ABSTRACT
Infants' thoughts are classically characterized as iconic, perceptual-like representations.1,2,3 Less clear is whether preverbal infants also possess a propositional language of thought, where mental symbols are combined according to syntactic rules, very much like words in sentences.4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17 Because it is rich, productive, and abstract, a language of thought would provide a key to explaining impressive achievements in early infancy, from logical inference to representation of false beliefs.18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 A propositional language-including a language of thought5-implies thematic roles that, in a sentence, indicate the relation between noun and verb phrases, defining who acts on whom; i.e., who is the agent and who is the patient.32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39 Agent and patient roles are abstract in that they generally apply to different situations: whether A kicks, helps, or kisses B, A is the agent and B is the patient. Do preverbal infants represent abstract agent and patient roles? We presented 7-month-olds (n = 143) with sequences of scenes where the posture or relative positioning of two individuals indicated that, across different interactions, A acted on B. Results from habituation (experiment 1) and pupillometry paradigms (experiments 2 and 3) demonstrated that infants showed surprise when roles eventually switched (B acted on A). Thus, while encoding social interactions, infants fill in an abstract relational structure that marks the roles of agent and patient and that can be accessed via different event scenes and properties of the event participants (body postures or positioning). This mental process implies a combinatorial capacity that lays the foundations for productivity and compositionality in language and cognition.
Subject(s)
Language , Humans , Infant , Female , Male , Child Development , Language DevelopmentABSTRACT
As a powerful social signal, a body, face, or gaze facing toward oneself holds an individual's attention. We asked whether, going beyond an egocentric stance, facingness between others has a similar effect and why. In a preferential-looking time paradigm, human adults showed spontaneous preference to look at two bodies facing toward (vs. away from) each other (Experiment 1a, N = 24). Moreover, facing dyads were rated higher on social semantic dimensions, showing that facingness adds social value to stimuli (Experiment 1b, N = 138). The same visual preference was found in juvenile macaque monkeys (Experiment 2, N = 21). Finally, on the human development timescale, this preference emerged by 5 years, although young infants by 7 months of age already discriminate visual scenes on the basis of body positioning (Experiment 3, N = 120). We discuss how the preference for facing dyads-shared by human adults, young children, and macaques-can signal a new milestone in social cognition development, supporting processing and learning from third-party social interactions.