Shared health governance, mutual collective accountability, and transparency in COVAX: A qualitative study triangulating data from document sampling and key informant interviews.

Background: To facilitate global COVID-19 vaccine equity, the World Health Organization, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations, and the United Nations Children's Fund supported the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) partnership. COVAX's goals may have best been pursued through shared health governance - a theory of global health governance based on six premises, in which global health actors collaborate to achieve a shared goal. Shared health governance employs a framework for accountability termed "mutual collective accountability", in which actors hold each other accountable for achieving their goal, thus relying on transparency with one another. Methods: We conducted a multi-method qualitative study triangulating document analysis and key informant interviews to address the question: To what extent did COVAX employ shared health governance, mutual collective accountability, and transparency? We thus aimed to explore the governance structures and accountability and transparency mechanisms in COVAX and determine whether these constituted shared health governance and mutual collective accountability. Results: We identified 117 documents and interviewed 20 key informants. Our findings suggest that COVAX's co-convening organisations were governed by their individual formal governance mechanisms, while each was formally accountable to its own leadership team, resulting in challenges when activities and decisions involved collaboration between organisations. Furthermore, COVAX's governance lacked transparency, as there was little public information about their decision-making processes and operations, including information about the algorithm with which they make vaccine allocation decision, possibly contributing to its inability to achieve its goals. Conclusions: The COVAX partnership only achieved four of the six premises of shared health governance. Since actors involved in COVAX did not hold one another accountable for their role in the partnership, it did not employ mutual collective accountability, while also lacking in transparency. Although these results do not entirely explain COVAX's shortcomings, they contribute to evidence about the roles of good governance, transparency, and accountability in large global health initiatives and underscore failures of the current global governance system.

Anti-corruption in global health systems: using key informant interviews to explore anti-corruption, accountability and transparency in international health organisations.

OBJECTIVES: Corruption undermines the quality of healthcare and leads to inequitable access to essential health products. WHO, Global Fund, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank are engaged in anti-corruption in health sectors globally. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, weakened health systems and overlooked regulatory processes have increased corruption risks. The objective of this study is thus to explore the strengths and weaknesses of these organisations' anti-corruption mechanisms and their trajectories since the pandemic began. DESIGN, SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: 25 semistructured key informant interviews with a total of 27 participants were conducted via Zoom between April and July 2021 with informants from WHO, World Bank, Global Fund and UNDP, other non-governmental organisations involved in anti-corruption and academic institutions. Key informant selection was guided by purposive and snowball sampling. Detailed interview notes were qualitatively coded by three researchers. Data analysis followed an inductive-deductive hybrid thematic analysis framework. RESULTS: The findings demonstrate that WHO, World Bank, Global Fund and UNDP have shifted from criminalisation/punitive approaches to anti-corruption to preventative ones and that anti-corruption initiatives are strong when they are well funded, explicitly address corruption and are complemented by strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Weaknesses in the organisations' approaches to anti-corruption include one-size-fits-all approaches, lack of political will to address corruption and zero-tolerance policies for corruption. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the necessity of improving anti-corruption by promoting strong accountability and transparency in health systems. CONCLUSIONS: Results from this study highlight the strengths, weaknesses and recent trajectories of anti-corruption in the Global Fund, World Bank, UNDP and WHO. This study underscores the importance of implementing strong and robust anti-corruption mechanisms specifically geared towards corruption prevention that remain resilient even in times of emergency.

State capture through indemnification demands? Effects on equity in the global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.

BACKGROUND: State capture by the pharmaceutical industry is a form of corruption whereby pharmaceutical companies shift laws or policies about their products away from the best interest of the public and toward their private benefit. State capture often limits equitable access to pharmaceutical products by inflating drug prices and increasing barriers to entry into the pharmaceutical industry. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the high demand and low supply of COVID-19 vaccines has put governments that manage vaccine procurement at risk of capture by COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers, both through bilateral deals and the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility; this threatens equity in the global distribution of these products. The purpose of this study is to determine whether COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers have been engaging in state capture and, if so, to examine the implications of state capture on equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines. METHODS: A targeted rapid literature search was conducted on state capture by the pharmaceutical industry. Results were limited to journal articles, books, and grey literature published between 2000 and 2021 in or translated to English. A literature search was also conducted for information about state capture during the COVID-19 pandemic. Results were limited to media articles published between March 2020 and July 2021 in or translated to English. All articles were qualitatively analyzed using thematic analysis. RESULTS: COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers have demanded financial indemnification from national governments who procure their vaccines. While most high-income countries are legislatively capable of indemnifying vaccine manufacturers, many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are not. A number of LMICs have thus changed their legislations to permit for manufacturers' indemnification demands. Amending legislation in this way is state capture and has led to delays in LMICs and vaccine manufacturers signing procurement contracts. This has critically stalled access to vaccines in LMICs and created disparities in access to vaccines between high-income countries and LMICs. CONCLUSIONS: COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers' indemnification demands constitute state capture in many LMICs though not in high-income countries; this has enhanced global COVID-19 vaccine inequities. Results underscore the need to find alternatives to financial indemnification that do not hinder critical efforts to end the pandemic.

An exploration of anti-corruption and health in international organizations.

Corruption is a global wicked problem that threatens the achievement of health, social and economic development goals, including Sustainable Development Goal # 3: Ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all. The COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting strain on health systems has heightened risks of corruption both generally and specifically within health systems. Over the past years, international organizations, including those instrumental to the global COVID-19 response, have increased efforts to address corruption within their operations and related programs. However, as attention to anti-corruption efforts is relatively recent within international organizations, there is a lack of literature examining how these organizations address corruption and the impact of their anti-corruption efforts. This study addresses this gap by examining how accountability, transparency, and anti-corruption are taken up by international organizations within their own operations and the reported outcomes of such efforts. The following international organizations were selected as the focus of this document analysis: the World Health Organization, the Global Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank Group. Documents were identified through a targeted search of each organization's website. Documents were then analyzed combining elements of content analysis and thematic analysis. The findings demonstrate that accountability and transparency mechanisms have been employed by each of the four international organizations to address corruption. Further, these organizations commonly employed oversight mechanisms, including risk assessments, investigations, and audits to monitor their internal and external operations for fraud and corruption. All organizations used sanction strategies meant to reprimand identified transgressors and deter future corruption. Findings also demonstrate a marked increase in anti-corruption efforts by these international organizations in recent years. Though this is promising, there remains a distinct absence of evidence demonstrating the impact of such efforts on the prevalence and severity of corruption in international organizations.