ABSTRACT
A common form of moral hypocrisy occurs when people blame others for moral violations that they themselves commit. It is assumed that hypocritical blamers act in this manner to falsely signal that they hold moral standards that they do not really accept. We tested this assumption by investigating the neurocognitive processes of hypocritical blamers during moral decision-making. Participants (62 adult UK residents; 27 males) underwent functional MRI scanning while deciding whether to profit by inflicting pain on others and then judged the blameworthiness of others' identical decisions. Observers (188 adult U.S. residents; 125 males) judged participants who blamed others for making the same harmful choice to be hypocritical, immoral, and untrustworthy. However, analyzing hypocritical blamers' behaviors and neural responses shows that hypocritical blame was positively correlated with conflicted feelings, neural responses to moral standards, and guilt-related neural responses. These findings demonstrate that hypocritical blamers may hold the moral standards that they apply to others.
Subject(s)
Guilt , Morals , Adult , Male , Humans , Emotions , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , CognitionABSTRACT
Previous reports of COVID-19 case, hospitalization, and death rates by vaccination status indicate that vaccine protection against infection, as well as serious COVID-19 illness for some groups, declined with the emergence of the B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, and waning of vaccine-induced immunity (1-4). During August-November 2021, CDC recommended§ additional primary COVID-19 vaccine doses among immunocompromised persons and booster doses among persons aged ≥18 years (5). The SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant emerged in the United States during December 2021 (6) and by December 25 accounted for 72% of sequenced lineages (7). To assess the impact of full vaccination with additional and booster doses (booster doses),¶ case and death rates and incidence rate ratios (IRRs) were estimated among unvaccinated and fully vaccinated adults by receipt of booster doses during pre-Delta (April-May 2021), Delta emergence (June 2021), Delta predominance (July-November 2021), and Omicron emergence (December 2021) periods in the United States. During 2021, averaged weekly, age-standardized case IRRs among unvaccinated persons compared with fully vaccinated persons decreased from 13.9 pre-Delta to 8.7 as Delta emerged, and to 5.1 during the period of Delta predominance. During October-November, unvaccinated persons had 13.9 and 53.2 times the risks for infection and COVID-19-associated death, respectively, compared with fully vaccinated persons who received booster doses, and 4.0 and 12.7 times the risks compared with fully vaccinated persons without booster doses. When the Omicron variant emerged during December 2021, case IRRs decreased to 4.9 for fully vaccinated persons with booster doses and 2.8 for those without booster doses, relative to October-November 2021. The highest impact of booster doses against infection and death compared with full vaccination without booster doses was recorded among persons aged 50-64 and ≥65 years. Eligible persons should stay up to date with COVID-19 vaccinations.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 Vaccines/immunology , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/mortality , COVID-19/prevention & control , Immunization, Secondary , SARS-CoV-2/immunology , Vaccine Efficacy , Adult , Aged , Humans , Incidence , Middle Aged , United States/epidemiologyABSTRACT
Humans have an exceptional ability to cooperate relative to many other species. We review the neural mechanisms supporting human cooperation, focusing on the prefrontal cortex. One key feature of human social life is the prevalence of cooperative norms that guide social behavior and prescribe punishment for noncompliance. Taking a comparative approach, we consider shared and unique aspects of cooperative behaviors in humans relative to nonhuman primates, as well as divergences in brain structure that might support uniquely human aspects of cooperation. We highlight a medial prefrontal network common to nonhuman primates and humans supporting a foundational process in cooperative decision-making: valuing outcomes for oneself and others. This medial prefrontal network interacts with lateral prefrontal areas that are thought to represent cooperative norms and modulate value representations to guide behavior appropriate to the local social context. Finally, we propose that more recently evolved anterior regions of prefrontal cortex play a role in arbitrating between cooperative norms across social contexts, and suggest how future research might fruitfully examine the neural basis of norm arbitration.
