Face coverings differentially alter valence judgments of emotional expressions.

Face masks that prevent disease transmission obscure facial expressions, impairing nonverbal communication. We assessed the impact of lower (masks) and upper (sunglasses) face coverings on emotional valence judgments of clearly valenced (fearful, happy) and ambiguously valenced (surprised) expressions, the latter of which have both positive and negative meaning. Masks, but not sunglasses, impaired judgments of clearly valenced expressions compared to faces without coverings. Drift diffusion models revealed that lower, but not upper, face coverings slowed evidence accumulation and affected differences in non-judgment processes (i.e., stimulus encoding, response execution time) for all expressions. Our results confirm mask-interference effects in nonverbal communication. The findings have implications for nonverbal and intergroup communication, and we propose guidance for implementing strategies to overcome mask-related interference.

Fact or artifact? Demand characteristics and participants' beliefs can moderate, but do not fully account for, the effects of facial feedback on emotional experience.

The facial feedback hypothesis suggests that an individual's facial expressions can influence their emotional experience (e.g., that smiling can make one feel happier). However, a reoccurring concern is that supposed facial feedback effects are merely methodological artifacts. Six experiments conducted across 29 countries (N = 995) examined the extent to which the effects of posed facial expressions on emotion reports were moderated by (a) the hypothesis communicated to participants (i.e., demand characteristics) and (b) participants' beliefs about facial feedback effects. Results indicated that these methodological artifacts moderated, but did not fully account for, the effects of posed facial expressions on emotion reports. Even when participants were explicitly told or personally believed that facial poses do not influence emotions, they still exhibited facial feedback effects. These results indicate that facial feedback effects are not solely driven by demand or placebo effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

A multi-lab test of the facial feedback hypothesis by the Many Smiles Collaboration.

Following theories of emotional embodiment, the facial feedback hypothesis suggests that individuals' subjective experiences of emotion are influenced by their facial expressions. However, evidence for this hypothesis has been mixed. We thus formed a global adversarial collaboration and carried out a preregistered, multicentre study designed to specify and test the conditions that should most reliably produce facial feedback effects. Data from n = 3,878 participants spanning 19 countries indicated that a facial mimicry and voluntary facial action task could both amplify and initiate feelings of happiness. However, evidence of facial feedback effects was less conclusive when facial feedback was manipulated unobtrusively via a pen-in-mouth task.

Meaningful endings and mixed emotions: The double-edged sword of reminiscence on good times.

Meaningful endings lead people to experience mixed emotions, but it is unclear why. We hypothesized that it is in part because meaningful endings lead people to reminisce on good times. In Study 1, college students who took part in our study on their graduation day (vs. a typical day) reported having spent more time that day reminiscing on good times. Moreover, reminiscence on good times partially mediated the effect of graduation on happiness, sadness, and mixed emotions. In Study 2, we asked undergraduates to reminisce on good (vs. ordinary) times from high school and found that reminiscence on good times elicited happiness, sadness, and mixed emotions. In Study 3, we found that reminiscing on good times that were not (vs. were) repeatable elicited especially intense sadness and mixed emotions. Taken together, results indicate that reminiscing on good times, especially good times gone, elicits mixed emotions and that these emotional consequences help explain why meaningful endings elicit mixed emotions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Feeling good and bad about nothing at all: Evidence that the status quo can elicit mixed feelings.

Sometimes we come out ahead and sometimes we fall behind. Sometimes the status quo is maintained and we end up where we began. The status quo can be disappointing when things might have gone better and relieving when they might have gone worse, but it is not clear how the status quo will feel when things might have gone better or worse. Hume (1739/2000) and Bain (1859) would contend that feelings of disappointment and relief will neutralize one another. The evaluative space model (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994), which conceptualizes the positive and negative substrates of the affect system as separable, raises the possibility that the status quo will elicit mixed feelings in such circumstances. To test this possibility, we had participants play games that offered a 40% chance to win, a 40% chance to lose, and a 20% chance of getting nothing. Participants' self-reported positive and negative affect indicate that the status quo elicited (a) less positive affect than wins and more positive affect than losses, and (b) less negative affect than losses and more negative affect than wins. More interestingly, the status quo elicited more mixed feelings than both wins and losses. Thus, when things might have turned out either better or worse, the status quo may best be conceived of as a bittersweet nothing. More generally, results indicate that a complete understanding of how counterfactual comparisons influence emotions requires conceptualizing positivity and negative as separable. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

A meta-analysis of the facial feedback literature: Effects of facial feedback on emotional experience are small and variable.

