Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities-Risks for the Posteradication Era.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) type 2 was last detected in 1999, WPV type 3 was last detected in 2012, and over the past 2 years WPV type 1 has been detected only in parts of 2 countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan). Once the eradication of poliomyelitis is achieved, infectious and potentially infectious poliovirus materials retained in laboratories, vaccine production sites, and other storage facilities will continue to pose a risk for poliovirus reintroduction into communities. The recent breach in containment of WPV type 2 in an inactivated poliovirus vaccine manufacturing site in the Netherlands prompted this review, which summarizes information on facility-associated release of polioviruses into communities reported over >8 decades. Successful polio eradication requires the management of poliovirus containment posteradication to prevent the consequences of the reestablishment of poliovirus transmission.

Progress Toward Poliovirus Containment Implementation - Worldwide, 2017-2018.

Substantial progress has been made since the World Health Assembly (WHA) resolved to eradicate poliomyelitis in 1988 (1). Among the three wild poliovirus (WPV) types, type 2 (WPV2) was declared eradicated in 2015, and type 3 (WPV3) has not been reported since 2012 (1). In 2017 and 2018, only Afghanistan and Pakistan have reported WPV type 1 (WPV1) transmission (1). When global eradication of poliomyelitis is achieved, facilities retaining poliovirus materials need to minimize the risk for reintroduction of poliovirus into communities and reestablishment of transmission. Poliovirus containment includes biorisk management requirements for laboratories, vaccine production sites, and other facilities that retain polioviruses after eradication; the initial milestones are for containment of type 2 polioviruses (PV2s). At the 71st WHA in 2018, World Health Organization (WHO) Member States adopted a resolution urging acceleration of poliovirus containment activities globally, including establishment by the end of 2018 of national authorities for containment (NACs) to oversee poliovirus containment (2). This report summarizes containment progress since the previous report (3) and outlines remaining challenges. As of August 2018, 29 countries had designated 81 facilities to retain PV2 materials; 22 of these countries had established NACs. Although there has been substantial progress, intensification of containment measures is needed.

Assessing the potency and immunogenicity of inactivated poliovirus vaccine after exposure to freezing temperatures.

According to manufacturers, inactivated poliovirus vaccines (IPVs) are freeze sensitive and require storage between 2°C and 8°C, whereas oral poliovirus vaccine requires storage at -20 °C. Introducing IPV into ongoing immunization services might result in accidental exposure to freezing temperatures and potential loss of vaccine potency. To better understand the effect of freezing IPVs, samples of single-dose vaccine vials from Statens Serum Institut (VeroPol) and multi-dose vaccine vials from Sanofi Pasteur (IPOL) were exposed to freezing temperatures mimicking what a vaccine vial might encounter in the field. D-antigen content was measured to determine the in vitro potency by ELISA. Immunogenicity testing was conducted for a subset of exposed IPVs using the rat model. Freezing VeroPol had no detectable effect on in vitro potency (D-antigen content) in all exposures tested. Freezing of the IPOL vaccine for 7 days at -20 °C showed statistically significant decreases in D-antigen content by ELISA in poliovirus type 1 (p < 0.0001) and type 3 (p = 0.048). Reduction of poliovirus type 2 potency also approached significance (p = 0.062). The observed loss in D-antigen content did not affect immunogenicity in the rat model. Further work is required to determine the significance of the loss observed and the implications for vaccine handling policies and practices.

Regulatory Aspects of Sabin Type 2 Withdrawal From Trivalent Oral Poliovirus Vaccine: Process and Lessons Learned.

