adapting effort cost.

All life must solve how to allocate limited energy resources to maximise benefits from scarce opportunities. Economic theory posits decision makers optimise choice by maximising the subjective benefit (utility) of reward minus the subjective cost (disutility) of the required effort. While successful in many settings, this model does not fully account for how experience can alter reward-effort trade-offs. Here we test how well the subtractive model of effort disutility explains the behavior of two non-human primates ( Macaca mulatta ) in a binary choice task in which reward quantity and physical effort to obtain were varied.Applying random utility modelling to independently estimate reward utility and effort disutility, we show the subtractive effort model better explains out-of-sample choice behavior when compared to parabolic and exponential effort discounting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that effort disutility is dependent on previous experience of effort: in analogy to work from behavioral labour economics, we develop a model of reference-dependent effort disutility to explain the increased willingness to expend effort following previous experience of effortful options in a session. The result of this analysis suggests that monkeys discount reward by an effort cost that is measured relative to an expected effort learned from previous trials. When this subjective cost of effort, a function of context and experience, is accounted for, trial-by-trial choice behavior can be explained by the subtractive cost model of effort.Therefore, in searching for net utility signals that may underpin effort-based decision-making in the brain, careful measurement of subjective effort costs is an essential first step. Significance: All decision-makers need to consider how much effort they need to expend when evaluating potential options. Economic theories suggest that the optimal way to choose is by cost-benefit analysis of reward against effort. To be able to do this efficiently over many decision contexts, this needs to be done flexibly, with appropriate adaptation to context and experience. Therefore, in aiming to understand how this might be achieved in the brain, it is important to first carefully measure the subjective cost of effort. Here we show monkeys make reward-effort cost-benefit decisions, subtracting the subjective cost of effort from the subjective value of rewards. Moreover, the subjective cost of effort is dependent on the monkeys’ experience of effort in previous trials.

Reward-specific satiety affects subjective value signals in orbitofrontal cortex during multicomponent economic choice.

Sensitivity to satiety constitutes a basic requirement for neuronal coding of subjective reward value. Satiety from natural ongoing consumption affects reward functions in learning and approach behavior. More specifically, satiety reduces the subjective economic value of individual rewards during choice between options that typically contain multiple reward components. The unconfounded assessment of economic reward value requires tests at choice indifference between two options, which is difficult to achieve with sated rewards. By conceptualizing choices between options with multiple reward components ("bundles"), Revealed Preference Theory may offer a solution. Despite satiety, choices against an unaltered reference bundle may remain indifferent when the reduced value of a sated bundle reward is compensated by larger amounts of an unsated reward of the same bundle, and then the value loss of the sated reward is indicated by the amount of the added unsated reward. Here, we show psychophysically titrated choice indifference in monkeys between bundles of differently sated rewards. Neuronal chosen value signals in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) followed closely the subjective value change within recording periods of individual neurons. A neuronal classifier distinguishing the bundles and predicting choice substantiated the subjective value change. The choice between conventional single rewards confirmed the neuronal changes seen with two-reward bundles. Thus, reward-specific satiety reduces subjective reward value signals in OFC. With satiety being an important factor of subjective reward value, these results extend the notion of subjective economic reward value coding in OFC neurons.

Single-Dimensional Human Brain Signals for Two-Dimensional Economic Choice Options.

