Getting rights right: implementing 'Martha's Rule'.

The UK government has recently committed to adopting a new policy-dubbed 'Martha's Rule'-which has been characterised as providing patients the right to rapidly access a second clinical opinion in urgent or contested cases. Support for the rule emerged following the death of Martha Mills in 2021, after doctors failed to admit her to intensive care despite concerns raised by her parents. We argue that framing this issue in terms of patient rights is not productive, and should be avoided. Insofar as the ultimate goal of Martha's Rule is the provision of a clinical service that protects patient safety, an approach that focuses on the obligations of the health system-rather than the individual rights of patients-will better serve this goal. We outline an alternative approach that situates rapid clinical review as part of a suite of services aimed at enhancing and protecting patient care. This approach would make greater progress towards addressing the difficult systemic issues that Martha's Rule does not, while also better engaging with the constraints of clinical practice.

Use of functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess cognition and consciousness in severe Guillain-Barré syndrome

Objective: Functional neuroimaging may provide a viable means of assessment and communication in patients with Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) mimicking the complete locked-in state. Functional neuroimaging has been used to assess residual cognitive function and has allowed for binary communication with other behaviourally non-responsive patients, such as those diagnosed with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome. We evaluated the potential application of functional neuroimaging using a clinical-grade scanner to determine if individuals with severe GBS retained auditory function, command following, and communication. Methods: Fourteen healthy participants and two GBS patients were asked to perform motor imagery and spatial navigation imagery tasks while being scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging. The GBS patients were also asked to perform additional functional neuroimaging scans to attempt communication. Results: The motor imagery and spatial navigation task elicited significant activation in appropriate regions of interest for both GBS patients, indicating intact command following. Both patients were able to use the imagery technique to communicate in some instances. Patient 1 was able to use one of four communication tasks to answer a question correctly. Patient 2 was able to use three of seven communication tasks. However, two questions were incorrectly answered while a third was non-verifiable. Conclusions: GBS patients can respond using mental imagery and these responses can be detected using functional neuroimaging. Furthermore, these patients may also be able to use mental imagery to provide answers to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions in some instances. We argue that the most appropriate use of neuroimaging-based communication in these patients is to allow them to communicate wishes or preferences and assent to previously expressed decisions, rather than to facilitate decision-making. (AU)

Data for sale: trust, confidence and sharing health data with commercial companies.

Powered by 'big health data' and enormous gains in computing power, artificial intelligence and related technologies are already changing the healthcare landscape. Harnessing the potential of these technologies will necessitate partnerships between health institutions and commercial companies, particularly as it relates to sharing health data. The need for commercial companies to be trustworthy users of data has been argued to be critical to the success of this endeavour. I argue that this approach is mistaken. Our interactions with commercial companies need not, and should not, be based on trust. Rather, they should be based on confidence. I begin by elucidating the differences between trust, reliability, and confidence, and argue that trust is not the appropriate attitude to adopt when it comes to sharing data with commercial companies. I argue that what we really should want is confidence in a system of data sharing. I then provide an outline of what a confidence-worthy system of data sharing with commercial companies might look like, and conclude with some remarks about the role of trust within this system.

Use of functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess cognition and consciousness in severe Guillain-Barré syndrome.

Objective: Functional neuroimaging may provide a viable means of assessment and communication in patients with Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) mimicking the complete locked-in state. Functional neuroimaging has been used to assess residual cognitive function and has allowed for binary communication with other behaviourally non-responsive patients, such as those diagnosed with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome. We evaluated the potential application of functional neuroimaging using a clinical-grade scanner to determine if individuals with severe GBS retained auditory function, command following, and communication. Methods: Fourteen healthy participants and two GBS patients were asked to perform motor imagery and spatial navigation imagery tasks while being scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging. The GBS patients were also asked to perform additional functional neuroimaging scans to attempt communication. Results: The motor imagery and spatial navigation task elicited significant activation in appropriate regions of interest for both GBS patients, indicating intact command following. Both patients were able to use the imagery technique to communicate in some instances. Patient 1 was able to use one of four communication tasks to answer a question correctly. Patient 2 was able to use three of seven communication tasks. However, two questions were incorrectly answered while a third was non-verifiable. Conclusions: GBS patients can respond using mental imagery and these responses can be detected using functional neuroimaging. Furthermore, these patients may also be able to use mental imagery to provide answers to 'yes' or 'no' questions in some instances. We argue that the most appropriate use of neuroimaging-based communication in these patients is to allow them to communicate wishes or preferences and assent to previously expressed decisions, rather than to facilitate decision-making.

