Treatment Approaches for Altered Facial Expression: A Systematic Review in Facioscapulohumeral Muscular Dystrophy and Other Neurological Diseases.

Background: Facial weakness is a key feature of facioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy (FSHD) and may lead to altered facial expression and subsequent psychosocial impairment. There is no cure and supportive treatments focus on optimizing physical fitness and compensation of functional disabilities. Objective: We hypothesize that symptomatic treatment options and psychosocial interventions for other neurological diseases with altered facial expression could be applicable to FSHD. Therefore, the aim of this review is to collect symptomatic treatment approaches that target facial muscle function and psychosocial interventions in various neurological diseases with altered facial expression in order to discuss the applicability to FSHD. Methods: A systematic search was performed. Selected studies had to include FSHD, Bell's palsy, Moebius syndrome, myotonic dystrophy type 1, or Parkinson's disease and treatment options which target altered facial expression. Data was extracted for study and patients' characteristics, outcome assessment tools, treatment, outcome of facial expression and or psychosocial functioning. Results: Forty studies met the inclusion criteria, of which only three studies included FSHD patients exclusively. Most, twenty-one, studies were performed in patients with Bell's palsy. Studies included twelve different therapy categories and results were assessed with different outcomes measures. Conclusions: Five therapy categories were considered applicable to FSHD: training of (non-verbal) communication compensation strategies, speech training, physical therapy, conference attendance, and smile restoration surgery. Further research is needed to establish the effect of these therapies in FSHD. We recommend to include outcome measures in these studies that cover at least cosmetic, functional, communication, and quality of life domains.

Social anxiety is associated with personal distress and disrupted recognition of negative emotions.

Past research investigating the relation between social anxiety (SA), empathy and emotion recognition is marked by conceptual and methodological issues. In the present study, we aim to overcome these limitations by examining whether individuals with high (n = 40) vs. low (n = 43) social anxiety differed across these two facets of empathy and whether this could be related to their recognition of emotions. We employed a naturalistic emotion recognition paradigm in which participants watched short videos of individuals (targets) sharing authentic emotional experiences. After each video, we measured self-reported empathic concern and distress, as well as their ability to recognize the emotions expressed by the targets in the videos. Our results show that individuals with high social anxiety recognized the targets' emotions less accurately. Furthermore, high socially anxious individuals reported more personal distress than low socially anxious individuals, whereas no significant difference was found for empathic concern. The findings suggest that reduced recognition of emotions among SA individuals can be better explained by the negative effects of social stress than by a general deficit in empathy.

"You're just envious": Inferring benign and malicious envy from facial expressions and contextual information.

Envy shapes social hierarchies. To protect their rank, envied persons react to the threat posed by enviers. Doing so requires that envied persons initially perceive who envies them. However, a common perspective is that envy lacks a unique expression and that enviers disguise their experience, preventing the social perception of envy. In contrast to this perspective, recent evidence indicates that observers perceive benign and malicious forms of envy accurately when they can integrate information about targets. These findings suggest that observers infer envy based on multiple, contextual cues. We hypothesized that observers infer envy from facial and bodily expressions in comparison situations. Specifically, observers should infer benign envy when a target, who encounters an advantaged person, turns with disappointment toward the advantage. Conversely, observers should infer malicious envy when the target turns with anger toward the advantaged person. Three preregistered studies tested these hypotheses (total N = 693). In Studies 1 and 2, targets turned with an emotional or neutral expression either toward a person silhouette or a valuable object, and participants rated targets' envy. In Study 3, participants performed the same task with more realistic stimuli. Across studies, emotional display and head turning had independent effects on inferences of benign and malicious envy. Furthermore, observers inferred envy more when the target expressed an emotion instead of remaining neutral. We discuss how the results inform research on the social perception of envy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotion Recognition from Realistic Dynamic Emotional Expressions Cohere with Established Emotion Recognition Tests: A Proof-of-Concept Validation of the Emotional Accuracy Test.

