ABSTRACT
Characterizing rocky exoplanets is a central aim of astronomy, and yet the search for atmospheres on rocky exoplanets has so far resulted in either tight upper limits on the atmospheric mass1-3 or inconclusive results4-6. The 1.95REarth and 8.8MEarth planet 55 Cancri e (abbreviated 55 Cnc e), with a predominantly rocky composition and an equilibrium temperature of around 2,000 K, may have a volatile envelope (containing molecules made from a combination of C, H, O, N, S and P elements) that accounts for up to a few percent of its radius7-13. The planet has been observed extensively with transmission spectroscopy14-22 and its thermal emission has been measured in broad photometric bands23-26. These observations disfavour a primordial H2/He-dominated atmosphere but cannot conclusively determine whether the planet has a secondary atmosphere27,28. Here we report a thermal emission spectrum of the planet obtained by the NIRCam and MIRI instruments aboard the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) from 4 to 12 µm. The measurements rule out the scenario in which the planet is a lava world shrouded by a tenuous atmosphere made of vaporized rock29-32 and indicate a bona fide volatile atmosphere that is probably rich in CO2 or CO. This atmosphere can be outgassed from and sustained by a magma ocean.
ABSTRACT
Over the coming century, the accelerating advance of bioenhancement technologies, robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI) may significantly broaden the qualitative range of sentient and intelligent beings. This article proposes a taxonomy of such beings, ranging from modified animals to bioenhanced humans to advanced forms of robots and AI. It divides these diverse beings into three moral and legal categories-animals, persons, and presumed persons-describing the moral attributes and legal rights of each category. In so doing, the article sets forth a framework for extending the concept of personhood well beyond its current boundaries, assigning moral standing to a variety of biological and nonbiological beings. The author concludes that six of the eight subgroups of such beings deserve to be treated as persons or as if they were persons, with full consideration for their presumed interests, rights, obligations, and capabilities for ethically significant agency and patiency.
Subject(s)
Artificial Intelligence/ethics , Biomedical Enhancement/ethics , Personhood , Robotics/ethics , Animal Rights , Animals , Human Rights , Humans , Moral Obligations , MoralsABSTRACT
A key aspect of transhumanist thought involves the modification or augmentation of human physical and mental capabilities--a form of intervention often encapsulated under the term "enhancement." This article provides an overview of the concept of enhancement, focusing on six major areas in which usages of the term become slippery and controversial: normal or species-typical functioning, therapeutics or healing, natural functioning, human nature, authenticity, and the ambiguity between "more" and "better." I argue that we need to be aware of the tendency to embed the concept of enhancement within stark binary oppositions that seem perfectly reasonable at first glance, but that in fact yield little more than conceptual muddles if they are not handled carefully.