Do Incentives Crowd Out Motivation? A Feasibility Study of a Community Vector-Control Campaign in Peru.

Incentives are a useful tool in encouraging healthy behavior as part of public health initiatives. However, there remains concern about motivation crowd out-a decline in levels of motivation to undertake a behavior to below baseline levels after incentives have been removed-and few public health studies have assessed for motivation crowd out. Here, we assess the feasibility of identifying motivation crowd out following a lottery to promote participation in a Chagas disease vector control campaign. We look for evidence of crowd out in subsequent participation in the same behavior, a related behavior, and an unrelated behavior. We identified potential motivation crowd out for the same behavior, but not for related behavior or unrelated behaviors after lottery incentives are removed. Despite some limitations, we conclude that motivation crowd out is feasible to assess in large-scale trials of incentives.

Increasing participation in a vector control campaign: a cluster randomised controlled evaluation of behavioural economic interventions in Peru.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the efficacy of strategies informed by behavioural economics for increasing participation in a vector control campaign, compared with current practice. DESIGN: Pragmatic cluster randomised controlled trial. SETTING: Arequipa, Peru. PARTICIPANTS: 4922 households. INTERVENTIONS: Households were randomised to one of four arms: advanced planning, leader recruitment, contingent group lotteries, or control. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Participation (allowing the house to be sprayed with insecticide) during the vector control campaign. RESULTS: In intent-to-treat analyses, none of the interventions increased participation compared with control (advanced planning adjusted OR (aOR) 1.07 (95% CI 0.87 to 1.32); leader recruitment aOR 0.95 (95% CI 0.78 to 1.15); group lotteries aOR 1.12 (95% CI 0.89 to 1.39)). The interventions did not improve the efficiency of the campaign (additional minutes needed to spray house from generalised estimating equation regressions: advanced planning 1.08 (95% CI -1.02 to 3.17); leader recruitment 3.91 (95% CI 1.85 to 5.97); group lotteries 3.51 (95% CI 1.38 to 5.64)) nor did it increase the odds that houses would be sprayed in an earlier versus a later stage of the campaign cycle (advanced planning aOR 0.94 (95% CI 0.76 to 1.25); leader recruitment aOR 0.68 (95% CI 0.55 to 0.83); group lotteries aOR 1.19 (95% CI 0.96 to 1.47)). A post hoc analysis suggested that advanced planning increased odds of participation compared with control among households who had declined to participate previously (aOR 2.50 (95% CI 1.41 to 4.43)). CONCLUSIONS: Achieving high levels of household participation is crucial for many disease prevention efforts. Our trial was not successful in improving participation compared with the existing campaign. The trial highlights persistent challenges to field experiments as well as lessons about the intervention design process, particularly understanding barriers to participation through a behavioural lens. TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER: American Economic Association AEARCTR-0000620.

Sleep and Alertness in Medical Interns and Residents: An Observational Study on the Role of Extended Shifts.

Study Objectives: Fatigue from sleep loss is a risk to physician and patient safety, but objective data on physician sleep and alertness on different duty hour schedules is scarce. This study objectively quantified differences in sleep duration and alertness between medical interns working extended overnight shifts and residents not or rarely working extended overnight shifts. Methods: Sleep-wake activity of 137 interns and 87 PGY-2/3 residents on 2-week Internal Medicine and Oncology rotations was assessed with wrist-actigraphy. Alertness was assessed daily with a brief Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT) and the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale. Results: Interns averaged 6.93 hours (95% confidence interval [CI] 6.84-7.03 hours) sleep per 24 hours across shifts, significantly less than residents not working overnight shifts (7.18 hours, 95% CI 7.06-7.30 hours, p = .007). Interns obtained on average 2.19 hours (95% CI 2.02-2.36 hours) sleep during on-call nights (17.5% obtained no sleep). Alertness was significantly lower on mornings after on-call nights compared to regular shifts (p < .001). Naps between 9 am and 6 pm on the first day post-call were frequent (90.8%) and averaged 2.84 hours (95% CI 2.69-3.00 hours), but interns still slept 1.66 hours less per 24 hours (95% CI 1.56-1.76 hours) compared to regular shift days (p < .001). Sleep inertia significantly affected alertness in the 60 minutes after waking on-call. Conclusions: Extended overnight shifts increase the likelihood of chronic sleep restriction in interns. Reduced levels of alertness after on-call nights need to be mitigated. A systematic comparison of sleep, alertness, and safety outcomes under current and past duty hour rules is encouraged.

A randomized controlled trial of co-payment elimination: the CHORD trial.