The facial feedback hypothesis suggests that an individual's experience of emotion is influenced by feedback from their facial movements. To evaluate the cumulative evidence for this hypothesis, we conducted a meta-analysis on 286 effect sizes derived from 138 studies that manipulated facial feedback and collected emotion self-reports. Using random effects meta-regression with robust variance estimates, we found that the overall effect of facial feedback was significant but small. Results also indicated that feedback effects are stronger in some circumstances than others. We examined 12 potential moderators, and 3 were associated with differences in effect sizes: (a) Type of emotional outcome: Facial feedback influenced emotional experience (e.g., reported amusement) and, to a greater degree, affective judgments of a stimulus (e.g., the objective funniness of a cartoon). Three publication bias detection methods did not reveal evidence of publication bias in studies examining the effects of facial feedback on emotional experience, but all 3 methods revealed evidence of publication bias in studies examining affective judgments. (b) Presence of emotional stimuli: Facial feedback effects on emotional experience were larger in the absence of emotionally evocative stimuli (e.g., cartoons). (c) Type of stimuli: When participants were presented with emotionally evocative stimuli, facial feedback effects were larger in the presence of some types of stimuli (e.g., emotional sentences) than others (e.g., pictures). The available evidence supports the facial feedback hypothesis' central claim that facial feedback influences emotional experience, although these effects tend to be small and heterogeneous. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

On the relationship between positive and negative affect: Their correlation and their co-occurrence.

Understanding the nature of emotional experience requires understanding the relationship between positive and negative affect. Two particularly important aspects of that relationship are the extent to which positive and negative affect are correlated with one another and the extent to which they co-occur. Some researchers have assumed that weak negative correlations imply greater co-occurrence (i.e., more mixed emotions) than do strong negative correlations, but others have noted that correlations may imply very little about co-occurrence. We investigated the relationship between the correlation between positive and negative affect and co-occurrence. Participants in each of 2 samples provided moment-to-moment happiness and sadness ratings as they watched an evocative film and listened to music. Results indicated (a) that 4 measures of the correlation between positive and negative affect were quite highly related to 1 another; (b) that the strength of the correlation between measures of mixed emotions varied considerably; (c) that correlational measures were generally (but not always) weakly correlated with mixed emotion measures; and (d) that bittersweet stimuli consistently led to elevations in mixed emotion measures but did not consistently weaken the correlation between positive and negative affect. Results highlight that the correlation between positive and negative affect and their co-occurrence are distinct aspects of the relationship between positive and negative affect. Such insight helps clarify the implications of existing work on age-related and cultural differences in emotional experience and sets the stage for greater understanding of the experience of mixed emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record

A temporal examination of co-activated emotion valence networks in schizophrenia and schizotypy.

Emotional abnormalities are prominent across the schizophrenia spectrum. To better define these abnormalities, we examined state emotional functions across opposing ends of the spectrum, notably in chronic outpatients with schizophrenia (Study 1) and college students with psychometrically defined schizotypy (Study 2). In line with existing studies, we predicted that individuals with schizophrenia would show unusually co-activated positive and negative emotions while college students with schizotypy would show abnormally low positive and abnormally high negative emotions. Drawing from the affective science literature, we employed continuous emotion ratings in response to a dynamic and evocatively "bittersweet" stimulus. Participants included 27 individuals with schizophrenia, 39 individuals with psychometrically defined schizotypy and 26 community and 35 college control participants. Participants continuously rated their state happiness and sadness throughout a six-minute clip from a tragicomic film (i.e., Life is Beautiful). In contrast to expectations as well as the extant literature, there were no state emotional abnormalities noted from either schizophrenia-spectrum group. Of particular note, neither individuals with schizophrenia nor individuals with schizotypy were abnormal in their experience of state negative, positive or coactivated emotions. Conversely, abnormalities in trait emotion were observed in both groups relative to their respective control groups. These results help confirm that the schizophrenia-spectrum is not characterized by deficits in state emotional experience and suggest that sadness is not abnormally co-activated with pleasant emotions. These results are critical for clarifying the "chronometry" of emotional dysfunctions across the schizophrenia-spectrum.

