History for some or lesson for all? A systematic review and meta-analysis on the immediate and long-term mental health impact of the 2002-2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak.

BACKGROUND: The aims of this systematic review and meta-analysis are to examine the prevalence of adverse mental health outcomes, both short-term and long-term, among SARS patients, healthcare workers and the general public of SARS-affected regions, and to examine the protective and risk factors associated with these mental health outcomes. METHODS: We conducted a systematic search of the literature using databases such as Medline, Pubmed, Embase, PsycInfo, Web of Science Core Collection, CNKI, the National Central Library Online Catalog and dissertation databases to identify studies in the English or Chinese language published between January 2003 to May 2020 which reported psychological distress and mental health morbidities among SARS patients, healthcare workers, and the general public in regions with major SARS outbreaks. RESULTS: The literature search yielded 6984 titles. Screening resulted in 80 papers for the review, 35 of which were included in the meta-analysis. The prevalence of post-recovery probable or clinician-diagnosed anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among SARS survivors were 19, 20 and 28%, respectively. The prevalence of these outcomes among studies conducted within and beyond 6 months post-discharge was not significantly different. Certain aspects of mental health-related quality of life measures among SARS survivors remained impaired beyond 6 months post-discharge. The prevalence of probable depressive disorder and PTSD among healthcare workers post-SARS were 12 and 11%, respectively. The general public had increased anxiety levels during SARS, but whether there was a clinically significant population-wide mental health impact remained inconclusive. Narrative synthesis revealed occupational exposure to SARS patients and perceived stigmatisation to be risk factors for adverse mental health outcomes among healthcare workers, although causality could not be determined due to the limitations of the studies. CONCLUSIONS: The chronicity of psychiatric morbidities among SARS survivors should alert us to the potential long-term mental health complications of covid-19 patients. Healthcare workers working in high-risk venues should be given adequate mental health support. Stigmatisation against patients and healthcare workers should be explored and addressed. The significant risk of bias and high degree of heterogeneity among included studies limited the certainty of the body of evidence of the review.

Capacitação sobre o COVID-2019 (Coronavírus)

O médico infectologista, André Prudente, sobre o Coronavírus: - história do vírus; - epidemiologia; - quadro clínico; - diagnóstico; - manejo

COVID-19 and Other Pandemics: How Might They Be Prevented?

Pandemics such as influenza, smallpox, and plague have caused the loss of hundreds of millions of lives and have occurred for many centuries. Fortunately, they have been largely eliminated by the use of vaccinations and drugs. More recently, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and now Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) have arisen, and given the current absence of highly effective approved vaccines or drugs, brute-force approaches involving physical barriers are being used to counter virus spread. A major basis for physical protection from respiratory infections is eye, nose, and mouth protection. However, eye protection with goggles is problematic due to "fogging", while nose/mouth protection is complicated by the breathing difficulties associated with non-valved respirators. Here, we give a brief review of the origins and development of face masks and eye protection to counter respiratory infections on the basis of experiments conducted 100 years ago, work that was presaged by the first use of personal protective equipment, "PPE", by the plague doctors of the 17th Century. The results of the review lead to two conclusions: first, that eye protection using filtered eye masks be used to prevent ocular transmission; second, that new, pre-filtered, valved respirators be used to even more effectively block viral transmission.

Occupational health responses to COVID-19: What lessons can we learn from SARS?

On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) received reports of pneumonia cases of unknown etiology in the city of Wuhan in Hubei Province, China. The agent responsible was subsequently identified as a coronavirus-SARS-CoV-2. The WHO declared this disease as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern at the end of January 2020. This event evoked a sense of déjà vu, as it has many similarities to the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) of 2002-2003. Both illnesses were caused by a zoonotic novel coronavirus, both originated during winter in China and both spread rapidly all over the world. However, the case-fatality rate of SARS (9.6%) is higher than that of COVID-19 (<4%). Another zoonotic novel coronavirus, MERS-CoV, was responsible for the Middle East respiratory syndrome, which had a case-fatality rate of 34%. Our experiences in coping with the previous coronavirus outbreaks have better equipped us to face the challenges posed by COVID-19, especially in the health care setting. Among the insights gained from the past outbreaks were: outbreaks caused by viruses are hazardous to healthcare workers; the impact of the disease extends beyond the infection; general principles of prevention and control are effective in containing the disease; the disease poses both a public health as well as an occupational health threat; and emerging infectious diseases pose a continuing threat to the world. Given the perspectives gained and lessons learnt from these past events, we should be better prepared to face the current COVID-19 outbreak.

Overview: The history and pediatric perspectives of severe acute respiratory syndromes: Novel or just like SARS.

