The effectiveness of the UK national DNA database.

Since the emergence of forensic DNA profiling and the corollary creation of DNA databases, efforts to maximise the efficiency and utility of DNA technology have intensified. Such efforts are expedient given the imperative that expenditure on DNA should be cost-effective and the benefits demonstrable. The practice of retaining DNA profiles in databases, either obtained from individuals involved in criminal investigations, or retrieved from suspected crime scenes, has spread globally. The UK's National DNA Database (NDNAD), created in 1995, is both one of the longest established, and biggest of such forensic DNA databases internationally. As such, it is instructive to look at whether there is evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of this DNA database. This paper thus examines efforts to gauge the effectiveness of forensic DNA databases, concluding that while the UK NDNAD may have led directly to convictions in high profile crimes, its broader impact upon public security goals remains elusive.

Forensic DNA retention: Public perspective studies in the United Kingdom and around the world.

This review analysed public perspective studies on forensic DNA retention in the United Kingdom and around the world. The studies generally show strong public support for the long-term or indefinite retention of DNA from convicts and suspects. There is considerable support for the retention of DNA from all or some arrestees and potentially the entire population. This was predicated upon the belief that forensic DNA databases have crime-solving abilities, which the public rate highly. In the UK, it was found that the current Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 regime is broadly representative of the recommendations of the surveyed British public. Nevertheless, the studies highlighted a gap in forensic DNA education among the public, suggesting that public views may not be well informed. Overall, there was clear evidence of privacy concerns and the potential misuse of DNA records among the public, with a significant number opposing the retention of DNA from the innocent. It was found that most of the studies were qualitative or non-representative of the relevant population, limiting the generalisation of the results. There was also limited studies among a representative sample of primary stakeholders who are well-informed or directly exposed to the benefits, challenges and risks associated with DNA retention. A research into stakeholders rating of different forensic DNA retention regimes is therefore highly recommended. This is important because the studies suggest divergent views among criminal justice professionals and other members of the public, with the former expressing expansive views and the latter expressing restrictive views. The primary stakeholder's survey will help establish whether the relevant safeguards have been put in place to protect both public security and individual interests.

The UK National DNA Database: Implementation of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights, in S and Marper v the United Kingdom, ruled that a retention regime that permits the indefinite retention of DNA records of both convicted and non-convicted ("innocent") individuals is disproportionate. The court noted that there was inadequate evidence to justify the retention of DNA records of the innocent. Since the Marper ruling, the laws governing the taking, use, and retention of forensic DNA in England and Wales have changed with the enactment of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). This Act, put briefly, permits the indefinite retention of DNA profiles of most convicted individuals and temporal retention for some first-time convicted minors and innocent individuals on the National DNA Database (NDNAD). The PoFA regime was implemented in October 2013. This paper examines ten post-implementation reports of the NDNAD Strategy Board (3), the NDNAD Ethics Group (3) and the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner (OBC) (4). Overall, the reports highlight a considerable improvement in the performance of the database, with a current match rate of 63.3%. Further, the new regime has strengthened the genetic privacy protection of UK citizens. The OBC reports detail implementation challenges ranging from technical, legal and procedural issues to sufficient understanding of the requirements of PoFA by police forces. Risks highlighted in these reports include the deletion of some "retainable" profiles, which could potentially lead to future crimes going undetected. A further risk is the illegal retention of some profiles from innocent individuals, which may lead to privacy issues and legal challenges. In conclusion, the PoFA regime appears to be working well, however, critical research is still needed to evaluate its overall efficacy compared to other retention regimes.

Does an English appeal court ruling increase the risks of miscarriages of justice when complex DNA profiles are searched against the national DNA database?