Feeling more together: group attention intensifies emotion.

The idea that group contexts can intensify emotions is centuries old. Yet, evidence that speaks to how, or if, emotions become more intense in groups remains elusive. Here we examine the novel possibility that group attention--the experience of simultaneous coattention with one's group members--increases emotional intensity relative to attending alone, coattending with strangers, or attending nonsimultaneously with one's group members. In Study 1, scary advertisements felt scarier under group attention. In Study 2, group attention intensified feelings of sadness to negative images, and feelings of happiness to positive images. In Study 3, group attention during a video depicting homelessness led to greater sadness that prompted larger donations to charities benefiting the homeless. In Studies 4 and 5, group attention increased the amount of cognitive resources allocated toward sad and amusing videos (as indexed by the percentage of thoughts referencing video content), leading to more sadness and happiness, respectively. In all, these effects could not be explained by differences in physiological arousal, emotional contagion, or vicarious emotional experience. Greater fear, gloom, and glee can thus result from group attention to scary, sad, and happy events, respectively.

Threatening scenes but not threatening faces shorten time-to-contact estimates.

We previously reported that time-to-contact (TTC) judgments of threatening scene pictures (e.g., frontal attacks) resulted in shortened estimations and were mediated by cognitive processes, and that judgments of threatening (e.g., angry) face pictures resulted in a smaller effect and did not seem cognitively mediated. In the present study, the effects of threatening scenes and faces were compared in two different tasks. An effect of threatening scene pictures occurred in a prediction-motion task, which putatively requires cognitive motion extrapolation, but not in a relative TTC judgment task, which was designed to be less reliant on cognitive processes. An effect of threatening face pictures did not occur in either task. We propose that an object's explicit potential of threat per se, and not only emotional valence, underlies the effect of threatening scenes on TTC judgments and that such an effect occurs only when the task allows sufficient cognitive processing. Results are consistent with distinctions between predator and social fear systems and different underlying physiological mechanisms. Not all threatening information elicits the same responses, and whether an effect occurs at all may depend on the task and the degree to which the task involves cognitive processes.

Distinct sources of self-discrepancies: effects of being who you want to be and wanting to be who you are on well-being.

Self-discrepancy theory contends that well-being depends, in part, on the amount of overlap between one's actual and ideal selves. There is a variety of supportive evidence, but Rabbi Hyman Schachtel's (1954, The real enjoyment of living, New York, NY, Dutton) contention that "happiness is not having what you want, but wanting what you have" (p. 37) highlights that a distinction between two potential sources of overlap between one's actual and ideal selves has been overlooked. Whereas most measures of ideal self-discrepancies index the extent to which people are who they want to be (i.e., ideal self-actualization [ISA]), others index the extent to which people want to be who they are (i.e., actual self-regard [ASR]). In several studies, we measured ideal self-actualization by asking people to identify traits they would ideally like to possess and rate the extent to which they had those traits. We also measured actual self-regard by asking participants to identify traits they possessed and indicate the extent to which they wanted those traits. In all 4 studies, ideal self-actualization and actual self-regard were distinct from one another (rs = .24 to .32) and both were distinct from self-compassion (Study 1) and global self-esteem (Study 4). Moreover, ASR consistently accounted for unique variance in aspects of well-being (e.g., subjective well-being, positive affect, psychological growth) and ISA often did so. Finally, a longitudinal study provided evidence that actual self-regard is a precursor, but not a consequence, of subjective well-being (Study 4).

What might have been? The role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and lateral orbitofrontal cortex in counterfactual emotions and choice.

