Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: New estimates of R&D costs.

The research and development costs of 106 randomly selected new drugs were obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the average pre-tax cost of new drug and biologics development. The costs of compounds abandoned during testing were linked to the costs of compounds that obtained marketing approval. The estimated average out-of-pocket cost per approved new compound is $1395 million (2013 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 10.5% yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of $2558 million (2013 dollars). When compared to the results of the previous study in this series, total capitalized costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 8.5% above general price inflation. Adding an estimate of post-approval R&D costs increases the cost estimate to $2870 million (2013 dollars).

The roles of patents and research and development incentives in biopharmaceutical innovation.

Patents and other forms of intellectual property protection play essential roles in encouraging innovation in biopharmaceuticals. As part of the "21st Century Cures" initiative, Congress is reviewing the policy mechanisms designed to accelerate the discovery, development, and delivery of new treatments. Debate continues about how best to balance patent and intellectual property incentives to encourage innovation, on the one hand, and generic utilization and price competition, on the other hand. We review the current framework for accomplishing these dual objectives and the important role of patents and regulatory exclusivity (together, the patent-based system), given the lengthy, costly, and risky biopharmaceutical research and development process. We summarize existing targeted incentives, such as for orphan drugs and neglected diseases, and we consider the pros and cons of proposed voluntary or mandatory alternatives to the patent-based system, such as prizes and government research and development contracting. We conclude that patents and regulatory exclusivity provisions are likely to remain the core approach to providing incentives for biopharmaceutical research and development. However, prizes and other voluntary supplements could play a useful role in addressing unmet needs and gaps in specific circumstances.

Regulatory and cost barriers are likely to limit biosimilar development and expected savings in the near future.

In March 2010 Congress established an abbreviated Food and Drug Administration approval pathway for biosimilars-drugs that are very similar but not identical to a reference biological product and cost less. Because bringing biosimilars to the market currently requires large investments of money, fewer biosimilars are expected to enter the biologics market than has been the case with generic drugs entering the small-molecule drug market. Additionally, given the high regulatory hurdles to obtaining interchangeability-which would allow pharmacists to substitute a biosimilar for its reference product, subject to evolving state substitution laws-most biosimilars will likely compete as therapeutic alternatives instead of as therapeutic equivalents. In other words, biosimilars will need to compete with their reference product on the basis of quality; price; and manufacturer's reputation with physicians, insurers, and patient groups. Biosimilars also will face dynamic competition from new biologics in the same therapeutic class-including "biobetters," which offer incremental improvements on reference products, such as extended duration of action. The prospects for significant cost savings from the use of biosimilars appear to be limited for the next several years, but their use should increase over time because of both demand- and supply-side factors.

Evolving brand-name and generic drug competition may warrant a revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

The evolution of pharmaceutical competition since Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 raises questions about whether the act's intended balance of incentives for cost savings and continued innovation has been achieved. Generic drug usage and challenges to brand-name drugs' patents have increased markedly, resulting in greatly increased cost savings but also potentially reduced incentives for innovators. Congress should review whether Hatch-Waxman is achieving its intended purpose of balancing incentives for generics and innovation. It also should consider whether the law should be amended so that some of its provisions are brought more in line with recently enacted legislation governing approval of so-called biosimilars, or the corollary for biologics of generic competition for small-molecule drugs.

The economic returns of pediatric clinical trials of antihypertensive drugs.

BACKGROUND: Congress has authorized the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to provide industry sponsors with a 6-month extension of drug marketing rights under the Pediatric Exclusivity Provision if FDA-requested pediatric drug trials are conducted. The cost and economic return of pediatric exclusivity to industry sponsors has been shown to be highly variable. We sought to determine the cost of performing pediatric exclusivity trials within a single therapeutic area and the subsequent economic return to industry sponsors. METHODS: We evaluated 9 orally administered antihypertensive drugs submitted to the FDA under the Pediatric Exclusivity Provision from 1997 to 2004 and obtained key elements of the clinical trial designs and operations. Estimates of the costs of performing the studies were generated and converted into after-tax cash outflow. Market sales were obtained and converted into after-tax inflows based on 6 months of additional patent protection. Net economic return and net return-to-cost ratios were determined for each drug. RESULTS: Of the 9 antihypertensive agents studied, an average of 2 studies per drug was performed, including at least 1 pharmacokinetic study and a safety and efficacy study. The median cost of completing a pharmacokinetic trial was $862,000 (range $556,000 to 1.8 million). The median cost of performing safety and efficacy trials for these agents was $4.3 million (range $2.1-12.9 million). The ratio of net economic return to cost was 17 (range 4-64.7). CONCLUSION: We found that, within a cohort of antihypertensive drugs, the Pediatric Exclusivity Provision has generated highly variable, yet lucrative returns to industry sponsors.

Misleading congress about drug development: Reply.

The review essay by Donald Light about a Congressional Budget Office report on pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) (Light 2007) contains factual errors, leaves the reader uninformed about rebuttal responses to criticisms made in the review about studies of R&D costs, and draws erroneous conclusions about the nature of industry economics.

Impact of economic, regulatory, and patent policies on innovation in cancer chemoprevention.

