Confirmation Bias through Selective Use of Evidence in Human Cortex.

Decision-makers often process new evidence selectively, depending on their current beliefs about the world. We asked whether such confirmation biases result from biases in the encoding of sensory evidence in the brain, or alternatively in the utilization of encoded evidence for behavior. Human participants estimated the source of a sequence of visual-spatial evidence samples while we measured cortical population activity with magnetoencephalography (MEG). Halfway through the sequence, participants were prompted to judge the more likely source category. Their processing of subsequent evidence depended on its consistency with the previously chosen category, but the encoding of evidence in cortical activity did not. Instead, the encoded evidence in parietal and primary visual cortex contributed less to the estimation report when that evidence was inconsistent with the previous choice. We conclude that confirmation bias originates from the way in which decision-makers utilize information encoded in the brain. This provides room for deliberative control.

Activity in primate visual cortex is minimally driven by spontaneous movements.

Organisms process sensory information in the context of their own moving bodies, an idea referred to as embodiment. This idea is important for developmental neuroscience, robotics and systems neuroscience. The mechanisms supporting embodiment are unknown, but a manifestation could be the observation in mice of brain-wide neuromodulation, including in the primary visual cortex, driven by task-irrelevant spontaneous body movements. We tested this hypothesis in macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta), a primate model for human vision, by simultaneously recording visual cortex activity and facial and body movements. We also sought a direct comparison using an analogous approach to those used in mouse studies. Here we found that activity in the primate visual cortex (V1, V2 and V3/V3A) was associated with the animals' own movements, but this modulation was largely explained by the impact of the movements on the retinal image, that is, by changes in visual input. These results indicate that visual cortex in primates is minimally driven by spontaneous movements and may reflect species-specific sensorimotor strategies.

Decision making: How the past guides the future in frontal cortex.

Our judgments of our environment are often shaped by heuristics and prior experience. New research shows that the resulting biases are encoded, and combined with new sensory input, by groups of neurons in the frontal cortex during decisions under uncertainty.

Choices change the temporal weighting of decision evidence.

Many decisions result from the accumulation of decision-relevant information (evidence) over time. Even when maximizing decision accuracy requires weighting all the evidence equally, decision-makers often give stronger weight to evidence occurring early or late in the evidence stream. Here, we show changes in such temporal biases within participants as a function of intermittent judgments about parts of the evidence stream. Human participants performed a decision task that required a continuous estimation of the mean evidence at the end of the stream. The evidence was either perceptual (noisy random dot motion) or symbolic (variable sequences of numbers). Participants also reported a categorical judgment of the preceding evidence half-way through the stream in one condition or executed an evidence-independent motor response in another condition. The relative impact of early versus late evidence on the final estimation flipped between these two conditions. In particular, participants' sensitivity to late evidence after the intermittent judgment, but not the simple motor response, was decreased. Both the intermittent response as well as the final estimation reports were accompanied by nonluminance-mediated increases of pupil diameter. These pupil dilations were bigger during intermittent judgments than simple motor responses and bigger during estimation when the late evidence was consistent than inconsistent with the initial judgment. In sum, decisions activate pupil-linked arousal systems and alter the temporal weighting of decision evidence. Our results are consistent with the idea that categorical choices in the face of uncertainty induce a change in the state of the neural circuits underlying decision-making.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The psychology and neuroscience of decision-making have extensively studied the accumulation of decision-relevant information toward a categorical choice. Much fewer studies have assessed the impact of a choice on the processing of subsequent information. Here, we show that intermittent choices during a protracted stream of input reduce the sensitivity to subsequent decision information and transiently boost arousal. Choices might trigger a state change in the neural machinery for decision-making.

Confirmation Bias through Selective Overweighting of Choice-Consistent Evidence.

People's assessments of the state of the world often deviate systematically from the information available to them [1]. Such biases can originate from people's own decisions: committing to a categorical proposition, or a course of action, biases subsequent judgment and decision-making. This phenomenon, called confirmation bias [2], has been explained as suppression of post-decisional dissonance [3, 4]. Here, we provide insights into the underlying mechanism. It is commonly held that decisions result from the accumulation of samples of evidence informing about the state of the world [5-8]. We hypothesized that choices bias the accumulation process by selectively altering the weighting (gain) of subsequent evidence, akin to selective attention. We developed a novel psychophysical task to test this idea. Participants viewed two successive random dot motion stimuli and made two motion-direction judgments: a categorical discrimination after the first stimulus and a continuous estimation of the overall direction across both stimuli after the second stimulus. Participants' sensitivity for the second stimulus was selectively enhanced when that stimulus was consistent with the initial choice (compared to both, first stimuli and choice-inconsistent second stimuli). A model entailing choice-dependent selective gain modulation explained this effect better than several alternative mechanisms. Choice-dependent gain modulation was also established in another task entailing averaging of numerical values instead of motion directions. We conclude that intermittent choices direct selective attention during the evaluation of subsequent evidence, possibly due to decision-related feedback in the brain [9]. Our results point to a recurrent interplay between decision-making and selective attention.

Confidence-based integrated reweighting model of task-difficulty explains location-based specificity in perceptual learning.

Perceptual learning is classically thought to be highly specific to the trained stimuli's retinal locations. However, recent research using a novel double-training paradigm has found dramatic transfer of perceptual learning to untrained locations. These results challenged existing models of perceptual learning and provoked intense debate in the field. Recently, Hung and Seitz (2014) showed that previously reported results could be reconciled by considering the details of the training procedure, in particular, whether it involves prolonged training at threshold using a single staircase procedure or multiple staircases. Here, we examine a hierarchical neural network model of the visual pathway, built upon previously proposed integrated reweighting models of perceptual learning, to understand how retinotopic transfer depends on the training procedure adopted. We propose that the transfer and specificity of learning between retinal locations can be explained by considering the task-difficulty and confidence during training. In our model, difficult tasks lead to higher learning of weights from early visual cortex to the decision unit, and thus to specificity, while easy tasks lead to higher learning of weights from later stages of the visual hierarchy and thus to more transfer. To model interindividual difference in task-difficulty, we relate task-difficulty to the confidence of subjects. We show that our confidence-based reweighting model can account for the results of Hung and Seitz (2014) and makes testable predictions.