Fear of Dementia and the Obligation to Provide Aggregate Research Results to Study Participants.

A general obligation to make aggregate research results available to participants has been widely supported in the bioethics literature. However, dementia research presents several challenges to this perspective, particularly because of the fear associated with developing dementia. The authors argue that considerations of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice fail to justify an obligation to make aggregate research results available to participants in dementia research. Nevertheless, there are positive reasons in favor of making aggregate research results available; when the decision is made to do so, it is critical that a clear strategy for communicating results is developed, including what support will be provided to participants receiving aggregate research results.

A Just Standard: The Ethical Management of Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging Research.

Neuroimaging research regularly yields "incidental findings": observations of potential clinical significance in healthy volunteers or patients, but which are unrelated to the purpose or variables of the study.

Residual Cognitive Capacities in Patients With Cognitive Motor Dissociation, and Their Implications for Well-Being.

Patients with severe disorders of consciousness are thought to be unaware of themselves or their environment. However, research suggests that a minority of patients diagnosed as having a disorder of consciousness remain aware. These patients, designated as having "cognitive motor dissociation" (CMD), can demonstrate awareness by imagining specific tasks, which generates brain activity detectable via functional neuroimaging. The discovery of consciousness in these patients raises difficult questions about their well-being, and it has been argued that it would be better for these patients if they were allowed to die. Conversely, I argue that CMD patients may have a much higher level of well-being than is generally acknowledged. It is far from clear that their lives are not worth living, because there are still significant gaps in our understanding of how these patients experience the world. I attempt to fill these gaps, by analyzing the neuroscientific research that has taken place with these patients to date. Having generated as comprehensive a picture as possible of the capacities of CMD patients, I examine this picture through the lens of traditional philosophical theories of well-being. I conclude that the presumption that CMD patients do not have lives worth living is not adequately supported.

Well-Being After Severe Brain Injury: What Counts as Good Recovery?

Disorders of consciousness (DOC) continue to profoundly challenge both families and medical professionals. Once a brain-injured patient has been stabilized, questions turn to the prospect of recovery. However, what "recovery" means in the context of patients with prolonged DOC is not always clear. Failure to recognize potential differences of interpretation-and the assumptions about the relationship between health and well-being that underlie these differences-can inhibit communication between surrogate decisionmakers and a patient's clinical team, and make it difficult to establish the goals of care. The authors examine the relationship between health and well-being as it pertains to patients with prolonged DOC. They argue that changes in awareness or other function should not be equated to changes in well-being, in the absence of a clear understanding of the constituents of well-being for that particular patient. The authors further maintain that a comprehensive conception of recovery for patients with prolonged DOC should incorporate aspects of both experienced well-being and evaluative well-being.

Governing AI-Driven Health Research: Are IRBs Up to the Task?

Many are calling for concrete mechanisms of oversight for health research involving artificial intelligence (AI). In response, institutional review boards (IRBs) are being turned to as a familiar model of governance. Here, we examine the IRB model as a form of ethics oversight for health research that uses AI. We consider the model's origins, analyze the challenges IRBs are facing in the contexts of both industry and academia, and offer concrete recommendations for how these committees might be adapted in order to provide an effective mechanism of oversight for health-related AI research.

Taking it to the bank: the ethical management of individual findings arising in secondary research.

A rapidly growing proportion of health research uses 'secondary data': data used for purposes other than those for which it was originally collected. Do researchers using secondary data have an obligation to disclose individual research findings to participants? While the importance of this question has been duly recognised in the context of primary research (ie, where data are collected from participants directly), it remains largely unexamined in the context of research using secondary data. In this paper, we critically examine the arguments for a moral obligation to disclose individual research findings in the context of primary research, to determine if they can be applied to secondary research. We conclude that they cannot. We then propose that the nature of the relationship between researchers and participants is what gives rise to particular moral obligations, including the obligation to disclose individual results. We argue that the relationship between researchers and participants in secondary research does not generate an obligation to disclose. However, we also argue that the biobanks or data archives which collect and provide access to secondary data may have such an obligation, depending on the nature of the relationship they establish with participants.

