ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: The dynamic nature of zoonotic emergence, spillover and spread necessitates multisectoral coordination beyond national borders to encompass cross-boundary and regional cooperation. Designated points of entry (POEs), specifically ground crossings, serve as critical locales for establishing and maintaining robust prevention, detection, notification, coordination, and response mechanisms to transboundary emerging and re-emerging disease threats. In order to better assess One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases (TZD) prevention, detection and response we adapted an existing tool, One Health Systems Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHSAPZ), for a cross-border, POE setting in North Africa. METHODS: The One Health Transboundary Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHTAPZ) tool was used to support prioritization of transboundary zoonoses and analyze operational capacities between national and subnational-level human and animal health stakeholders from Libya and Tunisia. Country partners jointly identified and prioritized five TZDs of concern. Case study scenarios for each priority pathogen were used to elicit current disease operations, as well as multisectoral and bilateral engagement networks. Finally, a gap analysis was performed to determine bilateral strengths and weaknesses to TZDs. RESULTS: The five priority TZDs jointly confirmed to undergo One Health assessment were avian influenza (low and high pathogenic strains); brucellosis; Rift Valley fever; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; and rabies. Using the qualitative information collected, a transboundary systems map schematic was developed outlining the movement of human patients, animals, diagnostic samples, and routes of communication and coordination both within and between countries for zoonotic diseases. CONCLUSIONS: Analysis of current operations (prevention, detection, surveillance, laboratory capacity, quarantine/isolation, and response) and the resulting transboundary systems map schematic helped identify existing capacity strengths for certain priority pathogens, as well as challenges to timely information-sharing and coordination. We developed targeted recommendations to address these limitations for joint action planning between Libya and Tunisia.
ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Points of Entry (POEs) are at the frontline for prevention, detection and response to international spread of diseases. The objective of this assessment was to ascertain the current level of existing International Health Regulations (IHR) core capacities of designated airports, ports and ground crossings in Cameroon and identify critical gaps for capacity building for prevention, early warning and response to public health threats including COVID-19. METHODS: Data were collected from April to May 2020 in 5 designated POEs: Yaounde Nsimalen International Airport (YIA), Douala international Airport (DIA), Douala Autonomous Port (DAP), Garoua-Boulai ground crossing, Kye-Ossi ground crossing which were all selected for their high volume of passenger and goods traffic. The World Health Organization (WHO) assessment tool for core capacity requirements at designated airports, ports and ground crossings was used to collect data on three technical capacities: (i) communication and coordination, (ii) Capacities at all times and (iii) capacities to respond to Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC). RESULTS: All the investigated POEs scored below 50% of capacities in place. YIA recorded the highest percentage for all groups of capacities, coordination and communication and for core capacity at all times with a percentage of 42%, 58% and 32% respectively. For core capacity to respond to PHEIC, all the POEs recorded below 50%. The DAP and all ground crossings lacked trained personnel for inspection of conveyances. Only DIA had a public health emergency plan. There is no isolation/quarantine and transport capacity at the POEs. CONCLUSION: All POEs assessed did not meet IHR standards and need significant improvement to fulfill the IHR requirements. Unstructured communication channels between stakeholders make the implementation of IHR challenging. A coordination mechanism, with clear functions and structure, is necessary for well-coordinated response efforts to health emergencies at POEs. This assessment will serve as a baseline to inform planning and IHR implementation at designated POEs in Cameroon.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Public Health , Humans , COVID-19/epidemiology , Cameroon/epidemiology , Emergencies , Pandemics/prevention & controlABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: The implementation of core capacities as stated in the International Health Regulations (IHR) is far from complete, and, as the COVID-19 pandemic shows, the spreading of infectious diseases through points of entry (POEs) is a serious problem. To guide training and exercises, we performed a training needs assessment on infectious disease management among professionals at European POE. METHODS: We disseminated a digital questionnaire to representatives of designated airports, ports, and ground-crossings in Europe. Topics were derived from the IHR core capacities for POEs. Based on the importance (4-point Likert scale) and training needs (4-point Likert scale), we identified the topics with the highest priority for training. These results were put in further perspective using prior experience (training < 3 year, exercise < 5 years, events < 5 years). Also, preferences for training methodologies were assessed. RESULTS: Fifty questionnaires were included in the analyses, representing 50 POEs from 19 European countries. Importance is high for 26/30 topics, although scores widely vary among respondents. Topics with a high training need (16/30) are amongst others the handling of ill travelers; using and composing the public health emergency contingency plan, and public health measures. Respondents from ports and airports attribute equal importance to most topics, but respondents from ports showed higher training needs on 75% of the topics. POEs are unevenly and generally little experienced. The most preferred training methods were presentations. Simulation is the preferred methodology for training the handling of ill or exposed travelers. CONCLUSIONS: The European workforce at designated ports, airports and ground-crossings has a different level of experience and perceives varying importance of the topics assessed in our study. We identified the topics on which training is required. We call for European collaboration between POEs to agree upon the importance of infectious disease management, and to jointly build a trained and prepared workforce that is ready to face the next crisis.
