Gender differences and variability in creative ability: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the greater male variability hypothesis in creativity.

Society is largely shaped by creativity, making it critical to understand why, despite minimal mean gender differences in creative ability, substantial differences exist in the creative achievement of men and women. Although the greater male variability hypothesis (GMVH) in creativity has been proposed to explain women's underrepresentation as eminent creators, studies examining the GMVH are sparse and limited. This systematic review and meta-analysis were conducted to examine whether the GMVH in creativity can adequately explain the gender gap in creative achievement. We examined the GMVH in creativity, along with mean gender differences, in a range of indicators of creativity and across different sample characteristics and measurement approaches. Effect sizes (k = 1,003) were calculated using information retrieved from 194 studies (N = 68,525). Data were analyzed using three-level meta-analysis and metaregression and publication bias was evaluated using Egger's regression test and contour-enhanced funnel plots. Results revealed minimal gender differences overall, with a slight mean advantage for females (g = -0.10, 95% CI [-0.13, -0.06]) and a trivial variability advantage for males (lnVR = 0.02, 95% CI [0.004, 0.04]) in creative ability scores. However, the magnitude of the effect sizes was moderated by creative domain, task type, scoring type, and study region for mean differences and by country-level gender egalitarianism values for variability. Taken together, gender differences in the mean and variability of creative ability scores are minimal and inconsistent across different contexts, suggesting that the GMVH may not provide much explanatory power for the gender gap in creative achievement. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Changes of creative ability and underlying brain network connectivity throughout the lifespan.

Creativity, or divergent thinking, is essential to and supported by cognitive functions necessary for everyday tasks. The current study investigates divergent thinking and its neural mechanisms from adolescence to late adulthood. To do this, 180 healthy participants completed a creativity task called the egg task including 86 adolescents (mean age (SD) = 13.62 (1.98)), 52 young adults (24.92 (3.60), and 42 older adults (62.84 (7.02)). Additionally, a subsample of 111 participants completed a resting-state fMRI scan. After investigating the impact of age on different divergent thinking metrics, we investigated the impact of age on the association between divergent thinking and resting-state functional connectivity within and between major resting-state brain networks associated with creative thinking: the DMN, ECN, and SN. Adolescents tended to be less creative than both young and older adults in divergent thinking scores related to expansion creativity, and not in persistent creativity, while young and older adults performed relatively similar. We found that adolescents' functional integrity of the executive control network (ECN) was positively associated with expansion creativity, which was significantly different from the negative association in both the young and older adults. These results suggest that creative performance and supporting brain networks change throughout the lifespan.

Creativity, Critical Thinking, Communication, and Collaboration: Assessment, Certification, and Promotion of 21st Century Skills for the Future of Work and Education.

This article addresses educational challenges posed by the future of work, examining "21st century skills", their conception, assessment, and valorization. It focuses in particular on key soft skill competencies known as the "4Cs": creativity, critical thinking, collaboration, and communication. In a section on each C, we provide an overview of assessment at the level of individual performance, before focusing on the less common assessment of systemic support for the development of the 4Cs that can be measured at the institutional level (i.e., in schools, universities, professional training programs, etc.). We then present the process of official assessment and certification known as "labelization", suggesting it as a solution both for establishing a publicly trusted assessment of the 4Cs and for promoting their cultural valorization. Next, two variations of the "International Institute for Competency Development's 21st Century Skills Framework" are presented. The first of these comprehensive systems allows for the assessment and labelization of the extent to which development of the 4Cs is supported by a formal educational program or institution. The second assesses informal educational or training experiences, such as playing a game. We discuss the overlap between the 4Cs and the challenges of teaching and institutionalizing them, both of which may be assisted by adopting a dynamic interactionist model of the 4Cs-playfully entitled "Crea-Critical-Collab-ication"-for pedagogical and policy-promotion purposes. We conclude by briefly discussing opportunities presented by future research and new technologies such as artificial intelligence and virtual reality.

How does social evaluation influence Hot and Cool inhibitory control in adolescence?

