Avian influenza viruses and avian paramyxoviruses in wintering and breeding waterfowl populations in North Carolina, USA.

Although wild ducks are recognized reservoirs for avian influenza viruses (AIVs) and avian paramyxoviruses (APMVs), information related to the prevalence of these viruses in breeding and migratory duck populations on North American wintering grounds is limited. Wintering (n=2,889) and resident breeding (n=524) ducks were sampled in North Carolina during winter 2004-2006 and summer 2005-2006, respectively. Overall prevalence of AIV was 0.8% and restricted to the winter sample; however, prevalence in species within the genus Anas was 1.3% and was highest in Black Ducks (7%; Anas rubripes) and Northern Shovelers (8%; Anas clypeata). Of the 24 AIVs, 16 subtypes were detected, representing nine hemagglutinin and seven neuraminidase subtypes. Avian paramyxoviruses detected in wintering birds included 18 APMV-1s, 15 APMV-4s, and one APMV-6. During summers 2005 and 2006, a high prevalence of APMV-1 infection was observed in resident breeding Wood Ducks (Aix sponsa) and Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos).

Avian paramyxoviruses in shorebirds and gulls.

There are nine serotypes of avian paramyxovirus (APMV), including APMV-1, or Newcastle disease virus. Although free-flying ducks and geese have been extensively monitored for APMV, limited information is available for species in the order Charadriiformes. From 2000 to 2005 we tested cloacal swabs from 9,128 shorebirds and gulls (33 species, five families) captured in 10 states within the USA and in three countries in the Caribbean and South America. Avian paramyxoviruses were isolated from 60 (0.7%) samples by inoculation of embryonating chicken eggs; isolates only included APMV-1 and APMV-2. Two isolates (APMV-2) were made from gulls and 58 isolates (APMV-1 [41 isolates] and APMV-2 [17 isolates]) were made from shorebirds. All of the positive shorebirds were sampled at Delaware Bay (Delaware and New Jersey) and 45 (78%) of these isolates came from Ruddy Turnstones (Arenaria interpres). The APMV-1 infection rate was higher among Ruddy Turnstones compared with other shorebird species and varied by year. Avian paramyxovirus-2 was isolated from two of 394 (0.5%) Ruddy Turnstones at Delaware Bay in 2001 and from 13 of 735 (1.8%) Ruddy Turnstones during 2002. For both APMV-1 and APMV-2, infection rates were higher among Ruddy Turnstones sampled on the south shore of Delaware Bay compared to north shore populations. This spatial variation may be related to local movements of Ruddy Turnstones within this ecosystem. The higher prevalence of APMV in Ruddy Turnstones mirrors results observed for avian influenza viruses in shorebirds and may suggest similar modes of transmission.

Evidence for a new avian paramyxovirus serotype 10 detected in rockhopper penguins from the Falkland Islands.

The biological, serological, and genomic characterization of a paramyxovirus recently isolated from rockhopper penguins (Eudyptes chrysocome) suggested that this virus represented a new avian paramyxovirus (APMV) group, APMV10. This penguin virus resembled other APMVs by electron microscopy; however, its viral hemagglutination (HA) activity was not inhibited by antisera against any of the nine defined APMV serotypes. In addition, antiserum generated against this penguin virus did not inhibit the HA of representative viruses of the other APMV serotypes. Sequence data produced using random priming methods revealed a genomic structure typical of APMV. Phylogenetic evaluation of coding regions revealed that amino acid sequences of all six proteins were most closely related to APMV2 and APMV8. The calculation of evolutionary distances among proteins and distances at the nucleotide level confirmed that APMV2, APMV8, and the penguin virus all were sufficiently divergent from each other to be considered different serotypes. We propose that this isolate, named APMV10/penguin/Falkland Islands/324/2007, be the prototype virus for APMV10. Because of the known problems associated with serology, such as antiserum cross-reactivity and one-way immunogenicity, in addition to the reliance on the immune response to a single protein, the hemagglutinin-neuraminidase, as the sole base for viral classification, we suggest the need for new classification guidelines that incorporate genome sequence comparisons.

