A Comparative Analysis of International Drug Price Negotiation Frameworks: An Interview Study of Key Stakeholders.

Policy Points Health care systems around the world rely on a range of methods to ensure the affordability of prescription drugs, including negotiating prices soon after drug approval and relying on formal clinical assessments that compare newly approved therapies with existing alternatives. The negotiation framework established under the Inflation Reduction Act is far more limited than other frameworks explored in this study. Adding elements from these frameworks could lead to more effective price negotiation in the United States. CONTEXT: In 2022, Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which allowed Medicare, for the first time, to begin negotiating the prices for certain high-cost brand-name prescription drugs. Many other industrialized countries negotiate drug prices, and we sought to compare and contrast key features of the negotiation process across several health systems. We focused, in particular, on the criteria for selecting drugs for price negotiation, procedures for negotiation, factors that influence negotiated prices, and how prices are implemented. METHODS: We included four G7 countries in our analysis (Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom [England]), two Benelux countries (Belgium and the Netherlands), and one Scandinavian country (Norway) with long-established frameworks for drug price negotiation. We also analyzed the Veterans Affairs Health System in the United States. For each system, we gathered relevant legislation, government publications, and guidelines to understand negotiation frameworks, and we reached out to key drug price negotiators in each system to conduct semistructured interviews. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded, and data were analyzed based on an internal assessment tool that we developed. FINDINGS: All eight systems negotiate the prices of brand-name prescription drugs soon after approval and rely on formal clinical assessments that compare newly approved drugs with existing therapies. Systems in our study differed on characteristics such as whether the body performing clinical assessments is separate from the negotiating authority, how added health benefit is assessed, whether explicit willingness-to-pay thresholds are employed, and how specific approaches for priority disease areas are taken. CONCLUSIONS: High-income countries around the world adopt different approaches to conducting price negotiations on brand-name drugs but coalesce around a set of practices that will largely be absent from the current Medicare negotiation framework. US policymakers might consider adding some of these characteristics in the future to improve negotiation outcomes.

Seeking a Better Paper Trail of Federal Research Funding.

This work discusses initiatives designed to capture the value of public investment that will result in an accurate, comprehensive, and transparent paper trail of public funding.

A Dynamic Prognostic Model for Identifying Vulnerable COVID-19 Patients at High Risk of Rapid Deterioration.

PURPOSE: We aimed to validate and, if performance was unsatisfactory, update the previously published prognostic model to predict clinical deterioration in patients hospitalized for COVID-19, using data following vaccine availability. METHODS: Using electronic health records of patients ≥18 years, with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19, from a large care-delivery network in Massachusetts, USA, from March 2020 to November 2021, we tested the performance of the previously developed prediction model and updated the prediction model by incorporating data after availability of COVID-19 vaccines. We randomly divided data into development (70%) and validation (30%) cohorts. We built a model predicting worsening in a published severity scale in 24 h by LASSO regression and evaluated performance by c-statistic and Brier score. RESULTS: Our study cohort consisted of 8185 patients (Development: 5730 patients [mean age: 62; 44% female] and Validation: 2455 patients [mean age: 62; 45% female]). The previously published model had suboptimal performance using data after November 2020 (N = 4973, c-statistic = 0.60. Brier score = 0.11). After retraining with the new data, the updated model included 38 predictors including 18 changing biomarkers. Patients hospitalized after Jun 1st, 2021 (when COVID-19 vaccines became widely available in Massachusetts) were younger and had fewer comorbidities than those hospitalized before. The c-statistic and Brier score were 0.77 and 0.13 in the development cohort, and 0.73 and 0.14 in the validation cohort. CONCLUSION: The characteristics of patients hospitalized for COVID-19 differed substantially over time. We developed a new dynamic model for rapid progression with satisfactory performance in the validation set.

Emulating Randomized Trials by Observational Database Studies: The RCT-DUPLICATE Initiative in COPD and Asthma.

Observational studies are increasingly used to provide real-world evidence in regulatory decision-making. The RCT-DUPLICATE initiative conducted observational studies emulating two trials in patients with asthma and three in COPD. For each trial, new-user cohorts were constructed from two US healthcare claims databases, comparing initiators of the study and comparator drugs, matched on propensity scores. Proportional hazards models were used to compare the treatments on study outcomes. The observational studies involved more subjects than the corresponding trials, with treatment arms well-matched on baseline characteristics. An asthma example involved emulation of the 26-week FDA-mandated D5896 trial. With 6,494 asthma patients per arm, the hazard ratio (HR) of a serious asthma-related event with budesonide-formoterol versus budesonide was 1.29 (95% CI: 0.63-2.65), compared with 1.07 (95% CI: 0.70-1.65) in the trial. A COPD example is the emulation of the one-year IMPACT trial. With 4,365 COPD patients per arm, the HR of a COPD exacerbation with triple therapy versus dual bronchodilators was 1.08 (95% CI: 1.00-1.17), compared with 0.84 (95% CI: 0.78-0.91) in the trial. We found mainly discordant results between observational analyses and randomized trials, likely from the forced discontinuation of treatments prior to randomization in the trials, not mimicable in the observational analyses.

