Children's gender essentialism and prejudice: Testing causal links via an experimental manipulation.

Despite increases in visibility, gender-nonconforming young people continue to be at risk for bullying and discrimination. Prior work has established that gender essentialism in children correlates with prejudice against people who do not conform to gender norms, but to date no causal link has been established. The present study investigated this link more directly by testing whether children's gender essentialism and prejudice against gender nonconformity can be reduced by exposure to anti-essentialist messaging. Children ages 6-10 years of age (N = 102) in the experimental condition viewed a short video describing similarities between boys and girls and variation within each gender; children in the control condition (N = 102) viewed a corresponding video describing similarities between two types of climate and variation within each. Children then received measures of gender essentialism and prejudice against gender nonconformity. Finally, to ask whether manipulating children's gender essentialism extends to another domain, we included assessments of racial essentialism and prejudice. We found positive correlations between gender essentialism and prejudice against gender nonconformity; both also correlated negatively with participant age. However, we observed no differences between children in the experimental versus control conditions in overall essentialism or prejudice, indicating that our video was largely ineffective in manipulating essentialism. Accordingly, we were unable to provide evidence of a causal relationship between essentialism and prejudice. We did, however, see a difference between conditions on the discreteness measure, which is most closely linked to the wording in the video. This finding suggests that specific aspects of essentialism in young children may be modifiable. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Consistent with prior research, we found that greater gender essentialism was associated with greater prejudice against gender-nonconforming children; both decreased with age. We randomly assigned children to view either an anti-essentialist video manipulation or a control video to test if this relation was causal in nature. The anti-essentialist video did not reduce overall essentialism as compared to the control, so we did not find support for a causal link. We observed a reduction in the dimension of essentialism most closely linked to the anti-essentialist video language, suggesting the potential utility of anti-essentialist messaging.

Transformative tales: The role of story videos on children's reasoning about transgender identities.

The current study explored whether positive contact through stories could influence how young children think about transgender identities and gender in general. A total of 174 children ages 5-6 and 9-10 were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Jazz (participants watched a video regarding a transgender child named Jazz), Blue (participants watched a video regarding a marker that looked red on the outside but inside was really blue) and control (no video). Both videos described the main character as feeling different inside than outside, and their social transition to their preferred identity; researcher scaffolding supported the video messages. Children who viewed the Jazz video had: (a) greater understanding of transgender identities and (b) no overall differences in gender essentialism, but (c) lower gender essentialism on three specific measures (gender immutability, innate toy behaviours and innate preferences). Also, gender essentialism was lower in older versus younger children. In this study, a direct, realistic story was the only effective means of teaching children about transgender identities and reducing belief in gender immutability. Thus, stories can be a way to teach children about the social world and change essentialist beliefs, but the impact may be limited and greatly affected by features of the story.

Gender Essentialism Predicts Prejudice against Gender Nonconformity in Two Cultural Contexts.

Gender-nonconforming children face a substantial amount of prejudice, making it important to investigate potential contributing factors. In a correlational study of 253 U.S. Midwestern and Pacific Northwestern 6- to 10-year-old gender-conforming children (Age M = 7.95, SD = 1.43; 54% girl, 46% boy; 77% White), we examined how gender essentialism (beliefs that gender is biological, discrete, informative, and immutable) and gender identity essentialism (beliefs that gender identity is immutable) relate to prejudice against gender-nonconforming children. We also examined whether these associations varied by the child's cultural context (rural, non-diverse, conservative vs. urban, more diverse, liberal). We found a positive correlation between gender essentialism and prejudice, in both cultural contexts. Additionally, children from the more rural context endorsed more essentialism and expressed more prejudice than did their counterparts from the more urban context. However, we found no differences in children's gender identity essentialism by cultural context and no association with prejudice.

The social aspects of illness: Children's and parents' explanations of the relation between social categories and illness in a predominantly white U.S. sample.

The COVID-19 pandemic in the United States has had a disproportionate impact on Black, low-income, and elderly individuals. We recruited 175 predominantly white children ages 5-12 and their parents (N = 112) and asked which of two individuals (differing in age, gender, race, social class, or personality) was more likely to get sick with either COVID-19 or the common cold and why. Children and parents reported that older adults were more likely to get sick than younger adults, but reported few differences based on gender, race, social class, or personality. Children predominantly used behavioral explanations, but older children used more biological and structural explanations. Thus, children have some understanding of health disparities, and their understanding increases with age.

Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact in adults' and children's category-based induction.

Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence the use of information from direct observations in category learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and children integrate their observations with testimony when learning about the causal property of a novel category. Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four types of testimony: generic, quantified "all", specific, or only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed that some proportion of objects (10%-100%) possessed a causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123, Mage = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range 4.01-5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects had the causal property. Generic and quantified "all" claims led both adults and children to generalize the causal property beyond what was observed. Adults and children diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that could be verified by observations: adults were more skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard. The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult learners integrate information from both sources, offering insights into the mechanisms by which language frames first-hand experience.

Generically partisan: Polarization in political communication.

American political parties continue to grow more polarized, but the extent of ideological polarization among the public is much less than the extent of perceived polarization (what the ideological gap is believed to be). Perceived polarization is concerning because of its link to interparty hostility, but it remains unclear what drives this phenomenon. We propose that a tendency for individuals to form broad generalizations about groups on the basis of inconsistent evidence may be partly responsible. We study this tendency by measuring the interpretation, endorsement, and recall of category-referring statements, also known as generics (e.g., "Democrats favor affirmative action"). In study 1 (n = 417), perceived polarization was substantially greater than actual polarization. Further, participants endorsed generics as long as they were true more often of the target party (e.g., Democrats favor affirmative action) than of the opposing party (e.g., Republicans favor affirmative action), even when they believed such statements to be true for well below 50% of the relevant party. Study 2 (n = 928) found that upon receiving information from political elites, people tended to recall these statements as generic, regardless of whether the original statement was generic or not. Study 3 (n = 422) found that generic statements regarding new political information led to polarized judgments and did so more than nongeneric statements. Altogether, the data indicate a tendency toward holding mental representations of political claims that exaggerate party differences. These findings suggest that the use of generic language, common in everyday speech, enables inferential errors that exacerbate perceived polarization.

How essentialist reasoning about language acquisition relates to educational myths and policy endorsements.

How people conceptualize learning is related to real-world educational consequences across many domains of education. Despite its centrality to the educational system, we know little about how the public reasons about language acquisition, and the potential consequences for their thinking about real-world issues (e.g., policy endorsements). The current studies examined people's essentialist beliefs about language acquisition (e.g., that language is innate and biologically based), then investigated how individual differences in these beliefs related to the endorsement of educational myths and policies. We probed several dimensions of essentialist beliefs, including that language acquisition is innate, genetically based, and wired in the brain. In two studies, we tested specific hypotheses regarding the extent to which people use essentialist thinking when reasoning about: learning a specific language (e.g., Korean), learning a first language more generally, and learning two or more languages. Across studies, participants were more likely to essentialize the ability to learn multiple languages than one's first language, and more likely to essentialize the learning of multiple languages and one's first language than the learning of a particular language. We also found substantial individual differences in the degree to which participants essentialized language acquisition. In both studies, these individual differences correlated with an endorsement of language-related educational neuromyths (Study 1 and pre-registered Study 2), and rejection of educational policies that promote multilingual education (Study 2). Together, these studies reveal the complexity of how people reason about language acquisition and its corresponding educational consequences.

Testing the effects of congruence in adult multilingual acquisition with implications for creole genesis.

Linguists from across sub-disciplines have noted that congruence (i.e., form-function mapping) across languages in contact seems to affect acquisition and play a role in language emergence (e.g. Creole genesis). However, because congruence is often confounded with other variables (e.g., frequency, language type, speakers' proficiency levels, perceptual salience, semantic transparency), it remains unclear whether congruence per se benefits learners. In this paper, we provide an experimental test of the effects of congruence on acquisition through an artificial language-learning experiment involving English (L1) and two artificial languages (Flugerdu and Zamperese). English-speakers who identified as "native" (i.e., first-language) speakers (N = 163) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, varying which of the three languages expressed negation with congruent forms: all three languages; only Flugerdu and Zamperese; only English and Flugerdu; or none. Our findings show that participants better acquired the negation morpheme when the form was congruent with negation in English but not when the two artificial languages alone shared a congruent form. We likewise found unanticipated spillover effects in which participants better acquired the vocabulary and grammar of the artificial languages when all three languages had congruent negation forms. These findings provide insight into the effects of congruence on language acquisition in multilingual environments and Creole language formation.

Preliminary evidence for progressions in ownership reasoning over the preschool period.

