Strategic disinformation outperforms honesty in competition for social influence.

Competition for social influence is a major force shaping societies, from baboons guiding their troop in different directions, to politicians competing for voters, to influencers competing for attention on social media. Social influence is invariably a competitive exercise with multiple influencers competing for it. We study which strategy maximizes social influence under competition. Applying game theory to a scenario where two advisers compete for the attention of a client, we find that the rational solution for advisers is to communicate truthfully when favored by the client, but to lie when ignored. Across seven pre-registered studies, testing 802 participants, such a strategic adviser consistently outcompeted an honest adviser. Strategic dishonesty outperformed truth-telling in swaying individual voters, the majority vote in anonymously voting groups, and the consensus vote in communicating groups. Our findings help explain the success of political movements that thrive on disinformation, and vocal underdog politicians with no credible program.

Knowledge as commitment.

This commentary on the paper "Knowledge before belief" argues that it is not only in the cognitive sciences that knowledge should be separated into a separate category from belief, but also in rational decision theory. It outlines how knowledge-as-commitment - as distinct from knowledge-as-belief - can be built into an extension of the economic theory of revealed preference.

Modeling justice as a natural phenomenon.

Among other things, Baumard et al.'s "A Mutualistic Approach to Morality" considers the enforcement and establishment of moral norms, the interpersonal comparison of welfare, and the structure of fairness norms. This commentary draws attention to the relevance of the game theory literature to the first and second topic, and the social psychology literature to the third topic.

Sex and evolutionary stability.

We study evolutionary games in which the rest points of the evolutionary dynamic cluster in connected components, focusing on what we call the Resource Game as a canonical example. The long-term outcome in such games can depend critically on second-order forces that were excluded from the evolutionary dynamics because they are typically insignificant compared with selection pressures. We show that the influence of second-order forces on long-term outcomes can depend on whether the reproduction underlying the evolutionary dynamics is sexual or asexual. An implication is that care is needed in adopting the convenience of an asexual model when examining the behavior of a sexual population in games with nontrivial components of rest points.

Cooperation should not be assumed.

Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for explaining social interactions, including those between males and females. In a recent article, Roughgarden et al. discuss a new approach to sexual selection based on cooperative game theory and argue that cooperation rather than competition is fundamental in interactions between the sexes. However, compelling reasons for adopting this approach are not given and the authors do not adopt it consistently. We argue that non-cooperative game theory provides an adequate basis for understanding sexual selection, but that further work is needed to produce realistic models. We agree with Roughgarden and colleagues that bargaining is an important aspect of social interactions, but this is not a novel claim. Bargaining does not require the assumption of cooperation and does not necessarily lead to it.