Individual differences in understanding other people's emotions have typically been studied with recognition tests using prototypical emotional expressions. These tests have been criticized for the use of posed, prototypical displays, raising the question of whether such tests tell us anything about the ability to understand spontaneous, non-prototypical emotional expressions. Here, we employ the Emotional Accuracy Test (EAT), which uses natural emotional expressions and defines the recognition as the match between the emotion ratings of a target and a perceiver. In two preregistered studies (Ntotal = 231), we compared the performance on the EAT with two well-established tests of emotion recognition ability: the Geneva Emotion Recognition Test (GERT) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). We found significant overlap (r > 0.20) between individuals' performance in recognizing spontaneous emotions in naturalistic settings (EAT) and posed (or enacted) non-verbal measures of emotion recognition (GERT, RMET), even when controlling for individual differences in verbal IQ. On average, however, participants reported enjoying the EAT more than the other tasks. Thus, the current research provides a proof-of-concept validation of the EAT as a useful measure for testing the understanding of others' emotions, a crucial feature of emotional intelligence. Further, our findings indicate that emotion recognition tests using prototypical expressions are valid proxies for measuring the understanding of others' emotions in more realistic everyday contexts.

Interpreting Emotions From Women With Covered Faces: A Comparison Between a Middle Eastern and Western-European Sample.

While new regulations obligate or recommend people to wear medical masks at public places to prevent further spread of the Covid-19 virus, there are still open questions as to what face coverage does to social emotional communication. Previous research on the effects of wearing veils or face-covering niqabs showed that covering of the mouth led to the attribution of negative emotions and to the perception of less intense positive emotions. The current study compares a sample from the Netherlands with a sample from the United Arab Emirates on their perception of emotions from faces covered by a niqab, censoring black bars, or uncovered faces. The results show that covering the mouth area leads to greater anxiety in participants in both countries. Furthermore, although participants did not report greater decoding difficulties for faces that were covered as compared to fully visible, results show that face coverage did influence emotion perception. Specifically, happiness and anger were perceived as being less intense. Further, face coverage by a niqab, as compared to black bars, yielded lower emotional intensity ratings. We conclude that face coverage in particular can modulate the perception of emotions, but that affective contextual cues may play a role as well.

Different faces of empathy: Feelings of similarity disrupt recognition of negative emotions.

Empathizing with others is widely presumed to increase our understanding of their emotions. Little is known, however, about which empathic process actually help people recognize others' feelings more accurately. Here, we probed the relationship between emotion recognition and two empathic processes: spontaneously felt similarity (having had a similar experience) and deliberate perspective taking (focus on the other vs. oneself). We report four studies in which participants (total N = 803) watched videos of targets sharing genuine negative emotional experiences. Participants' multi-scalar ratings of the targets' emotions were compared with the targets' own emotion ratings. In Study 1 we found that having had a similar experience to what the target was sharing was associated with lower recognition of the target's emotions. Study 2 replicated the same pattern and in addition showed that making participants' own imagined reaction to the described event salient resulted in further reduced accuracy. Studies 3 and 4 were preregistered replications and extensions of Studies 1 and 2, in which we observed the same outcome using a different stimulus set, indicating the robustness of the finding. Moreover, Study 4 directly investigated the underlying mechanism of the observed effect. Findings showed that perceivers who have had a negative life experience similar to the emotional event described in the video felt greater personal distress after watching the video, which in part explained their reduced accuracy. These results provide the first demonstration that spontaneous empathy, evoked by similarity in negative experiences, may inhibit rather than increase our understanding of others' emotions.

Toward an Integrative Psychometric Model of Emotions.

Emotions are part and parcel of the human condition, but their nature is debated. Three broad classes of theories about the nature of emotions can be distinguished: affect-program theories, constructionist theories, and appraisal theories. Integrating these broad classes of theories into a unifying theory is challenging. An integrative psychometric model of emotions can inform such a theory because psychometric models are intertwined with theoretical perspectives about constructs. To identify an integrative psychometric model, we delineate properties of emotions stated by emotion theories and investigate whether psychometric models account for these properties. Specifically, an integrative psychometric model of emotions should allow (a) identifying distinct emotions (central in affect-program theories), (b) between- and within-person variations of emotions (central in constructionist theories), and (c) causal relationships between emotion components (central in appraisal theories). Evidence suggests that the popular reflective and formative latent variable models-in which emotions are conceptualized as unobservable causes or consequences of emotion components-cannot account for all properties. Conversely, a psychometric network model-in which emotions are conceptualized as systems of causally interacting emotion components-accounts for all properties. The psychometric network model thus constitutes an integrative psychometric model of emotions, facilitating progress toward a unifying theory.