Defining developmental progressions can be an important step in identifying developmental precursors and mechanisms of change, within and across areas of reasoning. In one exploratory study, we examine whether the development of children's thinking about ownership follows a systematic progression wherein some components emerge reliably before others. We examine this issue in a sample of 72 children: 40 older 2-year-olds, Mage = 2.78 (.14); R = 2.50-3.00, and 32 older 4-year-olds, Mage = 4.77 (.16); R = 4.50-5.00, living in Michigan in the United States. We use a battery of four established ownership tasks that tested different aspects of children's ownership thinking. A Guttman test revealed a reliable sequence that explained 81.9% of children's performance. Namely, we discovered that identifying familiar owned objects emerged first, control of permission as a cue to ownership second, understanding ownership transfers third, and the tracking of sets of identical objects last. This ordering suggests two foundational ownership abilities on which more complex reasoning may be built: the ability to include information about familiar owners in children's mental models of objects and recognizing that control is central to ownership. The observed progression is an important first step toward developing a formal ownership scale. This study paves the way for mapping the conceptual and information-processing demands (e.g., executive functioning, memory) that likely underlie change in ownership thinking across childhood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Looking beyond the obvious.

A hallmark of human cognition is the capacity to think about observable experience in ways that are nonobvious-from scientific concepts (genes, molecules) to everyday understandings (germs, soul). Where does this capacity come from, and how does it develop? I propose that, contrary to what is classically assumed, young children often extend beyond the tangible "here-and-now" to think about hidden, invisible, abstract, or nonpresent entities. I review examples from three lines of research: essentialism, generic language, and object history. These findings suggest that, in some respects, the standard developmental story may be backward: for young humans, going beyond the obvious can be easy, and sticking with the here-and-now can be a challenge. I discuss the implications for how children learn, what is basic in human thought, and how tendencies that make us so smart and sophisticated can also be sources of distortion and bias. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

"It kinda has like a mind": Children's and parents' beliefs concerning viral disease transmission for COVID-19 and the common cold.

How people reason about disease transmission is central to their commonsense theories, scientific literacy, and adherence to public health guidelines. This study provided an in-depth assessment of U.S. children's (ages 5-12, N = 180) and their parents' (N = 125) understanding of viral transmission of COVID-19 and the common cold, during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. The primary aim was to discover children's causal models of viral transmission, by asking them to predict and explain counter-intuitive outcomes (e.g., asymptomatic disease, symptom delay) and processes that cannot be directly observed (e.g., viral replication, how vaccines work). A secondary aim was to explore parental factors that might contribute to children's understanding. Although even the youngest children understood germs as disease-causing and were highly knowledgeable about certain behaviors that transmit or block viral disease (e.g., sneezing, mask-wearing), they generally failed to appreciate the processes that play out over time within the body. Overall, children appeared to rely on two competing mental models of viruses: one in which viruses operate strictly via mechanical processes (movement through space), and one in which viruses are small living creatures, able to grow in size and to move by themselves. These results suggest that distinct causal frameworks co-exist in children's understanding. A challenge for the future is how to teach children about illness as a biological process without also fostering inappropriate animism or anthropomorphism of viruses.

Understanding the value of telescopic testimony: With age, a predominantly White Midwestern sample of children credits knowledge to speakers whose statements go beyond the evidence.

One primary value of testimony lies in its ability to extend our powers of observation. Do children credit more knowledge to speakers whose testimony goes beyond firsthand observation? The current study investigated 3- to 8-year-old children's (N = 180) and adults' (N = 20) knowledge attributions to speakers who made claims regarding perceptually evident features of a novel animal (e.g., "is brown") or claims regarding perceptually absent features (e.g., "eats insects"). By 7 years of age, children and adults attributed more knowledge to speakers who discussed telescopic information and generalized their knowledge to other domains. Because the knowledge base of child listeners expands with age, they place increased value on telescopic information and the speakers who provide it.

What makes Voldemort tick? Children's and adults' reasoning about the nature of villains.