Commercial markups on pediatric oncology drugs at 340B pediatric hospitals.

Eligible pediatric hospitals can purchase clinician-administered drugs at discounted rates through the 340B Drug Pricing Program and charge payers prices exceeding drug acquisition costs, but the magnitude of these markups is not known. In a study of newly approved oncology drugs at pediatric 340B hospitals, median negotiated prices ranged from 102% (interquartile range [IQR]: 91%-156%) of average sales price (ASP) at Phoenix Children's Hospital to 630% (IQR: 526%-630%) at Driscoll Children's Hospital. Pediatric hospitals participating in the federal 340B Drug Pricing Program can extract steep payments on new drugs from commercial insurers, though with wide variation between and within hospitals.

Use of Track One Prioritized Examination for Pharmaceutical Patents.

This study examines the use of the Track One prioritized patent examination program by pharmaceutical manufacturers from 2011 to 2022.

Removing the FDA's Boxed Hepatotoxicity Warning and Liver Function Testing Requirement for Ambrisentan.

Importance: Endothelin receptor antagonists are first-line therapy for pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH). The first 2 agents approved in the class, bosentan and ambrisentan, initially carried boxed warnings for hepatotoxicity and required monthly liver function tests (LFTs) as part of a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS); however, in 2011, as further safety data emerged on ambrisentan, the boxed hepatotoxicity warning and LFT requirements were removed. Objective: To analyze changes in the use of and LFT monitoring for ambrisentan and bosentan after changes to the ambrisentan labeling and REMS. Design, Setting, and Participants: This serial cross-sectional study used data from 3 longitudinal health care insurance claims databases-Medicaid, Optum's deidentified Clinformatics Data Mart, and Merative Marketscan-to perform an interrupted time series analysis of prescription fills and LFTs for patients taking ambrisentan and bosentan. Participants were patients filling prescriptions for ambrisentan and bosentan from July 1, 2007, to December 31, 2018. Data analysis was performed from April 2021 to August 2023. Exposure: Removal of the boxed warning for hepatotoxicity and the REMS LFT monitoring requirements on ambrisentan in March 2011. Main Outcomes and Measures: The primary outcomes were use of ambrisentan (ie, individuals with at least 1 dispensing per 1 000 000 individuals enrolled in the 3 datasets) vs bosentan and LFT monitoring (ie, proportion of initiators with at least 1 ordered test) before initiation and before the first refill. Results: A total of 10 261 patients received a prescription for ambrisentan during the study period (7442 women [72.5%]; mean [SD] age, 52.6 [17.6] years), and 11 159 patients received a prescription for bosentan (7931 women [71.1%]; mean [SD] age, 47.7 [23.7] years). Removal of the ambrisentan boxed hepatotoxicity warning and LFT monitoring requirement was associated with an immediate increase in the use of ambrisentan (1.50 patients per million enrollees; 95% CI, 1.08 to 1.92 patients per million enrollees) but no significant change in the use of bosentan. There were reductions in recorded LFTs before drug initiation (13.1% absolute decrease; 95% CI, -18.2% to -8.0%) and before the first refill (26.4% absolute decrease; 95% CI, -34.4% to -18.5%) of ambrisentan but not bosentan. Conclusions and Relevance: In this serial cross-sectional study of ambrisentan, labeling changes and removal of the REMS-related LFT requirement were associated with shifts in prescribing and testing behavior for ambrisentan but not bosentan. Further clinician education may be needed to maximize the benefits of REMS programs and labeling warnings designed to ensure the safe administration of high-risk medications.

Trust in the Food and Drug Administration: A National Survey Study.

Building trust in public health agencies like the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has become a key government priority. Understanding the roots of FDA mistrust is important if the agency is to develop targeted messaging and reforms aimed at building confidence in the agency. We conducted a survey of 2,021 respondents in the US probing attitudes toward the FDA. The primary outcome was FDA trust, defined as the mean score that each respondent assigned to the FDA across four prespecified axes: (1) competence and effectiveness; (2) commitment to acting in the best interests of the American public; (3) abiding by the rules and regulations set forth by policy or law; and (4) expertise in health, science, and medicine. On multivariable ordinal logistic regression, FDA mistrust was associated with female gender (odds ratio [OR] = 0.74, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.62-0.88), rural community (OR 0.85, 95% CI 0.75-0.96), conservative political views (OR 0.77, 95% CI 0.74-0.81), worse self-reported health (OR 0.89, 95% CI 0.80-0.98), lower satisfaction with health care received (OR 0.63, 95% CI 0.56-0.71), less attention to health and science news (OR 0.72, 95% CI 0.64-0.80), and not having children under the age of 18 (OR 0.72, 95% CI 0.60-0.86). These findings underscore the challenges faced by US political leaders in convincing a heterogeneous American public to trust the FDA. The FDA should develop and deploy targeted outreach strategies to populations with lower levels of trust and strengthen internal processes that minimize biases and ensure sound decision-making.