Good vibrations: A review of vocal expressions of positive emotions.

Researchers examining nonverbal communication of emotions are becoming increasingly interested in differentiations between different positive emotional states like interest, relief, and pride. But despite the importance of the voice in communicating emotion in general and positive emotion in particular, there is to date no systematic review of what characterizes vocal expressions of different positive emotions. Furthermore, integration and synthesis of current findings are lacking. In this review, we comprehensively review studies (N = 108) investigating acoustic features relating to specific positive emotions in speech prosody and nonverbal vocalizations. We find that happy voices are generally loud with considerable variability in loudness, have high and variable pitch, and are high in the first two formant frequencies. When specific positive emotions are directly compared with each other, pitch mean, loudness mean, and speech rate differ across positive emotions, with patterns mapping onto clusters of emotions, so-called emotion families. For instance, pitch is higher for epistemological emotions (amusement, interest, relief), moderate for savouring emotions (contentment and pleasure), and lower for a prosocial emotion (admiration). Some, but not all, of the differences in acoustic patterns also map on to differences in arousal levels. We end by pointing to limitations in extant work and making concrete proposals for future research on positive emotions in the voice.

Teachers' multicultural attitudes and perspective taking abilities as factors in culturally responsive teaching.

BACKGROUND: Culturally responsive teaching (CRT) has been associated with increased student engagement and achievement. Its practice in classrooms, however, has been shown to be less than optimal. Nonetheless, certain teacher qualities have been suggested to facilitate its practice. AIMS: The current study sought quantitative evidence in support of two of these teacher qualities, namely teachers' multicultural attitudes, and their perspective taking abilities. By identifying the strength of the suggested relationships, we aimed to examine the generalizability of previous findings in the literature and inform teachers' professional development and interventions. SAMPLE: A total of 143 primary school teachers from different parts of the Netherlands responded to our online survey. METHODS: We conducted a multivariate multiple regression analysis to investigate the relationship between these qualities and teachers' engagement in two separate but related components of CRT (i.e., socially sensitive and culturally sensitive teaching). RESULTS: Results of our analysis yielded significant relationships between the two teacher qualities and the frequency with which teachers engage in socially and culturally sensitive teaching. Perspective taking was a stronger predictor for both aspects of CRT. CONCLUSION: These findings signal the significance of incorporating especially perspective taking experiences and exercises into teacher education and professional development programmes, which could benefit all students regardless of their backgrounds. Our results are promising as these qualities are malleable and thus can be improved.

Stop crying! The impact of situational demands on interpersonal emotion regulation.

Crying is a common response to emotional distress that elicits support from the environment. People may regulate another's crying in several ways, such as by providing socio-affective support (e.g. comforting) or cognitive support (e.g. reappraisal), or by trying to emotionally disengage the other by suppression or distraction. We examined whether people adapt their interpersonal emotion regulation strategies to the situational context, by manipulating the regulatory demand of the situation in which someone is crying. Participants watched a video of a crying man and provided support by recording a video message. We hypothesised that when immediate down-regulation was required (i.e. high regulatory demand), participants would provide lower levels of socio-affective and cognitive support, and instead distract the crying person or encourage them to suppress their emotions, compared to when there is no such urgency (i.e. low regulatory demand). As predicted, both self-reported and behavioural responses indicated that high (as compared to low) regulatory demand led to a reduction in socio-affective support provision, and a strong increase in suppression and distraction. Cognitive support provision, however, was unaffected by regulatory demand. When the context required more immediate down-regulation, participants thus employed more regulation strategies aimed at disengaging from the emotional experience. This study provides a first step in showing that people take the context into account when attempting to regulate others' emotions.

I hear you (not): sharers' expressions and listeners' inferences of the need for support in response to negative emotions.

