Consensus-building conversation leads to neural alignment.

Conversation is a primary means of social influence, but its effects on brain activity remain unknown. Previous work on conversation and social influence has emphasized public compliance, largely setting private beliefs aside. Here, we show that consensus-building conversation aligns future brain activity within groups, with alignment persisting through novel experiences participants did not discuss. Participants watched ambiguous movie clips during fMRI scanning, then conversed in groups with the goal of coming to a consensus about each clip's narrative. After conversation, participants' brains were scanned while viewing the clips again, along with novel clips from the same movies. Groups that reached consensus showed greater similarity of brain activity after conversation. Participants perceived as having high social status spoke more and signaled disbelief in others, and their groups had unequal turn-taking and lower neural alignment. By contrast, participants with central positions in their real-world social networks encouraged others to speak, facilitating greater group neural alignment. Socially central participants were also more likely to become neurally aligned to others in their groups.

Deep social neuroscience: the promise and peril of using artificial neural networks to study the social brain.

This review offers an accessible primer to social neuroscientists interested in neural networks. It begins by providing an overview of key concepts in deep learning. It then discusses three ways neural networks can be useful to social neuroscientists: (i) building statistical models to predict behavior from brain activity; (ii) quantifying naturalistic stimuli and social interactions; and (iii) generating cognitive models of social brain function. These applications have the potential to enhance the clinical value of neuroimaging and improve the generalizability of social neuroscience research. We also discuss the significant practical challenges, theoretical limitations and ethical issues faced by deep learning. If the field can successfully navigate these hazards, we believe that artificial neural networks may prove indispensable for the next stage of the field's development: deep social neuroscience.

Evidence for Spinozan "Unbelieving" in the Right Inferior Prefrontal Cortex.

Humans can think about possible states of the world without believing in them, an important capacity for high-level cognition. Here, we use fMRI and a novel "shell game" task to test two competing theories about the nature of belief and its neural basis. According to the Cartesian theory, information is first understood, then assessed for veracity, and ultimately encoded as either believed or not believed. According to the Spinozan theory, comprehension entails belief by default, such that understanding without believing requires an additional process of "unbelieving." Participants (n = 70) were experimentally induced to have beliefs, desires, or mere thoughts about hidden states of the shell game (e.g., believing that the dog is hidden in the upper right corner). That is, participants were induced to have specific "propositional attitudes" toward specific "propositions" in a controlled way. Consistent with the Spinozan theory, we found that thinking about a proposition without believing it is associated with increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus. This was true whether the hidden state was desired by the participant (because of reward) or merely thought about. These findings are consistent with a version of the Spinozan theory whereby unbelieving is an inhibitory control process. We consider potential implications of these results for the phenomena of delusional belief and wishful thinking.

Causal complexity demands community coordination.

Yarkoni's argument risks skepticism about the very possibility of social science: If social phenomena are too causally complex, normal scientific methods could not possibly untangle them. We argue that the problem of causal complexity is best approached at the level of scientific communities and institutions, not the modeling practices of individual scientists.

Visual and auditory brain areas share a representational structure that supports emotion perception.

Emotionally expressive music and dance occur together across the world. This may be because features shared across the senses are represented the same way even in different sensory brain areas, putting music and movement in directly comparable terms. These shared representations may arise from a general need to identify environmentally relevant combinations of sensory features, particularly those that communicate emotion. To test the hypothesis that visual and auditory brain areas share a representational structure, we created music and animation stimuli with crossmodally matched features expressing a range of emotions. Participants confirmed that each emotion corresponded to a set of features shared across music and movement. A subset of participants viewed both music and animation during brain scanning, revealing that representations in auditory and visual brain areas were similar to one another. This shared representation captured not only simple stimulus features but also combinations of features associated with emotion judgments. The posterior superior temporal cortex represented both music and movement using this same structure, suggesting supramodal abstraction of sensory content. Further exploratory analysis revealed that early visual cortex used this shared representational structure even when stimuli were presented auditorily. We propose that crossmodally shared representations support mutually reinforcing dynamics across auditory and visual brain areas, facilitating crossmodal comparison. These shared representations may help explain why emotions are so readily perceived and why some dynamic emotional expressions can generalize across cultural contexts.

Rapid dissonant grunting, or, but why does music sound the way it does?

Each target article contributes important proto-musical building blocks that constrain music as-we-know-it. However, neither the credible signaling nor social bonding accounts elucidate the central mystery of why music sounds the way it does. Getting there requires working out how proto-musical building blocks combine and interact to create the complex, rich, and affecting music humans create and enjoy.

A multi-sensory code for emotional arousal.

People express emotion using their voice, face and movement, as well as through abstract forms as in art, architecture and music. The structure of these expressions often seems intuitively linked to its meaning: romantic poetry is written in flowery curlicues, while the logos of death metal bands use spiky script. Here, we show that these associations are universally understood because they are signalled using a multi-sensory code for emotional arousal. Specifically, variation in the central tendency of the frequency spectrum of a stimulus-its spectral centroid-is used by signal senders to express emotional arousal, and by signal receivers to make emotional arousal judgements. We show that this code is used across sounds, shapes, speech and human body movements, providing a strong multi-sensory signal that can be used to efficiently estimate an agent's level of emotional arousal.

Prevalence-induced concept change in human judgment.

Why do some social problems seem so intractable? In a series of experiments, we show that people often respond to decreases in the prevalence of a stimulus by expanding their concept of it. When blue dots became rare, participants began to see purple dots as blue; when threatening faces became rare, participants began to see neutral faces as threatening; and when unethical requests became rare, participants began to see innocuous requests as unethical. This "prevalence-induced concept change" occurred even when participants were forewarned about it and even when they were instructed and paid to resist it. Social problems may seem intractable in part because reductions in their prevalence lead people to see more of them.

Music and movement share a dynamic structure that supports universal expressions of emotion.

Music moves us. Its kinetic power is the foundation of human behaviors as diverse as dance, romance, lullabies, and the military march. Despite its significance, the music-movement relationship is poorly understood. We present an empirical method for testing whether music and movement share a common structure that affords equivalent and universal emotional expressions. Our method uses a computer program that can generate matching examples of music and movement from a single set of features: rate, jitter (regularity of rate), direction, step size, and dissonance/visual spikiness. We applied our method in two experiments, one in the United States and another in an isolated tribal village in Cambodia. These experiments revealed three things: (i) each emotion was represented by a unique combination of features, (ii) each combination expressed the same emotion in both music and movement, and (iii) this common structure between music and movement was evident within and across cultures.

Associations between auditory pitch and visual elevation do not depend on language: evidence from a remote population.

Associations between auditory pitch and visual elevation are widespread in many languages, and behavioral associations have been extensively documented between height and pitch among speakers of those languages. However, it remains unclear whether perceptual correspondences between auditory pitch and visual elevation inform these linguistic associations, or merely reflect them. We probed this cross-modal mapping in members of a remote Kreung hill tribe in northeastern Cambodia who do not use spatial language to describe pitch. Participants viewed shapes rising or falling in space while hearing sounds either rising or falling in pitch, and reported on the auditory change. Associations between pitch and vertical position in the Kreung were similar to those demonstrated in populations where pitch is described in terms of spatial height. These results suggest that associations between visual elevation and auditory pitch can arise independently of language. Thus, widespread linguistic associations between pitch and elevation may reflect universally predisposed perceptual correspondences.