Spirituality As A Determinant Of Health: Emerging Policies, Practices, And Systems.

Reimagining public health's future should include explicitly considering spirituality as a social determinant of health that is linked to human goods and is deeply valued by people and their communities. Spirituality includes a sense of ultimate meaning, purpose, transcendence, and connectedness. With that end in mind, we assessed how recommendations recently issued by an expert panel for integrating spiritual factors into public health and medicine are being adopted in current practice in the United States. These recommendations emerged from a systematic review of empirical evidence on spirituality, serious illness, and population health published between 2000 and 2022. For each recommendation, we reviewed current federal, state, and local policies and practices recognizing spiritual factors, and we considered the ways in which they reflected the panel's recommendations. In this article, we highlight opportunities for broader application and scale while also noting the potential harms and benefits associated with incorporating these recommendations in various contexts. This analysis, while respecting the spiritual and religious diversity of the US population, identifies promising approaches for strengthening US public health by integrating spiritual considerations to inform person- and community-centered policy and practice.

Three Arguments Against Institutional Conscientious Objection, and Why They Are (Metaphysically) Unconvincing.

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection.

Genetic disenhancement and xenotransplantation: diminishing pigs' capacity to experience suffering through genetic engineering.

One objection to xenotransplantation is that it will require the large-scale breeding, raising and killing of genetically modified pigs. The pigs will need to be raised in designated pathogen-free facilities and undergo a range of medical tests before having their organs removed and being euthanised. As a result, they will have significantly shortened life expectancies, will experience pain and suffering and be subject to a degree of social and environmental deprivation. To minimise the impact of these factors, we propose the following option for consideration-ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it becomes possible to do so and if that pain and suffering cannot be eliminated by other means. Despite not being a morally ideal 'solution', it is morally better to prevent unavoidable pain until a viable non-animal alternative becomes available.

An Ethical Examination of Donor Anonymity and a Defence of a Legal Ban on Anonymous Donation and the Establishment of a Central Register.

Many if not most sperm donors in the early years of IVF donated under conditions of anonymity. There is, however, a growing awareness of the ethical cost of withholding identifying parental information from donor children. Today, anonymous donation is illegal in many jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions have gone as far as retrospectively invalidating contracts whereby donors were guaranteed anonymity. This article provides a critical evaluation of the ethics and legality of anonymous donation. We defend Australian and British legislation that has outlawed donor anonymity, and we argue for the establishment of a central registry that provides donor children with the ability to easily and reliably access identifying information about their donor parents.

Abortion, euthanasia, and the limits of principlism.

Principlism is an ethical framework that has dominated bioethical discourse for the past 50 years. There are differing perspectives on its proper scope and limits. In this article, we consider to what extent principlism provides guidance for the abortion and euthanasia debates. We argue that whilst principlism may be considered a useful framework for structuring bioethical discourse, it does not in itself allow for the resolution of these neuralgic policy discussions. Scholars have attempted to use principlism to analyse the ethics and legality of abortion and euthanasia; but such efforts are methodologically problematic. We close with a consideration of the proper scope of principlism in bioethics-a vision that is more modest than the manner in which principlism is often deployed in contemporary academic bioethics and medical education.

On the importance of consistency: a response to Giubilini et al.

Giubilini et al offer some helpful reflections on the conscientious provision of medical care and whether and in what circumstances professional associations ought to support the conscientious provision of abortion in circumstances where abortion is banned or heavily restricted. I have several reservations, however, about the argument developed in the article. First, the essay makes questionable use of the case of Savita Halappanavar to justify its central argument about conscientious provision. Second, there is an apparent inconsistency between this article and the authors' statements elsewhere about the conscientious refusal of care. Third, there are risks that attend to professional associations supporting practitioners who break the law, and yet Giubilini et al do not give sufficient attention to this. This response will briefly discuss these three concerns.

Why Conscience Matters: A Theory of Conscience and Its Relevance to Conscientious Objection in Medicine.

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living a moral life. In section one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent's identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one's capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection.

Conscientious Objection in Health Care: Why the Professional Duty Argument is Unconvincing.

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in health care. Specifically, several commentators have discussed the implications that conscientious objection has for the delivery of timely, efficient, and nondiscriminatory medical care. In this paper, I discuss the main argument put forward by the most prominent critics of conscientious objection-what I call the Professional Duty Argument or PDA. According to proponents of PDA, doctors should place patients' well-being and rights at the center of their professional practice. Doctors should be prepared to set their personal moral or religious beliefs aside where these beliefs conflict with what is legal and considered good medical practice by relevant professional associations. Conscientious objection, on this account, should be heavily restricted, if even allowed at all. I discuss two powerful objections against PDA. The first objection, which I call the fallibility objection, notes that law and professional codes of conduct are fallible guides for ethical conduct and that conscientious objection has in the past and continues today to provide a check on aberrations in law and professional convention. The second, which I call the professional discretion objection, states that restrictions on conscientious objection undermine one of the cornerstones of good medical practice, namely, a practitioner's right to independent professional judgment. I argue that these two objections give us reason to retain conscience clauses in professional codes of conduct.

