No clear evidence of a difference between individuals who self-report an absence of auditory imagery and typical imagers on auditory imagery tasks.

Aphantasia is characterised by the inability to create mental images in one's mind. Studies investigating impairments in imagery typically focus on the visual domain. However, it is possible to generate many different forms of imagery including imagined auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, motor, taste and other experiences. Recent studies show that individuals with aphantasia report a lack of imagery in modalities, other than vision, including audition. However, to date, no research has examined whether these reductions in self-reported auditory imagery are associated with decrements in tasks that require auditory imagery. Understanding the extent to which visual and auditory imagery deficits co-occur can help to better characterise the core deficits of aphantasia and provide an alternative perspective on theoretical debates on the extent to which imagery draws on modality-specific or modality-general processes. In the current study, individuals that self-identified as being aphantasic and matched control participants with typical imagery performed two tasks: a musical pitch-based imagery and voice-based categorisation task. The majority of participants with aphantasia self-reported significant deficits in both auditory and visual imagery. However, we did not find a concomitant decrease in performance on tasks which require auditory imagery, either in the full sample or only when considering those participants that reported significant deficits in both domains. These findings are discussed in relation to the mechanisms that might obscure observation of imagery deficits in auditory imagery tasks in people that report reduced auditory imagery.

Real-world implications of aphantasia: episodic recall of eyewitnesses with aphantasia is less complete but no less accurate than typical imagers.

Individuals with aphantasia report an inability to voluntarily visually image and reduced episodic memory, yet episodic accounts provided by witnesses and victims are fundamental for criminal justice. Using the mock-witness paradigm, we investigated eyewitness memory of individuals with aphantasia versus typical imagers. Participants viewed a mock crime and 48 hours later were interviewed about the event, randomly allocated to one of three conditions. Two interview conditions included techniques designed to support episodic retrieval mode, namely (i) Mental Reinstatement of Context (MRC) and (ii) Sketch Reinstatement of Context (Sketch-RC). A third Control condition did not include retrieval support. Aphantasic mock-eyewitnesses recalled 30% less correct information and accounts were less complete, but they made no more errors and were as accurate as typical imagers. Interaction effects revealed reduced correct recall and less complete accounts for aphantasic participants in MRC interviews versus Sketch-RC and Control. Aphantaisic participants in the Control outperformed those in both the Sketch-RC and MRC, although Sketch-RC improved completeness by 15% versus MRC. Our pattern of results indicates reduced mental imagery ability might be compensated for by alternative self-initiated cognitive strategies. Findings offer novel insights into episodic recall performance in information gathering interviews when ability to voluntarily visualize is impoverished.

Independent measurement of face perception, face matching, and face memory reveals impairments in face perception and memory, but not matching, in autism.

Multiple psychological processes are required in order for a face to be recognised from memory. However, when testing face memory using tasks such as the Cambridge Face Memory Task (CFMT), it is rare for studies to attempt to account for individual differences in face perception and face matching in order to isolate variance in face memory specifically. In Study 1, the Oxford Face Matching Test (OFMT) was used to assess face matching and face perception in a large sample of participants (N = 1,112). Results revealed independent contributions of face perception and matching to CFMT performance, and these results replicated with the Glasgow Face Matching Test. In Study 2, the same procedure was used to test face perception, face matching and face memory in a group of 57 autistic adults and a matched neurotypical control group. Results revealed impaired face perception and memory in the individuals with autism, but intact face matching. Face perception may therefore act as a potential intervention target for individuals with autism who exhibit face recognition impairments.

Individuals with developmental prosopagnosia show independent impairments in face perception, face memory and face matching.

Individuals with developmental prosopagnosia (DP) all exhibit impairments in face memory, but the specificity of these face memory impairments is debated. One problem is that standard behavioural tasks are not able to provide independent measurement of face perception, face memory, and face matching (the decision process required to judge whether two instances of a face are of the same individual or different individuals). The present study utilised a new test of face matching, the Oxford Face Matching Test (OFMT), and a novel analysis strategy to derive these independent indices. Twenty-nine individuals with DP and the same number of matched neurotypical controls completed the OFMT, the Glasgow Face Matching Test, and the Cambridge Face Memory Test. Results revealed individuals with DP exhibit impairments in face perception, face memory and face matching. Collectively, these results suggest that face processing impairments in DP are more comprehensive than has previously been suggested.

Only minimal differences between individuals with congenital aphantasia and those with typical imagery on neuropsychological tasks that involve imagery.

Aphantasia describes the experience of individuals who self-report a lack of voluntary visual imagery. It is not yet known whether individuals with aphantasia show deficits in cognitive and neuropsychological tasks thought to relate to aspects of visual imagery, including Spatial Span, One Touch Stocking of Cambridge, Pattern Recognition Memory, Verbal Recognition Memory and Mental Rotation. Twenty individuals with congenital aphantasia (VVIQ < 25) were identified and matched on measures of age and IQ to twenty individuals with typical imagery (VVIQ > 35). A group difference was found in the One Touch Stocking of Cambridge task for response time, but not accuracy, when the number of imagined moves that participants had to hold in their heads to complete the task increased. Similarly, a group difference in response time was apparent in the mental rotation task, but only in the subgroup of aphantasic participants who reported a severe deficit in visual imagery (VVIQ score of 16). These results suggest that the cognitive profile of people without imagery does not greatly differ from those with typical imagery when examined by group. In addition, the severity of aphantasia (and VVIQ criterion) may be an important factor to consider when investigating differences in imagery experience. Overall, this study raises questions about whether or not aphantasia represents a difference in cognitive function or in conscious experience.

Quantifying aphantasia through drawing: Those without visual imagery show deficits in object but not spatial memory.

Congenital aphantasia is a recently characterized variation of experience defined by the inability to form voluntary visual imagery, in individuals who are otherwise high performing. Because of this specific deficit to visual imagery, individuals with aphantasia serve as an ideal group for probing the nature of representations in visual memory, particularly the interplay of object, spatial, and symbolic information. Here, we conducted a large-scale online study of aphantasia and revealed a dissociation in object and spatial content in their memory representations. Sixty-one individuals with aphantasia and matched controls with typical imagery studied real-world scene images, and were asked to draw them from memory, and then later copy them during a matched perceptual condition. Drawings were objectively quantified by 2,795 online scorers for object and spatial details. Aphantasic participants recalled significantly fewer objects than controls, with less color in their drawings, and an increased reliance on verbal scaffolding. However, aphantasic participants showed high spatial accuracy equivalent to controls, and made significantly fewer memory errors. These differences between groups only manifested during recall, with no differences between groups during the matched perceptual condition. This object-specific memory impairment in individuals with aphantasia provides evidence for separate systems in memory that support object versus spatial information. The study also provides an important experimental validation for the existence of aphantasia as a variation in human imagery experience.

Test-retest reliability and task order effects of emotional cognitive tests in healthy subjects.

Little is known of the retest reliability of emotional cognitive tasks or the impact of using different tasks employing similar emotional stimuli within a battery. We investigated this in healthy subjects. We found improved overall performance in an emotional attentional blink task (EABT) with repeat testing at one hour and one week compared to baseline, but the impact of an emotional stimulus on performance was unchanged. Similarly, performance on a facial expression recognition task (FERT) was better one week after a baseline test, though the relative effect of specific emotions was unaltered. There was no effect of repeat testing on an emotional word categorising, recall and recognition task. We found no difference in performance in the FERT and EABT irrespective of task order. We concluded that it is possible to use emotional cognitive tasks in longitudinal studies and combine tasks using emotional facial stimuli in a single battery.