The aim of the present study is to examine whether in Hot, i.e., affectively charged contexts, or cool, i.e., affectively neutral contexts, inhibitory control capacity increases or decreases under social evaluation in adolescents and adults. In two experiments, adolescents and young adults completed two Stroop-like tasks under either a social evaluation condition or an alone condition. The social evaluation condition comprised the presence of a peer (Experiment 1) or an expert (Experiment 2) playing the role of an evaluator, while under the alone condition, the task was performed alone. In the Cool Stroop task, participants had to refrain from reading color names to identify the ink color in which the words were printed. In the Hot Stroop task, participants had to determine the emotional expression conveyed by faces from the NimStim database while ignoring the emotion word displayed beneath. The results were similar in both experiments. In adolescents, social evaluation by a peer (Experiment 1) or by an expert (Experience 2) facilitated Hot but not cool inhibitory control. In adults, social evaluation had no effect on Hot or cool inhibitory control. The present findings expand our understanding of the favorable influence of socioemotional context on Hot inhibitory control during adolescence in healthy individuals.

Peers' Choices Influence Adolescent Risk-taking Especially When Explicit Risk Information is Lacking.

This study examines the impact of peers' previous cautious versus risky choices on adolescents' risk-taking depending on the level of information about the risk. Adolescents completed an adaptation of the BART that manipulated social influence (cautious and risky) and risk information (i.e., informed, noninformed). Results showed that social influence impacts adolescents' decisions on the noninformed BART but not on the informed BART. In the noninformed BART, the peers' cautious choices strongly decreased risk-taking and led to greater performance. The peers' risky choices increase adolescents' risk-taking, but this effect is limited to situations involving minimal risk. Thus social experience may be a specific social context that represents a valuable source of information during adolescence, especially in situations with high uncertainty.

Neural basis of functional fixedness during creative idea generation: An EEG study.

Decades of problem solving and creativity research have converged to show that the ability to generate new and useful ideas can be blocked or impeded by intuitive biases leading to mental fixations. The present study aimed at investigating the neural bases of the processes involved in overcoming fixation effects during creative idea generation. Using the AU task adapted for EEG recording, we examined whether participant's ability to provide original ideas was related to alpha power changes in both the frontal and temporo-parietal regions. Critically, for half of the presented objects, the classical use of the object was primed orally, and a picture of the classical use was presented visually to increase functional fixedness (Fixation Priming condition). For the other half, only the name of the object and a picture of the object was provided to the participants (control condition). As expected, priming the classical use of an object before the generation of creative alternative uses of the object impeded participants' performances in terms of remoteness. In the control condition, while the frontal alpha synchronization was maintained across all successive time windows in participants with high remoteness scores, the frontal alpha synchronization decreased in participants with low remoteness scores. In the Fixation Priming condition, in which functional fixedness was maximal, both participants with high and low remoteness scores maintained frontal alpha synchronization throughout the period preceding their answer. Whereas participants with high remoteness scores maintained alpha synchronization in the temporo-parietal regions throughout the creative idea generation period, participants with low remoteness scores displayed alpha desynchronization in the same regions during this period. We speculate that individuals with high remoteness scores might generate more creative ideas than individuals with low remoteness scores because they rely more on internal semantic association and selection processes.

How minimal executive feedback influences creative idea generation.

The fixation effect is known as one of the most dominant of the cognitive biases against creativity and limits individuals' creative capacities in contexts of idea generation. Numerous techniques and tools have been established to help overcome these cognitive biases in various disciplines ranging from neuroscience to design sciences. Several works in the developmental cognitive sciences have discussed the importance of inhibitory control and have argued that individuals must first inhibit the spontaneous ideas that come to their mind so that they can generate creative solutions to problems. In line with the above discussions, in the present study, we performed an experiment on one hundred undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology at Paris Descartes University, in which we investigated a minimal executive feedback-based learning process that helps individuals inhibit intuitive paths to solutions and then gradually drive their ideation paths toward creativity. Our results provide new insights into novel forms of creative leadership for idea generation.

Inhibitory Control as a Core Process of Creative Problem Solving and Idea Generation from Childhood to Adulthood.

Developmental cognitive neuroscience studies tend to show that the prefrontal brain regions (known to be involved in inhibitory control) are activated during the generation of creative ideas. In the present article, we discuss how a dual-process model of creativity-much like the ones proposed to account for decision making and reasoning-could broaden our understanding of the processes involved in creative ideas generation. When generating creative ideas, children, adolescents, and adults tend to follow "the path of least resistance" and propose solutions that are built on the most common and accessible knowledge within a specific domain, leading to fixation effect. In line with recent theory of typical cognitive development, we argue that the ability to resist the spontaneous activation of design heuristics, to privilege other types of reasoning, might be critical to generate creative ideas at all ages. In the present review, we demonstrate that inhibitory control at all ages can actually support creativity. Indeed, the ability to think of something truly new and original requires first inhibiting spontaneous solutions that come to mind quickly and unconsciously and then exploring new ideas using a generative type of reasoning.