How do children make sense of antisocial acts committed by evil-doers? We addressed this question in three studies with 434 children (4-12 years) and 277 adults, focused on participants' judgments of both familiar and novel fictional villains and heroes. Study 1 established that children viewed villains' actions and emotions as overwhelmingly negative, suggesting that children's well-documented positivity bias does not prevent their appreciation of extreme forms of villainy. Studies 2 and 3 assessed children's and adults' beliefs regarding heroes' and villains' moral character and true selves, using an array of converging evidence, including: how a character felt inside, whether a character's actions reflected their true self, whether a character's true self could change over time, and how an omniscient machine would judge a character's true self. Across these measures, both children and adults consistently evaluated villains' true selves to be more negative than heroes'. Importantly, at the same time, we also detected an asymmetry in the judgments, wherein villains were more likely than heroes to have a true self that differed from their outward behavior. More specifically, across the ages studied participants more often reported that villains were inwardly good, than that heroes were inwardly bad. Implications, limitations, and directions for future research are discussed in light of our expanding understanding of the development of true self beliefs.

Women Versus Females: Gender Essentialism in Everyday Language.

How do different words referring to gender/sex categories reflect and/or shape our understanding of gender/sex concepts? The current study examined this issue by assessing how individuals use gender/sex terms (females, males, women, men). Participants recruited through MTurk (N = 299) completed an online survey, rating the terms on nine dimensions, completing a fill-in-the-blank task, and reporting gender essentialist beliefs. Overall, participants rated the words females/males as more biological and technical, and women/men as higher on all other dimensions (e.g., appropriate, polite, warm). Preference for females/males correlated positively with gender essentialism among women. These findings suggest that use of certain gendered terms is linked to how people conceptualize gender/sex. Future research should further explore the relation between choice of gendered terms, how language choice reflects and shapes attitudes and beliefs about gender/sex, and factors (e.g., race) that may influence this relation.

Learning the rules of the game: The role of generic "you" and "we" in shaping children's interpretations of norms.

A critical skill of childhood is learning social norms. We examine whether the generic pronouns "you" and "we," which frame information as applying to people in general rather than to a specific individual, facilitate this process. In one pre-registered experiment conducted online between 2020 and 2021, children 4- to 9-year-old primarily living in the midwestern U.S. (N = 146, 75 girls, 71 boys, Mage  = 7.14, SD = 1.69, 82% White) interpreted actions described with generic pronouns (vs. "I") as normatively correct and selected the speaker who used generic pronouns as the rule-follower, particularly when generic pronouns were presented first. There were no significant effects of age. These results illustrate how generic pronouns influence how children discern unfamiliar norms and form interpersonal judgments.

Generic Language for Social and Animal Kinds: An Examination of the Asymmetry Between Acceptance and Inferences.

Generics (e.g., "Ravens are black") express generalizations about categories or their members. Previous research found that generics about animals are interpreted as broadly true of members of a kind, yet also accepted based on minimal evidence. This asymmetry is important for suggesting a mechanism by which unfounded generalizations may flourish; yet, little is known whether this finding extends to generics about groups of people (heretofore, "social generics"). Accordingly, in four preregistered studies (n = 665), we tested for an inferential asymmetry for generics regarding novel groups of animals versus people. Participants were randomly assigned to either an Implied Prevalence task (given a generic, asked to estimate the prevalence of a property) or a Truth-Conditions task (given prevalence information, asked whether a generic was true or false). A generic asymmetry was found in both domains, at equivalent levels. The asymmetry also extended to properties varying in valence (dangerous and neutral). Finally, there were differences as a function of property valence in the Implied Prevalence task and a small but consistent interaction between domain and prevalence in the Truth-Conditions task. We discuss the implications of these results for the semantics of generics, theoretical accounts of the asymmetry, and the relation between generics and stereotyping.

Formal explanations shape children's representations of animal kinds and social groups.

In certain domains, people represent some of an individual's properties (e.g., a tiger's ferocity), but not others (e.g., a tiger's being in the zoo), as stemming from the assumed "essence" of the individual's category. How do children identify which properties of an individual are essentialized and which are not? Here, we examine whether formal explanations-that is, explanations that appeal to category membership (e.g., "That's ferocious because it's a tiger")-help children to identify which properties are essentialized. We investigated this question in two domains: animal kinds (Study 1) and social categories (specifically, gender; Studies 2 and 3). Across studies, we introduced children to novel behaviors and preferences of individuals using either a formal explanation or closely matched wording that did not express a formal explanation. To measure the extent to which children essentialized the novel properties, we assessed their inferences about the stability, innateness, and generalizability of these properties. In Study 1 (N = 104; 61 girls, 43 boys; predominantly White and multiracial children from high-income backgrounds), we found that formal explanations led 5- and 6-year-old children to view novel properties of individual animals as more stable across time. In Studies 2 and 3 (total N = 163; 84 girls, 79 boys; predominantly White, Asian, and multiracial children from high-income backgrounds), we found that formal explanations led 6-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, to view novel properties of individual girls and boys as more stable across contexts. These studies highlight an important mechanism by which formal explanations guide conceptual development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The development of digital ownership in children.

