Reducing carbon emissions in prefabricated buildings supply chains: a focus on component manufacturing processes.

The construction sector accounts for 23% of CO 2 emissions from global economic activity, with China responsible for nearly 41%. Although China has vigorously promoted the development of prefabricated buildings (PBS) in pursuit of cleaner production, the carbon emissions from prefabricated component factories (PCF) should not be underestimated. So, the focus of this research was on how to promote the decarbonization of PCF. Based on the carbon trading market mechanism, the carbon emissions trading tax and revenue tax collection, the authors established a differential game model consisting of the local government and the PCF, studied the equilibrium solutions under different decision models, and analyzed the roles of the two tax systems, carbon trading revenue, and market preferences. The results are as follows: (1) The PCF's low-carbon technology (LCT) innovation efforts can be directly affected by the carbon price, component price, and tax rate and indirectly affected by influencing the local government's efforts. Besides, the local government and the PCF strategies can be changed through the central government's regulation of carbon prices and tax rates. (2) PCF should set reasonable prices for components, improving economic efficiency and the LCT stocks. (3) Cost-sharing contracts can encourage PCF to increase their LCT innovation, which is conducive to increasing the optimal benefits of the PCF. (4) The local government cannot be motivated by cost-sharing contracts. They can increase their optimal benefits only if the cost-sharing coefficient is below a threshold or if the environmental benefits from low-carbon production are above a specific value.

La táctica como fundamento esencial en el proceso de preparación del futbolista

El fútbol es un deporte de oposición, cooperación, donde se interrelacionan las estructuras y las funciones específicas que lo rigen, de carácter eminentemente táctico y de ahí la necesidad que tienen los jugadores de relacionarse para organizarse colectivamente con eficacia en las situaciones ofensivas, defensivas, y las transiciones de ambas acciones, las cuales van a surgir el resto de capacidades técnicas, físicas, de teóricas y psicológicas según las necesidades de la idea de juego. Esta investigación, enmarcada en el proceso de preparación táctica de la selección provincial de fútbol de mayores de Pinar del Río, tuvo objetivo determinar el estado en que se encuentra la preparación táctica de los jugadores según el modelo de juego planificado para enfrentar el torneo nacional y definir la metodología de entrenamiento sustentada en los sistemas modernos de preparación fundamentado en el componente táctico como dimensión rectora en el proceso. Con la utilización de métodos teóricos, empíricos, y de nivel estadístico, se guía todo el proceso de la investigación a través de observaciones a entrenamientos, entrevistas y mediciones del comportamiento táctico en partidos oficiales, con lo cual se pudo corroborar en los resultados alcanzados una serie de insuficiencias y limitaciones tácticas en las dimensiones e indicadores valorados que denota que problemas en la preparación para la competencia.

O futebol é um esporte de oposição, cooperação, onde as estruturas e funções específicas que o regem estão inter-relacionadas, de natureza eminentemente tática e daí a necessidade de os jogadores se relacionarem entre si para se organizarem coletivamente de forma eficaz em situações ofensivas e defensivas, e as transições de ambas as ações, que darão origem ao resto das capacidades técnicas, físicas, teóricas e psicológicas de acordo com as necessidades da ideia de jogo. Esta pesquisa, enquadrada no processo de preparação tática da equipe de futebol sênior provincial de Pinar del Río, teve como objetivo determinar o estado da preparação tática dos jogadores de acordo com o modelo de jogo planejado para enfrentar o torneio nacional e definir a metodologia de treinamento com base nos modernos sistemas de preparação baseados no componente tático como uma dimensão orientadora no processo. Com a utilização de métodos teóricos, empíricos e estatísticos, todo o processo da pesquisa foi orientado por meio de observações em sessões de treinamento, entrevistas e medições do comportamento tático em jogos oficiais, com os quais foi possível corroborar nos resultados alcançados uma série de insuficiências e limitações táticas nas dimensões e indicadores avaliados que denotam problemas na preparação para a competição.

