There is no belief update bias for neutral events: failure to replicate Burton et al. (2022).

In a recent paper, Burton et al. claim that individuals update beliefs to a greater extent when learning an event is less likely compared to more likely than expected. Here, we investigate Burton's et al.'s, findings. First, we show how Burton et al.'s data do not in fact support a belief update bias for neutral events. Next, in an attempt to replicate their findings, we collect a new data set employing the original belief update task design, but with neutral events. A belief update bias for neutral events is not observed. Finally, we highlight the statistical errors and confounds in Burton et al.'s design and analysis. This includes mis-specifying a reinforcement learning approach to model the data and failing to follow standard computational model fitting sanity checks such as parameter recovery, model comparison and out of sample prediction. Together, the results find little evidence for biased updating for neutral events.

Decision heuristics in contexts integrating action selection and execution.

Heuristics can inform human decision making in complex environments through a reduction of computational requirements (accuracy-resource trade-off) and a robustness to overparameterisation (less-is-more). However, tasks capturing the efficiency of heuristics typically ignore action proficiency in determining rewards. The requisite movement parameterisation in sensorimotor control questions whether heuristics preserve efficiency when actions are nontrivial. We developed a novel action selection-execution task requiring joint optimisation of action selection and spatio-temporal skillful execution. State-appropriate choices could be determined by a simple spatial heuristic, or by more complex planning. Computational models of action selection parsimoniously distinguished human participants who adopted the heuristic from those using a more complex planning strategy. Broader comparative analyses then revealed that participants using the heuristic showed combined decisional (selection) and skill (execution) advantages, consistent with a less-is-more framework. In addition, the skill advantage of the heuristic group was predominantly in the core spatial features that also shaped their decision policy, evidence that the dimensions of information guiding action selection might be yoked to salient features in skill learning.

Anhedonia and sensitivity to punishment in schizophrenia, depression and opiate use disorder.

BACKGROUND: From a behavioural perspective anhedonia is defined as diminished interest in the engagement of pleasurable activities. Despite its presence across a range of psychiatric disorders, the cognitive processes that give rise to anhedonia remain unclear. METHODS: Here we examine whether anhedonia is associated with learning from positive and negative outcomes in patients diagnosed with major depression, schizophrenia and opiate use disorder alongside a healthy control group. Responses in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test - a task associated with healthy prefrontal cortex function - were fitted to the Attentional Learning Model (ALM) which separates learning from positive and negative feedback. RESULTS: Learning from punishment, but not from reward, was negatively associated with anhedonia beyond other socio-demographic, cognitive and clinical variables. This impairment in punishment sensitivity was also associated with faster responses following negative feedback, independently of the degree of surprise. LIMITATIONS: Future studies should test the longitudinal association between punishment sensitivity and anhedonia also in other clinical populations controlling for the effect of specific medications. CONCLUSIONS: Together the results reveal that anhedonic subjects, because of their negative expectations, are less sensitive to negative feedbacks; this might lead them to persist in actions leading to negative outcomes.

Absence of detectable monkeypox virus DNA in 11,000 English blood donations during the 2022 outbreak.

BACKGROUND: A large, worldwide outbreak of mpox (formerly referred to as monkeypox) involving mainly men who have sex with men commenced in May 2022. We evaluated the frequency of positivity for the causative agent, monkeypox virus (MPXV), in blood donations collected in August 2022, during the outbreak period in Southern England. METHODS/MATERIALS: The sensitivity and specificity of an MPXV-specific PCR and a generic non-variola orthopoxvirus (NVO) PCR were evaluated using samples from mpox cases and synthetic DNA standards. Residual minipools from nucleic acid testing were obtained from 10,896 blood donors in Southern England, with 21% from London. RESULTS: MPXV and NVO PCRs were both capable of detection of single copies of target sequence with calculated limits of detection (LOD)90 s of 2.3 and 2.1 DNA copies and analytical sample sensitivities of 46 and 42 MPXV DNA copies/ml, respectively. 454 minipools produced from 10,896 unique donors were assayed for MPXV DNA by both methods. No positive minipools were detected by either PCR. CONCLUSIONS: Although blood donors are unrepresentative of the UK population in terms of MPXV infection risk, the uniformly negative MPXV DNA testing results provide reassurance that MPXV viraemia and potential transmission risk were rare or absent in donors during the outbreak period. Minipools from blood donors allow rapid implementation of large-scale population-based screening for emerging pathogens and represent an important resource for pandemic preparedness.

Quantifying the heritability of belief formation.

