Do preschoolers track and evaluate social includers and excluders?

Social exclusion is harmful and leads to negative consequences across the lifespan. Based on studies primarily with adults, psychologists have characterized a highly sensitive "ostracism detection system" that acts quickly and automatically to detect exclusion and mitigate its effects. However, research with children has not fully explored whether a system with similar characteristics is operational in early childhood, and prior work probing children's responses to exclusion has produced mixed findings. We investigated 4- to 6-year-old children's abilities to negatively evaluate those who have excluded them as well as to use these experiences for prosocial gossip. Children engaged one pair of play partners in an inclusive game and engaged another pair in an exclusive game. Nearly one third (n = 28 of 96) did not accurately recall who had excluded them. Yet those who did recall their game experiences evaluated excluders more negatively than includers, and they were less likely to recommend excluders as play partners to others. These findings indicate that not all children sensitively track their excluders' identities-but those who do so will evaluate excluders negatively. More work is needed to understand developments in how and when children recognize their own exclusion and whether the underlying processes should be viewed as homologous to adults' ostracism detection system.

Children's developing views of social excluders: A dissociation between social evaluation and partner preference.

When facing social exclusion, children seek to strengthen existing social connections and form new ones. This study asked whether they also make strategic choices about the targets of their affiliative goals. Three- to six-year-olds (N = 69; 36 female; mostly non-Hispanic White) observed characters acting inclusively or exclusively. All ages viewed excluders more negatively than includers, but only five- and six-year-olds preferred includers as play partners. Despite easily detecting and remembering exclusion events, younger children expressed no play partner preference. Children's verbal justifications revealed that older children choose partners more carefully and draw on a richer understanding of exclusion. More generally, the initial dissociation between social evaluation and preference formation underscores that these are distinct processes with different developmental trajectories.

Beyond avatars and arrows: Testing the mentalising and submentalising hypotheses with a novel entity paradigm.

In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In this study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general "submentalising" processes. Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalising processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g., arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from "novel entity" paradigms from infant gaze-following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic "perspective-taking" effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalising interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct.

Young children and adults associate social power with indifference to others' needs.

In hierarchical societies, what do we expect from people at the top? Early in life, children use horizontal relationships (e.g., affiliation) to predict selectivity in others' prosocial behavior. But it is unknown whether children also view asymmetries in prosocial behavior as characteristic of vertical relationships (e.g., differences in social power). In two experiments, we investigated 4- to 7-year-old children's and adults' (N = 192) intuitions about links among relative authority status, helpful action, and unhelpful inaction. In Experiment 1, participants at all ages viewed a character who chose not to help another person as holding a position of authority over them; participants also viewed this unhelpful character as being less nice than the person in need. However, no age group made consistent inferences about the relative authority of a helper and a helpee. In Experiment 2, children had mixed intuitions when separately predicting whether high- and low-authority characters would be helpful in the future. However, older children and adults consistently indicated that a subordinate would be more likely than an authority to help a third party. These findings establish that children's social theories include expectations for links between power and prosociality by at least the preschool years. Whereas some judgments in this domain are stable from 4 years of age onward, others emerge gradually. Whether consistent responses occurred early or only later in development, however, all measures converged on a single intuition: People more easily associate authority with indifference to others' needs.

Helping, Sharing, and Comforting in Young Children: Links to Individual Differences in Attachment.

Although attachment theory has long posited a link between early experiences of care and children's prosocial behavior, investigations of this association have not embraced the multifaceted nature of prosociality. This study is the first to assess associations between child attachment and independent observations of helping, sharing, and comforting. Attachment quality in 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 137) was linked to all three prosocial behaviors. Additionally, bifactor analyses revealed distinct associations between attachment and children's general prosocial dispositions and their specific abilities to meet the unique challenges of helping and, marginally, comforting. These findings underscore the importance of considering multiple explanations for links between attachment and prosocial behavior and provide novel insights into sources of variation in children's prosociality.

Getting help for others: An examination of indirect helping in young children.

When young children recruit others to help a person in need, media reports often treat it as a remarkable event. Yet it is unclear how commonly children perform this type of pro-social behavior and what forms of social understanding, cognitive abilities, and motivational factors promote or discourage it. In this study, 48 three- to four-year-old children could choose between two actors to retrieve an out-of-reach object for a third person; during this event, one actor was physically unable to provide help. Nearly all of children's responses appropriately incorporated the actors' action capacities, indicating that rational prosocial reasoning-the cognitive basis for effective indirect helping-is common at this young age. However, only half of children actually directed an actor to help, suggesting that additional motivational factors constrained their prosocial actions. A behavioral measure of social inhibition and within-task scaffolding that increased children's personal involvement were both strongly associated with children's initiation of indirect helping behavior. These results highlight social inhibition and recognizing one's own potential agency as key motivational challenges that children must overcome to recruit help for others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Children's developing judgments about the physical manifestations of power.

When navigating unfamiliar social environments, it is important to identify who is powerful. Determining who has power can be challenging because observers may have limited social information, and because people achieve influence for many reasons. In experiments with 3- to 5-year-old children (n = 192) and adults (n = 32), we investigated the developmental origins and conceptual structure of power judgments based on physical appearance. At 3 years of age, children already associated physical strength with expansive posture; soon after, expansive postures also supported judgments of normative authority and were joined by similar judgments about masculine facial structure. By the age of 4, children also matched high- and low-power versions of faces and postures together, indicating that they draw connections between different aspects of more or less powerful appearance. The complexity and timing of these changes highlights limitations in current accounts of the origins of adults' intuitions about powerful appearances. This study documents several novel developmental patterns that generate new hypotheses about the mechanisms that support the emergence of children's intuitions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Shyness and Social Conflict Reduce Young Children's Social Helpfulness.

