ABSTRACT
The article that one presents has for purpose outline and comment on the recent modifications to the Penal Code for the Federal District of México which establish, for the first time, crimes related to the artificial procreation and to the genetic manipulation. Also one refers to the interaction of the new legal texts with the sanitary legislation of the country. Since it will be stated in some cases they present confrontations between the penal and the sanitary reglamentation and some points related to the legality or unlawfulness of a conduct that stayed without the enough development. These lacks will complicate the application of the new rules of the Penal Code of the Federal District.
Subject(s)
Genetic Engineering/legislation & jurisprudence , Reproductive Techniques, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , Humans , Insemination, Artificial/legislation & jurisprudence , MexicoABSTRACT
As novas técnicas de reproduçäo humana assistida com doaçäo de sêmen, de óvulos ou de pré-embriöes provocaram uma autêntica revoluçäo nos conceitos e na regulamentaçäo relativos aos laços paterno-filiais consagradas no Direito de Família brasileiro, em funçäo da dissociaçäo da figura do pai/mäe gerador da criança (pai biologico) da figura daquele que tem vontade de mar, criar, educar e sustentar essa mesma criança (pai social). O ponto nodal deste artigo é o exame da questäo da determinaçäo da filiaçäo da criança por meio da utilizaçäo dessas novas técnicas, à luz do Direito de Família brasileiro e da doutrina, e oferecer sugestöes de reforma de dispositivos do Código Civil e da Lei n 8.560/92, na tentativa de solucionar algumas das questöes decorrentes
Subject(s)
Humans , Male , Female , Bioethics , Legislation as Topic , Insemination, Artificial/legislation & jurisprudenceSubject(s)
Humans , Female , Pregnancy , Blastocyst , Cloning, Organism , Embryo Transfer , Ethics, Medical , Fertilization in Vitro , Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer , Infertility , Insemination, Artificial/legislation & jurisprudence , Insemination, Artificial/methods , Preimplantation Diagnosis , Bioethics , Communicable Diseases , Cryopreservation , Insemination, Artificial, Heterologous , Oocyte Donation , Prenatal DiagnosisSubject(s)
Humans , Insemination, Artificial/legislation & jurisprudence , Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Bioethical Issues , Criminal Liability , Ethics, Medical , Malpractice , Uruguay , Sperm Banks/legislation & jurisprudence , Surrogate Mothers/legislation & jurisprudence , Criminal Law , Codes of Ethics , Eugenics/legislation & jurisprudence , Human Experimentation/legislation & jurisprudenceABSTRACT
In this paper I discuss whether or not biographical information concerning the sperm donor should be disclosed to children conceived through donor insemination. Policies of disclosure for example in the context of adoption, have been justified on the basis of a notion of identity which emphasizes genetic ties. This notion of identity and the policies of disclosure of information concerning biological parents based on it, have been criticized by many writers, including feminists, as reinforcing explanations of human organization and development based on biological determinism rather than on ideas such as social construction. Further, this notion of identity is seen to emphasize the importance of genetic parenthood over the commitment involved in bringing up a child as a social parent. While agreeing with these criticisms of that particular notion of identity, I argue that the notion of identity as a whole should not be summarily rejected. Rather, it should be re-interpreted using a sociological approach incorporating the notion of narrative. This second narrative notion of identity is developed with reference to the situation of some groups of children, who like those born from donor insemination, generally do not have any knowledge of their biological parent[s], for example adoptees, the children of the disappeared in Argentina and child migrants. In this paper, policies of disclosure which allow these children to gain some knowledge of their biological parents are discussed in light of the two notions of identity. It is argued that disclosure may be justified on the basis of a narrative notion of identity. This allows for the rigid dichotomy created between biological determinism and social construction: the importance of social parents to the child is emphasized, however the desire a child may have to know something about her or his biological parent is not denied or dismissed.