Antiviral susceptibility of avian and swine influenza virus of the N1 neuraminidase subtype.

Influenza viruses of the N1 neuraminidase (NA) subtype affecting both animals and humans caused the 2009 pandemic. Anti-influenza virus NA inhibitors are crucial early in a pandemic, when specific influenza vaccines are unavailable. Thus, it is urgent to confirm the antiviral susceptibility of the avian viruses, a potential source of a pandemic virus. We evaluated the NA inhibitor susceptibilities of viruses of the N1 subtype isolated from wild waterbirds, swine, and humans. Most avian viruses were highly or moderately susceptible to oseltamivir (50% inhibitory concentration [IC(50)], <5.1 to 50 nM). Of 91 avian isolates, 7 (7.7%) had reduced susceptibility (IC(50), >50 nM) but were sensitive to the NA inhibitors zanamivir and peramivir. Oseltamivir susceptibility ranged more widely among the waterbird viruses (IC(50), 0.5 to 154.43 nM) than among swine and human viruses (IC(50), 0.33 to 2.56 nM). Swine viruses were sensitive to oseltamivir, compared to human seasonal H1N1 isolated before 2007 (mean IC(50), 1.4 nM). Avian viruses from 2007 to 2008 were sensitive to oseltamivir, in contrast to the emergence of resistant H1N1 in humans. Susceptibility remained high to moderate over time among influenza viruses. Sequence analysis of the outliers did not detect molecular markers of drug-resistance (e.g., H275Y NA mutation [N1 numbering]) but revealed mutations outside the NA active site. In particular, V267I, N307D, and V321I residue changes were found, and structural analyses suggest that these mutations distort hydrophobic pockets and affect residues in the NA active site. We determined that natural oseltamivir resistance among swine and wild waterbirds is rare. Minor naturally occurring variants in NA can affect antiviral susceptibility.

Avian influenza in North and South America, the Caribbean, and Australia, 2006-2008.

Between 2006 and 2008, only one outbreak of highly pathogenic notifiable avian influenza (AI) was reported from the Americas, the Caribbean, and Australia. The outbreak, caused by H7N3, occurred in September 2007 in a multiage broiler breeder facility (approximately 49,000 birds) near Regina Beach in southern Saskatchewan, Canada. The disease was confined to a single farm; the farm was depopulated. All other reports of infections in poultry or wild birds involved low pathogenicity AI viruses. A notable event that occurred during the 3-yr period was the spread of low pathogenicity notifiable AI (LPNAI) H5N2 (Mexican lineage) into the Caribbean countries of the Dominican Republic and Haiti in 2007 and 2008, respectively, representing the first detection of AI reported in these countries. Mexico reported that the LPNAI H5N2 virus continued to circulate in the central regions of the country, and a total of 49 isolations were made from 12 states between 2006 and 2008. Also, during this period there was a significant increase in AI surveillance in many countries throughout the Americas, the Caribbean, and Australia, resulting in the detection of AI subtypes H1 through H12 and N1 through N9 in domestic bird species (chickens, turkeys, guinea fowl, upland game birds, and ducks/geese). The United States was the only one of these countries that reported detections of LPNAI (H5 or H7) infections in commercial poultry: one in chickens (H7N3, 2007), two in turkeys (H5N1 and H5N2, 2007), and one in pheasants (H5N8, 2008). Detections of AI viruses in wild birds between 2006 and 2008 were reported from North America (Canada and the United States), South America (Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil), and Australia.

The evolutionary genetics and emergence of avian influenza viruses in wild birds.

We surveyed the genetic diversity among avian influenza virus (AIV) in wild birds, comprising 167 complete viral genomes from 14 bird species sampled in four locations across the United States. These isolates represented 29 type A influenza virus hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) subtype combinations, with up to 26% of isolates showing evidence of mixed subtype infection. Through a phylogenetic analysis of the largest data set of AIV genomes compiled to date, we were able to document a remarkably high rate of genome reassortment, with no clear pattern of gene segment association and occasional inter-hemisphere gene segment migration and reassortment. From this, we propose that AIV in wild birds forms transient "genome constellations," continually reshuffled by reassortment, in contrast to the spread of a limited number of stable genome constellations that characterizes the evolution of mammalian-adapted influenza A viruses.