OBJECTIVES: Efforts to improve adherence by reducing co-payments through value-based insurance design are become more prevalent despite limited evidence of improved health outcomes. The objective of this study was to determine whether eliminating patient co-payments for blood pressure medications improves blood pressure control. STUDY DESIGN: Randomized controlled trial. METHODS: The Collaboration to Reduce Disparities in Hypertension (CHORD) was a randomized controlled trial with 12 months' follow-up conducted among patients from the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh Veterans Administration Medical Centers. We enrolled 479 patients with poorly controlled systolic blood pressure. Participants were randomly assigned to: a) receive reductions in co-payments from $8 to $0 per medication per month for each antihypertensive prescription filled, b) a computerized behavioral intervention (CBI), c) both co-pay reduction and CBI, or d) usual care. Our main outcome measure was change in systolic blood pressure from enrollment to 12 months post enrollment. We also measured adherence using the medication possession ratio in a subset of participants. RESULTS: There were no significant interactions between the co-payment interventions and the CBI interventions. There was no relative difference in the change in medication possession ratio between baseline and 12 months (0.05% and -.90% in control and incentive groups, respectively; P = .74) or in continuous medication gaps of 30, 60, or 90 days. Blood pressure decreased among all participants, but to a similar degree between the financial incentive and control groups. Systolic pressure within the incentive group dropped 13.2 mm Hg versus 15.2 mm Hg for the control group (difference = 2.0; 95% CI, -2.3 to 6.3; P = .36). The proportion of patients with blood pressure under control at 12 months was 29.5% in the incentive group versus 33.9 in the control group (odds ratio, 0.8; 95% CI, 0.5-1.3; P = .36). CONCLUSIONS: Among patients with poorly controlled blood pressure, financial incentives--as implemented in this trial--that reduced patient cost sharing for blood pressure medications did not improve medication adherence or blood pressure control.

A randomized controlled trial of negative co-payments: the CHORD trial.

OBJECTIVES: Value-based insurance designs are being widely used. We undertook this study to examine whether a financial incentive that lowered co-payments for blood pressure medications below $0 improved blood pressure control among patients with poorly controlled hypertension. STUDY DESIGN: Randomized controlled trial. METHODS: Participants from 3 Pennsylvania hospitals (n = 337) were randomly assigned to: a) be paid $8 per medication per month for filling blood pressure prescriptions, b) a computerized behavioral intervention (CBI), c) both payment and CBI, or d) usual care. The primary outcome was change in blood pressure between baseline and 12 months post enrollment. We also measured adherence using the medication possession ratio in a subset of participants. RESULTS: There were no significant interactions between the incentive and the CBI interventions. There were no significant changes in medication possession ratio in the treatment group. Blood pressure decreased among all participants, but to a similar degree between the financial incentive and control groups. Systolic blood pressure (SBP) dropped 13.7 mm Hg for the incentive group versus 10.0 mm Hg for the control group (difference = ­3.7; 95% CI, ­9.0 to 1.6; P = .17). The proportion of patients with blood pressure under control 12 months post enrollment was 35.6% of the incentive group versus 27.7% of the control group (odds ratio, 1.4; 95% CI, 0.8-2.5; P = .19). Diabetics in the incentive group had an average drop in SBP of 12.7 mm Hg between baseline and 12 months compared with 4.0 mm Hg in the control group (P = .02). Patients in the incentive group without diabetes experienced average SBP reductions of 15.0 mm Hg, compared with 16.3 mm Hg for control group nondiabetics (P = .71). CONCLUSIONS: Among patients with poorly controlled blood pressure, financial incentives­as implemented in this trial­did not improve blood pressure control or adherence except among patients with diabetes.

Web-Based Access to Positive Airway Pressure Usage with or without an Initial Financial Incentive Improves Treatment Use in Patients with Obstructive Sleep Apnea.

STUDY OBJECTIVES: We tested whether providing adults with obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) with daily Web-based access to their positive airway pressure (PAP) usage over 3 mo with or without a financial incentive in the first week improves adherence and functional outcomes. SETTING: Academic- and community-based sleep centers. PARTICIPANTS: One hundred thirty-eight adults with newly diagnosed OSA starting PAP treatment. INTERVENTIONS: Participants were randomized to: usual care, usual care with access to PAP usage, or usual care with access to PAP usage and a financial incentive. PAP data were transmitted daily by wireless modem from the participants' PAP unit to a website where hours of usage were displayed. Participants in the financial incentive group could earn up to $30/day in the first week for objective PAP use ≥ 4 h/day. MEASUREMENTS AND RESULTS: Mean hours of daily PAP use in the two groups with access to PAP usage data did not differ from each other but was significantly greater than that in the usual care group in the first week and over 3 mo (P < 0.0001). Average daily use (mean ± standard deviation) during the first week of PAP intervention was 4.7 ± 3.3 h in the usual care group, and 5.9 ± 2.5 h and 6.3 ± 2.5 h in the Web access groups with and without financial incentive respectively. Adherence over the 3-mo intervention decreased at a relatively constant rate in all three groups. Functional Outcomes of Sleep Questionnaire change scores at 3 mo improved within each group (P < 0.0001) but change scores of the two groups with Web access to PAP data were not different than those in the control group (P > 0.124). CONCLUSIONS: Positive airway pressure adherence is significantly improved by giving patients Web access to information about their use of the treatment. Inclusion of a financial incentive in the first week had no additive effect in improving adherence.