Subject(s)
Magnetic Resonance Imaging , Prefrontal Cortex , Animals , Brain , Brain Mapping , Decision Making , Humans , PunishmentABSTRACT
Prosocial behaviors-actions that benefit others-fundamentally shape our interpersonal interactions. Psychiatric disorders have been suggested to be related to prosocial disturbances, which may underlie many of their social impairments. However, broader affective traits, present to different degrees in both psychiatric and healthy populations, also have been linked to variability in prosociality. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent prosocial variability is explained by specific psychiatric disorders relative to broad affective traits. Using a computational, transdiagnostic approach in two online studies, we found that participants who reported being more affectively reactive across a broad cluster of traits manifested greater frequencies of prosocial actions in two different contexts: They reported being more averse to harming others for profit, and they were more willing to exert effort to benefit others. These findings help illuminate the profile of prosociality across psychiatric conditions as well as the architecture of prosocial behavior in healthy individuals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
Subject(s)
Altruism , Social Behavior , Affect , Biomarkers , Humans , Interpersonal RelationsABSTRACT
A dislike of waiting for pain, aptly termed 'dread', is so great that people will increase pain to avoid delaying it. However, despite many accounts of altruistic responses to pain in others, no previous studies have tested whether people take delay into account when attempting to ameliorate others' pain. We examined the impact of delay in 2 experiments where participants (total N = 130) specified the intensity and delay of pain either for themselves or another person. Participants were willing to increase the experimental pain of another participant to avoid delaying it, indicative of dread, though did so to a lesser extent than was the case for their own pain. We observed a similar attenuation in dread when participants chose the timing of a hypothetical painful medical treatment for a close friend or relative, but no such attenuation when participants chose for a more distant acquaintance. A model in which altruism is biased to privilege pain intensity over the dread of pain parsimoniously accounts for these findings. We refer to this underestimation of others' dread as a 'Dread Empathy Gap'.
Subject(s)
Altruism , Pain , Empathy , HumansABSTRACT
Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions, measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular relationships. In this work, we show that this 'relational norms' model better predicts patterns of moral wrongness judgments across relationships than alternative models based on genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.
Subject(s)
Judgment/physiology , Humans , Interpersonal Relations , Morals , Social PerceptionABSTRACT
Helping other people can entail risks for the helper. For example, when treating infectious patients, medical volunteers risk their own health. In such situations, decisions to help should depend on the individual's valuation of others' well-being (social preferences) and the degree of personal risk the individual finds acceptable (risk preferences). We investigated how these distinct preferences are psychologically and neurobiologically integrated when helping is risky. We used incentivized decision-making tasks (Study 1; N = 292 adults) and manipulated dopamine and norepinephrine levels in the brain by administering methylphenidate, atomoxetine, or a placebo (Study 2; N = 154 adults). We found that social and risk preferences are independent drivers of risky helping. Methylphenidate increased risky helping by selectively altering risk preferences rather than social preferences. Atomoxetine influenced neither risk preferences nor social preferences and did not affect risky helping. This suggests that methylphenidate-altered dopamine concentrations affect helping decisions that entail a risk to the helper.
Subject(s)
Decision Making , Methylphenidate , Adult , Brain , Dopamine , Humans , Risk-TakingABSTRACT
Serotonin is involved in updating responses to changing environmental circumstances. Optimising behaviour to maximise reward and minimise punishment may require shifting strategies upon encountering new situations. Likewise, autonomic responses to threats are critical for survival yet must be modified as danger shifts from one source to another. Whilst numerous psychiatric disorders are characterised by behavioural and autonomic inflexibility, few studies have examined the contribution of serotonin in humans. We modelled both processes, respectively, in two independent experiments (N = 97). Experiment 1 assessed instrumental (stimulus-response-outcome) reversal learning whereby individuals learned through trial and error which action was most optimal for obtaining reward or avoiding punishment initially, and the contingencies subsequently reversed serially. Experiment 2 examined Pavlovian (stimulus-outcome) reversal learning assessed by the skin conductance response: one innately threatening stimulus predicted receipt of an uncomfortable electric shock and another did not; these contingencies swapped in a reversal phase. Upon depleting the serotonin precursor tryptophan-in a double-blind randomised placebo-controlled design-healthy volunteers showed impairments in updating both actions and autonomic responses to reflect changing contingencies. Reversal deficits in each domain, furthermore, were correlated with the extent of tryptophan depletion. Initial Pavlovian conditioning, moreover, which involved innately threatening stimuli, was potentiated by depletion. These results translate findings in experimental animals to humans and have implications for the neurochemical basis of cognitive inflexibility.