Individual differences in behaviour, traits and mental-health are partially heritable. Traditionally, studies have focused on quantifying the heritability of high-order characteristics, such as happiness or education attainment. Here, we quantify the degree of heritability of lower-level mental processes that likely contribute to complex traits and behaviour. In particular, we quantify the degree of heritability of cognitive and affective factors that contribute to the generation of beliefs about risk, which drive behavior in domains ranging from finance to health. Monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs completed a belief formation task. We first show that beliefs about risk are associated with vividness of imagination, affective evaluation and learning abilities. We then demonstrate that the genetic contribution to individual differences in these processes range between 13.5 and 39%, with affect evaluation showing a particular robust heritability component. These results provide clues to which mental factors may be driving the heritability component of beliefs formation, which in turn contribute to the heritability of complex traits.

Model Sharing in the Human Medial Temporal Lobe.

Effective planning involves knowing where different actions take us. However, natural environments are rich and complex, leading to an exponential increase in memory demand as a plan grows in depth. One potential solution is to filter out features of the environment irrelevant to the task at hand. This enables a shared model of transition dynamics to be used for planning over a range of different input features. Here, we asked human participants (13 male, 16 female) to perform a sequential decision-making task, designed so that knowledge should be integrated independently of the input features (visual cues) present in one case but not in another. Participants efficiently switched between using a low-dimensional (cue independent) and a high-dimensional (cue specific) representation of state transitions. fMRI data identified the medial temporal lobe as a locus for learning state transitions. Within this region, multivariate patterns of BOLD responses were less correlated between trials with differing input features but similar state associations in the high dimensional than in the low dimensional case, suggesting that these patterns switched between separable (specific to input features) and shared (invariant to input features) transition models. Finally, we show that transition models are updated more strongly following the receipt of positive compared with negative outcomes, a finding that challenges conventional theories of planning. Together, these findings propose a computational and neural account of how information relevant for planning can be shared and segmented in response to the vast array of contextual features we encounter in our world.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Effective planning involves maintaining an accurate model of which actions take us to which locations. But in a world awash with information, mapping actions to states with the right level of complexity is critical. Using a new decision-making "heist task" in conjunction with computational modeling and fMRI, we show that patterns of BOLD responses in the medial temporal lobe-a brain region key for prospective planning-become less sensitive to the presence of visual features when these are irrelevant to the task at hand. By flexibly adapting the complexity of task-state representations in this way, state-action mappings learned under one set of features can be used to plan in the presence of others.

A habenula-insular circuit encodes the willingness to act.

The decision that it is worth doing something rather than nothing is a core yet understudied feature of voluntary behaviour. Here we study "willingness to act", the probability of making a response given the context. Human volunteers encountered opportunities to make effortful actions in order to receive rewards, while watching a movie inside a 7 T MRI scanner. Reward and other context features determined willingness-to-act. Activity in the habenula tracked trial-by-trial variation in participants' willingness-to-act. The anterior insula encoded individual environment features that determined this willingness. We identify a multi-layered network in which contextual information is encoded in the anterior insula, converges on the habenula, and is then transmitted to the supplementary motor area, where the decision is made to either act or refrain from acting via the nigrostriatal pathway.

Belief updating in bipolar disorder predicts time of recurrence.

Bipolar disorder is a chronic relapsing condition in which mood episodes are interspersed with periods of wellbeing (euthymia). Shorter periods of euthymia are associated with poorer functioning, so it is crucial to identify predictors of relapse to facilitate treatment. Here, we test the hypothesis that specific valence-dependent learning patterns emerge prior to the clinical manifestation of a relapse, predicting its timing. The ability to update beliefs in response to positive and negative information was quantified in bipolar patients during euthymia, who were then monitored for 5 years. We found that reduced tendency to update beliefs in response to positive relative to negative information predicted earlier relapse. Less updating in response to positive information may generate pessimistic beliefs, which in turn can lead to more severe prodromal symptoms (e.g. sleep disturbance, irritability etc.). The results suggest that measuring valence-dependent belief updating could facilitate risk prediction in bipolar disorder.

Biased belief updating and suboptimal choice in foraging decisions.

Deciding which options to engage, and which to forego, requires developing accurate beliefs about the overall distribution of prospects. Here we adapt a classic prey selection task from foraging theory to examine how individuals keep track of an environment's reward rate and adjust choices in response to its fluctuations. Preference shifts were most pronounced when the environment improved compared to when it deteriorated. This is best explained by a trial-by-trial learning model in which participants estimate the reward rate with upward vs. downward changes controlled by separate learning rates. A failure to adjust expectations sufficiently when an environment becomes worse leads to suboptimal choices: options that are valuable given the environmental conditions are rejected in the false expectation that better options will materialize. These findings offer a previously unappreciated parallel in the serial choice setting of observations of asymmetric updating and resulting biased (often overoptimistic) estimates in other domains.

Sympathetic involvement in time-constrained sequential foraging.

