Developing a Common Global Baseline for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening.

Introduction: Nucleic acid synthesis is a powerful tool that has revolutionized the life sciences. However, the misuse of synthetic nucleic acids could pose a serious threat to public health and safety. There is a need for international standards for nucleic acid synthesis screening to help prevent the misuse of this technology. Methods: We outline current barriers to the adoption of screening, which include the cost of developing screening tools and resources, adapting to existing commercial practices, internationalizing screening, and adapting screening to benchtop nucleic acid synthesis devices. To address these challenges, we then introduce the Common Mechanism for DNA Synthesis Screening, which was developed in consultation with a technical consortium of experts in DNA synthesis, synthetic biology, biosecurity, and policy, with the aim of addressing current barriers. The Common Mechanism software uses a variety of methods to identify sequences of concern, identify taxonomic best matches to regulated pathogens, and identify benign genes that can be cleared for synthesis. Finally, we describe outstanding challenges in the development of screening practices. Results: The Common Mechanism is a step toward ensuring the safe and responsible use of synthetic nucleic acids. It provides a baseline capability that overcomes challenges to nucleic acid synthesis screening and provides a solution for broader international adoption of screening practices. Conclusion: The Common Mechanism is a valuable tool for preventing the misuse of synthetic nucleic acids. It is a critical step toward ensuring the safe and responsible use of this powerful technology.

Trends in Synthetic Biology Applications, Tools, Industry, and Oversight and Their Security Implications.

Recent developments in synthetic biology tools and techniques are driving commercialization of a wide range of products for human health, agriculture, environmental stewardship, and other purposes. This article reviews some of the trends in synthetic biology applications as well as some of the tools enabling these and future advances. These tools and capabilities are being developed in the context of a rapidly changing industry, which may have an impact on the rate and direction of progress. Final products are subject to a regulatory framework that is being challenged by the pace, scale, and novelty of this new era of biotechnology. This article includes discussion of these factors and how they may affect product design and the types of applications that are most likely to be supported and pursued commercially. The final section provides perspective on the security implications of these advances, with a focus on US interests.

Options for Synthetic DNA Order Screening, Revisited.

Gene synthesis providers affiliated with the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) voluntarily screen double-stranded DNA (dsDNA) synthesis orders over 200 bp to check for matches to regulated pathogens and to screen customers. Questions have been raised, however, about the continuing feasibility and effectiveness of screening. There are technical challenges (e.g., oligonucleotides and tracts of DNA less than 200 bp are not screened) and corporate challenges (e.g., the costs of screening are high, but other costs are dropping, so screening is an increasing portion of operating costs). In this article, we describe tangible actions that should be taken to (i) preserve the effectiveness of DNA order screening as a security tool and (ii) develop additional mechanisms to increase the safety and security of DNA synthesis technologies. Screening is not a perfect solution to DNA synthesis security challenges, but we believe it is still a valuable addition to security, and it can remain effective for some time.

Splice variants of the NR1 subunit differentially induce NMDA receptor-dependent gene expression.

Subunits of the NMDA receptor (NMDAR) associate with many postsynaptic proteins that substantially broaden its signaling capacity. Although much work has been focused on the signaling of NR2 subunits, little is known about the role of the NR1 subunit. We set out to elucidate the role of the C terminus of the NR1 subunit in NMDAR signaling. By introducing a C-terminal deletion mutant of the NR1 subunit into cultured neurons from NR1(-/-) mice, we found that the C terminus was essential for NMDAR inactivation, downstream signaling, and gene expression, but not for global increases in intracellular Ca2+. Therefore, whereas NMDARs can increase Ca2+ throughout the neuron, NMDAR-dependent signaling, both local and long range, requires coupling through the NR1 C terminus. Two major NR1 splice variants differ by the presence or absence of a C-terminal domain, C1, which is determined by alternative splicing of exon 21. Analysis of these two variants showed that removal of this domain significantly reduced the efficacy of NMDAR-induced gene expression without affecting receptor inactivation. Thus, the NR1 C terminus couples to multiple downstream signaling pathways that can be modulated selectively by RNA splicing.