Evaluation of routine depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection procedures in the live bird markets, New York.

During the past years surveillance for avian influenza has been conducted in the live bird markets (LBMs) in New York as well as other states along the east coast. Repeated attempts to eradicate H5 and H7 influenza from the New York markets have focused efforts on the LBMs themselves. Despite repeated mandatory market closures accompanied by cleaning and disinfecting (C/D) procedures, avian influenza virus continued to be isolated. In an effort to assess the adequacy of the C/D procedure, samples were collected in temporal proximity to the depopulation and C/D. Comparison of the pre-C/D (83% virus positive), at C/D approval (1.6% positive) and post-C/D testing (33% positive) indicate that the current procedures of C/D can be effective at eliminating these influenza viruses. However, reinfection via introduction of influenza-virus-positive birds can occur shortly after the market reopens.

Phylogenetic diversity among low-virulence newcastle disease viruses from waterfowl and shorebirds and comparison of genotype distributions to those of poultry-origin isolates.

Low-virulence Newcastle disease viruses (loNDV) are frequently recovered from wild bird species, but little is known about their distribution, genetic diversity, or potential to cause disease in poultry. NDV isolates recovered from cloacal samples of apparently healthy waterfowl and shorebirds (WS) in the United States during 1986 to 2005 were examined for genomic diversity and their potential for virulence (n = 249). In addition 19 loNDV isolates from U.S. live bird markets (LBMs) were analyzed and found to be genetically distinct from NDV used in live vaccines but related to WS-origin NDV. Phylogenetic analysis of the fusion protein identified nine novel genotypes among the class I NDV, and new genomic subgroups were identified among genotypes I and II of the class II viruses. The WS-origin viruses exhibited broad genetic and antigenic diversity, and some WS genotypes displayed a closer phylogenetic relationship to LBM-origin NDV. All NDV were predicted to be lentogenic based upon sequencing of the fusion cleavage site, intracerebral pathogenicity index, or mean death time in embryo assays. The USDA real-time reverse transcription-PCR assay, which targets the matrix gene, identified nearly all of the class II NDV tested but failed to detect class I viruses from both LBM and WS. The close phylogenetic proximity of some WS and LBM loNDV suggests that viral transmission may occur among wild birds and poultry; however, these events may occur unnoticed due to the broad genetic diversity of loNDV, the lentogenic presentation in birds, and the limitations of current rapid diagnostic tools.

Characterization of low-pathogenicity H5N1 avian influenza viruses from North America.

Wild-bird surveillance in North America for avian influenza (AI) viruses with a goal of early identification of the Asian H5N1 highly pathogenic AI virus has identified at least six low-pathogenicity H5N1 AI viruses between 2004 and 2006. The hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes from all 6 H5N1 viruses and an additional 38 North American wild-bird-origin H5 subtype and 28 N1 subtype viruses were sequenced and compared with sequences available in GenBank by phylogenetic analysis. Both HA and NA were phylogenetically distinct from those for viruses from outside of North America and from those for viruses recovered from mammals. Four of the H5N1 AI viruses were characterized as low pathogenicity by standard in vivo pathotyping tests. One of the H5N1 viruses, A/MuteSwan/MI/451072-2/06, was shown to replicate to low titers in chickens, turkeys, and ducks. However, transmission of A/MuteSwan/MI/451072-2/06 was more efficient among ducks than among chickens or turkeys based on virus shed. The 50% chicken infectious dose for A/MuteSwan/MI/451072-2/06 and three other wild-waterfowl-origin H5 viruses were also determined and were between 10(5.3) and 10(7.5) 50% egg infective doses. Finally, seven H5 viruses representing different phylogenetic clades were evaluated for their antigenic relatedness by hemagglutination inhibition assay, showing that the antigenic relatedness was largely associated with geographic origin. Overall, the data support the conclusion that North American H5 wild-bird-origin AI viruses are low-pathogenicity wild-bird-adapted viruses and are antigenically and genetically distinct from the highly pathogenic Asian H5N1 virus lineage.