The current study examined whether, for children and adults, behaviors that are considered violations of property rights in the case of physical property are likewise viewed as violations in the case of digital property. In this preregistered study (N = 156), 5- to 10-year-old children and adults heard a story about a person who downloaded a digital file (e.g., an e-book that she did not own) onto her personal computer (digital) versus a person who put a physical item (e.g., a book that she did not own) into her bag (physical). Participants were asked to evaluate how okay each behavior is. We found that from 5 years of age children evaluated taking a physical object more negatively than downloading a digital file, which was also the pattern observed in adults. Furthermore, by 9 years of age children were equivalent to adults in their evaluation of downloading digital files. The current study has implications for the development of ownership in children.

Scientific and Folk Theories of Viral Transmission: A Comparison of COVID-19 and the Common Cold.

Disease transmission is a fruitful domain in which to examine how scientific and folk theories interrelate, given laypeople's access to multiple sources of information to explain events of personal significance. The current paper reports an in-depth survey of U.S. adults' (N = 238) causal reasoning about two viral illnesses: a novel, deadly disease that has massively disrupted everyone's lives (COVID-19), and a familiar, innocuous disease that has essentially no serious consequences (the common cold). Participants received a series of closed-ended and open-ended questions probing their reasoning about disease transmission, with a focus on causal mechanisms underlying disease contraction, transmission, treatment, and prevention; non-visible (internal) biological processes; and ontological frameworks regarding what kinds of entities viruses are. We also assessed participants' attitudes, such as their trust in scientific experts and willingness to be vaccinated. Results indicated complexity in people's reasoning, consistent with the co-existence of multiple explanatory frameworks. An understanding of viral transmission and viral replication existed alongside folk theories, placeholder beliefs, and lack of differentiation between viral and non-viral disease. For example, roughly 40% of participants who explained illness in terms of the transmission of viruses also endorsed a non-viral folk theory, such as exposure to cold weather or special foods as curative. Additionally, participants made use of competing modes of construal (biological, mechanical, and psychological) when explaining how viruses operate, such as framing the immune system response (biological) as cells trying to fight off the virus (psychological). Indeed, participants who displayed greater knowledge about viral transmission were significantly more likely to anthropomorphize bodily processes. Although comparisons of COVID-19 and the common cold revealed relatively few differences, the latter, more familiar disease elicited consistently lower levels of accuracy and greater reliance on folk theories. Moreover, for COVID-19 in particular, accuracy positively correlated with attitudes (trusting medical scientists and taking the disease more seriously), self-protective behaviors (such as social distancing and mask-wearing), and willingness to be vaccinated. For both diseases, self-assessed knowledge about the disease negatively predicted accuracy. The results are discussed in relation to challenges for formal models of explanatory reasoning.

Genetic essentialist beliefs about criminality predict harshness of recommended punishment.

Genetic essentialism is a set of beliefs holding that certain categories have a heritable, intrinsic, and biological basis. The current studies explore people's genetic essentialist beliefs about criminality, how such essentialism relates to beliefs about appropriate punishment, and the kinds of judgments and motivations that underlie these associations. Study 1 validated a novel task, in which respondents estimated how possible it would be for a child to inherit criminal behavior from a sperm donor with whom they had no contact. Studies 2-4 used this task to address how genetic essentialist beliefs related to the harmfulness of a crime and the harshness of recommended punishment. Results indicated a tendency to essentialize both low- and high-harm crimes, though genetic essentialism was higher for more harmful crimes. Moreover, genetic essentialist beliefs predicted recommendations for harsher punishments, with retributive and protective motivations, as well as perceptions of recidivism risk, partially mediating this association. Further, Studies 3 and 4 found that genetic essentialism positively predicted support for harsh punishments such as the death penalty, as well as support for directing financial resources more toward law enforcement and less toward social support. Lay theories about criminality may have profound implications for decisions about appropriate punishment for wrongdoers, as well as broader policy decisions about crime, punishment, and resource allocation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).