The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution.

Biology can be misused, and the risk of this causing widespread harm increases in step with the rapid march of technological progress. A key security challenge involves attribution: determining, in the wake of a human-caused biological event, who was responsible. Recent scientific developments have demonstrated a capability for detecting whether an organism involved in such an event has been genetically modified and, if modified, to infer from its genetic sequence its likely lab of origin. We believe this technique could be developed into powerful forensic tools to aid the attribution of outbreaks caused by genetically engineered pathogens, and thus protect against the potential misuse of synthetic biology.

Preventing biological weapon development through the governance of life science research.

The dual-use dilemma in the life sciences-that illicit applications draw on the same science and technology base as legitimate applications-makes it inherently difficult to control one without inhibiting the other. Since before the September 11 attacks, the science and security communities in the United States have struggled to develop governance processes that can simultaneously minimize the risk of misuse of the life sciences, promote their beneficial applications, and protect the public trust. What has become clear over that time is that while procedural steps can be specified for assessing and managing dual-use risks in the review of research proposals, oversight of ongoing research, and communication of research results, the actions or decisions to be taken at each of these steps to mitigate dual-use risk defy codification. Yet the stakes are too high to do nothing, or to be seen as doing nothing. The U.S. government should therefore adopt an oversight framework largely along the lines recommended by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity almost 5 years ago-one that builds on existing processes, can gain buy-in from the scientific community, and can be implemented at modest cost (both direct and opportunity), while providing assurance that a considered and independent examination of dual-use risks is being applied. Without extraordinary visibility into the actions of those who would misuse biology, it may be impossible to know how well such an oversight system will actually succeed at mitigating misuse. But maintaining the public trust will require a system to be established in which reasonably foreseeable dual-use consequences of life science research are anticipated, evaluated, and addressed.

Gerald L. Epstein, PhD: director, center for science, technology, and security policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Interview by Madeline Drexler.

Over his entire career, Gerald Epstein has toiled at the nexus of science, technology, and security. From 2003 to 2009, he was Senior Fellow for Science and Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Homeland Security Program, where he worked on reducing biological weapons threats, improving national preparedness, and easing potential tensions between the scientific research and national security communities. Epstein came to CSIS from the Institute for Defense Analyses. From 1996 to 2001, he served in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. And from 1983 to 1989, and again from 1991 until its demise in 1995, Epstein worked at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, where he directed a study on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, alongside research on other global security topics. A recognized expert in biological risk reduction, Epstein was actually trained as a physicist, having received SB degrees in physics and electrical engineering from MIT, and a PhD in physics from the University of California at Berkeley. How, then, did he come to study the evolving threat from bioterrorism? "What compelled me about bioterrorism was that it was a stellar example of a topic that would lead to a train wreck between the scientific community and the security community unless they figured out how to work together," he said. "The distance between a laboratory and a very large consequence event is a lot shorter in biology than in any other field. I got into bioterrorism to help make sure that the security community doesn't get so scared of the science that it shuts it down, and that the science community isn't so oblivious of security concerns that it pays no attention to them." Epstein spoke on November 6, 2009, with contributing writer Madeline Drexler, author of Emerging Epidemics: The Menace of New Infections (Penguin, 2009), an updated version of an earlier volume. Drexler holds a visiting appointment at the Harvard School of Public Health and is a senior fellow at Brandeis University's Schuster Institute for Investigative Journalism.