Characteristics of diagnostic tests used in the 2002 low-pathogenicity avian influenza H7N2 outbreak in Virginia.

An outbreak of low-pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) H7N2 occurred in 2002 in the Shenandoah Valley, a high-density poultry production region in Virginia. Infected flocks were identified through a combination of observation of clinical signs and laboratory diagnostic tests designed to detect avian influenza (AI) antibodies, virus, or H7-specific RNA. In this report, fitness for purpose of 3 virus/RNA detection assays used during the outbreak was examined: 1) antigen capture enzyme immunoassay (AC-EIA), 2) real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RRT-PCR), and 3) virus isolation (VI). Results from testing 762 turkey and 2,216 chicken tracheal swab pooled specimens were analyzed to determine diagnostic sensitivities and specificities of these tests under field conditions using Bayesian techniques for validation of diagnostic tests in the absence of a "gold standard." Diagnostic sensitivities (with 95% probability intervals) in turkeys of AC-EIA and RRT-PCR, in reference to VI, were 65.9 (50.6; 81.3)% and 85.1 (71.9; 95.7)% and of VI 92.9 (78.0; 98.8)% in reference to AC-EIA or 88.7 (76.0; 97.2)% in reference to RRT-PCR; in chickens, diagnostic sensitivities were 75.1 (45.6; 94.2)%, 86.3 (65.9; 97.1)%, and 86.2 (65.8; 97.1)% or 86.3 (66.4; 97.2)%, respectively. Specificities were 99.1 (97.9; 99.8)%, 98.9 (98.0; 99.5)%, and 98.6 (97.4; 99.4)% or 98.8 (97.8; 99.5)% in turkeys and between 99.25% and 99.27% with probability intervals of approximately +/-0.4% for all tests in chickens. Simultaneous use of AC-EIA and RRT-PCR contributed significantly to the rapid control of the outbreak, but the AI RRT-PCR assay with >85% sensitivity and approximately 99% specificity, combined with relatively low cost and fast turnaround, could be used as the sole diagnostic test in outbreaks of LPAI.

Avian influenza in North and South America, 2002-2005.

Between 2002 and 2005, three outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) occurred in the Americas: one outbreak in Chile (H7N3) in 2002, one outbreak in the United States (H5N2) in 2004, and one outbreak in Canada (H7N3) in 2004. The outbreak in Chile was limited to a large broiler breeder operation and a nearby turkey flock and represented the first outbreak of HPAI in that country. The outbreak of HPAI in the United States occurred in Texas and was limited to one premise where chickens were raised for sale in nearby live-bird markets. The outbreak in Canada was the largest of the three HPAI outbreaks, involving 42 premises and approximately 17 million birds in the Fraser Valley, British Columbia. In each of the HPAI outbreaks, the disease was successfully eradicated by depopulation of infected farms. All other reports of infections in poultry and isolations from wild bird species pertained to low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. Animal Health Officials in Canada reported subtypes H3, H5, and H6 in domestic poultry, and H3, H5, H11, and H13 from imported and/or wild bird species. An LPAI H5N2 virus continues to circulate in Mexico and the Central American countries of Guatemala and El Salvador. Each country reported isolations of H5N2 virus from poultry and the large-scale use of inactivated and recombinant H5 vaccines in their AI control programs. In Colombia, AI was reported for the first time when antibodies to H9N2 were detected in chickens by routine surveillance. Intensive surveillance activities in the United States detected AI virus or specific antibodies to 13 of the 16 hemagglutinin (H1-H13) and all nine neuraminidase subtypes in live-bird markets, small holder farms, and in commercial poultry from 29 states. The largest outbreak of LPAI in the United States occurred in 2002, when 197 farms were depopulated (4.7 million birds) to control an outbreak in Virginia and surrounding states. The outbreak was caused by an LPAI H7N2 virus closely related to an H7N2 virus that has been circulating in the live-bird marketing system in the northeastern United States since 1994.