Many respiratory viral infections such as influenza and measles result in severe acute respiratory symptoms and epidemics. In the spring of 2003, an epidemic of coronavirus pneumonia spread from Guangzhou to Hong Kong and subsequently to the rest of the world. The WHO coined the acronym SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and subsequently the causative virus as SARS-CoV. In the summer of 2012, epidemic of pneumonia occurred again in Saudi Arabia which was subsequently found to be caused by another novel coronavirus. WHO coined the term MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) to denote the Middle East origin of the novel virus (MERS-CoV). In the winter of 2019, another outbreak of pneumonia occurred in Wuhan, China which rapidly spread globally. Yet another novel coronavirus was identified as the culprit and has been named SARS-CoV-2 due to its similarities with SARS-CoV, and the disease as coronavirus disease-2019. This overview aims to compare and contrast the similarities and differences of these three major episodes of coronavirus outbreak, and conclude that they are essentially the same viral respiratory syndromes caused by similar strains of coronavirus with different names. Coronaviruses have caused major epidemics and outbreaks worldwide in the last two decades. From an epidemiological perspective, they are remarkably similar in the mode of spread by droplets. Special focus is placed on the pediatric aspects, which carry less morbidity and mortality in all three entities.

The deadly coronaviruses: The 2003 SARS pandemic and the 2020 novel coronavirus epidemic in China.

The 2019-nCoV is officially called SARS-CoV-2 and the disease is named COVID-19. This viral epidemic in China has led to the deaths of over 1800 people, mostly elderly or those with an underlying chronic disease or immunosuppressed state. This is the third serious Coronavirus outbreak in less than 20 years, following SARS in 2002-2003 and MERS in 2012. While human strains of Coronavirus are associated with about 15% of cases of the common cold, the SARS-CoV-2 may present with varying degrees of severity, from flu-like symptoms to death. It is currently believed that this deadly Coronavirus strain originated from wild animals at the Huanan market in Wuhan, a city in Hubei province. Bats, snakes and pangolins have been cited as potential carriers based on the sequence homology of CoV isolated from these animals and the viral nucleic acids of the virus isolated from SARS-CoV-2 infected patients. Extreme quarantine measures, including sealing off large cities, closing borders and confining people to their homes, were instituted in January 2020 to prevent spread of the virus, but by that time much of the damage had been done, as human-human transmission became evident. While these quarantine measures are necessary and have prevented a historical disaster along the lines of the Spanish flu, earlier recognition and earlier implementation of quarantine measures may have been even more effective. Lessons learned from SARS resulted in faster determination of the nucleic acid sequence and a more robust quarantine strategy. However, it is clear that finding an effective antiviral and developing a vaccine are still significant challenges. The costs of the epidemic are not limited to medical aspects, as the virus has led to significant sociological, psychological and economic effects globally. Unfortunately, emergence of SARS-CoV-2 has led to numerous reports of Asians being subjected to racist behavior and hate crimes across the world.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Historical, Epidemiologic, and Clinical Features.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), emerged from China and rapidly spread worldwide. Over 8098 people fell ill and 774 died before the epidemic ended in July 2003. Bats are likely an important reservoir for SARS-CoV. SARS-like CoVs have been detected in horseshoe bats and civet cats. The main mode of transmission of SARS-CoV is through inhalation of respiratory droplets. Faeco-oral transmission has been recorded. Strict infection control procedures with respiratory and contact precautions are essential. Fever and respiratory symptoms predominate, and diarrhea is common. Treatment involves supportive care. There are no specific antiviral treatments or vaccines available.

Taiwan's Experience in Hospital Preparedness and Response for Emerging Infectious Diseases.

The Communicable Disease Control Medical Network (CDCMN), established in 2003 after the SARS outbreak in Taiwan, has undergone several phases of modification in structure and activation. The main organizing principles of the CDCMN are centralized isolation of patients with severe highly infectious diseases and centralization of medical resources, as well as a network of designated regional hospitals like those in other countries. The CDCMN is made up of a command system, responding hospitals, and supporting hospitals. It was tested and activated in response to the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009-10 and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014-2016, and it demonstrated high-level functioning and robust capacity. In this article, the history, structure, and operation of the CDCMN is introduced globally for the first time, and the advantages and challenges of this system are discussed. The Taiwanese experience shows an example of a collaboration between the public health system and the medical system that may help other public health authorities plan management and hospital preparedness for highly infectious diseases.

Challenges and Strategies of Laboratory Diagnosis for Newly Emerging Influenza Viruses in Taiwan: A Decade after SARS.

Since the first case of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan was identified in March 2003, viral respiratory infections, in particular the influenza virus, have become a national public health concern. Taiwan would face a serious threat of public health problems if another SARS epidemic overlapped with a flu outbreak. After SARS, the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control accelerated and strengthened domestic research on influenza and expanded the exchange of information with international counterparts. The capacity of influenza A to cross species barriers presents a potential threat to human health. Given the mutations of avian flu viruses such as H7N9, H6N1, and H10N8, all countries, including Taiwan, must equip themselves to face a possible epidemic or pandemic. Such preparedness requires global collaboration.