Counterfactual feelings of regret occur when people make comparisons between an actual outcome and a better outcome that would have occurred under a different choice. We investigated the choices of individuals with damage to the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and the lateral orbital frontal cortex (LOFC) to see whether their emotional responses were sensitive to regret. Participants made choices between gambles, each with monetary outcomes. After every choice, subjects learned the consequences of both gambles and rated their emotional response to the outcome. Normal subjects and lesion control subjects tended to make better choices and reported post-decision emotions that were sensitive to regret comparisons. VMPFC patients tended to make worse choices, and, contrary to our predictions, they reported emotions that were sensitive to regret comparisons. In contrast, LOFC patients made better choices, but reported emotional reactions that were insensitive to regret comparisons. We suggest the VMPFC is involved in the association between choices and anticipated emotions that guide future choices, while the LOFC is involved in experienced emotions that follow choices, emotions that may signal the need for behavioral change.

Children's understanding and experience of mixed emotions: the roles of age, gender, and empathy.

The present study examined the development of children's ability report understanding and experiencing allocentric mixed emotions, and explored the relation of gender and empathic ability to these skills. Participants (128 elementary school-aged children [63 boys, 65 girls]) were shown a movie clip with bittersweet themes to elicit mixed emotions. Findings from this study are consistent with prior research (Larsen, To, & Fireman, 2007), supporting a developmental progression in children's ability to both understand and report experiencing mixed emotions, with the two as distinct skills and children reporting understanding earlier than experiencing of emotions. Consistent with previous research, girls performed significantly better on the emotion experience task. Finally, results provided evidence that empathy partially mediates the relationship between age and reports of mixed emotion experience, but no evidence that empathy plays a role in mixed emotional understanding.

Evidence for mixed feelings of happiness and sadness from brief moments in time.

Theorists disagree about whether valence is a basic building block of affective experience or whether the positive and negative substrates underlying valence are separable in experience. If positivity and negativity are separable in experience, people should be able to feel happy and sad at the same time. We addressed limitations of earlier evidence for mixed feelings by collecting moment-to-moment measures of happiness and sadness that required participants to monitor their feelings only occasionally. In Study 1, participants were occasionally cued to press one button if they felt happy and another if they felt sad. Participants spent more time reporting mixed feelings (i.e., simultaneously pressing both buttons) during bittersweet scenes than non-bittersweet scenes. In Study 2, participants reported their feelings only once. Participants spent more time reporting mixed feelings when cued during a bittersweet, as opposed to non-bittersweet, scene. These results extend earlier evidence that happiness and sadness can co-occur.

Threatening pictures induce shortened time-to-contact estimates.

The ability to estimate the time remaining until collision occurs with an approaching object (time-to-collision, TTC) is crucial for any mobile animal. In the present study, we report three experiments examining whether higher level cognitive factors, represented by affective value of approaching objects, could affect judgments of TTC. A theory of TTC estimates based purely on the optical variable tau does not predict an influence of the affective value of an approaching object. In Experiments 1 and 2, we compared TTC estimates of threatening and neutral pictures that approached our participants on a screen and disappeared from view before a collision would have occurred. Images were taken from the International Affective Picture System. Threatening pictures-in particular, the picture of a frontal attack-were judged to collide earlier than neutral pictures. In Experiment 3, the approaching stimuli were faces with different emotional expressions. TTC tended to be underestimated for angry faces. We discuss these results, considering the roles of affective and cognitive mechanisms modulating TTC estimation and general time perception.

On "risk" and reward: investigating state anhedonia in psychometrically defined schizotypy and schizophrenia.

Anhedonia, defined as dysfunction in the experience of pleasant emotions, is a hallmark symptom of the schizophrenia spectrum. Of interest, it is well documented that patients with schizophrenia, at least as a group, do not show reductions in their state experience of pleasant stimuli. However, there is emerging evidence to suggest that individuals with schizotypy--defined as the personality organization reflecting the latent vulnerability for schizophrenia--do show these state deficits. This is paradoxical in that schizophrenia reflects a more pathological state in virtually every conceivable domain as compared with schizotypy. The present study examined self-reported affective reactions to neutral-, bad-, and good-valenced stimuli in individuals with psychometrically defined schizotypy and schizophrenia. Two separate control groups were also included, comprising psychometrically defined controls and stable outpatients with affective disorders. With no exceptions, the schizotypy group reported significantly less pleasant affect for each of the three conditions than each of the other groups. Conversely, the schizophrenia group did not statistically differ from the control groups for any of the conditions. Within both the schizotypy and schizophrenia groups, severity of negative symptoms/traits was associated with less pleasant report. We found that individuals with prominent negative symptoms and traits from the schizophrenia and schizotypy groups resembled each other in terms of state anhedonia. The present findings did not appear to reflect comorbid depression or anxiety. Our discussion centers on this apparent paradox in the schizophrenia spectrum--that individuals with schizotypy exhibit state anhedonia, whereas patients with schizophrenia do not.