Pathogenic potential of North American H7N2 avian influenza virus: a mutagenesis study using reverse genetics.

An H7N2 subtype avian influenza virus (AIV) first appeared in the live bird marketing system (LBMS) in the Northeastern United States in 1994. Since then this lineage of virus has become the predominant subtype of AIV isolated from the LBMS and has been linked to several costly commercial poultry outbreaks. Concern for this low pathogenicity isolate mutating to the highly pathogenic form has remained high because of the increasing number of basic amino acids at the hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site, which is known to be associated with increased pathogenicity of AIV. To address the risk of low pathogenic LBMS-lineage H7N2 virus mutating to the highly pathogenic form of the virus, we generated a series of mutant viruses that have changes in the sequence at the HA cleavage site by using plasmid-based reverse genetics. We confirmed that a conserved proline at -5 position from the HA cleavage site could be changed to a basic amino acid, producing a virus with five basic amino acids in a row at the cleavage site, but with no increase in virulence. Increased virulence was only observed when additional basic amino acids were inserted. We also observed that the virus preferred the arginine instead of lysine at the -4 position from the cleavage site to manifest increased virulence both in vitro and in vivo. Using helper virus-based reverse genetics, where only one transcription plasmid expressing a mutated HA vRNA is used, we identified specific HA cleavage site sequences that were preferentially incorporated into the low pathogenic wild-type virus. The resultant reassortant viruses were highly pathogenic in chickens. This study provides additional evidence that H7 avian influenza viruses require an insertional event to become highly pathogenic, as compared to H5 viruses that can become highly pathogenic strictly by mutation or by insertions.

Development and application of reference antisera against 15 hemagglutinin subtypes of influenza virus by DNA vaccination of chickens.

Reference antisera were produced against 15 influenza hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes using DNA vaccination to produce a high-quality polyclonal serum to the HA protein without antibodies to other influenza viral proteins. The HA gene from each of 15 different HA subtypes of influenza virus was cloned into a eukaryotic expression vector and injected intramuscularly, together with a cationic lipid, into 3- to 4-week-old specific-pathogen-free chickens. Birds were boostered twice at 4-week intervals after the initial injection, and in general, antibody titers increased after each boost. The antisera were successfully applied in the hemagglutination inhibition test, which is the standard method for the classification of the HA subtypes of influenza virus. We also demonstrated the HA specificity of the antisera by Western blot and immunodot blot analysis. DNA vaccination also provides a safer alternative for the production of HA-specific antibodies, since it is produced without the use of live virus.

Avian influenza viruses and paramyxoviruses in wintering and resident ducks in Texas.

Cloacal swabs were collected from teal (Anas crecca, Anas cyanoptera, Anas discors), mottled duck (Anas fulvigula) and northern pintail (Anas acuta) in Brazoria County, Texas, USA, during February 2001, mottled ducks during August 2001, and blue-winged teal (A. discors) during February 2002. Prevalence of avian influenza virus (AIV) infections during each sampling period were 11, 0, and 15%, respectively. The hemagglutinin (H) subtypes H2 and H7 were detected in both years, while the H8 subtype was detected in 2001 and the H1 subtype was detected in 2002. Avian paramyxovirus type 1 (APMV-1) was isolated from 13% of mottled ducks sampled in August 2001 and 30.7% of teal in February 2002. The season of isolation of both viruses and the majority of the AIV subtypes detected in this study are not typical based on previous reports of these viruses from North American ducks.

H5N2 avian influenza outbreak in Texas in 2004: the first highly pathogenic strain in the United States in 20 years?