Subject(s)
Reversal Learning , Serotonin , Conditioning, Operant , Humans , Punishment , Reversal Learning/physiology , RewardABSTRACT
OBJECTIVES: Widespread SARS-CoV-2 testing is critical to identify infected people and implement public health action to interrupt transmission. With SARS-CoV-2 testing supplies and laboratory capacity now widely available in the United States, understanding the spatial heterogeneity of associations between social determinants and the use of SARS-CoV-2 testing is essential to improve testing availability in populations disproportionately affected by SARS-CoV-2. METHODS: We assessed positive and negative results of SARS-CoV-2 molecular tests conducted from February 1 through June 17, 2020, from the Massachusetts Virtual Epidemiologic Network, an integrated web-based surveillance and case management system in Massachusetts. Using geographically weighted regression and Moran's I spatial autocorrelation tests, we quantified the associations between SARS-CoV-2 testing rates and 11 metrics of the Social Vulnerability Index in all 351 towns in Massachusetts. RESULTS: Median SARS-CoV-2 testing rates decreased with increasing percentages of residents with limited English proficiency (median relative risk [interquartile range] = 0.96 [0.95-0.99]), residents aged ≥65 (0.97 [0.87-0.98]), residents without health insurance (0.96 [0.95-1.04], and people residing in crowded housing conditions (0.89 [0.80-0.94]). These associations differed spatially across Massachusetts, and localized models improved the explainable variation in SARS-CoV-2 testing rates by 8% to 12%. CONCLUSION: Indicators of social vulnerability are associated with variations in SARS-CoV-2 testing rates. Accounting for the spatial heterogeneity in these associations may improve the ability to explain and address the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic at substate levels.
Subject(s)
COVID-19/diagnosis , COVID-19/epidemiology , Vulnerable Populations/statistics & numerical data , Age Factors , COVID-19 Testing , Housing , Humans , Language , Massachusetts/epidemiology , Pandemics , Public Health , SARS-CoV-2 , Socioeconomic Factors , Spatial AnalysisABSTRACT
Moral outrage shapes fundamental aspects of social life and is now widespread in online social networks. Here, we show how social learning processes amplify online moral outrage expressions over time. In two preregistered observational studies on Twitter (7331 users and 12.7 million total tweets) and two preregistered behavioral experiments (N = 240), we find that positive social feedback for outrage expressions increases the likelihood of future outrage expressions, consistent with principles of reinforcement learning. In addition, users conform their outrage expressions to the expressive norms of their social networks, suggesting norm learning also guides online outrage expressions. Norm learning overshadows reinforcement learning when normative information is readily observable: in ideologically extreme networks, where outrage expression is more common, users are less sensitive to social feedback when deciding whether to express outrage. Our findings highlight how platform design interacts with human learning mechanisms to affect moral discourse in digital public spaces.
ABSTRACT
Trust in leaders is central to citizen compliance with public policies. One potential determinant of trust is how leaders resolve conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas. Past research suggests that utilitarian responses to dilemmas can both erode and enhance trust in leaders: sacrificing some people to save many others ('instrumental harm') reduces trust, while maximizing the welfare of everyone equally ('impartial beneficence') may increase trust. In a multi-site experiment spanning 22 countries on six continents, participants (N = 23,929) completed self-report (N = 17,591) and behavioural (N = 12,638) measures of trust in leaders who endorsed utilitarian or non-utilitarian principles in dilemmas concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. Across both the self-report and behavioural measures, endorsement of instrumental harm decreased trust, while endorsement of impartial beneficence increased trust. These results show how support for different ethical principles can impact trust in leaders, and inform effective public communication during times of global crisis. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION STATEMENT: The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 13 November 2020. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.13247315.v1 .