This study examined social influences on 3-year-old children's decisions to help an experimenter gain another person's attention (N = 32). Children were slower to help the experimenter when the target had previously expressed disinterest in attending to her. Shy children were less likely to support the experimenter's attempts to communicate with the target; however, this association was not influenced by children's knowledge of the target's disinterest, and there was no relation between shyness and children's support for a separate physical goal. Therefore, young children's decisions to act helpfully incorporate consideration for others beyond a focal person with an unmet need, and they are further constrained by children's own comfort with the actions required to help.

Contingency is not enough: Social context guides third-party attributions of intentional agency.

Four experiments investigated whether infants and adults infer that a novel entity that interacts in a contingent, communicative fashion with an experimenter is itself an intentional agent. The experiments contrasted the hypothesis that such an inference follows from amodal representations of the contingent interaction alone with the hypothesis that features of the experimenter's behavior might also influence intentional attribution. Twelve- to 13-month-old infants and adults observed a novel entity respond contingently to a confederate experimenter, the form of whose actions varied across conditions. For infants, intentionality attribution was assessed by the extent to which they subsequently followed the faceless entity's implied attentional focus. For adults, intentionality attribution was assessed from their use of psychological terms when later describing the entity's behavior. In both groups, construal of the entity as an intentional agent was limited to a subset of contingent interaction conditions. At both ages, the pattern of responses across conditions suggests that whether an observed contingent interaction can be seen as a social interaction influences the attribution of intentional agency. These results further indicate that the agent detection mechanism responding to third-party contingent interactions, as a context-sensitive process, is distinct from the mechanism responding to directly experienced contingent interactions, suggested by prior developmental work to be based solely on amodal representations of an entity's contingent reaction to behaviors of an infant.

Young children help others to achieve their social goals.

From early in development, humans have strong prosocial tendencies. Much research has documented young children's propensity to help others achieve their unfulfilled goals toward physical objects. Yet many of our most common and important goals are social--directed toward other people. Here we demonstrate that children are also inclined, and able, to help others achieve their social goals. Three-year-old children observed an experimenter trying unsuccessfully to get the attention of another individual and then helped by directing the 2nd individual's attention back to the experimenter. A control condition ensured that children's responses were not motivated by a general desire to inform the 2nd individual about interesting events. A 2nd experiment showed that children distinguish between fulfilled and frustrated versions of this social goal and help appropriately on the basis of this distinction. Young children are therefore willing to intervene in a 3rd-party interaction to help it along. This result expands the range of situations in which young children are known to spontaneously help others into the social domain, thereby underscoring the pervasiveness of their prosocial motivations and identifying a critical area for further research.

Infants' developing understanding of social gaze.

Young infants are sensitive to self-directed social actions, but do they appreciate the intentional, target-directed nature of such behaviors? The authors addressed this question by investigating infants' understanding of social gaze in third-party interactions (N = 104). Ten-month-old infants discriminated between 2 people in mutual versus averted gaze, and expected a person to look at her social partner during conversation. In contrast, 9-month-old infants showed neither ability, even when provided with information that highlighted the gazer's social goals. These results indicate considerable improvement in infants' abilities to analyze the social gaze of others toward the end of their 1st year, which may relate to their appreciation of gaze as both a social and goal-directed action.

Two types of recollection-based monitoring in younger and older adults: Recall-to-reject and the distinctiveness heuristic.

People often use recollection to avoid false memories. At least two types of recollection-based monitoring processes can be identified in the literature. Recall-to-reject is based on the recall of logically inconsistent information (which disqualifies the false event from having occurred), whereas the distinctiveness heuristic is based on the failure to recall to-be-expected information (which is diagnostic of non-occurrence). We attempted to investigate these hypothetical monitoring processes in a single task, as a first step at delineating the functional relationship between them. By design, participants could reject familiar lures by (1) recalling them from a to-be-excluded list (recall-to-reject) or (2) realising the absence of expected picture recollections (the distinctiveness heuristic). Both manipulations reduced false recognition in young adults, suggesting that these two types of monitoring were deployed on the same test. In contrast, older adults had limited success in reducing false recognition with either manipulation, indicating deficits in recollection-based monitoring processes. Depending on how a retrieval task is structured, attempts to use one monitoring process might interfere with another, especially in older adults.

Memory and emotions for the september 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in patients with Alzheimer's disease, patients with mild cognitive impairment, and healthy older adults.

National traumatic events can produce extremely vivid memories. Using a questionnaire administered during telephone interviews, the authors investigated emotional responses to, and memory for. the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD), patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI), and healthy older adults in the initial weeks following the event and again 3-4 months later. There were several notable findings. First, patients with AD showed less memory than patients with MCI and older adults. Second, patients with AD, but not patients with MCI or older adults, appeared to retain more memory for personal versus factual information. Third, patients with AD and older adults did not differ in the intensity of their reported emotional responses to the attacks, whereas patients with MCI reported relatively less intense emotional responses. Last, distortions of memory for personal information were frequent for all participants but were more common in patients with AD.