Soccer is a sport of opposition and cooperation, where the specific structures and functions that govern it are interrelated, of an eminently tactical nature and hence the need for players to relate to organize themselves collectively effectively in offensive, defensive, and the transitions of both actions, from which the rest of the technical, physical, theoretical and psychological capacities will emerge according to the needs of the game idea. This research, framed in the tactical preparation process of the provincial senior soccer team of Pinar del Río, had the objective of determining the state of the tactical preparation of the players according to the game model planned to face the national tournament and define the training methodology supported by modern preparation systems based on the tactical component as a guiding dimension in the process. With the use of theoretical, empirical, and statistical methods, the entire research process is guided through observations of training, interviews, and measurements of tactical behavior in official matches, with which it was possible to corroborate in the results achieved a series of insufficiencies and tactical limitations in the valued dimensions and indicators that denote problems in preparation for the competition.

Sustainable digital transformation path for manufacturing outwards foreign direct investment firms: Gradual or leapfrogging.

Digital transformation plays an important role in improving the efficiency of production of enterprises and can provide strong support for green and sustainable development. Compared with domestic enterprises, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) enterprises have greater access to advanced digital technology. This paper aims to analyze the path selection of green and sustainable production for the digital transformation of manufacturing outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) companies, whether gradual or leapfrogging. However, there is a lack of systemic game mechanisms and numerical simulation methods for heterogeneous enterprises. Based on the analysis of reverse technology spillover intensity of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and differences in the absorptive capacity of enterprises, we have proposed the evolutionary game model for different path selection of digital transformation of manufacturing enterprises, due to heterogeneous enterprises under different spillover degrees with numerical analysis methods. The research results show that: (i) Under low reverse technology spillover intensity, all enterprises evolve to a gradual transformation path, and enterprises with weaker absorptive capacity converge faster; (ii) There is a certain threshold for reverse technology spillover. When reverse technology spillover intensity exceeds the threshold, enterprises with stronger absorptive capacity converge to a leapfrog transformation path, but enterprises with weak absorptive capacity converge to a gradual transformation path; (iii) With high reverse technology spillover intensity, all enterprises evolve toward a leapfrog transformation path, and faster convergence happens to enterprises with higher absorptive capacity. The evolutionary game path of digital transformation in manufacturing enterprises is illustrated in Fig. 1.

Evolutionary game analysis for multi-level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective.

In a risk society, the survival and development of humans are facing threats of complex and severe public crisis events. Public participation in collaborative governance (CG) of public crisis events is increasingly recognized as an important direction for the reform of the current and future emergency management system. Previous studies of CG have mainly focused on the macro level and ignored to address micro-level discussions of the behavioral strategy evolution of stakeholders. From a fresh value perception perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model to clarify the evolution mechanism of multi-level emergency CG. First, the value perception model is built based on Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting to optimize the traditional game matrix. Second, the evolutionary stability is analyzed to solve the system evolution law. Finally, numerical simulation is conducted in the case of Heilongjiang province, a main region of food and energy supply in China. Results showed that (1) the CG game system has a complex evolutionary path; (2) the behavior of game players is affected by perceived incomes and perceived costs; (3) compared with the reference value and the risk aversion coefficient of income accounts, game players are more sensitive to that of cost accounts; (4) enhancing the perceived value of public psychological satisfaction and government reputation is helpful for the long-term construction of CG. Overall, this study aims to highlight the potential utility of value perception in promoting effective implementations of CG and to provide new insights for the development of CG in China and other countries.

Game Model Analysis of Fraud Audit in Public Hospitals / 中国卫生经济

Preventing fraud is an important goal and urgent task of internal control in public hospitals.Using game model to study the effective path for internal audit department to reduce management fraud.Increasing the reward of staff in internal audit department after discovering fraud,reducing the cost of fraud audit and increasing the probability of fraud audit can reduce the possibility of fraud by management.

To intervene or not: the game of recycled water use for residents with different preferences.