Appraising sequential offers relative to an unknown future opportunity and a time cost requires an optimization policy that draws on a learned estimate of an environment's richness. Converging evidence points to a learning asymmetry, whereby estimates of this richness update with a bias toward integrating positive information. We replicate this bias in a sequential foraging (prey selection) task and probe associated activation within the sympathetic branch of the autonomic system, using trial-by-trial measures of simultaneously recorded cardiac autonomic physiology. We reveal a unique adaptive role for the sympathetic branch in learning. It was specifically associated with adaptation to a deteriorating environment: it correlated with both the rate of negative information integration in belief estimates and downward changes in moment-to-moment environmental richness, and was predictive of optimal performance on the task. The findings are consistent with a framework whereby autonomic function supports the learning demands of prey selection.

Updating Beliefs under Perceived Threat.

Humans are better at integrating desirable information into their beliefs than undesirable information. This asymmetry poses an evolutionary puzzle, as it can lead to an underestimation of risk and thus failure to take precautionary action. Here, we suggest a mechanism that can speak to this conundrum. In particular, we show that the bias vanishes in response to perceived threat in the environment. We report that an improvement in participants' tendency to incorporate bad news into their beliefs is associated with physiological arousal in response to threat indexed by galvanic skin response and self-reported anxiety. This pattern of results was observed in a controlled laboratory setting (Experiment I), where perceived threat was manipulated, and in firefighters on duty (Experiment II), where it naturally varied. Such flexibility in how individuals integrate information may enhance the likelihood of responding to warnings with caution in environments rife with threat, while maintaining a positivity bias otherwise, a strategy that can increase well-being.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The human tendency to be overly optimistic has mystified scholars and lay people for decades: How could biased beliefs have been selected over unbiased beliefs? Scholars have suggested that although the optimism bias can lead to negative outcomes, including financial collapse and war, it can also facilitate health and productivity. Here, we demonstrate that a mechanism generating the optimism bias, namely asymmetric information integration, evaporates under threat. Such flexibility could result in enhanced caution in dangerous environments while supporting an optimism bias otherwise, potentially increasing well-being.

Optimistic update bias holds firm: Three tests of robustness following Shah et al.

A diverse body of research has demonstrated that people update their beliefs to a greater extent when receiving good news compared to bad news. Recently, a paper by Shah et al. claimed that this asymmetry does not exist. Here we carefully examine the experiments and simulations described in Shah et al. and follow their analytic approach on our data sets. After correcting for confounds we identify in the experiments of Shah et al., an optimistic update bias for positive life events is revealed. Contrary to claims made by Shah et al., we observe that participants update their beliefs in a more Bayesian manner after receiving good news than bad. Finally, we show that the parameters Shah et al. pre-selected for simulations are at odds with participants' data, making these simulations irrelevant to the question asked. Together this report makes a strong case for a true optimistic asymmetry in belief updating.

The brain adapts to dishonesty.

Dishonesty is an integral part of our social world, influencing domains ranging from finance and politics to personal relationships. Anecdotally, digressions from a moral code are often described as a series of small breaches that grow over time. Here we provide empirical evidence for a gradual escalation of self-serving dishonesty and reveal a neural mechanism supporting it. Behaviorally, we show that the extent to which participants engage in self-serving dishonesty increases with repetition. Using functional MRI, we show that signal reduction in the amygdala is sensitive to the history of dishonest behavior, consistent with adaptation. Critically, the extent of reduced amygdala sensitivity to dishonesty on a present decision relative to the previous one predicts the magnitude of escalation of self-serving dishonesty on the next decision. The findings uncover a biological mechanism that supports a 'slippery slope': what begins as small acts of dishonesty can escalate into larger transgressions.

Forming Beliefs: Why Valence Matters.

One of the most salient attributes of information is valence: whether a piece of news is good or bad. Contrary to classic learning theories, which implicitly assume beliefs are adjusted similarly regardless of valence, we review evidence suggesting that different rules and mechanisms underlie learning from desirable and undesirable information. For self-relevant beliefs this asymmetry generates a positive bias, with significant implications for individuals and society. We discuss the boundaries of this asymmetry, characterize the neural system supporting it, and describe how changes in this circuit are related to individual differences in behavior.

Human Frontal-Subcortical Circuit and Asymmetric Belief Updating.