Chemoprevention agents are an emerging new scientific area that holds out the promise of delaying or avoiding a number of common cancers. These new agents face significant scientific, regulatory, and economic barriers, however, which have limited investment in their research and development (R&D). These barriers include above-average clinical trial scales, lengthy time frames between discovery and Food and Drug Administration approval, liability risks (because they are given to healthy individuals), and a growing funding gap for early-stage candidates. The longer time frames and risks associated with chemoprevention also cause exclusivity time on core patents to be limited or subject to significant uncertainties. We conclude that chemoprevention uniquely challenges the structure of incentives embodied in the economic, regulatory, and patent policies for the biopharmaceutical industry. Many of these policy issues are illustrated by the recently Food and Drug Administration-approved preventive agents Gardasil and raloxifene. Our recommendations to increase R&D investment in chemoprevention agents include (a) increased data exclusivity times on new biological and chemical drugs to compensate for longer gestation periods and increasing R&D costs; chemoprevention is at the far end of the distribution in this regard; (b) policies such as early-stage research grants and clinical development tax credits targeted specifically to chemoprevention agents (these are policies that have been very successful in increasing R&D investment for orphan drugs); and (c) a no-fault liability insurance program like that currently in place for children's vaccines.

Economic return of clinical trials performed under the pediatric exclusivity program.

CONTEXT: In 1997, Congress authorized the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to grant 6-month extensions of marketing rights through the Pediatric Exclusivity Program if industry sponsors complete FDA-requested pediatric trials. The program has been praised for creating incentives for studies in children and has been criticized as a "windfall" to the innovator drug industry. This critique has been a substantial part of congressional debate on the program, which is due to expire in 2007. OBJECTIVE: To quantify the economic return to industry for completing pediatric exclusivity trials. DESIGN AND SETTING: A cohort study of programs conducted for pediatric exclusivity. Nine drugs that were granted pediatric exclusivity were selected. From the final study reports submitted to the FDA (2002-2004), key elements of the clinical trial design and study operations were obtained, and the cost of performing each study was estimated and converted into estimates of after-tax cash outflows. Three-year market sales were obtained and converted into estimates of after-tax cash inflows based on 6 months of additional market protection. Net economic return (cash inflows minus outflows) and net return-to-costs ratio (net economic return divided by cash outflows) for each product were then calculated. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Net economic return and net return-to-cost ratio. RESULTS: The indications studied reflect a broad representation of the program: asthma, tumors, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, hypertension, depression/generalized anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus, gastroesophageal reflux, bacterial infection, and bone mineralization. The distribution of net economic return for 6 months of exclusivity varied substantially among products (net economic return ranged from -$8.9 million to $507.9 million and net return-to-cost ratio ranged from -0.68 to 73.63). CONCLUSIONS: The economic return for pediatric exclusivity is variable. As an incentive to complete much-needed clinical trials in children, pediatric exclusivity can generate lucrative returns or produce more modest returns on investment.

Economics of new oncology drug development.

PURPOSE: Review existing studies and provide new results on the development, regulatory, and market aspects of new oncology drug development. METHODS: We utilized data from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), company surveys, and publicly available commercial business intelligence databases on new oncology drugs approved in the United States and on investigational oncology drugs to estimate average development and regulatory approval times, clinical approval success rates, first-in-class status, and global market diffusion. RESULTS: We found that approved new oncology drugs to have a disproportionately high share of FDA priority review ratings, of orphan drug designations at approval, and of drugs that were granted inclusion in at least one of the FDA's expedited access programs. US regulatory approval times were shorter, on average, for oncology drugs (0.5 years), but US clinical development times were longer on average (1.5 years). Clinical approval success rates were similar for oncology and other drugs, but proportionately more of the oncology failures reached expensive late-stage clinical testing before being abandoned. In relation to other drugs, new oncology drug approvals were more often first-in-class and diffused more widely across important international markets. CONCLUSION: The market success of oncology drugs has induced a substantial amount of investment in oncology drug development in the last decade or so. However, given the great need for further progress, the extent to which efforts to develop new oncology drugs will grow depends on future public-sector investment in basic research, developments in translational medicine, and regulatory reforms that advance drug-development science.

Developing drugs for developing countries.

Infectious and parasitic diseases create enormous health burdens, but because most of the people suffering from these diseases are poor, little is invested in developing treatments. We propose that developers of treatments for neglected diseases receive a "priority review voucher." The voucher could save an average of one year of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review and be sold by the developer to the manufacturer of a blockbuster drug. In a well-functioning market, the voucher would speed access to highly valued treatments. Thus, the voucher could benefit consumers in both developing and developed countries at relatively low cost to the taxpayer.

Spending on postapproval drug safety.

Withdrawals of high-profile pharmaceuticals have focused attention on post-approval safety surveillance. There have been no systematic assessments of spending on postapproval safety. We surveyed drug manufacturers regarding safety efforts. Mean spending on postapproval safety per company in 2003 was 56 million dollars (0.3 percent of sales). Assuming a constant safety-to-sales ratio, we estimated that total spending on postapproval safety by the top twenty drug manufacturers was 800 million dollars in 2003. We also examined, using regression analysis, the relationship between the number of safety personnel and the number of initial adverse-event reports. This study offers information for the debate on proposed changes to safety surveillance.

The quantity and quality of worldwide new drug introductions, 1982-2003.

We examined trends in the introduction of new chemical entities (NCEs) worldwide from 1982 through 2003. Although annual introductions of NCEs decreased over time, introductions of high-quality NCEs (that is, global and first-in-class NCEs) increased moderately. Both biotech and orphan products enjoyed tremendous growth, especially for cancer treatment. Country-level analyses for 1993-2003 indicate that U.S. firms overtook their European counterparts in innovative performance or the introduction of first-in-class, biotech, and orphan products. The United States also became the leading market for first launch.

The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs.

The research and development costs of 68 randomly selected new drugs were obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the average pre-tax cost of new drug development. The costs of compounds abandoned during testing were linked to the costs of compounds that obtained marketing approval. The estimated average out-of-pocket cost per new drug is 403 million US dollars (2000 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 11% yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of 802 million US dollars (2000 dollars). When compared to the results of an earlier study with a similar methodology, total capitalized costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 7.4% above general price inflation.