Recycled water contributes to sustainable development by providing a unified approach to wastewater treatment and rational water supply. However, the environmental benefit-sharing feature of recycled water may encourage some residents to show "free-rider" behavior. In this study, the evolutionary game model was applied to a game system consisting of two types of people, environmental preference and risk aversion. We analyzed internal and external factors and conducted a numerical simulation to seek both players' behavior evolutionary and stabilization trends. The study found that interventions are indispensable during recycled water use's initial and intermediate stages. Moreover, interventions should be tailored to different stages. In the initial stage, the benefits of co-use and the recycled water scientific information should be advertised. In the intermediate and mature stages, it is necessary to increase the trust coefficient or knowledge base of decided people who belong to early adopters of the recycled water diffusion system.

Enhancing Resource Sharing and Access Control for VNF Instantiation with Blockchain.

In the realm of Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) are crucial software entities that require execution on virtualized hardware infrastructure. Deploying a Service Function Chain (SFC) requires multiple steps for instantiating VNFs to analyze, request, deploy, and monitor resources. It is well recognized that the sharing of infrastructure resources among different VNFs will enhance resource utilization. However, conventional mechanisms for VNF sharing often neglect the interests of both VNF instances and infrastructure providers. In this context, this paper presents a blockchain-based framework that focuses on resource sharing and access control, with a particular emphasis on ensuring profitability during VNF instantiation. Additionally, a resource sharing game model and a novel greedy matching algorithm are introduced to optimize the benefits for both VNF instances and infrastructure resource providers. Furthermore, a blockchain-based access control mechanism is designed to securely store keys and provide fine-grained access control. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed resource sharing game model and greedy matching algorithm promote healthy competition among resource owners and facilitate effective bargaining between resource owners and infrastructure providers. In comparison to the standard Stackelberg game solution, our proposed method achieves up to an 8.1 times performance improvement while sacrificing fewer optimal social utility values. Furthermore, compared to other CP-ABE methods, the proposed approach enhances security within a blockchain-based framework while maintaining an excellent encryption efficiency and a moderate decryption efficiency.

A Game Model for Analyzing Wireless Sensor Networks of 5G Environment Based on Adaptive Equilibrium Optimizer Algorithm.

Wireless sensors networks (WSNs) play an important role in life. With the development of 5G, its security issues have also raised concerns. Therefore, it is an important topic to study the offense and defense confrontation in WSNs. A complete information static game model is established to analyze the offense and defense confrontation problem of WSNs in 5G. An adaptive equilibrium optimizer algorithm (AEO) based on parameter adaptive strategy is proposed, which can jump out of the local optimal solution better. Experiments show that the optimization ability of AEO outperforms other algorithms on at least 80% of the 23 classical test functions of CEC. The convergence speed of AEO is better in the early stage of population iteration. The optimal offensive and defensive strategy under different offense and defense resources through simulation experiments is analyzed. The conclusion shows that when the offensive resources are large, the offender takes an indiscriminate attack. When the defense resources are small, the defender should defend the most important elements, and when the defense resources are large, the defender should allocate the same resources to defend each element to obtain the maximum benefit. This paper provides new solution ideas for the security problems under the offense and defense game in WSNs.

A regional cooperative reduction game model for air pollution control in North China.

Due to variations in economic scale, economic structure, and technological advancement across different Chinese provinces and cities, the cost of air pollution reduction differs significantly. Therefore, the total reduction cost can be decreased by capitalizing on these regional discrepancies in reduction cost to carry out cooperative emission reduction. In this paper, taking NOx reduction in North China as an example, a regional cooperative reduction game (CRG) model was constructed to minimize the total cost of emission reduction while achieving future emission reduction targets. The fair allocation of benefits from cooperation plays a crucial role in motivating regions to participate into the cooperation. A comprehensive mechanism of benefits allocation was proposed to achieve fair transferred compensation. The mechanism combines the consumption responsibility principle based on input-output theory and the Shapley value method based on game theory. Compared to the cost before the optimized collaboration, the CRG model will save 20.36% and 13.71% of the total reduction cost in North China, respectively, under the target of 17.68% NOx reduction by 2025 and 66.44% NOx reduction by 2035 relative to 2020. This method can be employed in other regions to achieve targets for air pollution reduction at minimum cost, and to motivate inter-regional cooperation with this practical and fair way of transferred compensation.

Suppression force-fields and diffuse competition: competition de-escalation is an evolutionarily stable strategy.

