Epidemiologic Findings from Case Investigations and Contact Tracing for First 200 Cases of Coronavirus Disease, Santa Clara County, California, USA.

In January 2020, Santa Clara County, California, USA, began identifying laboratory-confirmed coronavirus disease among residents. County staff conducted case and contact investigations focused on households and collected detailed case demographic, occupation, exposure, and outcome information. We describe the first 200 test-positive cases during January 31-March 20, 2020, to inform future case and contact investigations. Probable infection sources included community transmission (104 cases), known close contact with a confirmed case-patient (66 cases), and travel (30 cases). Disease patterns across race and ethnicity, occupational, and household factors suggested multiple infection risk factors. Disproportionately high percentages of case-patients from racial and ethnic subgroups worked outside the home (Hispanic [86%] and Filipino [100%]); household transmission was more common among persons from Vietnam (53%). Even with the few initial cases, detailed case and contact investigations of household contacts capturing occupational and disaggregated race and ethnicity data helped identify at-risk groups and focused solutions for disease control.

Crisis Decision-Making at the Speed of COVID-19: Field Report on Issuing the First Regional Shelter-in-Place Orders in the United States.

CONTEXT: In March, 2020, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2), the causal agent of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), was spreading in the Bay Area, especially in Santa Clara County, causing increases in cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. PROGRAM: The Association of Bay Area Health Officials (ABAHO) represents 13 Bay Area health jurisdictions. IMPLEMENTATION: On March 15, 2020, the local health officers of 7 ABAHO members (counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara and the city of Berkeley) decided to issue legal orders on March 16 for 6.7 million residents to shelter in place to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the causal agent of COVID-19. The Bay Area was the first region in the United States to shelter in place, and within days, other regions in the United States followed. EVALUATION: Subsequent comparative analyses have confirmed that acting early in issuing shelter-in-place orders prevented a large number of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths in the Bay Area throughout the United States. The quality of a decision-in this case, for crisis decision making-cannot be judged by the outcome. A good decision can have a bad outcome, and a bad decision can have a good outcome. The quality of a decision depends only on the quality of the decision-making process at the time the decision was made. DISCUSSION: In this Field Report, we review how we made this collective decision. With the benefit of hindsight and reflection, we recount our story through the lens of public health legal authority, meta-leadership, and decision intelligence. Our purpose is to improve the crisis decision-making skills of public health officials by improving how we make high-stakes decisions each day in our continuing fight to contain the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, to save lives, and to eliminate COVID-19 racial/ethnic inequities.

Enhanced contact investigations for nine early travel-related cases of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the respiratory disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first identified in Wuhan, China and has since become pandemic. In response to the first cases identified in the United States, close contacts of confirmed COVID-19 cases were investigated to enable early identification and isolation of additional cases and to learn more about risk factors for transmission. Close contacts of nine early travel-related cases in the United States were identified and monitored daily for development of symptoms (active monitoring). Selected close contacts (including those with exposures categorized as higher risk) were targeted for collection of additional exposure information and respiratory samples. Respiratory samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Four hundred four close contacts were actively monitored in the jurisdictions that managed the travel-related cases. Three hundred thirty-eight of the 404 close contacts provided at least basic exposure information, of whom 159 close contacts had ≥1 set of respiratory samples collected and tested. Across all actively monitored close contacts, two additional symptomatic COVID-19 cases (i.e., secondary cases) were identified; both secondary cases were in spouses of travel-associated case patients. When considering only household members, all of whom had ≥1 respiratory sample tested for SARS-CoV-2, the secondary attack rate (i.e., the number of secondary cases as a proportion of total close contacts) was 13% (95% CI: 4-38%). The results from these contact tracing investigations suggest that household members, especially significant others, of COVID-19 cases are at highest risk of becoming infected. The importance of personal protective equipment for healthcare workers is also underlined. Isolation of persons with COVID-19, in combination with quarantine of exposed close contacts and practice of everyday preventive behaviors, is important to mitigate spread of COVID-19.

Multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii infection, colonization, and transmission related to a long-term care facility providing subacute care.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate Acinetobacter baumannii infection, colonization, and transmission related to a long-term care facility (LTCF) providing subacute care (facility A). METHODS: We reviewed facility A and affiliated local hospital records for facility A residents with A. baumannii isolated during the period January 2009 through February 2010 and compared A. baumannii antimicrobial resistance patterns of residents with those of hospital patients. During March 2010, we implemented a colonization survey of facility A residents who received respiratory support or who could provide sputum samples and looked for A. baumannii colonization risks. Available clinical and survey isolates underwent pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE); PFGE strains were linked with overlapping stays to identify possible transmission. RESULTS: During the period January 2009 through February 2010, 33 facility A residents had A. baumannii isolates; all strains were multidrug resistant (MDR), which was a significantly higher prevalence of MDR strains than that found among isolates from hospital patients (81 [66%] of 122 hospital patient isolates were MDR; P < .001). The sputum survey found that 14 (20%) of 70 residents had A. baumannii colonization, which was associated with ventilator use (adjusted odds ratio, 4.24 [95% confidence interval, 1.06-16.93]); 12 (86%) of 14 isolates were MDR. Four facility A resident groups clustered with 3 PFGE strains and overlapping stays. One of these facility A residents also clustered with 3 patients at an affiliated hospital. CONCLUSIONS: We documented substantial MDR A. baumannii infections and colonization with probable intra- and interfacility spread associated with a single LTCF providing subacute care. Given the limited infection prevention and antimicrobial stewardship resources in such settings, regional collaborations among facilities across the spectrum of health care are needed to address this MDR threat.

Hepatitis C virus transmission from an anesthesiologist to a patient.

BACKGROUND: An anesthesiologist was diagnosed as having acute hepatitis C 3 days after providing anesthesia during the thoracotomy of a 64-year-old man (patient A). Eight weeks later, patient A was diagnosed as having acute hepatitis C. METHODS: We performed tests for antibody to hepatitis C virus (HCV) on serum samples from the thoracotomy surgical team and from surgical patients at the 2 hospitals where the anesthesiologist worked before and after his illness. We determined the genetic relatedness of the HCV isolates by sequencing the quasispecies from hypervariable region 1. RESULTS: Of the surgical team members, only the anesthesiologist was positive for antibody to HCV. Of the 348 surgical patients treated by him and tested, 6 were positive for antibody to HCV. Of these 6 patients, isolates from 2 (patients A and B) were the same genotype (1a) as that of the anesthesiologist. The quasispecies sequences of these 3 isolates clustered with nucleotide identity of 97.8% to 100.0%. Patient B was positive for antibody to HCV before her surgery 9 weeks before the anesthesiologist's illness onset. The anesthesiologist did not perform any exposure-prone invasive procedures, and no breaks in technique or incidents were reported. He denied risk factors for HCV. CONCLUSIONS: Our investigation suggests that the anesthesiologist acquired HCV infection from patient B and transmitted HCV to patient A. No further transmission was identified. Although we did not establish how transmission occurred in this instance, the one previous report of bloodborne pathogen transmission to patients from an anesthesiologist involved reuse of needles for self-injection.