Risk of hospitalization and death for healthcare workers with COVID-19 in nine European countries, January 2020-January 2021.

This article presents and compares coronavirus disease 2019 attack rates for infection, hospitalization, intensive care unit (ICU) admission and death in healthcare workers (HCWs) and non-HCWs in nine European countries from 31st January 2020 to 13th January 2021. Adjusted attack rate ratios in HCWs (compared with non-HCWs) were 3.0 [95% confidence interval (CI) 2.2-4.0] for infection, 1.8 (95% CI 1.2-2.7) for hospitalization, 1.9 (95% CI 1.1-3.2) for ICU admission and 0.9 (95% CI 0.4-2.0) for death. Among hospitalized cases, the case-fatality ratio was 1.8% in HCWs and 8.2% in non-HCWs. Differences may be due to better/earlier access to treatment, differential underascertainment and the healthy worker effect.

European all-cause excess and influenza-attributable mortality in the 2017/18 season: should the burden of influenza B be reconsidered?

OBJECTIVES: Weekly monitoring of European all-cause excess mortality, the EuroMOMO network, observed high excess mortality during the influenza B/Yamagata dominated 2017/18 winter season, especially among elderly. We describe all-cause excess and influenza-attributable mortality during the season 2017/18 in Europe. METHODS: Based on weekly reporting of mortality from 24 European countries or sub-national regions, representing 60% of the European population excluding the Russian and Turkish parts of Europe, we estimated age stratified all-cause excess morality using the EuroMOMO model. In addition, age stratified all-cause influenza-attributable mortality was estimated using the FluMOMO algorithm, incorporating influenza activity based on clinical and virological surveillance data, and adjusting for extreme temperatures. RESULTS: Excess mortality was mainly attributable to influenza activity from December 2017 to April 2018, but also due to exceptionally low temperatures in February-March 2018. The pattern and extent of mortality excess was similar to the previous A(H3N2) dominated seasons, 2014/15 and 2016/17. The 2017/18 overall all-cause influenza-attributable mortality was estimated to be 25.4 (95%CI 25.0-25.8) per 100,000 population; 118.2 (116.4-119.9) for persons aged 65. Extending to the European population this translates into over-all 152,000 deaths. CONCLUSIONS: The high mortality among elderly was unexpected in an influenza B dominated season, which commonly are considered to cause mild illness, mainly among children. Even though A(H3N2) also circulated in the 2017/18 season and may have contributed to the excess mortality among the elderly, the common perception of influenza B only having a modest impact on excess mortality in the older population may need to be reconsidered.

Urgent request on avian influenza.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8 is currently causing an epizootic in Europe, infecting many poultry holdings as well as captive and wild bird species in more than 10 countries. Given the clear clinical manifestation, passive surveillance is considered the most effective means of detecting infected wild and domestic birds. Testing samples from new species and non-previously reported areas is key to determine the geographic spread of HPAIV H5N8 2016 in wild birds. Testing limited numbers of dead wild birds in previously reported areas is useful when it is relevant to know whether the virus is still present in the area or not, e.g. before restrictive measures in poultry are to be lifted. To prevent introduction of HPAIV from wild birds into poultry, strict biosecurity implemented and maintained by the poultry farmers is the most important measure. Providing holding-specific biosecurity guidance is strongly recommended as it is expected to have a high impact on the achieved biosecurity level of the holding. This is preferably done during peace time to increase preparedness for future outbreaks. The location and size of control and in particular monitoring areas for poultry associated with positive wild bird findings are best based on knowledge of the wider habitat and flight distance of the affected wild bird species. It is recommended to increase awareness among poultry farmers in these established areas in order to enhance passive surveillance and to implement enhanced biosecurity measures including poultry confinement. There is no scientific evidence suggesting a different effectiveness of the protection measures on the introduction into poultry holdings and subsequent spread of HPAIV when applied to H5N8, H5N1 or other notifiable HPAI viruses.