Competition theory is founded on the premise that individuals benefit from harming their competitors, which helps them secure resources and prevent inhibition by neighbours. When multiple individuals compete, however, competition has complex indirect effects that reverberate through competitive neighbourhoods. The consequences of such 'diffuse' competition are poorly understood. For example, competitive effects may dilute as they propagate through a neighbourhood, weakening benefits of neighbour suppression. Another possibility is that competitive effects may rebound on strong competitors, as their inhibitory effects on their neighbours benefit other competitors in the community. Diffuse competition is unintuitive in part because we lack a clear conceptual framework for understanding how individual interactions manifest in communities of multiple competitors. Here, I use mathematical and agent-based models to illustrate that diffuse interactions-as opposed to direct pairwise interactions-are probably the dominant mode of interaction among multiple competitors. Consequently, competitive effects may regularly rebound, incurring fitness costs under certain conditions, especially when kin-kin interactions are common. These models provide a powerful framework for investigating competitive ability and its evolution and produce clear predictions in ecologically realistic scenarios.

The effects of carbon pricing instruments on carbon emission reduction in China's refining industry: an evolutionary game between heterogeneous refineries.

Carbon emissions from the refining industry are receiving increasing national attention. In view of long-term sustainable development, a carbon pricing mechanism oriented to carbon emission reduction needs to be developed. Currently, the two most common carbon pricing instruments are emission trading system and carbon tax. Therefore, it is important to study the carbon emission problems in the refining industry under emission trading system or carbon tax. Based on the current situation of China's refining industry, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for backward and advanced refineries to explore which instrument is more effectively applied in the refining industry and identify the effective factors that can promote carbon emission reduction in refineries. According to the numerical results, if the heterogeneity of enterprises is small, the government's implementation of an emission trading system is the most effective measure, while carbon tax can only ensure that the equilibrium strategy solution is (1,1) when the tax rate is high. If the heterogeneity is large, the carbon tax policy will not have any effect, indicating that government implementation of an emission trading system is more effective than the carbon tax. In addition, there is a positive relationship between carbon price, carbon tax, and refineries' agreement to carbon emission reduction. Finally, consumers' preference for low-carbon products, R&D investment level, and R&D spillover effect have nothing to do with carbon emission reduction. Only by reducing refinery heterogeneity and improving the R&D efficiency of backward refineries can all enterprises agree to carbon emission reduction.

Resource Support for "Mobilization-Participation" in Public Health Emergencies Based on a Complex Network Evolutionary Game.

The organized system of emergency resources with the participation of social subjects features a network, which puts forward new requirements for mobilization policies for public health emergencies. Considering the "mobilization-participation" action of the relationship between the government and social resource subjects and revealing the mechanism of governance measures represent the foundation of developing effective mobilization strategies. To analyze the behavior of subjects in an emergency resource network, this study proposes a framework for the emergency actions of government and social resource subjects, as well as clarifies the functions of relational mechanisms and interorganizational learning in decision making. The game model and its rules of evolution in the network were developed by considering the interventions of rewards and penalties. An emergency resource network was constructed on the basis of a response to the COVID-19 epidemic in a city in China, and a simulation of the "mobilization-participation" game was designed and conducted. We propose a path to promote emergency resource actions by analyzing the initial situations and the interventions' effects. This article suggests that guiding and improving the initial selection of subjects under a certain reward system would be an effective path to facilitate resource support actions during public health emergencies.

Evolutionary game model of migraine based on the human brain hypersensitivity.

Based on all studies published up to 2020, the prevalence of migraine worldwide is approximately 14%, although it varies regionally. Despite being one of the most disabling diseases, migraine still exists through natural selection and is prevalent today. This raises the question of what evolutionary advantages have led to the survival of migraine. The ultimate answer to this question should be found in evolution; however, there is no clear explanation yet. Notably, all the genes that cause migraine make the sensory organs and cortex of the migraine sufferer hypersensitive. In a state of hypersensitivity, the brain could recognize external threats easily. Game theory is a useful tool for explaining evolution in terms of genes. Just as the Hawk-Dove game, which has two strategies (aggressive and passive) and four fitness values, an evolutionary game between a migraineur and a non-migraineur, which shows two phenotypes (more sensitive and less sensitive) and four fitness values, can be played if a migraineur quickly recognizes a predator and informs a non-migraineur of its appearance and the non-migraineur later helps the migraineur escape from danger. This study aimed to explore the evolutionary mechanics of migraine that can be modeled. Furthermore, it tried to define why the human brain's hypersensitivity is a prerequisite for developing this evolutionary game model.