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for support. Paradoxically, even when people perceive social support to be beneficial, it often does not result in emotional recovery. This paradox may be explained by the fact that the sharing process disproportionately centres on support that is not helpful in the long run. A distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support alleviates momentary emotional distress, cognitive support fosters long-term recovery. But can listeners tell what support the sharer needs? The present study examines the hypothesis that sharers communicate their support goals by sharing in such a way that it allows listeners to infer the sharer's needs. In Experiment 1, we manipulated participants' support goals, and showed that socio-affective support goals led participants to express more emotions, whereas cognitive support goals resulted in greater use of appraisals. In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested whether these differential expressions would affect the support goals that listeners inferred. We found no evidence for such an effect: Listeners consistently perceived the sharer to predominantly want socio-affective support. These findings help explain why many social sharing instances revolve around socio-affective support, leading to subjectively experienced benefits, but not to genuine recovery.

Comment: The Emotional Basis of Toxic Affect.

I focus on some differences between negative emotional states and how they are coped with in explaining different cardiac risks. The different cognitive, motivational, and physiological characteristics of emotions imply different appraisals of the negative event, and different resources to cope with the event. Cardiovascular activity depends on these different appraisals and coping strategies. For example, cortisol levels have shown to be differently associated with anger and fear responses to social stress. In addition, different ways to regulate one's emotions are also associated with different bodily responses that may increase or decrease cardiac risks. Future research should not only examine different emotions to stressors, but also more long-term regulation strategies and coping resources, such as self-esteem.

Effects of Social Anxiety on Emotional Mimicry and Contagion: Feeling Negative, but Smiling Politely.

Socially anxiety may be related to a different pattern of facial mimicry and contagion of others' emotions. We report two studies in which participants with different levels of social anxiety reacted to others' emotional displays, either shown on a computer screen (Study 1) or in an actual social interaction (Study 2). Study 1 examined facial mimicry and emotional contagion in response to displays of happiness, anger, fear, and contempt. Participants mimicked negative and positive emotions to some extent, but we found no relation between mimicry and the social anxiety level of the participants. Furthermore, socially anxious individuals were more prone to experience negative emotions and felt more irritated in response to negative emotion displays. In Study 2, we found that social anxiety was related to enhanced mimicry of smiling, but this was only the case for polite smiles and not for enjoyment smiles. These results suggest that socially anxious individuals tend to catch negative emotions from others, but suppress their expression by mimicking positive displays. This may be explained by the tendency of socially anxious individuals to avoid conflict or rejection.

Gender differences in emotion perception and self-reported emotional intelligence: A test of the emotion sensitivity hypothesis.

Previous meta-analyses and reviews on gender differences in emotion recognition have shown a small to moderate female advantage. However, inconsistent evidence from recent studies has raised questions regarding the implications of different methodologies, stimuli, and samples. In the present research based on a community sample of more than 5000 participants, we tested the emotional sensitivity hypothesis, stating that women are more sensitive to perceive subtle, i.e. low intense or ambiguous, emotion cues. In addition, we included a self-report emotional intelligence test in order to examine any discrepancy between self-perceptions and actual performance for both men and women. We used a wide range of stimuli and models, displaying six different emotions at two different intensity levels. In order to better tap sensitivity for subtle emotion cues, we did not use a forced choice format, but rather intensity measures of different emotions. We found no support for the emotional sensitivity account, as both genders rated the target emotions as similarly intense at both levels of stimulus intensity. Men, however, more strongly perceived non-target emotions to be present than women. In addition, we also found that the lower scores of men in self-reported EI was not related to their actual perception of target emotions, but it was to the perception of non-target emotions.

Recognition of facial expressions is moderated by Islamic cues.

Recognising emotions from faces that are partly covered is more difficult than from fully visible faces. The focus of the present study is on the role of an Islamic versus non-Islamic context, i.e. Islamic versus non-Islamic headdress in perceiving emotions. We report an experiment that investigates whether briefly presented (40 ms) facial expressions of anger, fear, happiness and sadness are perceived differently when covered by a niqab or turban, compared to a cap and shawl. In addition, we examined whether oxytocin, a neuropeptide regulating affection, bonding and cooperation between ingroup members and fostering outgroup vigilance and derogation, would differentially impact on emotion recognition from wearers of Islamic versus non-Islamic headdresses. The results first of all show that the recognition of happiness was more accurate when the face was covered by a Western compared to Islamic headdress. Second, participants more often incorrectly assigned sadness to a face covered by an Islamic headdress compared to a cap and shawl. Third, when correctly recognising sadness, they did so faster when the face was covered by an Islamic compared to Western headdress. Fourth, oxytocin did not modulate any of these effects. Implications for theorising about the role of group membership on emotion perception are discussed.