Leah Z. Rand, Daniel P. Carpenter, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Anushka Bhaskar, Jonathan J. Darrow, and William B. Feldman Reply.

The authors respond to a letter by Mitchell Berger in the March-April 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report concerning their essay "Securing the Trustworthiness of the FDA to Build Public Trust in Vaccines."

Delivery Device Patents on GLP-1 Receptor Agonists.

This study analyzed the US Food and Drug Administration­listed patents on glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists to determine their claim characteristics and the potential barriers they pose to generic entry.

Estimated Spending on Beremagene Geperpavec for Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa.

Importance: New gene therapies can offer substantial benefits to patients, particularly those with rare diseases who have few therapeutic options. In May 2023, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first topical gene therapy, beremagene geperpavec (B-VEC), for treating both autosomal recessive and autosomal dominant dystrophic epidermolysis bullosa (DEB). However, FDA approval was based on limited data in patients with autosomal dominant disease, even though they comprise approximately 50% of all DEB cases. Objective: To estimate projected spending in the US on B-VEC therapy for treating autosomal recessive and autosomal dominant DEB. Design, Setting, and Participants: This economic evaluation used data from the National Epidermolysis Bullosa Registry to estimate the current population of US patients with autosomal dominant and autosomal recessive DEB, with the aim of estimating US spending on B-VEC therapy from an all-payers perspective during 1- and 3-year periods after FDA approval. A base-case cost of $300 000 per patient per year was assumed based on a report from the manufacturer (Krystal Biotech). Exposure: Treatment with B-VEC. Main Outcomes and Measures: Estimated overall spending on B-VEC in the first year and over a 3-year period after FDA approval. Several prespecified sensitivity analyses with different assumptions about the eligible patient population and the cost of therapy were performed, and lifetime total costs of treatment per patient were estimated. Results: The estimated number of US patients with DEB who were eligible for treatment with B-VEC in the first year after FDA approval was 894. The estimated total expenditure for B-VEC therapy was $268 million (range, $179 million-$357 million). Over a 3-year period, estimated spending was $805 million (range, $537 million-$1.1 billion). Estimated lifetime total costs per patient were $15 million (range, $10 million-$20 million) per patient with autosomal recessive DEB and $17 million (range, $11 million-$22 million) for patients with autosomal dominant DEB. Conclusions and Relevance: Results of this economic evaluation suggest that the FDA's broad indication for the use of B-VEC in treating both autosomal recessive and autosomal dominant DEB will have significant implications for payers.

Biologic Patent Thickets and Terminal Disclaimers.

This study analyzes the use and timing of terminal disclaimers in all biologic patents involved in litigation from 2010 to 2023.

Cost of Exempting Sole Orphan Drugs From Medicare Negotiation.

Importance: The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) requires Medicare to negotiate prices for some high-spending drugs but exempts drugs approved solely for the treatment of a single rare disease. Objective: To estimate Medicare spending and global revenues for drugs that might have been exempt from negotiation from 2012 to 2021. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study analyzed drugs that met the IRA threshold for price negotiation (Medicare spending >$200 million/y) in any year from 2012 to 2021 and had an Orphan Drug Act designation. We stratified drugs into 4 mutually exclusive categories: approved for a single rare disease (sole orphan), approved for multiple rare diseases (multiorphan), initially approved for a rare disease and subsequently approved for a nonrare disease (orphan first), and initially approved for a nonrare disease and subsequently approved for a rare disease (non-orphan first). Outcomes: The primary outcomes were the number of sole orphan drugs, estimated Medicare spending on those drugs from 2012 to 2021, and global revenue since launch. Results: Among 282 drugs, 95 (34%) were approved to treat at least 1 rare disease, including 25 sole orphan drugs (26%), 20 multiorphan drugs (21%), 13 orphan first drugs (14%), and 37 non-orphan first drugs (39%). From 2012 to 2021, Medicare spending on sole orphan drugs increased from $3.4 billion to $10.0 billion. Each year, a median (IQR) of $2.5 ($1.9-$2.6) billion in Medicare spending would have been excluded from price negotiation because of the sole orphan exemption. The cumulative global revenue of the median (IQR) sole orphan drug was $11 ($6.6-$19.2) billion. Conclusions and Relevance: The sole orphan exemption will exclude billions of dollars of Medicare drug spending from price negotiation. The high level of global revenues achieved by these drugs, however, suggests that special exemption is unnecessary for them to achieve financial success. Congress could consider removing the sole orphan exemption to obtain additional savings for patients and taxpayers and to eliminate any potential disincentive for developing additional indications for these drugs.