Human-Dromedary Camel Interactions and the Risk of Acquiring Zoonotic Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Infection.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) cases without documented contact with another human MERS-CoV case make up 61% (517/853) of all reported cases. These primary cases are of particular interest for understanding the source(s) and route(s) of transmission and for designing long-term disease control measures. Dromedary camels are the only animal species for which there is convincing evidence that it is a host species for MERS-CoV and hence a potential source of human infections. However, only a small proportion of the primary cases have reported contact with camels. Other possible sources and vehicles of infection include food-borne transmission through consumption of unpasteurized camel milk and raw meat, medicinal use of camel urine and zoonotic transmission from other species. There are critical knowledge gaps around this new disease which can only be closed through traditional field epidemiological investigations and studies designed to test hypothesis regarding sources of infection and risk factors for disease. Since the 1960s, there has been a radical change in dromedary camel farming practices in the Arabian Peninsula with an intensification of the production and a concentration of the production around cities. It is possible that the recent intensification of camel herding in the Arabian Peninsula has increased the virus' reproductive number and attack rate in camel herds while the 'urbanization' of camel herding increased the frequency of zoonotic 'spillover' infections from camels to humans. It is reasonable to assume, although difficult to measure, that the sensitivity of public health surveillance to detect previously unknown diseases is lower in East Africa than in Saudi Arabia and that sporadic human cases may have gone undetected there.

Comparing introduction to Europe of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses A(H5N8) in 2014 and A(H5N1) in 2005.

Since the beginning of November 2014, nine outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) A(H5N8) in poultry have been detected in four European countries. In this report, similarities and differences between the modes of introduction of HPAIV A(H5N1) and A(H5N8) into Europe are described. Experiences from outbreaks of A(H5N1) in Europe demonstrated that early detection to control HPAIV in poultry has proven pivotal to minimise the risk of zoonotic transmission and prevention of human cases.

[Hospital surveillance during major outbreaks of community-acquired diseases. Pandemic Influenza Hospital Surveillance (PIKS) 2009/2010 and Surveillance of Bloody Diarrhea (SBD) 2011]. / Krankenhaus-Surveillance während großer Ausbrüche ambulant erworbener Erkrankungen. Die Pandemische-Influenza-Krankenhaus-Surveillance (PIKS) 2009/2010 und die Surveillance blutiger Durchfälle (SBD) 2011.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: During the influenza pandemic 2009/2010 and the outbreak of entero-haemorrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC)/hemolytic-uremic syndrome (HUS) 2011, the statutory reporting system in Germany was complemented by additional event-related surveillance systems in hospitals. The Pandemic Influenza Hospital Surveillance (PIKS) and the Surveillance of Bloody Diarrhea (SBD) were evaluated, to make experiences available for similar future situations. METHODS: The description and evaluation of our surveillance systems is based on the "Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems" published by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 2001. RESULTS: PIKS and SBD could be implemented quickly and were able to capture resilient data in a timely manner both on the severity and course of the influenza pandemic 2009/2010 and the outbreak of EHEC and HUS 2011. Although lacking in representativeness, sensitive and useful data were generated. CONCLUSION: In large outbreaks of severe diseases, the establishment of specific hospital surveillance should be considered as early as possible. In Germany, the participating hospitals were able to rapidly implement the required measures.

Increasing case numbers of adenovirus conjunctivitis in Germany, 2010.

In 2010 (as of 13 October 2010), the number of adenovirus conjunctivitis cases reported to the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin, Germany, has increased by more than 250% compared with same period in the previous two years. An investigation was initiated to identify spatial or temporal clusters, possible sources of infection and potential connections to cases abroad. The analysis did not show a disproportionately affected sex or age group, but many infections were preceded by exposure to ophthalmological facilities, communal facilities or public places.

Indigenous hepatitis E virus infection of a plasma donor in Germany.

BACKGROUND: Although Europe is supposed to be non-endemic for hepatitis E virus (HEV), locally acquired human cases are registered, and a relatively high prevalence for anti-HEV was found in blood donors in some European countries. Transfusion-transmitted infections by contaminated blood products were reported in Japan and sporadically in Europe. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Several samples from a plasma donor were screened with a highly sensitive quantitative HEV real-time polymerase chain reaction and the full-length genome was generated. Serology was performed with two different commercially available ELISA kits. RESULTS: The full-length genome sequence of human HEV was identified using samples from a plasma donor with acute self-limiting hepatitis. Plasma donated 2 weeks before onset of elevated liver enzyme levels was already positive for HEV RNA (10(4) copies/ml). High viraemia (10(6) copies/ml) correlated with the detection of anti-HEV IgM in the first blood sample with increased alanine transaminase levels. Phylogenetic analyses grouped the isolate within genotype 3, subtype 3f. CONCLUSION: The sequence analyses and the epidemiological data revealed that the plasma donor was most probably infected with a swine HEV. This case supports the ongoing discussion of an obligatory HEV nucleic acid testing of blood products for special recipient risk groups.