Can perceivers recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions?

Posed stimuli dominate the study of nonverbal communication of emotion, but concerns have been raised that the use of posed stimuli may inflate recognition accuracy relative to spontaneous expressions. Here, we compare recognition of emotions from spontaneous expressions with that of matched posed stimuli. Participants made forced-choice judgments about the expressed emotion and whether the expression was spontaneous, and rated expressions on intensity (Experiments 1 and 2) and prototypicality (Experiment 2). Listeners were able to accurately infer emotions from both posed and spontaneous expressions, from auditory, visual, and audiovisual cues. Furthermore, perceived intensity and prototypicality were found to play a role in the accurate recognition of emotion, particularly from spontaneous expressions. Our findings demonstrate that perceivers can reliably recognise emotions from spontaneous expressions, and that depending on the comparison set, recognition levels can even be equivalent to that of posed stimulus sets.

Sense or sensibility? Social sharers' evaluations of socio-affective vs. cognitive support in response to negative emotions.

When in emotional distress, people often turn to others for social support. A general distinction has been made between two types of support that are differentially effective: Whereas socio-affective support temporarily alleviates emotional distress, cognitive support may contribute to better long-term recovery. In the current studies, we examine what type of support individuals seek. We first confirmed in a pilot study that these two types of support can be reliably distinguished. Then, in Study 1, we experimentally tested participants' support evaluations in response to different emotional situations using a vignette methodology. Findings showed that individuals perceived any type of reaction that included socio-affective support as preferable. The evaluation of cognitive support, however, was dependent on the specific emotion: Unlike worry and regret, anger and sadness were characterised by a strong dislike for purely cognitive support. Using different materials, Study 2 replicated these findings. Taken together, the findings suggest that individuals evaluate different types of support in a way that is unlikely to benefit emotional recovery in the long run.

Contempt, like any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment.

Gervais & Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude) but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, like many other emotions, can be both an emotion and a sentiment.

When Is Humiliation More Intense? The Role of Audience Laughter and Threats to the Self.

In personal accounts, humiliation is often reported as a very intense, painful, negative emotion. We report two scenario studies in which we explored two factors that may contribute to the intense character of humiliation: (1) unwanted, negative public exposure, and (2) a threat to central aspects of one's identity. Study 1 (N = 115) assessed emotional reactions to a public insult when an audience responded with either laughter or not and when someone from the audience offered support after the insult or no support was offered. Results showed that the intensity of humiliation increased when people laughed after the insult. However, support offered after the insult had no effect on reported humiliation. Study 2 (N = 99) focused on threats to different self-related values and showed stronger reports of humiliation when central self-related values were threatened than when less central self-related values were threatened. Study 2 also replicated the audience-effect from Study 1, but only when central self-related values were threatened and not when less central self-related values were threatened. Limitations of these studies (e.g., the use of scenarios) and potential avenues for future research, such as the (long-term) consequences of humiliation and humiliation in the context of social media, are discussed.

We are sorry, they don't care: Misinterpretation of facial embarrassment displays in Arab-White intergroup contexts.

Embarrassment displays show others that one is aware of one's own misbehavior and willing to make up for it. The facial actions of embarrassment, however, are partly similar to those of disinterest, which has an opposite function, signaling that one is not concerned about one's self in relation to others. In the context of negative intergroup relations, embarrassment displays of outgroup members may therefore be misinterpreted as disinterest. In the present research, the authors predicted that Whites would perceive Arab expressions of embarrassment more as disinterest, but embarrassment displays of Whites more as embarrassment. Aggregated Study 1 (N = 1,154) confirms this hypothesis showing that White participants perceived more intense embarrassment in Whites than in Arabs and more intense disinterest in Arabs than in Whites. Studies 2 (n = 193) and 3 (n = 260) include methodological improvements and either largely or fully replicated our findings. Based on this evidence in an Arab-White context, the authors conclude that the affiliative function of embarrassment perception is dependent on the nature of the group context. Finally, they discuss the generalizability of this intergroup emotion bias in which emotional expressions may be perceived as the opposite of what they are intended to display. (PsycINFO Database Record