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1.
Bioinformatics ; 38(6): 1657-1668, 2022 03 04.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32871006

RESUMEN

MOTIVATION: Record Linkage has versatile applications in real-world data analysis contexts, where several datasets need to be linked on the record level in the absence of any exact identifier connecting related records. An example are medical databases of patients, spread across institutions, that have to be linked on personally identifiable entries like name, date of birth or ZIP code. At the same time, privacy laws may prohibit the exchange of this personally identifiable information (PII) across institutional boundaries, ruling out the outsourcing of the record linkage task to a trusted third party. We propose to employ privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) techniques that prevent, to various degrees, the leakage of PII while still allowing for the linkage of related records. RESULTS: We develop a framework for fault-tolerant PPRL using secure multi-party computation with the medical record keeping software Mainzelliste as the data source. Our solution does not rely on any trusted third party and all PII is guaranteed to not leak under common cryptographic security assumptions. Benchmarks show the feasibility of our approach in realistic networking settings: linkage of a patient record against a database of 10 000 records can be done in 48 s over a heavily delayed (100 ms) network connection, or 3.9 s with a low-latency connection. AVAILABILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION: The source code of the sMPC node is freely available on Github at https://github.com/medicalinformatics/SecureEpilinker subject to the AGPLv3 license. The source code of the modified Mainzelliste is available at https://github.com/medicalinformatics/MainzellisteSEL. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Supplementary data are available at Bioinformatics online.


Asunto(s)
Seguridad Computacional , Privacidad , Bases de Datos Factuales , Humanos , Registro Médico Coordinado/métodos , Programas Informáticos
2.
Stud Health Technol Inform ; 270: 8-12, 2020 Jun 16.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32570336

RESUMEN

The cryptographic method Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) could facilitate data sharing between health institutions by making it possible to perform analyses on a "virtual data pool", providing an integrated view of data that is actually distributed - without any of the participants having to disclose their private data. One drawback of SMPC is that specific cryptographic protocols have to be developed for every type of analysis that is to be performed. Moreover, these protocols have to be optimized to provide acceptable execution times. As a first step towards a library of efficient implementations of common methods in health data sciences, we present a novel protocol for efficient time-to-event analysis. Our implementation utilizes a common technique called garbled circuits and was implemented using a widespread SMPC programming framework. We further describe optimizations that we have developed to reduce the execution times of our protocol. We experimentally evaluated our solution by computing Kaplan-Meier estimators over a vertically distributed dataset while measuring performance. By comparing the SMPC results with a conventional analysis on pooled data, we show that our approach is practical and scalable.


Asunto(s)
Seguridad Computacional , Difusión de la Información , Humanos , Informática Médica
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