Rewarding choice options typically contain multiple components, but neural signals in single brain voxels are scalar and primarily vary up or down. In a previous study, we had designed reward bundles that contained the same two milkshakes with independently set amounts; we had used psychophysics and rigorous economic concepts to estimate two-dimensional choice indifference curves (ICs) that represented revealed stochastic preferences for these bundles in a systematic, integrated manner. All bundles on the same ICs were equally revealed preferred (and thus had same utility, as inferred from choice indifference); bundles on higher ICs (higher utility) were preferred to bundles on lower ICs (lower utility). In the current study, we used the established behavior for testing with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We now demonstrate neural responses in reward-related brain structures of human female and male participants, including striatum, midbrain, and medial orbitofrontal cortex (mid-OFC) that followed the characteristic pattern of ICs: similar responses along ICs (same utility despite different bundle composition), but monotonic change across ICs (different utility). Thus, these brain structures integrated multiple reward components into a scalar signal, well beyond the known subjective value coding of single-component rewards.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Rewards have several components, like the taste and size of an apple, but it is unclear how each component contributes to the overall value of the reward. While choice indifference curves (ICs) of economic theory provide behavioral approaches to this question, it is unclear whether brain responses capture the preference and utility integrated from multiple components. We report activations in striatum, midbrain, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) that follow choice ICs representing behavioral preferences over and above variations of individual reward components. In addition, the concept-driven approach encourages future studies on natural, multicomponent rewards that are prone to irrational choice of normal and brain-damaged individuals.

Experimentally revealed stochastic preferences for multicomponent choice options.

Realistic, everyday rewards contain multiple components. An apple has taste and size. However, we choose in single dimensions, simply preferring some apples to others. How can such single-dimensional preference relationships refer to multicomponent choice options? Here, we measured how stochastic choices revealed preferences for 2-component milkshakes. The preferences were intuitively graphed as indifference curves that represented the orderly integration of the 2 components as trade-off: parts of 1 component were given up for obtaining 1 additional unit of the other component without a change in preference. The well-ordered, nonoverlapping curves satisfied leave-one-out tests, followed predictions by machine learning decoders and correlated with single-dimensional Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) auction-like bids for the 2-component rewards. This accuracy suggests a decision process that integrates multiple reward components into single-dimensional estimates in a systematic fashion. In interspecies comparisons, human performance matched that of highly experienced laboratory monkeys, as measured by accuracy of the critical trade-off between bundle components. These data describe the nature of choices of multicomponent choice options and attest to the validity of the rigorous economic concepts and their convenient graphic schemes for explaining choices of human and nonhuman primates. The results encourage formal behavioral and neural investigations of normal, irrational, and pathological economic choices. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Orbitofrontal signals for two-component choice options comply with indifference curves of Revealed Preference Theory.

Economic choice options contain multiple components and constitute vectorial bundles. The question arises how they are represented by single-dimensional, scalar neuronal signals that are suitable for economic decision-making. Revealed Preference Theory provides formalisms for establishing preference relations between such bundles, including convenient graphic indifference curves. During stochastic choice between bundles with the same two juice components, we identified neuronal signals for vectorial, multi-component bundles in the orbitofrontal cortex of monkeys. A scalar signal integrated the values from all bundle components in the structured manner of the Theory; it followed the behavioral indifference curves within their confidence limits, was indistinguishable between differently composed but equally revealed preferred bundles, predicted bundle choice and complied with an optimality axiom. Further, distinct signals in other neurons coded the option components separately but followed indifference curves as a population. These data demonstrate how scalar signals represent vectorial, multi-component choice options.

Monkeys choose as if maximizing utility compatible with basic principles of revealed preference theory.

Revealed preference theory provides axiomatic tools for assessing whether individuals make observable choices "as if" they are maximizing an underlying utility function. The theory evokes a tradeoff between goods whereby individuals improve themselves by trading one good for another good to obtain the best combination. Preferences revealed in these choices are modeled as curves of equal choice (indifference curves) and reflect an underlying process of optimization. These notions have far-reaching applications in consumer choice theory and impact the welfare of human and animal populations. However, they lack the empirical implementation in animals that would be required to establish a common biological basis. In a design using basic features of revealed preference theory, we measured in rhesus monkeys the frequency of repeated choices between bundles of two liquids. For various liquids, the animals' choices were compatible with the notion of giving up a quantity of one good to gain one unit of another good while maintaining choice indifference, thereby implementing the concept of marginal rate of substitution. The indifference maps consisted of nonoverlapping, linear, convex, and occasionally concave curves with typically negative, but also sometimes positive, slopes depending on bundle composition. Out-of-sample predictions using homothetic polynomials validated the indifference curves. The animals' preferences were internally consistent in satisfying transitivity. Change of option set size demonstrated choice optimality and satisfied the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). These data are consistent with a version of revealed preference theory in which preferences are stochastic; the monkeys behaved "as if" they had well-structured preferences and maximized utility.