Subject(s)
COVID-19/psychology , Global Health , Leadership , Morals , Trust , Ethical Theory , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
Moral behavior is susceptible to peer influence. How does information from peers influence moral preferences? We used drift-diffusion modeling to show that peer influence changes the value of moral behavior by prioritizing the choice attributes that align with peers' goals. Study 1 (N = 100; preregistered) showed that participants accurately inferred the goals of prosocial and antisocial peers when observing their moral decisions. In Study 2 (N = 68), participants made moral decisions before and after observing the decisions of a prosocial or antisocial peer. Peer observation caused participants' own preferences to resemble those of their peers. This peer influence effect on value computation manifested as an increased weight on choice attributes promoting the peers' goals that occurred independently from peer influence on initial choice bias. Participants' self-reported awareness of influence tracked more closely with computational measures of prosocial than antisocial influence. Our findings have implications for bolstering and blocking the effects of prosocial and antisocial influence on moral behavior.
Subject(s)
Peer Influence , Social Behavior , Humans , Morals , Peer GroupABSTRACT
Adults punish moral transgressions to satisfy both retributive motives (such as wanting antisocial others to receive their 'just deserts') and consequentialist motives (such as teaching transgressors that their behaviour is inappropriate). Here, we investigated whether retributive and consequentialist motives for punishment are present in children approximately between the ages of five and seven. In two preregistered studies (N = 251), children were given the opportunity to punish a transgressor at a cost to themselves. Punishment either exclusively satisfied retributive motives by only inflicting harm on the transgressor, or additionally satisfied consequentialist motives by teaching the transgressor a lesson. We found that children punished when doing so satisfied only retributive motives, and punished considerably more when doing so also satisfied consequentialist motives. Together, these findings provide evidence for the presence of both retributive and consequentialist motives in young children.
Subject(s)
Child Behavior/psychology , Child Development , Motivation , Punishment/psychology , Social Interaction , Child , Child, Preschool , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
Moral behavior requires learning how our actions help or harm others. Theoretical accounts of learning propose a key division between "model-free" algorithms that cache outcome values in actions and "model-based" algorithms that map actions to outcomes. Here, we tested the engagement of these mechanisms and their neural basis as participants learned to avoid painful electric shocks for themselves and a stranger. We found that model-free decision making was prioritized when learning to avoid harming others compared to oneself. Model-free prediction errors for others relative to self were tracked in the thalamus/caudate. At the time of choice, neural activity consistent with model-free moral learning was observed in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), and switching after harming others was associated with stronger connectivity between sgACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Finally, model-free moral learning varied with individual differences in moral judgment. Our findings suggest moral learning favors efficiency over flexibility and is underpinned by specific neural mechanisms.
Subject(s)
Decision Making/physiology , Judgment/physiology , Learning/physiology , Moral Development , Adolescent , Adult , Brain Mapping , Female , Gyrus Cinguli/diagnostic imaging , Gyrus Cinguli/physiology , Healthy Volunteers , Humans , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , Male , Models, Psychological , Morals , Prefrontal Cortex/diagnostic imaging , Prefrontal Cortex/physiology , Young AdultABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a serious mental disorder characterized by marked interpersonal disturbances, including difficulties trusting others and volatile impressions of others' moral character, often resulting in premature relationship termination. We tested a hypothesis that moral character inference is disrupted in BPD and sensitive to democratic therapeutic community (DTC) treatment. METHODS: Participants with BPD (n = 43; 20 untreated and 23 DTC-treated) and control participants without BPD (n = 106) completed a moral inference task where they predicted the decisions of 2 agents with distinct moral preferences: the "bad" agent was more willing than the "good" agent to harm others for money. Periodically, participants rated their subjective impressions of the agent's moral character and the certainty of those impressions. We fit a hierarchical Bayesian learning model to participants' trialwise predictions to describe how beliefs about the morality of the agents were updated by new information. RESULTS: The computational mechanisms of moral inference differed for patients with untreated BPD relative to matched control participants and patients with DTC-treated BPD. In patients with BPD, beliefs about harmful agents were more certain and less amenable to updating relative to both control participants and participants who were treated with DTC. CONCLUSIONS: The findings suggest that DTC may help the maintenance of social relationships in BPD by increasing patients' openness to learning about adverse interaction partners. The results provide mechanistic insights into social deficits in BPD and demonstrate the potential for combining objective behavioral paradigms with computational modeling as a tool for assessing BPD pathology and treatment outcomes.