Vulnerability and Resilience: Phenomenological Analysis of Cancer Patients Value Directives.

CONTEXT: Personal values are individual conceptions of the desirable appraisals and actions that guide our attitudes and behaviour. Advance care planning (ACP) now emphasises the consideration of personal life goals and values expressed as a Values Directive (VD) to guide discussions concerning medical treatment. OBJECTIVE: To investigate the diversity of values, experiences and adaptations expressed in cancer patients VDs. METHODS: Contents of the VDs of ACPs of cancer patients who participated in a randomised control trial comparing a video intervention showing values communication between cancer patient-caregivers with usual care were analysed. Qualitative phenomenological content analysis was used to understand how participants made meaning of their lived experiences. RESULTS: Forty-two participants completed an ACP (37.2% response rate), with 97.6% of these completing a VD (57.1% female, mean age 72 years, 30.1% gastrointestinal cancer). Participants described diverse adjustments to frailty and adaptive coping with deteriorating functionality. Emotional and financial concerns were eased through experiencing benevolence and trust established through family and friendship bonds and reciprocation of care. Death anxiety and ambivalence were expressed concurrently with the experiential acceptance of dying. Secular and sacred rituals featured as an affirmation of their faith or beliefs. CONCLUSION: Cancer patients seek to make meaning of their experiences, concurrently posturing vulnerability and resilience, despite conflicting emotions and experiences. Given that the choices people make as they approach dying relate to their most deeply held values, ACP conversations should explore how patients draw from their values and life goals to optimise their adaptations to illness.

An Ethical Defense of a Mandated Choice Consent Procedure for Deceased Organ Donation.

Organ transplant shortages are ubiquitous in healthcare systems around the world. In response, several commentators have argued for the adoption of an opt-out policy for organ transplantation, whereby individuals would by default be registered as organ donors unless they informed authorities of their desire to opt-out. This may potentially lead to an increase in donation rates. An opt-out system, however, presumes consent even when it is evident that a significant minority are resistant to organ donation. In this article, we defend a mandated choice framework for consent to deceased organ donation. A mandated choice framework, coupled with good public education, would likely increase donation rates. More importantly, however, a mandated choice framework would respect the autonomous preferences of people who do not wish to donate. We focus in particular on the Australian healthcare context, and consider how a mandated choice system could function as an ethical means to increase the organ donation rate in Australia. We make the novel proposal that all individuals who vote at an Australian federal election be required to state their organ donation preferences when voting.

First among equals? Adaptive preferences and the limits of autonomy in medical ethics.

Respect for patient autonomy is a central principle of medical ethics. However, there are important unresolved questions about the characteristics of an autonomous decision, and whether some autonomous preferences should be subject to more scrutiny than others.In this paper, we consider whether inappropriately adaptive preferences-preferences that are based on and that may perpetuate social injustice-should be categorised as autonomous in a way that gives them normative authority. Some philosophers have argued that inappropriately adaptive preferences do not have normative authority, because they are only a reflection of a person's social context and not of their true self. Under this view, medical professionals who refuse to carry out actions which are based on inappropriately adaptive preferences are not in fact violating their patient's autonomy. However, we argue that it is very difficult to articulate a systematic and principled distinction between normal autonomous preferences and inappropriately adaptive preferences, especially if this distinction needs to be useful for clinicians in real-life situations. This makes it difficult to argue that inappropriately adaptive preferences are straightforwardly non-autonomous.Given this problem, we argue that there are significant theoretical issues with contemporary understandings of autonomy in bioethics. We discuss what this might mean for the practice of medicine and for medical ethics education.

Why should HCWs receive priority access to vaccines in a pandemic?

BACKGROUND: Viral pandemics present a range of ethical challenges for policy makers, not the least among which are difficult decisions about how to allocate scarce healthcare resources. One important question is whether healthcare workers (HCWs) should receive priority access to a vaccine in the event that an effective vaccine becomes available. This question is especially relevant in the coronavirus pandemic with governments and health authorities currently facing questions of distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. MAIN TEXT: In this article, we critically evaluate the most common ethical arguments for granting healthcare workers priority access to a vaccine. We review the existing literature on this topic, and analyse both deontological and utilitarian arguments in favour of HCW prioritisation. For illustrative purposes, we focus in particular on the distribution of a COVID-19 vaccine. We also explore some practical complexities attendant on arguments in favour of HCW prioritisation. CONCLUSIONS: We argue that there are deontological and utilitarian cases for prioritising HCWs. Indeed, the widely held view that we should prioritise HCWs represents an example of ethical convergence. Complexities arise, however, when considering who should be included in the category of HCW, and who else should receive priority in addition to HCWs.