Subject(s)
Airports , COVID-19 , Disease Management , Europe , Humans , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2ABSTRACT
A scoping search and a systematic literature review were conducted to give an insight on entry and exit screening referring to travelers at points of entry, by analyzing published evidence on practices, guidelines, and experiences in the past 15 years worldwide. Grey literature, PubMed. and Scopus were searched using specific terms. Most of the available data identified through the systematic literature review concerned entry screening measures at airports. Little evidence is available about entry and exit screening measure implementation and effectiveness at ports and ground crossings. Exit screening was part of the World Health Organisation's (WHO) temporary recommendations for implementation in certain points of entry, for specific time periods. Exit screening measures for Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in the three most affected West African countries did not identify any cases and showed zero sensitivity and very low specificity. The percentages of confirmed cases identified out of the total numbers of travelers that passed through entry screening measures in various countries worldwide for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) and EVD in West Africa were zero or extremely low. Entry screening measures for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) did not detect any confirmed SARS cases in Australia, Canada, and Singapore. Despite the ineffectiveness of entry and exit screening measures, authors reported several important concomitant positive effects that their impact is difficult to assess, including discouraging travel of ill persons, raising awareness, and educating the traveling public and maintaining operation of flights from/to the affected areas. Exit screening measures in affected areas are important and should be applied jointly with other measures including information strategies, epidemiological investigation, contact tracing, vaccination, and quarantine to achieve a comprehensive outbreak management response. Based on review results, an algorithm about decision-making for entry/exit screening was developed.
Subject(s)
Communicable Disease Control/methods , Communicable Diseases/diagnosis , Communicable Diseases/epidemiology , Mass Screening/statistics & numerical data , Travel , Africa, Western/epidemiology , Aircraft , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/epidemiology , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/prevention & control , Humans , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Mass Screening/standards , Public Health , Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome/epidemiology , Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome/prevention & controlABSTRACT
Health security in the European Union (EU) aims to protect citizens from serious threats to health such as biological agents and infectious disease outbreaks- whether natural, intentional or accidental. Threats may include established infections, emerging diseases or chemical and radiological agents. Co-ordinated international efforts attempt to minimize risks and mitigate the spread of infectious disease across borders.We review the current situation (March 2019) with respect to detection and management of serious human health threats across Irish borders- and what may change for Ireland if/when the United Kingdom (UK) withdraws from the EU (Brexit).Specifically, this paper reviews international legislation covering health threats, and its national transposition; and EU legislation and processes, especially the relevant European Decision No. 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross border threats to health with repeal of Decision No 2119/98/EC. We enumerate European surveillance systems and agencies which relate to port health security; we consider consortia and academic arrangements within the EU framework and established collaboration with the World Health Organization. We describe current Health Services Executive port health structures in Ireland which address preparedness and management of human health threats at points of entry. We appraise risks which Brexit could bring, reviewing literature on shared concerns about these risks, and we evaluate post-Brexit challenges for the EU, and potential opportunities to remain within current structures in shared health threat preparedness and response.It is imperative that the UK, Ireland and the EU work together to mitigate these risks using some agreed joint coordination mechanisms for a robust, harmonised approach to global public health threats at points of entry.