How humans integrate information to form beliefs about reality is a question that has engaged scientists for centuries, yet the biological system supporting this process is not well understood. One of the most salient attributes of information is valence. Whether a piece of news is good or bad is critical in determining whether it will alter our beliefs. Here, we reveal a frontal-subcortical circuit in the left hemisphere that is simultaneously associated with enhanced integration of favorable information into beliefs and impaired integration of unfavorable information. Specifically, for favorable information, stronger white matter connectivity within this system, particularly between the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left subcortical regions (including the amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, putamen, and pallidum), as well as insular cortex, is associated with greater change in belief. However, for unfavorable information, stronger connectivity within this system, particularly between the left IFG and left pallidum, putamen, and insular cortex, is associated with reduced change in beliefs. These novel results are consistent with models suggesting that partially separable processes govern learning from favorable and unfavorable information. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Beliefs of what may happen in the future are important, because they guide decisions and actions. Here, we illuminate how structural brain connectivity is related to the generation of subjective beliefs. We focus on how the valence of information is related to people's tendency to alter their beliefs. By quantifying the extent to which participants update their beliefs in response to desirable and undesirable information and relating those measures to the strength of white matter connectivity using diffusion tensor imaging, we characterize a left frontal-subcortical system that is associated simultaneously with greater belief updating in response to favorable information and reduced belief updating in response to unfavorable information. This neural architecture may allow valence to be incorporated into belief updating.

Losing the rose tinted glasses: neural substrates of unbiased belief updating in depression.

Recent evidence suggests that a state of good mental health is associated with biased processing of information that supports a positively skewed view of the future. Depression, on the other hand, is associated with unbiased processing of such information. Here, we use brain imaging in conjunction with a belief update task administered to clinically depressed patients and healthy controls to characterize brain activity that supports unbiased belief updating in clinically depressed individuals. Our results reveal that unbiased belief updating in depression is mediated by strong neural coding of estimation errors in response to both good news (in left inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral superior frontal gyrus) and bad news (in right inferior parietal lobule and right inferior frontal gyrus) regarding the future. In contrast, intact mental health was linked to a relatively attenuated neural coding of bad news about the future. These findings identify a neural substrate mediating the breakdown of biased updating in major depression disorder, which may be essential for mental health.

How robust is the optimistic update bias for estimating self-risk and population base rates?

Humans hold unrealistically optimistic predictions of what their future holds. These predictions are generated and maintained as people update their beliefs more readily when receiving information that calls for adjustment in an optimistic direction relative to information that calls for adjustment in a pessimistic direction. Thus far this update bias has been shown when people make estimations regarding the self. Here, we examine whether asymmetric belief updating also exists when making estimations regarding population base rates. We reveal that while participants update beliefs regarding risk in the population in an asymmetric manner, such valence-dependent updating of base rates can be accounted for by priors. In contrast, we show that optimistic updating regarding the self is a robust phenomenon, which holds even under different empirical definitions of desirable information.

The brain's temporal dynamics from a collective decision to individual action.

Social animals constantly make decisions together. What determines if individuals will subsequently adjust their behavior to align with collective choices? Here, using functional magnetic resonance imaging in humans, we characterize a novel temporal model of brain response from the time a collective decision is made to the time an individual action is required. We reveal that whether a behavioral modification will occur is determined not necessarily by the brain's response to the initial social influence, but by how that response (specifically in the orbitofrontal cortex; OFC) is mirrored at a later time when the individual selects their own action. This result suggests that the OFC may reconstitute an initial state of collective influence when individual action is subsequently needed. Importantly, these dynamics vary across individuals as a function of trait conformity and mediate the relationship between this personality characteristic and behavioral adjustment toward the group.

Human development of the ability to learn from bad news.

Humans show a natural tendency to discount bad news while incorporating good news into beliefs (the "good news-bad news effect"), an effect that may help explain seemingly irrational risk taking. Understanding how this bias develops with age is important because adolescents are prone to engage in risky behavior; thus, educating them about danger is crucial. We reveal a striking valence-dependent asymmetry in how belief updating develops with age. In the ages tested (9-26 y), younger age was associated with inaccurate updating of beliefs in response to undesirable information regarding vulnerability. In contrast, the ability to update beliefs accurately in response to desirable information remained relatively stable with age. This asymmetry was mediated by adequate computational use of positive but not negative estimation errors to alter beliefs. The results are important for understanding how belief formation develops and might help explain why adolescents do not respond adequately to warnings.

Confidence in value-based choice.

Decisions are never perfect, with confidence in one's choices fluctuating over time. How subjective confidence and valuation of choice options interact at the level of brain and behavior is unknown. Using a dynamic model of the decision process, we show that confidence reflects the evolution of a decision variable over time, explaining the observed relation between confidence, value, accuracy and reaction time. As predicted by our dynamic model, we show that a functional magnetic resonance imaging signal in human ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) reflects both value comparison and confidence in the value comparison process. Crucially, individuals varied in how they related confidence to accuracy, allowing us to show that this introspective ability is predicted by a measure of functional connectivity between vmPFC and rostrolateral prefrontal cortex. Our findings provide a mechanistic link between noise in value comparison and metacognitive awareness of choice, enabling us both to want and to express knowledge of what we want.