Who would rescue the dilemma of Chinese elderly care? An evolutionary game analysis and simulation research on the formalization of the domestic service industry with subsidy policy.

Since China entered the aging society, the surging demand for elderly care and the industrial upgrading of "silver economy" has forced the domestic service industry to face endogenous challenges. Among them, the formalization of the domestic service industry can effectively reduce the transaction costs and risks of actors, innovate the endogenous vitality of the industry, and promote the improvement of elderly care quality through a triangular employment relationship. By constructing a tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game model of clients, domestic enterprises and governmental departments, this study uses the stability theorem of differential equations to explore the influencing factors and action paths of the system's evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), and uses the research data collected from China to assign values to models for simulation analysis. This study finds that the ratio of the initial ideal strategy, the difference between profits and costs, subsidies to clients, and subsidies or punishments for breach of contract to domestic enterprises are the key factors affecting the formalization of the domestic service industry. Subsidy policy programs can be divided into long-term and periodic programs, and there are differences in the influence paths and effects of the key factors in different situations. Increasing domestic enterprises' market share with employee management systems, formulating subsidy programs for clients, and setting up evaluation and supervision mechanisms are efficient ways through which to promote the formalization of the domestic service industry in China. Subsidy policy of governmental departments should focus on improving the professional skills and quality of elderly care domestic workers, and also encourage domestic enterprises with employee management systems at the same time, to expand the scope of service beneficiaries by running nutrition restaurants in communities, cooperating with elderly care institutions, etc.

Technology adoption path of construction and demolition waste recycling under governmental subsidy: a theoretical model.

To achieve sustainable development, waste recycling is regarded as an ideal method to dispose of construction and demolition (C&D) waste. The economy is seen as the priority factor influencing recycling technology adoption. Hence, the subsidy is generally used to cross the economic barrier. To illustrate the recycling technology adoption path under governmental subsidy, this paper constructs a non-cooperative game model to investigate the impact of governmental subsidy on the C&D waste recycling technology adoption. By taking adoption profit, opportunity cost, and initial adoption marginal cost into consideration, the best time to adopt recycling technology and adoption behavior is discussed in detail in four scenarios. Results show that the governmental subsidy has a positive impact on C&D waste recycling technology adoption, and the subsidy could advance the adoption time of recyclers. If the subsidy proportion can reach 70% of the cost, recyclers will adopt recycling technology at the initial time. The results could contribute to a deeper understanding of C&D waste management by promoting the development of C&D waste recycling projects and also provide references to governments.

Subsidizing high-quality remanufactured products for sustainability.

This study aims to analyze the impact of government subsidy policies on the development of remanufacturing enterprises and product quality in the context of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, to promote the sustainable development of the remanufacturing industry. It establishes a comparative game model for two cases of remanufacturing enterprises respectively producing low-quality and high-quality remanufactured products. In the context of government subsidies for only high-quality remanufactured products, we investigate the effects of government subsidies on remanufactured products' forms, prices, profits, and consumer preferences. The results show that government subsidies for high-quality remanufactured products help not only reduce the quality cost of remanufactured products and lower the wholesale and retail prices but also increase consumer preference for high-quality remanufactured products, enhance the market demand for remanufactured products, and promote scale expansion of the remanufacturing industry. This study provides decision support for governments to formulate subsidy coefficients for remanufacturing enterprises, offers theoretical and methodological support for the decarbonization and scale-up of remanufacturing and reduction of environmental pollution, and has significant practical value for achieving carbon peak and carbon neutralization goals.

Port governance in the post COVID-19 pandemic era: Heterogeneous service and collusive incentive.