The Content, Teaching Methods and Effectiveness of Spiritual Care Training for Healthcare Professionals: A Mixed-Methods Systematic Review.

CONTEXT: Spirituality has been demonstrated to play an important role in healthcare, yet many staff feel ill-equipped to deliver spiritual care. Spiritual care training programs have been developed to address this need. OBJECTIVE: The aim of this mixed-methods systematic review was to identify spiritual care training programs for healthcare professionals or students, and to investigate program content, teaching methods, key outcomes, and identified challenges and facilitators. METHODS: A mixed-methods systematic review was conducted. The search terms ('religio*' OR 'spiritual*' OR 'existenti*') were combined with ('educat*' OR 'train*' OR 'curricul*' OR 'program*'), AND ('care' OR 'therap*' OR 'treatment' OR 'competenc*'). Search terms were entered into the following data bases: PsycINFO, Medline, Cinahl and Web of Science. Findings were restricted to peer-reviewed studies published in English between January 2010 and February 2020. RESULTS: Fifty-five studies were identified. The quality of studies was mixed. Programs encompassed a range of content and teaching methods. Reported outcomes included increased levels of competency across intrapersonal spirituality, interpersonal spirituality, and spiritual assessment and interventions. Identified barriers included competing healthcare priorities, negative perceptions of spirituality and spiritual care, resistance towards focusing on one's own spirituality, staff feeling inadequate, and the need for ongoing training. Facilitators included opportunities for reflection, involvement of chaplains, application of practical tools, opportunities for practice, online training, and managerial support. CONCLUSIONS: Positive outcomes following spiritual care training were identified. Further research is needed to identify patient-related outcomes of staff training, and to examine how the benefits of such training can be maintained over time.

Rationing, Responsibility and Blameworthiness: An Ethical Evaluation of Responsibility-Sensitive Policies for Healthcare Rationing.

Several ethicists have defended the use of responsibility-based criteria in healthcare rationing. Yet in this article we outline two challenges to the implementation of responsibility-based healthcare rationing policies. These two challenges are, namely, that responsibility for past behavior can diminish as an agent changes, and that blame can come apart from responsibility. These challenges suggest that it is more difficult to hold someone responsible for health related actions than proponents of responsibility-sensitive healthcare policies suggest. We close by discussing public health policies that could function as an alternative to contentious, responsibility-sensitive rationing policies.

Respect for persons and the allocation of lifesaving healthcare resources.

Many ethicists argue that we should respect persons when we distribute resources. Yet it is unclear what this means in practice. For some, the idea of respect for persons is synonymous with the idea of respect for autonomy. Yet a principle of respect for autonomy provides limited guidance for how we should distribute scarce medical interventions. In this article, however, I sketch an alternative conception of respect for persons-one that is based on an ethic of mutual accountability. I draw in particular upon Stephen Darwall's writings on respect and the second-person standpoint. I consider the implications of this conception of respect for the distribution of scarce, lifesaving healthcare resources. A second-personal account of respect rules out aggregative approaches to distribution, and instead requires that we give individual consideration to the claims that persons in need make on the resources in our control. The principles that we use to govern our allocation of resources, furthermore, should be principles that are acceptable to all reasonable agents. Building on this insight, the final section of this paper considers how a principle of need can be used as a means to make decisions about the allocation of lifesaving resources.

Persuasion, not coercion or incentivisation, is the best means of promoting COVID-19 vaccination.

Savulescu (forthcoming) argues that it may be ethically acceptable for governments to require citizens be vaccinated against COVID-19. He also recommends that governments consider providing monetary or in-kind incentives to citizens to increase vaccination rates. In this response, we argue against mandatory vaccination and vaccine incentivisation, and instead suggest that targeted public health messaging and a greater responsiveness to the concerns of vaccine-hesitant individuals would be the best strategy to address low vaccination rates.

Reflective disequilibrium: a critical evaluation of the complete lives framework for healthcare rationing.

One prominent view in recent literature on resource allocation is Persad, Emanuel and Wertheimer's complete lives framework for the rationing of lifesaving healthcare interventions (CLF). CLF states that we should prioritise the needs of individuals who have had less opportunity to experience the events that characterise a complete life. Persad et al argue that their system is the product of a successful process of reflective equilibrium-a philosophical methodology whereby theories, principles and considered judgements are balanced with each other and revised until we achieve an acceptable coherence between our various beliefs. Yet I argue that many of the principles and intuitions underpinning CLF conflict with each other, and that Persad et al have failed to achieve an acceptable coherence between them. I focus on three tensions in particular: the conflict between the youngest first principle and Persad et al's investment refinement; the conflict between current medical need and a concern for lifetime equality; and the tension between adopting an objective measure of complete lives and accommodating for differences in life narratives.