Nudging individuals' creativity using social labeling.

Simple instructions have been shown to robustly influence individual creativity, which is key to solve local problems. Building on social labeling theory, we examine the possibility of nudging individual's creativity using "creative" and "not creative" labels. Study 1 showed that subjects labeled as "creative" or "not creative" performed better in a creative task than unlabeled subjects and established the moderating effect of self-perceived creativity. Among subjects scoring low on self-perceived creativity, those labeled as "creative" performed better than those labeled as "not creative". Conversely, among subjects scoring high on self-perceived creativity, those labeled as "not creative" tend to perform better than those labeled as "creative". Study 2 and Study 3 further explored the psychological mechanisms at play in both cases: specifically, Study 2 showed that applying a "creative" label has the ability to increase creative self-efficacy through self-perceived creativity, whereas Study 3 demonstrated that applying a "not creative" label has the ability to increase individual creativity performance through a higher involvement in the creative task.

How minimal executive feedback influences creative idea generation.

The fixation effect is known as one of the most dominant of the cognitive biases against creativity and limits individuals' creative capacities in contexts of idea generation. Numerous techniques and tools have been established to help overcome these cognitive biases in various disciplines ranging from neuroscience to design sciences. Several works in the developmental cognitive sciences have discussed the importance of inhibitory control and have argued that individuals must first inhibit the spontaneous ideas that come to their mind so that they can generate creative solutions to problems. In line with the above discussions, in the present study, we performed an experiment on one hundred undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology at Paris Descartes University, in which we investigated a minimal executive feedback-based learning process that helps individuals inhibit intuitive paths to solutions and then gradually drive their ideation paths toward creativity. Our results provide new insights into novel forms of creative leadership for idea generation.

Inhibitory Control as a Core Process of Creative Problem Solving and Idea Generation from Childhood to Adulthood.

Developmental cognitive neuroscience studies tend to show that the prefrontal brain regions (known to be involved in inhibitory control) are activated during the generation of creative ideas. In the present article, we discuss how a dual-process model of creativity-much like the ones proposed to account for decision making and reasoning-could broaden our understanding of the processes involved in creative ideas generation. When generating creative ideas, children, adolescents, and adults tend to follow "the path of least resistance" and propose solutions that are built on the most common and accessible knowledge within a specific domain, leading to fixation effect. In line with recent theory of typical cognitive development, we argue that the ability to resist the spontaneous activation of design heuristics, to privilege other types of reasoning, might be critical to generate creative ideas at all ages. In the present review, we demonstrate that inhibitory control at all ages can actually support creativity. Indeed, the ability to think of something truly new and original requires first inhibiting spontaneous solutions that come to mind quickly and unconsciously and then exploring new ideas using a generative type of reasoning.

Does ambiguity aversion influence the framing effect during decision making?

Decision-makers present a systematic tendency to avoid ambiguous options for which the level of risk is unknown. This ambiguity aversion is one of the most striking decision-making biases. Given that human choices strongly depend on the options' presentation, the purpose of the present study was to examine whether ambiguity aversion influences the framing effect during decision making. We designed a new financial decision-making task involving the manipulation of both frame and uncertainty levels. Thirty-seven participants had to choose between a sure option and a gamble depicting either clear or ambiguous probabilities. The results revealed a clear preference for the sure option in the ambiguity condition regardless of frame. However, participants presented a framing effect in both the risk and ambiguity conditions. Indeed, the framing effect was bidirectional in the risk condition and unidirectional in the ambiguity condition given that it did not involve preference reversal but only a more extreme choice tendency.