In the post COVID-19 pandemic era, collusion strategy has been attempted to confront fierce market competition in container shipping supply chains. Three typical collusion scenarios are constructed as follows: i) none of the two pairs of shipping chains colludes; ii) both pairs collude; and iii) only one pair colludes. This paper developed a two-stage game model to study the optimal strategies of the container terminals and corresponding liner companies. The container ports set terminal handling charge (THC) to pursue optimal profits at the first stage, and then liner companies choose freight rate to obtain corresponding optimal profits at the second stage. Further, we analyzed the collusive incentives of the THC difference between heterogeneous terminals and the impact of the freight rate difference between heterogeneous container liners. In particular, the possibility of deviation from collusion and the decision of capacity expansion of container terminal are discussed through theoretical analysis. The results show that the optimal THC of a container terminal and freight rate of a container liner are both highly related to the capacity of the container terminal, which is profoundly influenced by the different structures of its collusion. Finally, the empirical study proves the theoretical result and the implications of port governance are subsequently discussed.

An evolutionary game analysis on price competition in recycling industry between large and small enterprises of China.

This research aims to analyse and understand recycling phenomena and competition between large-scale and small-scale enterprises under different public attention. It mainly emphasizes service-providing behaviours to the consumers in the recycling industry, where recyclers are struggling to enhance their profits. The government strives to protect the environment by promoting an efficient recycling industry. As fast-growing waste products, the recyclers should achieve the advantage of number and be equipped with service capability for the consumers. Thus, this study employs an evolutionary game model to analyse the competition for waste products acquisitions between large and small recyclers. Due to a significant association between the service and acquisition waste product price for the consumers and recycling quantity, there is a strong mutual influence between the acquisition price of waste products and the price strategy-taken rate of large and small recyclers. Results also reveal that the market acquisition price and processing cost play a crucial role in recyclers' decision-making on setting prices for acquiring waste products from consumers. Furthermore, it is also found that waste products acquisition price and recyclers' processing cost are the key factors that affect large and small recyclers' recycling quantity.

Dump or recycle? Consumer's environmental awareness and express package disposal based on an evolutionary game model.

Along with the rapid development of the express industry and the inevitable trend of sustainable development, the disposal of express packaging is an urgent problem that needs to be solved. With the objective to the effective disposal mode for express packaging, this paper introduces the consumers' environmental awareness into the framework and establishes an evolutionary game model to explore the governing measures of the express packaging recycling industry. It is found that without considering consumers' environmental awareness, the government's reward and punishment mechanism alone cannot restrain the recycler's decision-making effectively, while the participation of the consumers with environmental awareness could drive the strategy of the recycler to converge to the ideal state effectively, which is recycling the express packaging actively. The sensitivity analysis shows that the participation of consumers with environmental awareness significantly weakens the recycling difficulty and reduces the recycling cost of the recycler, which is helpful to improve the willingness of the recycler to recycle the express packaging continually. Thereby, the express packaging recycling industry can be improved better when the consumer's awareness of environmental protection is enhanced.

Evolutionary game analysis of WEEE recycling tripartite stakeholders under variable subsidies and processing fees.

The standardization of formal recycling and rational subsidy plays an important role in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling. In order to explore the tripartite decision and evolution path of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling in different time periods, a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of recyclers, manufacturers, and government are presented. Moreover, the evolution stability strategies and conditions in each period are calculated by replicating the dynamic equation and Jacobian matrix. Numerical simulations on tripartite evolution stability strategies corresponding to different stages of industry development are used to verify the rationality of the model. The results indicate that there is existed an indirect effect between tripartite decisions, and the indirect effect can expand the slack of tripartite decisions' thresholds of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling. The variable subsidy in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling proposed in this paper is useful to incentive recyclers to choose a formal recycling strategy, and manufacturers also choose production with recycled materials as subsidy varies. Besides, the appropriate waste electrical and electronic equipment processing fee is a conducive indirect effect for the tripartite decision to the optimal evolutionary stability strategy in waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling and can promote manufacturers to produce with the recycled materials. The research can assist in benefit coordination and behavior adjustment of waste electrical and electronic equipment recycling members and provide a theoretical basis for the government to formulate appropriate recycling subsidies to promote the formal recycling of electronic waste recycling.