In early 2004, an H5N2 avian influenza virus (AIV) that met the molecular criteria for classification as a highly pathogenic AIV was isolated from chickens in the state of Texas in the United States. However, clinical manifestations in the affected flock were consistent with avian influenza caused by a low-pathogenicity AIV and the representative virus (A/chicken/Texas/298313/04 [TX/04]) was not virulent for experimentally inoculated chickens. The hemagglutinin (HA) gene of the TX/04 isolate was similar in sequence to A/chicken/Texas/167280-4/02 (TX/02), a low-pathogenicity AIV isolate recovered from chickens in Texas in 2002. However, the TX/04 isolate had one additional basic amino acid at the HA cleavage site, which could be attributed to a single point mutation. The TX/04 isolate was similar in sequence to TX/02 isolate in several internal genes (NP, M, and NS), but some genes (PA, PB1, and PB2) had sequence of a clearly different origin. The TX/04 isolate also had a stalk deletion in the NA gene, characteristic of a chicken-adapted AIV. By analyzing viruses constructed by in vitro mutagenesis followed by reverse genetics, we found that the pathogenicity of the TX/04 virus could be increased in vitro and in vivo by the insertion of an additional basic amino acid at the HA cleavage site and not by the loss of a glycosylation site near the cleavage site. Our study provides the genetic and biologic characteristics of the TX/04 isolate, which highlight the complexity of the polygenic nature of the virulence of influenza viruses.

Evaluation of risk factors for the spread of low pathogenicity H7N2 avian influenza virus among commercial poultry farms.

OBJECTIVE: To identify risk factors associated with the spread of low pathogenicity H7N2 avian influenza (AI) virus among commercial poultry farms in western Virginia during an outbreak in 2002. DESIGN: Case-control study. PROCEDURE: Questionnaires were used to collect information about farm characteristics, biosecurity measures, and husbandry practices on 151 infected premises (128 turkey and 23 chicken farms) and 199 noninfected premises (167 turkey and 32 chicken farms). RESULTS: The most significant risk factor for AI infection was disposal of dead birds by rendering (odds ratio [OR], 73). In addition, age > or = 10 weeks (OR for birds aged 10 to 19 weeks, 4.9; OR for birds aged > or = 20 weeks, 4.3) was a significant risk factor regardless of poultry species involved. Other significant risk factors included use of nonfamily caretakers and the presence of mammalian wildlife on the farm. Factors that were not significantly associated with infection included use of various routine biosecurity measures, food and litter sources, types of domestic animals on the premises, and presence of wild birds on the premises. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Results suggest that an important factor contributing to rapid early spread of AI virus infection among commercial poultry farms during this outbreak was disposal of dead birds via rendering off-farm. Because of the highly infectious nature of AI virus and the devastating economic impact of outbreaks, poultry farmers should consider carcass disposal techniques that do not require off-farm movement, such as burial, composting, or incineration.

Genomic sequences of low-virulence avian paramyxovirus-1 (Newcastle disease virus) isolates obtained from live-bird markets in North America not related to commonly utilized commercial vaccine strains.

Avian paramyxovirus 1 (APMV-1), also referred to as Newcastle disease virus (NDV), variants of low virulence were isolated from chickens, ducks and other unidentified species found in live-bird markets of the northeastern United States. These isolates were characterized as APMV-1 by the hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) assay utilizing NDV-specific polyclonal antisera. However, the isolates failed to react with a monoclonal antibody that has specificity for a wide variety of APMV-1 isolates. Although only highly virulent isolates require reporting to international regulatory agencies, the ability to correctly identify APMV-1 types is important for control and regulatory purposes. Protein gel patterns of the purified isolates resembled previously reported APMV-1 and anti-NDV polyclonal sera recognized the viral proteins. For three isolates oligonucleotide primers specific for the nucleoprotein, fusion protein and polymerase genes of NDV were utilized to synthesize cDNA using viral RNA as a template. Approximately 12kb of the genome was subsequently sequenced for the three isolates that included the nucleoprotein, phosphoprotein, matrix protein, fusion (F) protein, hemagglutinin-neuraminidase protein genes and a 5' portion of the polymerase gene. The isolates had an F protein cleavage site sequence of ERQER/LVG indicating low-virulence viruses that phylogenetically separated with other unique NDV isolates designated as a lineage 6 genotype. Additionally, a four amino acid insert was detected in the predicted phosphoprotein which complies with the "rule of six" among paramyxoviruses. These APMV-1 genotypes have not been previously reported in North America and further substantiate the heterogeneous genetic nature of these commercially important pathogens found worldwide.

