Relationship between use of electronic health record features and health care quality: results of a statewide survey.

BACKGROUND: Electronic health records (EHRs) are widely viewed as useful tools for supporting the provision of high quality healthcare. However, evidence regarding their effectiveness for this purpose is mixed, and existing studies have generally considered EHR usage a binary factor and have not considered the availability and use of specific EHR features. OBJECTIVE: To assess the relationship between the use of an EHR and the use of specific EHR features with quality of care. RESEARCH DESIGN: A statewide mail survey of physicians in Massachusetts conducted in 2005. The results of the survey were linked with Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) quality measures, and generalized linear regression models were estimated to examine the associations between the use of EHRs and specific EHR features with quality measures, adjusting for physician practice characteristics. SUBJECTS: A stratified random sample of 1884 licensed physicians in Massachusetts, 1345 of whom responded. Of these, 507 had HEDIS measures available and were included in the analysis (measures are only available for primary care providers). MEASURE: Performance on HEDIS quality measures. RESULTS: The survey had a response rate of 71%. There was no statistically significant association between use of an EHR as a binary factor and performance on any of the HEDIS measure groups. However, there were statistically significant associations between the use of many, but not all, specific EHR features and HEDIS measure group scores. The associations were strongest for the problem list, visit note and radiology test result EHR features and for quality measures relating to women's health, colon cancer screening, and cancer prevention. For example, users of problem list functionality performed better on women's health, depression, colon cancer screening, and cancer prevention measures, with problem list users outperforming nonusers by 3.3% to 9.6% points on HEDIS measure group scores (all significant at the P < 0.05 level). However, these associations were not universal. CONCLUSIONS: Consistent with past studies, there was no significant relationship between use of EHR as a binary factor and performance on quality measures. However, availability and use of specific EHR features by primary care physicians was associated with higher performance on certain quality measures. These results suggest that, to maximize health care quality, developers, implementers and certifiers of EHRs should focus on increasing the adoption of robust EHR systems and increasing the use of specific features rather than simply aiming to deploy an EHR regardless of functionality.

The impact of pay-for-performance on health care quality in Massachusetts, 2001-2003.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has become one of the dominant approaches to improving quality of care, yet few studies have evaluated its effectiveness. We evaluated the impact on quality of all P4P programs introduced into physician group contracts during 2001-2003 by the five major commercial health plans operating in Massachusetts. Overall, P4P contracts were not associated with greater improvement in quality compared to a rising secular trend. Future research is required to determine whether changes to the magnitude, structure, or alignment of P4P incentives can lead to improved quality.

Does affiliation of physician groups with one another produce higher quality primary care?

PURPOSE: Recent reports have emphasized the importance of delivery systems in improving health care quality. However, few prior studies have assessed differences in primary care quality between physician groups that differ in size and organizational configuration. We examined whether larger physician group size and affiliation with networks of multiple groups are associated with higher quality of care. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional observational analysis of 132 physician groups (including 4,358 physicians) who delivered primary care services in Massachusetts in 2002. We compared physician groups on performance scores for 12 Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) measures reflecting processes of adult primary care. RESULTS: Network-affiliated physician groups had higher performance scores than non-affiliated groups for 10 of the 12 HEDIS measures (p < 0.05). There was no consistent relationship between group size and performance scores. Multivariable models including group size, network affiliation, and health plan showed that network-affiliated groups had higher performance scores than non-affiliated groups on 8 of the 12 HEDIS measures (p < 0.05), and larger group size was not associated with higher performance scores. Adjusted differences in the performance scores of network-affiliated and non-affiliated groups ranged from 2% to 15%. For 4 HEDIS measures related to diabetes care, performance score differences between network-affiliated and non-affiliated groups were most apparent among the smallest groups. CONCLUSIONS: Physician group affiliation with networks of multiple groups was associated with higher quality, and for measures of diabetes care the quality advantage of network-affiliation was most evident among smaller physician groups.

The response of physician groups to P4P incentives.

OBJECTIVES: Despite substantial enthusiasm among insurers and federal policy makers for pay-for-performance incentives, little is known about the current scope of these incentives or their influence on the delivery of care. To assess the scope and magnitude of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives among physician groups and to examine whether such incentives are associated with quality improvement initiatives. STUDY DESIGN: Structured telephone survey of leaders of physician groups delivering primary care in Massachusetts. ASSESSED METHODS: Prevalence of P4P incentives among physician groups tied to specific measures of quality or utilization and prevalence of physician group quality improvement initiatives. RESULTS: Most group leaders (89%) reported P4P incentives in at least 1 commercial health plan contract. Incentives were tied to performance on Health Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) quality measures (89% of all groups), utilization measures (66%), use of information technology (52%), and patient satisfaction (37%). Among the groups with P4P and knowledge of all revenue streams, the incentives accounted for 2.2% (range, 0.3%-8.8%) of revenue. P4P incentives tied to HEDIS quality measures were positively associated with groups' quality improvement initiatives (odds ratio, 1.6; P = .02). Thirty-six percent of group leaders with P4P incentives reported that they were very important or moderately important to the group's financial success. CONCLUSIONS: P4P incentives are now common among physician groups in Massachusetts, and these incentives most commonly reward higher clinical quality or lower utilization of care. Although the scope and magnitude of incentives are still modest for many groups, we found an association between P4P incentives and the use of quality improvement initiatives.