On the challenges and mechanisms of embodied decisions.

Neurophysiological studies of decision-making have focused primarily on elucidating the mechanisms of classic economic decisions, for which the relevant variables are the values of expected outcomes and action is simply the means of reporting the selected choice. By contrast, here we focus on the particular challenges of embodied decision-making faced by animals interacting with their environment in real time. In such scenarios, the choices themselves as well as their relative costs and benefits are defined by the momentary geometry of the immediate environment and change continuously during ongoing activity. To deal with the demands of embodied activity, animals require an architecture in which the sensorimotor specification of potential actions, their valuation, selection and even execution can all take place in parallel. Here, we review behavioural and neurophysiological data supporting a proposed brain architecture for dealing with such scenarios, which we argue set the evolutionary foundation for the organization of the mammalian brain.

Dorsal premotor cortex is involved in switching motor plans.

Previous studies have shown that neural activity in primate dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) can simultaneously represent multiple potential movement plans, and that activity related to these movement options is modulated by their relative subjective desirability. These findings support the hypothesis that decisions about actions are made through a competition within the same circuits that guide the actions themselves. This hypothesis further predicts that the very same cells that guide initial decisions will continue to update their activities if an animal changes its mind. For example, if a previously selected movement option suddenly becomes unavailable, the correction will be performed by the same cells that selected the initial movement, as opposed to some different group of cells responsible for online guidance. We tested this prediction by recording neural activity in the PMd of a monkey performing an instructed-delay reach selection task. In the task, two targets were simultaneously presented and their border styles indicated whether each would be worth 1, 2, or 3 juice drops. In a random subset of trials (FREE), the monkey was allowed a choice while in the remaining trials (FORCED) one of the targets disappeared at the time of the GO signal. In FORCED-LOW trials the monkey was forced to move to the less valuable target and started moving either toward the new target (Direct) or toward the target that vanished and then curved to reach the remaining one (Curved). Prior to the GO signal, PMd activity clearly reflected the monkey's subjective preference, predicting his choices in FREE trials even with equally valued options. In FORCED-LOW trials, PMd activity reflected the switch of the monkey's plan as early as 100 ms after the GO signal, well before movement onset (MO). This confirms that the activity is not related to feedback from the movement itself, and suggests that PMd continues to participate in action selection even when the animal changes its mind on-line. These findings were reproduced by a computational model suggesting that switches between action plans can be explained by the same competition process responsible for initial decisions.

Neural correlates of biased competition in premotor cortex.

It has been proposed that whenever an animal faces several action choices, their neural representations are processed in parallel in frontoparietal cortex and compete in a manner biased by any factor relevant to the decision. We tested this hypothesis by recording single-unit activity in dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) while a monkey performed two delayed center-out reaching tasks. In the one-target task, a single target was presented and its border style indicated its reward value. The two-target task was the same except two targets were presented and the value of each was varied. During the delay period of the one-target task, directionally tuned PMd activity showed no modulation with value. In contrast, during the two-target task, the same neurons showed strong effects of the value associated with their preferred target, always in relation to the value of the other target. Furthermore, the competition between action choices was strongest when targets were furthest apart. This angular distance effect appeared in neural activity as soon as cells became tuned, while modulation by relative value appeared much later. All of these findings can be reproduced by a computational model which suggests that decisions between actions are made through a biased competition taking place within a sensorimotor map of potential actions.

Making choices between rules or between actions.

A new study by Klaes et al. in this issue of Neuron shows that the brain can simultaneously apply two rules to the same sensory information in order to specify two parallel potential action goals, which then compete for execution in the sensorimotor system.