Generation of reassortant influenza vaccines by reverse genetics that allows utilization of a DIVA (Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals) strategy for the control of avian influenza.

Vaccination of poultry with inactivated influenza vaccine can be an effective tool in the control of avian influenza (AI). One major concern of using inactivated vaccine is vaccine-induced antibody interference with serologic surveillance and epidemiology. In the United States, low pathogenicity H5 and H7 subtype AI viruses have caused serious economic losses in the poultry industry. Most of these viruses also have the accompanying N2 subtype and no H5N1 or H7N8 subtype AI viruses have been identified in poultry in the US. In order to allow the Differentiation of Infected from Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) while maintaining maximum efficacy of the vaccine, we generated reassortant viruses by reverse genetics that contained the same H5 and H7 hemagglutinin (HA) gene as the challenge virus, but a heterologous N1 or N8 neuraminidase (NA) gene. In vaccination-challenge experiments in 2-week-old specific pathogen free chickens, reassortant influenza vaccines (rH5N1 and rH7N8) demonstrated similar antibody profiles and comparable protection rates as vaccines prepared with parent H5N2 and H7N2 viruses. Further, we were able to differentiate the sera from infected and vaccinated birds by neuraminidase inhibition test and indirect immunofluorescent antibody assay on the basis of different antibodies elicited by their NA proteins. These results demonstrate the usefulness of a reverse genetics system for the rapid generation of reassortant AI virus that allows utilization of the DIVA strategy for the control of AI infections in poultry.

Effect of vaccine use in the evolution of Mexican lineage H5N2 avian influenza virus.

An outbreak of avian influenza (AI) caused by a low-pathogenic H5N2 type A influenza virus began in Mexico in 1993 and several highly pathogenic strains of the virus emerged in 1994-1995. The highly pathogenic virus has not been reported since 1996, but the low-pathogenic virus remains endemic in Mexico and has spread to two adjacent countries, Guatemala and El Salvador. Measures implemented to control the outbreak and eradicate the virus in Mexico have included a widespread vaccination program in effect since 1995. Because this is the first case of long-term use of AI vaccines in poultry, the Mexican lineage virus presented us with a unique opportunity to examine the evolution of type A influenza virus circulating in poultry populations where there was elevated herd immunity due to maternal and active immunity. We analyzed the coding sequence of the HA1 subunit and the NS gene of 52 Mexican lineage viruses that were isolated between 1993 and 2002. Phylogenetic analysis indicated the presence of multiple sublineages of Mexican lineage isolates at the time vaccine was introduced. Further, most of the viruses isolated after the introduction of vaccine belonged to sublineages separate from the vaccine's sublineage. Serologic analysis using hemagglutination inhibition and virus neutralization tests showed major antigenic differences among isolates belonging to the different sublineages. Vaccine protection studies further confirmed the in vitro serologic results indicating that commercial vaccine was not able to prevent virus shedding when chickens were challenged with antigenically different isolates. These findings indicate that multilineage antigenic drift, which has not been observed in AI virus, is occurring in the Mexican lineage AI viruses and the persistence of the virus in the field is likely aided by its large antigenic difference from the vaccine strain.

Recombination resulting in virulence shift in avian influenza outbreak, Chile.

Influenza A viruses occur worldwide in wild birds and are occasionally associated with outbreaks in commercial chickens and turkeys. However, avian influenza viruses have not been isolated from wild birds or poultry in South America. A recent outbreak in chickens of H7N3 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) occurred in Chile. One month later, after a sudden increase in deaths, H7N3 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus was isolated. Sequence analysis of all eight genes of the LPAI virus and the HPAI viruses showed minor differences between the viruses except at the hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site. The LPAI virus had a cleavage site similar to other low pathogenic H7 viruses, but the HPAI isolates had a 30-nucleotide insert. The insertion likely occurred by recombination between the HA and nucleoprotein genes of the LPAI virus, resulting in a virulence shift. Sequence comparison of all eight gene segments showed the Chilean viruses were also distinct from all other avian influenza viruses and represent a distinct South American clade.