Implementation of a Physician Incentive Program for 18-Month Developmental Screening in Ontario, Canada.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate factors associated with uptake of a financial incentive for developmental screening at an enhanced 18-month well-child visit (EWCV) in Ontario, Canada. STUDY DESIGN: Population-based cohort study using linked administrative data of children (17-24 months of age) eligible for EWCV between 2009 and 2017. Logistic regression modeled associations of EWCV receipt by provider and patient characteristics. RESULTS: Of 910 976 eligible children, 54.2% received EWCV (annually, 39.2%-61.2%). The odds of assessment were lower for socially vulnerable children, namely, those from the lowest vs highest neighborhood income quintile (aOR, 0.84; 95% CI, 0.83-0.85), those born to refugee vs nonimmigrant mothers (aOR, 0.90; 95% CI, 0.88-0.93), and to teenaged mothers (aOR, 0.70; 95% CI, 0.69-0.71)). Children were more likely to have had developmental screening if cared for by a pediatrician vs family physician (aOR, 1.28; 95% CI, 1.13-1.44), recently trained physician (aOR, 1.38; 95% CI, 1.29-1.48 for ≤5 years in practice vs ≥21 years) and less likely if the physician was male (aOR, 0.64; 95% CI, 0.61-0.66). For physicians eligible for a pay-for-performance immunization bonus, there was a positive association with screening. CONCLUSIONS: In the context of a universal healthcare system and a specific financial incentive, uptake of the developmental assessment increased over time but remains moderate. The implementation of similar interventions or incentives needs to account for physician factors and focus on socially vulnerable children to be effective.

Payment for performance in the Family Health Programme: lessons from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework / Pagamento para desempenho no Programa Saúde da Família: lições do Quality and Outcomes Framework da Inglaterra

OBJECTIVE: Payment for performance financial incentive schemes reward doctors based on the quality and the outcomes of their treatment. In Brazil, the Ministry of Health is looking to scale up its use in public hospitals and some municipalities are developing payment for performance schemes even for the Family Health Programme. In this article the Quality and Outcomes Framework used in the UK since 2004 is discussed, as well as its experience to elaborate some important lessons that Brazilian municipalities should consider before embarking on payment for performance scheme in primary care settings.

OBJETIVO: Esquemas de pagamento para desempenho recompensam o médico baseado na qualidade e no resultado do tratamento dos seus pacientes. O Ministério da Saúde brasileiro analisa seu uso em hospitais públicos e alguns municípios estão desenvolvendo estratégias de pagamento por desempenho para o Programa de Saúde da Família. No artigo discute-se o Quality and Outcomes Framework - esquema de pagamento para desempenho usado no Reino Unido desde 2004, bem como sua experiência para elaborar algumas lições importantes que os municípios brasileiros devem considerar antes de empreender o esquema de pagamento por desempenho na atenção primária.

Payment for performance in the Family Health Programme: lessons from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework.

OBJECTIVE: Payment for performance financial incentive schemes reward doctors based on the quality and the outcomes of their treatment. In Brazil, the Ministry of Health is looking to scale up its use in public hospitals and some municipalities are developing payment for performance schemes even for the Family Health Programme. In this article the Quality and Outcomes Framework used in the UK since 2004 is discussed, as well as its experience to elaborate some important lessons that Brazilian municipalities should consider before embarking on payment for performance scheme in primary care settings.

[Pay for performance in Colombian healthcare]. / Pago por desempeño en el sistema colombiano de salud.

OBJECTIVE: Describing the extent and forms of use of pay for performance (P4P) in Colombian healthcare. METHODS: This was a descriptive study based on interviews and surveys of health insurance agency managers in Bogotá, Colombia. The authors relied on transaction cost theory to interpret the results. RESULTS: P4P was found to be used by contribution scheme insurers in an outpatient setting, basically in promotion and prevention; P4P is not being used in a hospital setting. Subsidized scheme insurers do not use P4P. Similarly, P4P is not being used in the case of so called associated users. CONCLUSIONS: P4P use in Colombia is limited. Colombian practice only partially validates the transaction costs theory approach to governance model attributes, one of which is incentive intensity.