Enforcement of Fairness Norms by Punishment: A Comparison of Gains and Losses.

Although in everyday life decisions about losses are prevalent (e.g., the climate crisis and the COVID-19 crisis), there is hardly any research on decisions in the loss domain. Therefore, we conducted online experiments with a sample of 672 participants (mostly students), using third-party punishment dictator games (DGs) in the loss domain to explore the impact of losses and punishment threats on the conformity to the fairness norm. Subjects in the treatment condition have to divide a loss of -10 € with the threat of a third-party punishment with different strengths (control: gains, no punishment). Overall, the statistical evidence seems rather weak, but when it comes to losses, subjects are more rational and straightforward with their words and deeds than with gains. Therefore, in the loss domain, subjects are more likely to believe that the fairness norm should be followed, and they subjectively perceive that the others do as well. Furthermore, although dictators' decisions are more selfish in the loss domain, dictators there react more strongly to the punishment threat by reducing their demands than in the gains domain. This holds as long as the punishment threat is strong enough, as judged from a rational perspective.

[Acceptance of Teledermatology: Results of a Survey of General Practitioners and Dermatologists in Saxony (Germany)]. / Akzeptanz der Teledermatologie: Ergebnisse einer Befragung sächsischer Haus- und HautärztInnen.

AIM OF THE STUDY: The aim of this study was to investigate acceptance and intention to use teledermatological application by means of a survey of general practitioners and dermatologists in Saxony (Germany). Considering the demographic development in Saxony and the low regional density of medical specialists, this federal state is particularly well suited for conducting a survey dealing with telemedicine. METHODS: Based on a stratified random selection, 108 physicians were interviewed via self-administered postal or online questionnaire (60 general practitioners and 48 dermatologists, response rate: 23.5%). The theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) was applied to teledermatology. Four central hypotheses were deduced and tested with logistic regressions. RESULTS: The tested hypotheses postulating relationships between performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence and facilitating conditions and the intention to use teledermatology were partly confirmed. In addition, teledermatology was shown to have potential among Saxon general practitioners, as 9.5% of their patients came to the medical office for treatment of skin diseases; 78% of general practitioners offered skin cancer screenings. CONCLUSION: The population structure and the low density of medical specialists in Saxony would be favourable prerequisites for the implementation of teledermatology. Survey results failed to show any reservations of general practitioners and dermatologists towards teledermatology.

The effects of social feedback on private opinions. Empirical evidence from the laboratory.

The question of how people change their opinions through social interactions has been on the agenda of social scientific research for many decades. Now that the Internet has led to an ever greater interconnectedness and new forms of exchange that seem to go hand in hand with increasing political polarization, it is once again gaining in relevance. Most recently, the field of opinion dynamics has been complemented by social feedback theory, which explains opinion polarization phenomena by means of a reinforcement learning mechanism. According to the assumptions, individuals not only evaluate the opinion alternatives available to them based on the social feedback received as a result of expressing an opinion within a certain social environment. Rather, they also internalize the expected and thus rewarded opinion to the point where it becomes their actual private opinion. In order to put the implications of social feedback theory to a test, we conducted a randomized controlled laboratory experiment. The study combined preceding and follow-up opinion measurements via online surveys with a laboratory treatment. Social feedback was found to have longer-term effects on private opinions, even when received in an anonymous and sanction free setting. Interestingly and contrary to our expectations, however, it was the mixture of supportive and rejective social feedback that resulted in the strongest influence. In addition, we observed a high degree of opinion volatility, highlighting the need for further research to help identify additional internal and external factors that might influence whether and how social feedback affects private opinions.

Experiments on norm focusing and losses in dictator games.

We conducted experiments on norm focusing. The tests were carried out with two versions of dictator games: in one version of the game, the dictator had to allocate a gain of €10, while in the other version, a loss of €-10 needs to be allocated. In a first treatment, we focused subjects on the average giving in similar previous dictator games. The second treatment focused subjects on the behaviour of what a self-interested actor should do. In total, N = 550 participants took part in our experiments. We found (1) a significant difference in giving behaviour between gain and loss treatments, with subjects being moderately more self-interested in the loss domain, (2) a significant effect of focusing subjects on the average behaviour of others, but (3) no effect of focusing subjects on the behaviour of self-interested actors.

Explaining Fairness : Results from an Experiment in Guinea.

Fairness is undoubtedly an essential normative concept in humans and promotes cooperation in human societies. The fact that fairness exists is puzzling, however, because it works against the short-term interest of individuals. Theories of genetic evolution, cultural evolution, and gene-culture coevolution identify plausible mechanisms for the evolution of fairness in humans. Such mechanisms include kin selection, the support of group-beneficial moral norms through ethnic markers, free partner choice with equal outside options, and free partner choice with reputation as well as spite in small populations. Here, we present the results of a common-pool resource game experiment on sharing. Based on data from 37 multiethnic villages in a subsistence agricultural population in Foutah Djallon, Guinea, we show that fair behavior in our experiment increased with increasing ethnic homogeneity and market integration. Group size and kinship had the opposite effect. Overall, fair behavior was not conditional on reputation. Instead, the ability of the different village populations to support individuals' fairness in situations lacking the opportunity to build a positive reputation varied significantly. Our results suggest that evolutionary theory provides a useful framework for the analysis of fairness in humans.

Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments.

While preference-based explanations play an increasing role in economics and sociology, the accurate measurement of social preferences deserves more attention. Most laboratory experiments measure social preferences by studying the division of "a cake that nobody had to bake" (Güth and Kliemt, 2003). This article reports results of the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter and implies a natural loss to subjects. This allows for a better measurement of the inherent conflict in the ultimatum game. We implemented three anonymity conditions; one baseline condition, one condition with anonymity among subjects and one double-blind condition in which the experimenter did not know the division of waiting time. While we expected to observe less other-regarding behavior in ultimatum game bargaining over time, our experimental results rather confirm previous ultimatum game experiments, in which people bargained over money. The modal offer was half of the waiting time and only one offer was rejected. Interestingly, anonymity did not change the results significantly. In conclusion, our experiment confirms other-regarding behavior in the ultimatum game.

A cautionary note on exact unconditional inference for a difference between two independent binomial proportions.

Fisher's exact test for comparing response proportions in a randomized experiment can be overly conservative when the group sizes are small or when the response proportions are close to zero or one. This is primarily because the null distribution of the test statistic becomes too discrete, a partial consequence of the inference being conditional on the total number of responders. Accordingly, exact unconditional procedures have gained in popularity, on the premise that power will increase because the null distribution of the test statistic will presumably be less discrete. However, we caution researchers that a poor choice of test statistic for exact unconditional inference can actually result in a substantially less powerful analysis than Fisher's conditional test. To illustrate, we study a real example and provide exact test size and power results for several competing tests, for both balanced and unbalanced designs. Our results reveal that Fisher's test generally outperforms exact unconditional tests based on using as the test statistic either the observed difference in proportions, or the observed difference divided by its estimated standard error under the alternative hypothesis, the latter for unbalanced designs only. On the other hand, the exact unconditional test based on the observed difference divided by its estimated standard error under the null hypothesis (score statistic) outperforms Fisher's test, and is recommended. Boschloo's test, in which the p-value from Fisher's test is used as the test statistic in an exact unconditional test, is uniformly more powerful than Fisher's test, and is also recommended.