Subject(s)
Borderline Personality Disorder , Bayes Theorem , Humans , Interpersonal Relations , Morals , PhenotypeABSTRACT
Impatience can be formalized as a delay discount rate, describing how the subjective value of reward decreases as it is delayed. By analogy, selfishness can be formalized as a social discount rate, representing how the subjective value of rewarding another person decreases with increasing social distance. Delay and social discount rates for reward are correlated across individuals. However no previous work has examined whether this relationship also holds for aversive outcomes. Neither has previous work described a functional form for social discounting of pain in humans. This is a pertinent question, since preferences over aversive outcomes formally diverge from those for reward. We addressed this issue in an experiment in which healthy adult participants (N = 67) chose the timing and intensity of hypothetical pain for themselves and others. In keeping with previous studies, participants showed a strong preference for immediate over delayed pain. Participants showed greater concern for pain in close others than for their own pain, though this hyperaltruism was steeply discounted with increasing social distance. Impatience for pain and social discounting of pain were weakly correlated across individuals. Our results extend a link between impatience and selfishness to the aversive domain.
Subject(s)
Delay Discounting , Pain/psychology , Social Perception , Adult , Altruism , Choice Behavior , Female , Humans , Male , Models, Psychological , Reward , Social Isolation/psychology , Social Perception/psychologyABSTRACT
Guilt is a quintessential emotion in interpersonal interactions and moral cognition. Detecting the presence and measuring the intensity of guilt-related neurocognitive processes is crucial to understanding the mechanisms of social and moral phenomena. Existing neuroscience research on guilt has been focused on the neural correlates of guilt states induced by various types of stimuli. While valuable in their own right, these studies have not provided a sensitive and specific bio-marker of guilt suitable for use as an indicator of guilt-related neurocognitive processes in novel experimental settings. In a recent study, we identified a distributed Guilt-Related Brain Signature (GRBS) based on 2 independent functional MRI datasets. We demonstrated the sensitivity of GRBS in detecting a critical cognitive antecedent of guilt, namely one's responsibility in causing harm to another person, across participant populations from 2 distinct cultures (ie, Chinese and Swiss). We also showed that the sensitivity of GRBS did not generalize to other types of negative affective states (eg, physical and vicarious pain). In this commentary, we discuss the relevance of guilt in the broader scope of social and moral phenomena, and discuss how guilt-related biomarkers can be useful in understanding their psychological and neurocognitive mechanisms underlying these phenomena.
ABSTRACT
How do people judge whether someone deserves moral praise for their actions? In contrast to the large literature on moral blame, work on how people attribute praise has, until recently, been scarce. However, there is a growing body of recent work from a variety of subfields in psychology (including social, cognitive, developmental, and consumer) suggesting that moral praise is a fundamentally unique form of moral attribution and not simply the positive moral analogue of blame attributions. A functional perspective helps explain asymmetries in blame and praise: we propose that while blame is primarily for punishment and signaling one's moral character, praise is primarily for relationship building.
Subject(s)
Morals , Social Perception , HumansABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic represents a massive global health crisis. Because the crisis requires large-scale behaviour change and places significant psychological burdens on individuals, insights from the social and behavioural sciences can be used to help align human behaviour with the recommendations of epidemiologists and public health experts. Here we discuss evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping. In each section, we note the nature and quality of prior research, including uncertainty and unsettled issues. We identify several insights for effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic and highlight important gaps researchers should move quickly to fill in the coming weeks and months.