Likelihood ratio (LR) methods to interpret multi-contributor, low template, complex DNA mixtures are becoming standard practice. The next major development will be to introduce search engines based on the new methods to interrogate very large national DNA databases, such as those held by China, the USA and the UK. Here we describe a rapid method that was used to assign a LR to each individual member of database of 5 million genotypes which can be ranked in order. Previous authors have only considered database trawls in the context of binary match or non-match criteria. However, the concept of match/non-match no longer applies within the new paradigm introduced, since the distribution of resultant LRs is continuous for practical purposes. An English appeal court decision allows scientists to routinely report complex DNA profiles using nothing more than their subjective personal 'experience of casework' and 'observations' in order to apply an expression of the rarity of an evidential sample. This ruling must be considered in context of a recent high profile English case, where an individual was extracted from a database and wrongly accused of a serious crime. In this case the DNA evidence was used to negate the overwhelming exculpatory (non-DNA) evidence. Demonstrable confirmation bias, also known as the 'CSI-effect, seriously affected the investigation. The case demonstrated that in practice, databases could be used to select and prosecute an individual, simply because he ranked high in the list of possible matches. We have identified this phenomenon as a cognitive error which we term: 'the naïve investigator effect'. We take the opportunity to test the performance of database extraction strategies either by using a simple matching allele count (MAC) method or LR. The example heard by the appeal court is used as the exemplar case. It is demonstrated that the LR search-method offers substantial benefits compared to searches based on simple matching allele count (MAC) methods.

Report into a discordant result at D16S539 between SGM Plus® and PowerPlex® ESI 16 kits in a criminal case sample and implications for the UK National DNA Database upgrade.

Upon re-testing of a DNA extract as part of a defence examination, a discordant result was observed at D16S539. Further STR testing and DNA sequencing of the sample identified the cause as a primer binding site mutation which was shown to be a previously unreported SNP. The testing results obtained in this case are considered in light of the current ongoing Multiplex Upgrade Project in the UK and the likely increase in discordant results that may be observed once different next generation kits are introduced.

Familial searching: a specialist forensic DNA profiling service utilising the National DNA Database to identify unknown offenders via their relatives--the UK experience.

The National DNA Database (NDNAD) of England and Wales was established on April 10th 1995. The NDNAD is governed by a variety of legislative instruments that mean that DNA samples can be taken if an individual is arrested and detained in a police station. The biological samples and the DNA profiles derived from them can be used for purposes related to the prevention and detection of crime, the investigation of an offence and for the conduct of a prosecution. Following the South East Asian Tsunami of December 2004, the legislation was amended to allow the use of the NDNAD to assist in the identification of a deceased person or of a body part where death has occurred from natural causes or from a natural disaster. The UK NDNAD now contains the DNA profiles of approximately 6 million individuals representing 9.6% of the UK population. As the science of DNA profiling advanced, the National DNA Database provided a potential resource for increased intelligence beyond the direct matching for which it was originally created. The familial searching service offered to the police by several UK forensic science providers exploits the size and geographic coverage of the NDNAD and the fact that close relatives of an offender may share a significant proportion of that offender's DNA profile and will often reside in close geographic proximity to him or her. Between 2002 and 2011 Forensic Science Service Ltd. (FSS) provided familial search services to support 188 police investigations, 70 of which are still active cases. This technique, which may be used in serious crime cases or in 'cold case' reviews when there are few or no investigative leads, has led to the identification of 41 perpetrators or suspects. In this paper we discuss the processes, utility, and governance of the familial search service in which the NDNAD is searched for close genetic relatives of an offender who has left DNA evidence at a crime scene, but whose DNA profile is not represented within the NDNAD. We discuss the scientific basis of the familial search approach, other DNA-based methods for eliminating individuals from the candidate lists generated by these NDNAD searches, the value of filtering these lists by age, ethnic appearance and geography and the governance required by the NDNAD Strategy Board when a police force commissions a familial search. We present the FSS data in relation to the utility of the familial searching service and demonstrate the power of the technique by reference to casework examples. We comment on the uptake of familial searching of DNA databases in the USA, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand. Finally, following the adverse ruling by the European Court of Human Rights against the UK in regard to the S & Marper cases and the consequent introduction of the Protection of Freedoms Act (2012), we discuss the impact that changes to regulations concerning the storage of DNA samples will have on the continuing provision of familial searching of the National DNA Database in England and Wales.