Grinding as a slaughter method for farmed black soldier fly (Hermetia illucens) larvae: Empirical recommendations to achieve instantaneous killing.

At least 200 billion black soldier fly (Hermetia illucens) larvae (BSFL) are reared each year as food and feed, and the insect farming industry is projected to grow rapidly. Despite interest by consumers, producers, and legislators, no empirical evidence exists to guide producers in practicing humane - or instantaneous - slaughter for these novel mini-livestock. BSFL may be slaughtered via freezing, boiling, grinding, or other methods; however standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment design may affect the likelihood of instantaneous death using these methods. We tested how larval body size and particle size plate hole diameter affect the likelihood of instantaneous death for black soldier fly larvae that are slaughtered using a standard meat grinder. Larval body size did not affect the likelihood of instantaneous death for larvae that are 106-175 mg in mass. However, particle size plate hole diameter had a significant effect on the likelihood of instantaneous death, with only 54% of larvae experiencing an instant death when using the largest particle size plate (12-mm hole diameter) compared to 84% using the smallest particle size plate (2.55 mm). However, a higher percentage of instantaneous death (up to 99%) could be achieved by reducing the proportion of larvae that become stuck in the machine. We conclude by outlining specific recommendations to support producers in achieving a 99% instantaneous death rate through specific SOPs to be used with similarly designed machines. We also develop a protocol for producers that wish to test their own grinding SOPs.

Animal welfare: Methods to improve policy and practice.

New methods are emerging to quantify human and animal welfare on a common scale, creating new tools for policy.

Hybrid theories, psychological plausibility, and the human/animal divide.

A hybrid theory is any moral theory according to which different classes of individuals ought to be treated according to different principles. We argue that some hybrid theories are able to meet standards of psychological plausibility, by which we mean that it's feasible for ordinary human beings to understand and act in accord with them. Insofar as psychological plausibility is a theoretical virtue, then, such hybrid theories deserve more serious consideration. To make the case for this view, we explain what psychological plausibility is and why we might value it, why the human/animal divide appears to be an entrenched feature of human psychology, and why Robert Nozick's hybrid theory doesn't go far enough. Finally, we make the case that a more promising psychologically plausible hybrid theory, with respect to humans and animals, will be (at least) at tribrid theory-that is, positing three domains rather than two.

Internally Triggered Experiences of Hedonic Valence in Nonhuman Animals: Cognitive and Welfare Considerations.

Do any nonhuman animals have hedonically valenced experiences not directly caused by stimuli in their current environment? Do they, like us humans, experience anticipated or previously experienced pains and pleasures as respectively painful and pleasurable? We review evidence from comparative neuroscience about hippocampus-dependent simulation in relation to this question. Hippocampal sharp-wave ripples and theta oscillations have been found to instantiate previous and anticipated experiences. These hippocampal activations coordinate with neural reward and fear centers as well as sensory and cortical areas in ways that are associated with conscious episodic mental imagery in humans. Moreover, such hippocampal "re- and preplay" has been found to contribute to instrumental decision making, the learning of value representations, and the delay of rewards in rats. The functional and structural features of hippocampal simulation are highly conserved across mammals. This evidence makes it reasonable to assume that internally triggered experiences of hedonic valence (IHVs) are pervasive across (at least) all mammals. This conclusion has important welfare implications. Most prominently, IHVs act as a kind of "welfare multiplier" through which the welfare impacts of any given experience of pain or pleasure are increased through each future retrieval. However, IHVs also have practical implications for welfare assessment and cause prioritization.

Challenges in farmed insect welfare: Beyond the question of sentience.

The global Insects as Food and Feed (IAFF) industry currently farms over a trillion individual insects a year and is growing rapidly. Intensive animal production systems are known to cause a range of negative affective states in livestock; given the potential scale of the IAFF industry, it is urgent to consider the welfare of the industry's insect livestock. The majority of the literature on farmed insect welfare has focused on: (i) establishing that insect welfare ought to be of concern; or (ii) extending vertebrate welfare frameworks to insects. However, there are many overlooked challenges to studying insect welfare and applying that knowledge in IAFF industry contexts. Here, we briefly review five of these challenges. We end with practical recommendations for the future study of insect welfare.

Animal Agriculture, Wet Markets, and COVID-19: a Case Study in Indirect Activism.

There were excellent reasons to reform intensive animal agriculture prior to COVID-19. Unfortunately, though, intensive animal agriculture has grown rapidly over the last century. All signs indicate that it will continue to grow in the future. This is bad news for billions of animals. It's also bad news for those who want an animal-friendly food system. Because the public isn't very concerned about the plight of animals-or is concerned, but has a high tolerance for cognitive dissonance-animal activists regularly engage in indirect activism. Indirect activism involves arguing that some cause that's indirectly related to the activist's primary agenda provides reasons to act in ways that are congruent with that agenda. In this paper, we consider the two indirect arguments that animal activists advanced in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic: first, some used COVID-19 to criticize intensive animal agriculture-many of these had US-based audiences as their target; second, and more modestly, some activists used COVID-19 to condemn wet markets specifically. We contend that both arguments had the risk of backfiring: they risked promoting the very systems that are worst for animals. We then assess the moral significance of this risk, concluding that while it may have been permissible to advance these arguments, there were some serious moral considerations against doing so-ones that weren't addressed by flagging animal activists' concern for animals or any other stakeholder in the discussion. In both cases, we think there are plausible precautionary arguments against the strategies that these activists pursued. Additionally, in the case of arguments against wet markets specifically, we contend that the precautionary argument can be supplemented with a side constraint condition that, arguably, activists violated insofar as they were acting in ways that maintain a racist and xenophobic system.

Animal Harms and Food Production: Informing Ethical Choices.

Ethical food choices have become an important societal theme in post-industrial countries. Many consumers are particularly interested in the animal welfare implications of the various foods they may choose to consume. However, concepts in animal welfare are rapidly evolving towards consideration of all animals (including wildlife) in contemporary approaches such as "One Welfare". This approach requires recognition that negative impacts (harms) may be intentional and obvious (e.g., slaughter of livestock) but also include the under-appreciated indirect or unintentional harms that often impact wildlife (e.g., land clearing). This is especially true in the Anthropocene, where impacts on non-human life are almost ubiquitous across all human activities. We applied the "harms" model of animal welfare assessment to several common food production systems and provide a framework for assessing the breadth (not intensity) of harms imposed. We considered all harms caused to wild as well as domestic animals, both direct effects and indirect effects. We described 21 forms of harm and considered how they applied to 16 forms of food production. Our analysis suggests that all food production systems harm animals to some degree and that the majority of these harms affect wildlife, not livestock. We conclude that the food production systems likely to impose the greatest overall breadth of harms to animals are intensive animal agriculture industries (e.g., dairy) that rely on a secondary food production system (e.g., cropping), while harvesting of locally available wild plants, mushrooms or seaweed is likely to impose the least harms. We present this conceptual analysis as a resource for those who want to begin considering the complex animal welfare trade-offs involved in their food choices.

Don't Demean "Invasives": Conservation and Wrongful Species Discrimination.

It is common for conservationists to refer to non-native species that have undesirable impacts on humans as "invasive". We argue that the classification of any species as "invasive" constitutes wrongful discrimination. Moreover, we argue that its being wrong to categorize a species as invasive is perfectly compatible with it being morally permissible to kill animals-assuming that conservationists "kill equally". It simply is not compatible with the double standard that conservationists tend to employ in their decisions about who lives and who dies.