Withdrawal of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in OPV-using countries required regulatory approval for use of inactivated poliovirus vaccine and bivalent OPV in routine immunization. Worldwide, a variety of mechanisms were used by member states, with some differences in approach observed between inactivated poliovirus vaccine and bivalent OPV. These included acceptance for use of World Health Organization (WHO) prequalified vaccines, registration and licensure pathways, participation in WHO-convened joint reviews of licensing dossiers, as well as pragmatic application of alternatively available mechanisms, when appropriate. Simple but effective tools were used to monitor progress and to record, authenticate, and share information. Essential to achievement of regulatory targets was ongoing communication with key stakeholders, including switch-country national regulatory authorities, vaccine manufacturers, partner organizations, and relevant units within WHO. Understanding of the regulatory environment gained through the OPV switch can be helpful in supporting further stages of the polio end game and other time-sensitive vaccine introduction programs.

Managing the Planned Cessation of a Global Supply Market: Lessons Learned From the Global Cessation of the Trivalent Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Market.

The Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 calls for the phased withdrawal of OPV, beginning with the globally synchronized cessation of tOPV by mid 2016. From a global vaccine supply management perspective, the strategy provided two key challenges; (1) the planned cessation of a high volume vaccine market; and (2) the uncertainty of demand leading and timeline as total vaccine requirements were contingent on epidemiology. The withdrawal of trivalent OPV provided a number of useful lessons that could be applied for the final OPV cessation. If carefully planned for and based on a close collaboration between programme partners and manufacturers, the cessation of a supply market can be undertaken with a successful outcome for both parties. As financial risks to manufacturers increase even further with OPV cessation, early engagement from the cessation planning phase and consideration of production lead times will be critical to ensure sufficient supply throughout to achieve programmatic objectives. As the GPEI will need to rely on residual stocks including with manufacturers through to the last campaign to achieve its objectives, the GPEI should consider to decide on and communicate a suitable mechanism for co-sharing of financial risks or other financial arrangement for the outer years.

Considerations for the Full Global Withdrawal of Oral Polio Vaccine After Eradication of Polio.

Eliminating the risk of polio from vaccine-derived polioviruses is essential for creating a polio-free world, and eliminating that risk will require stopping use of all oral polio vaccines (OPVs) once all types of wild polioviruses have been eradicated. In many ways, the experience with the global switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) can inform the eventual full global withdrawal of OPV. Significant preparation will be needed for a thorough, synchronized, and full withdrawal of OPV, and such preparation would be aided by setting a reasonably firm date for OPV withdrawal as far in advance as possible, ideally at least 24 months. A shorter lead time would provide valuable flexibility for decisions about when to stop use of OPV in the context of uncertainty about whether or not all types of wild polioviruses had been eradicated, but it might increase the cost of OPV withdrawal.

Progress Toward Containment of Poliovirus Type 2 - Worldwide, 2017.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Only one of the three serotypes, wild poliovirus (WPV) type 1 (WPV1), is still circulating, and the numbers of cases and countries with endemic transmission are at record lows. With the certification of wild poliovirus type 2 (WPV2) eradication in 2015 and the global replacement of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) containing Sabin poliovirus types 1, 2, and 3 with bivalent OPV containing only Sabin poliovirus types 1 and 3 during April-May 2016, poliovirus type 2 (PV2) is now an eradicated pathogen. However, in eight countries (Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria), monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2) was authorized for large-scale outbreak control after tOPV withdrawal (1). Poliovirus containment, an evolving area of work that affects every country, aims to ensure that all PV2 specimens are safely contained to minimize the risk for reintroducing the virus into communities. This report summarizes the current status of poliovirus containment and progress since the last report (2), and outlines remaining challenges. Within 30 countries, 86 facilities have been designated by the relevant national authorities (usually the Ministry of Health) to become poliovirus-essential facilities for the continued storage or handling of PV2 materials; each country is responsible for ensuring that these facilities meet all biorisk management requirements.

Off-label use of vaccines.