It's a bittersweet symphony: simultaneously mixed emotional responses to music with conflicting cues.

Some evidence indicates that emotional reactions to music can be organized along a bipolar valence dimension ranging from pleasant states (e.g., happiness) to unpleasant states (e.g., sadness), but songs can contain some cues that elicit happiness (e.g., fast tempos) and others that elicit sadness (e.g., minor modes). Some models of emotion contend that valence is a basic building block of emotional experience, which implies that songs with conflicting cues cannot make people feel happy and sad at the same time. Other models contend that positivity and negativity are separable in experience, which implies that music with conflicting cues might elicit simultaneously mixed emotions of happiness and sadness. Hunter, Schellenberg, and Schimmack (2008) tested these possibilities by having subjects report their happiness and sadness after listening to music with conflicting cues (e.g., fast songs in minor modes) and consistent cues (e.g., fast songs in major modes). Results indicated that music with conflicting cues elicited mixed emotions, but it remains unclear whether subjects simultaneously felt happy and sad or merely vacillated between happiness and sadness. To examine these possibilities, we had subjects press one button whenever they felt happy and another button whenever they felt sad as they listened to songs with conflicting and consistent cues. Results revealed that subjects spent more time simultaneously pressing both buttons during songs with conflicting, as opposed to consistent, cues. These findings indicate that songs with conflicting cues can simultaneously elicit happiness and sadness and that positivity and negativity are separable in experience.

Further evidence for mixed emotions.

Emotion theorists have long debated whether valence, which ranges from pleasant to unpleasant states, is an irreducible aspect of the experience of emotion or whether positivity and negativity are separable in experience. If valence is irreducible, it follows that people cannot feel happy and sad at the same time. Conversely, if positivity and negativity are separable, people may be able to experience such mixed emotions. The authors tested several alternative interpretations for prior evidence that happiness and sadness can co-occur in bittersweet situations (i.e., those containing both pleasant and unpleasant aspects). One possibility is that subjects who reported mixed emotions merely vacillated between happiness and sadness. The authors tested this hypothesis in Studies 1-3 by asking subjects to complete online continuous measures of happiness and sadness. Subjects reported more simultaneously mixed emotions during a bittersweet film clip than during a control clip. Another possibility is that subjects in earlier studies reported mixed emotions only because they were explicitly asked whether they felt happy and sad. The authors tested this hypothesis in Studies 4-6 with open-ended measures of emotion. Subjects were more likely to report mixed emotions after the bittersweet clip than the control clip. Both patterns occurred even when subjects were told that they were not expected to report mixed emotions (Studies 2 and 5) and among subjects who did not previously believe that people could simultaneously feel happy and sad (Studies 3 and 6). These results provide further evidence that positivity and negativity are separable in experience.

Comparing gains and losses.

Loss aversion in choice is commonly assumed to arise from the anticipation that losses have a greater effect on feelings than gains, but evidence for this assumption in research on judged feelings is mixed. We argue that loss aversion is present in judged feelings when people compare gains and losses and assess them on a common scale. But many situations in which people judge and express their feelings lack these features. When judging their feelings about an outcome, people naturally consider a context of similar outcomes for comparison (e.g., they consider losses against other losses). This process permits gains and losses to be normed separately and produces psychological scale units that may not be the same in size or meaning for gains and losses. Our experiments show loss aversion in judged feelings for tasks that encourage gain-loss comparisons, but not tasks that discourage them, particularly those using bipolar scales.