Ancillary Product Patents to Extend Biologic Patent Life.

This study examines all patents associated with biologic litigation to understand how manufacturers use ancillary product patents to delay biosimilar market entry.

Outcomes of the 340B Drug Pricing Program: A Scoping Review.

Importance: The 340B Drug Pricing Program requires manufacturers to offer discounted drug prices to support safety net hospitals and clinics (covered entities) providing care to low-income populations. Amid expansion, the program has received criticism and calls for reform. Objective: To assess the literature on the foundations of and outcomes associated with the 340B program. Evidence Review: The databases searched in this scoping review included PubMed, Embase, EconLit, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Westlaw, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (HHS-OIG) website, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) website, and Google in February 2023 for peer-reviewed literature, legal publications, opinion pieces, and government agency and committee reports related to the 340B program. Findings: Among a collected 900 documents, 289 met inclusion criteria: 83 articles from PubMed, 12 articles from Embase, 2 articles from EconLit, 1 article from NBER, 28 articles from Westlaw, 23 legislative history documents, 103 documents from Google, 11 GAO reports, and 26 HHS-OIG reports. Included literature pertained to 4 stakeholders in the 340B program: covered entities, pharmacies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and patients. This literature showed that hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies generated revenue and manufacturers have forgone revenue from 340B discounted drugs. Audits of covered entities found low rates of compliance with 340B program requirements, whereas mixed evidence was uncovered on how covered entities used their 340B revenue, with some studies suggesting use to expand health care services for low-income populations and others to acquire physician practices and open sites in higher-income neighborhoods. These studies were hampered by a lack of transparency and reporting on the use of 340B revenue. Studies revealed patient benefits from access to expanded health care services, but there was mixed evidence on patient cost savings. Although the review identified considerable research on 340B hospitals, pharmacies, and patients, less research was found evaluating the 340B program's effect on nonhospital covered entities, drug pricing, and racial and ethnic minority groups. Conclusions and Relevance: In this scoping review of the 340B program, we found that the 340B program was associated with financial benefits for hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies; improved access to health care services for patients; and substantial costs to manufacturers. Increased transparency regarding the use of 340B program revenue and strengthened rulemaking and enforcement authority for the Health Resources and Services Administration would support compliance and help ensure the 340B program achieves its intended purposes.

Patents and regulatory exclusivities on FDA-approved insulin products: A longitudinal database study, 1986-2019.

BACKGROUND: Insulin is the primary treatment for type 1 and some type 2 diabetes but remains costly in the United States, even though it was discovered more than a century ago. High prices can lead to nonadherence and are often sustained by patents and regulatory exclusivities that limit competition on brand-name products. We sought to examine how manufacturers have used patents and regulatory exclusivities on insulin products approved from 1986 to 2019 to extend periods of market exclusivity. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We used the publicly available Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) to identify all approved biosynthetic insulin products. Individual products approved under the same New Drug Application (NDA)-e.g., a vial and pen-were considered as separate products for the purposes of analysis. We recorded all patents and regulatory exclusivities listed in the Orange Book on each product and used Google Patents to extract the timing of patent application and whether patents were obtained on delivery devices or others aspects of the product. The primary outcome was the duration of expected protection, which was determined by subtracting the FDA approval date for each product from its last-to-expire patent or regulatory exclusivity (whichever occurred later). We performed a secondary analysis that considered overall protection on insulin lines-defined as groups of products approved under the same NDA with the same active ingredients manufactured by the same company. We also examined competition from follow-on insulin products-defined as products approved with the same active ingredients as originators but manufactured by different companies (approved via a specific drug approval pathway under section 505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). During the study period, the FDA approved 56 individual products across 25 different insulin lines and 5 follow-ons across 3 different insulin lines. Thirty-three (59%) of the 56 products were drug-device combinations. Manufacturers of 9 products approved during the study period obtained patents filed after FDA approval that extended their duration of expected protection (by a median of 6 years). Approximately 63% of all patents on drug-device combinations approved during the study period were related to delivery devices. The median duration of expected protection on insulin products was 16.0 years, and the median protection on insulin lines was 17.6 years. An important limitation of our analysis is that manufacturers may continue to add patents on existing insulin products while competitors may challenge patents; therefore, periods of protection may change over time. CONCLUSIONS: Among several strategies that insulin manufacturers have employed to extend periods of market exclusivity on brand-name insulin products are filing patents after FDA approval and obtaining a large number of patents on delivery devices. Policy reforms are needed to promote timely competition in the pharmaceutical market and ensure that patients have access to low-cost drugs.