This article reviews the off-label recommendations and use of vaccines, and focuses on the differences between the labelled instructions on how to use the vaccine as approved by the regulatory authorities (or "label"1), and the recommendations for use issued by public health advisory bodies at national and international levels. Differences between public health recommendations and the product label regarding the vaccine use can lead to confusion at the level of vaccinators and vaccinees and possibly result in lower compliance with national vaccination schedules. In particular, in many countries, the label may contain regulatory restrictions and warnings against vaccination of specific population groups (e.g. pregnant women) due to a lack of evidence of safety from controlled trials at the time of initial licensure of the vaccine, while public health authorities may recommend the same vaccine for that group, based on additional post-marketing data and benefit risk analyses. We provide an overview of the different responsibilities between regulatory authorities and public health advisory bodies, and the rationale for off-label use2 of vaccines, the challenges involved based on the impact of off-label use in real-life. We propose to reduce off-label use of vaccines by requiring the manufacturer to regularly adapt the label as much as possible to the public health needs as supported by new evidence. This would require manufacturers to collect and report post-marketing data, communicate them to all stakeholders and regulators to extrapolate existing evidence (when acceptable) to other groups or to other brands of a vaccine (class effect3). Regulatory authorities have a key role to play by requesting additional post-marketing data, e.g. in specific target groups. When public health recommendations for vaccine use that are outside labelled indications are considered necessary, good communication between regulatory bodies, public health authorities, companies and health care providers or vaccinators is crucial. Recommendations as well as labels and label changes should be evidence-based. The rationale for the discrepancy and the recommended off-label use of a vaccine should be communicated to providers.

Assessing the potency of oral polio vaccine kept outside of the cold chain during a national immunization campaign in Chad.

This study is the first systematic documentation of the potency of monovalent oral polio vaccine type 3 (mOPV3) kept at ambient temperatures during a polio immunization campaign in Chad. During the study test vials were exposed to temperatures of up to 47.1 °C, and kept outside of the 2-8 °C range for a maximum of 86.9 hours. Post-campaign laboratory testing confirmed that the test vials were still potent, and in conformity with the defined release specifications. Further, the Vaccine Vial Monitors performed as expected, giving an early warning indication of when cumulative exposure to heat reached levels that may have negatively affected the vaccine's potency. This study provides proof-of-concept evidence that certain types of OPV remain potent and thus can be kept, for limited periods of time, as well as administered at ambient temperatures.

Inactivated rabies vaccine control and release: use of an ELISA method.

Quality control of human rabies vaccines performed by National Control Laboratories (NCLs) prior to marketing vaccines batches requires in vivo and in vitro potency assays as requested by the relevant European Pharmacopoeia monographs, OMCLs guidelines and WHO technical recommendations. The aim of the present study was to check the suitability of an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) using a virus neutralizing monoclonal antibody, directed to the rabies virus glycoprotein, to monitor the consistency of the lot to lot rabies vaccines production. Furthermore, this work was implemented to establish in house specifications for the glycoprotein content.

Vaccine quality--can a single standard be defined?

To analyze the current global situation with respect to vaccine quality and to monitor progress in attaining it, it is first necessary to define what this means. While acknowledging that manufacturers are responsible for the quality of the vaccines they produce, World Health Organization (WHO) proposes a definition for "vaccines of assured quality" which depends on the existence of a competent and fully functional regulatory authority as assessed by an external expert team using widely agreed indicators to regulate the product. A vaccine of assured quality is defined as one that consistently meets appropriate levels of purity, potency, safety and efficacy as judged through an independent review system competent to take an evidence-based decision on the product for a specified population in a specific context. Such a review system would make use of all available information, such as licensing dossiers, surveillance of field performance, lot-by-lot scrutiny, appropriate laboratory testing, cGMP inspection of manufacturers, and evaluation of clinical trials, generally assumed by a fully functional regulatory authority. This definition implies that, faced with the same risk/benefit, any competent group would come to the same decision. The definition also indicates clear pathways to improve vaccine quality by strengthening national regulatory authorities and WHO is actively engaged in this task. By insisting on competent regulatory oversight, while recognizing the role of risk analysis in the selection of vaccines for use, WHO strongly reiterates the need for a single standard of quality. Only vaccine of assured quality should be considered for use in national immunization programs on the basis of the risk/benefit ratio for the particular population.