Strengthening biological security after COVID-19: Using cartoons for engaging life science stakeholders with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse, not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation. In this paper, we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security. We first discuss the issue of 'dual use' in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Third, we report on the development of an innovative awareness-raising tool, a cartoon series, that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues. Finally, we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.

The vital importance of a web of prevention for effective biosafety and biosecurity in the twenty-first century.

Biological threats are complex and multifaceted, as evidenced by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Their effective prevention and countering require multiple lines of collaborative action and sustained cross-sectorial coordination. This paper reviews the conclusions of Graham Pearson's 1997 JAMA article titled 'The Complementary Role of Environmental and Security Biological Control Regimes in the 21st Century', taking into account the international policy developments that have occurred over the past two decades. The paper underscores the utility of the concept of a 'web of prevention' for elucidating the need for continuous interaction between the international biosafety and international biosecurity regimes, in order to ensure that the life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. The terms 'biosafety' and 'biosecurity' are used to denote the primary purpose of the two regimes: the international biosafety regime seeks to prevent the unintentional (accidental) release of pathogens and toxins, including naturally occurring disease, whereas the biosecurity regime seeks to prevent the deliberate release and misuse of pathogens and toxins. The paper concludes by recommending practical steps for strengthening the implementation of all elements of the web of prevention and upholding the norms against the hostile misuse of life sciences.

80 questions for UK biological security.

Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.

Implementing biosecurity education: approaches, resources and programmes.

This paper aims to present possible approaches, resources and programmes to introduce the topic of biosecurity to life scientists and engineers at the higher education level. Firstly, we summarise key findings from a number of international surveys on biosecurity education that have been carried out in the United States, Europe, Israel and the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, we describe the development of our openly-accessible education resource, illustrating the scope and content of these materials. Thirdly, we report on actual cases of biosecurity education that have been implemented. These include achievements in and lessons derived from the implementation of biosecurity education at the National Defense Medical College in Japan. These experiences are followed by presentation of the expert-level "Train-the-Trainer" programmes subsequently launched by the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom. These examples will help readers to understand how educators can enhance their own understanding about biosecurity issues and how they can then disseminate their knowledge through development of their own customised, relevantly-targeted and stage-tailored education programmes within their own life science communities. By providing these examples, we argue that education for life scientists, policy-makers and other stakeholders about social responsibility on dual-use issues is easily achievable and need not be expensive, time-consuming or over-burdening. We suggest that recurring classes or courses be held at appropriate times during educational programmes to accommodate the developing expertise and advancing learning stages of students.

Biosafety, biosecurity and internationally mandated regulatory regimes: compliance mechanisms for education and global health security.

This paper highlights the biosafety and biosecurity training obligations that three international regulatory regimes place upon states parties. The duty to report upon the existence of such provisions as evidence of compliance is discussed in relation to each regime. We argue that such mechanisms can be regarded as building blocks for the development and delivery of complementary biosafety and biosecurity teaching and training materials. We show that such building blocks represent foundations upon which life and associated scientists--through greater awareness of biosecurity concerns--can better fulfil their responsibilities to guard their work from misuse in the future.

Online applied dual-use biosecurity education: a case study from the University of Bradford.

Reflecting a consensus that emerged at the 2008 Meeting of States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention on the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines; and in regard to the consensus on the importance of awareness raising and education and training programmes, and of the role that these can play in assisting in the implementation of the Convention, this paper highlights how novel online e-learning approaches can efficiently and effectively be deployed in building a sustainable worldwide capability in this much neglected area of education and training. It provides examples of the development and evolution of education and training resources, notes the importance of standing agenda items for the intersessional process of the BWC between the Seventh and Eight Review Conferences and the range of opportunities that therefore arise for States Party and civil society collaboration in building capacity and achieving sustainability in this area.

Economic evaluation of everolimus versus mycophenolate mofetil in combination with cyclosporine and prednisolone in de novo renal transplant recipients.

An economic evaluation was undertaken alongside a multicentre, international, trial of everolimus (Certican). Resource usage within the trial was assessed, and the cost implications of the use of everolimus were evaluated. Recipients of a primary cadaveric kidney transplant were recruited into a double-blind trial and received either everolimus 1.5 mg (n=194); everolimus 3 mg (n=198) or mycophenolate mofetil (MMF) 2 g (n=196). Clinical outcomes and resource usage were monitored for 12 months following transplantation. Local costs were obtained, and global analysis using health sector PPP rates was undertaken. The mean overall cost of treatment was 33,715 dollars (95%CI 30,013 dollars-37,417 dollars) with everolimus 1.5 mg, 38,519 dollars (95%CI 34,094 dollars-42,943 dollars) with everolimus 3 mg and 36,509 dollars (95%CI 32,430 dollars-40,587 dollars) with MMF. Differences between the three groups did not reach statistical significance. In conclusion, the economic analysis showed statistical equivalence over the three arms of the trial. Further work is required to demonstrate the cost consequences of the use of everolimus compared with MMF in renal transplantation patients.

The potential for abuse of genetics in militarily significant biological weapons.

Concern has been expressed at successive Review Conferences of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) regarding the possible misuse of new biological knowledge; this article reviews some of these developments. Genetic manipulation, and genomics in particular, would modify existing pathogens and render previously harmless organisms pathogenic. Viruses could be modified as vectors to alter their pathogenicity in animals and man or act as carriers for genes or toxins. Plant pathogens, particularly fungi, could be modified as biological warfare agents against crops. An effective verification protocol for the BTWC is an essential part of the web of deterrence against these developments.