Fast updating feedback from piriform cortex to the olfactory bulb relays multimodal reward contingency signals during rule-reversal.

While animals readily adjust their behavior to adapt to relevant changes in the environment, the neural pathways enabling these changes remain largely unknown. Here, using multiphoton imaging, we investigated whether feedback from the piriform cortex to the olfactory bulb supports such behavioral flexibility. To this end, we engaged head-fixed mice in a multimodal rule-reversal task guided by olfactory and auditory cues. Both odor and, surprisingly, the sound cues triggered cortical bulbar feedback responses which preceded the behavioral report. Responses to the same sensory cue were strongly modulated upon changes in stimulus-reward contingency (rule reversals). The re-shaping of individual bouton responses occurred within seconds of the rule-reversal events and was correlated with changes in the behavior. Optogenetic perturbation of cortical feedback within the bulb disrupted the behavioral performance. Our results indicate that the piriform-to-olfactory bulb feedback carries reward contingency signals and is rapidly re-formatted according to changes in the behavioral context.

People confabulate with high confidence when their decisions are supported by weak internal variables.

People can introspect on their internal state and report the reasons driving their decisions but choice blindness (CB) experiments suggest that this ability can sometimes be a retrospective illusion. Indeed, when presented with deceptive cues, people justify choices they did not make in the first place, suggesting that external cues largely contribute to introspective processes. Yet, it remains unclear what are the respective contributions of external cues and internal decision variables in forming introspective report. Here, using a brain-computer interface, we show that internal variables continue to be monitored but are less impactful than deceptive external cues during CB episodes. Moreover, we show that deceptive cues overturn the classical relationship between confidence and accuracy: introspective failures are associated with higher confidence than genuine introspective reports. We tracked back the origin of these overconfident confabulations by revealing their prominence when internal decision evidence is weak and variable. Thus, introspection is neither a direct reading of internal variables nor a mere retrospective illusion, but rather reflects the integration of internal decision evidence and external cues, with CB being a special instance where internal evidence is inconsistent.