Fit to Study: Reflections on designing and implementing a large-scale randomized controlled trial in secondary schools.

BACKGROUND: The randomised controlled trial (RCT) design is increasingly common among studies seeking good-quality evidence to advance educational neuroscience, but conducting RCTs in schools is challenging. Fit to Study, one of six such trials funded by the Education Endowment Foundation and Wellcome Trust, tested an intervention to increase vigorous physical activity during PE lessons on maths attainment among pupils aged 12-13. This review of designing and conducting an RCT in 104 schools is intended as a resource on which researchers might draw for future studies. METHOD: We consider intervention design and delivery; recruitment, retention, trial management, data collection and analysis including ethical considerations and working with evaluators. RESULTS: Teacher training, intervention delivery and data collection during large-scale RCTs require a flexible approach appropriate to educational settings, which in turn entails planning and resources. CONCLUSION: Simple interventions, with few outcome measures and minimal missing data, are preferable to more complex designs.

Precedent Autonomy and Surrogate Decisionmaking After Severe Brain Injury.

Patients with disorders of consciousness after severe brain injury need surrogate decision makers to guide treatment decisions on their behalf. Formal guidelines for surrogate decisionmaking generally instruct decision makers to first appeal to a patient's written advance directive, followed by making a substituted judgment of what the patient would have chosen, and lastly, to make decisions according to what seems to be in the patient's best medical interests. Substituted judgment is preferable because it is taken to preserve patient autonomy, by using a patient's past wishes and values to reconstruct what they would have chosen for themselves. In this paper, the author argues that for a certain population of patients, the standard interpretation of substituted judgment cannot ensure the preservation of patient autonomy. Patients with "covert awareness" may continue to have values and an authentic sense of self, which may differ from their past values and wishes. Accordingly, surrogate decision makers should make decisions based on how the patient is likely to experience their condition in the present, rather than their past wishes and values.

Memory During the Presumed Vegetative State: Implications for Patient Quality of Life.

A growing number of studies show that a significant proportion of patients, who meet the clinical criteria for the diagnosis of the vegetative state (VS), demonstrate evidence of covert awareness through successful performance of neuroimaging tasks. Despite these important advances, the day-to-day life experiences of any such patient remain unknown. This presents a major challenge for optimizing the patient's standard of care and quality of life (QoL). We describe a patient who, following emergence from a state of complete behavioral unresponsiveness and a clinical diagnosis of VS, reported rich memories of his experience during this time. This case demonstrates the potential for a sophisticated mental life enabled by preserved memory in a proportion of patients who, similarly, are thought to be unconscious. Therefore, it presents an important opportunity to examine the implications for patient QoL and standard of care, both during the period of presumed unconsciousness and after recovery.

Burying our mistakes: Dealing with prognostic uncertainty after severe brain injury.

Prognosis after severe brain injury is highly uncertain, and decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment are often made prematurely. These decisions are often driven by a desire to avoid a situation where the patient becomes 'trapped' in a condition they would find unacceptable. However, this means that a proportion of patients who would have gone on to make a good recovery, are allowed to die. I propose a shift in practice towards the routine provision of aggressive care, even in cases where the probability of survival and acceptable recovery is thought to be low. In conjunction with this shift, I argue in favour of a presumption towards withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, when it becomes clear that a patient will not recover to a level that would be acceptable to them. I then respond to three potential objections to this proposal.

Rethinking the ethical principles of genomic medicine services.

Clinical genome and exome sequencing is currently used in only a small fraction of patients, yet large scale genomic initiatives are becoming more embedded in clinical services. This paper examines the ethical principles that should guide regulatory processes regarding consent and data sharing in this context. We argue that a genomic dataset administered by the health system carries substantial societal benefits, and that the collective nature of this initiative means that at least those patients who benefit from genome sequencing have an ethical obligation to share their health information. This obligation is grounded in considerations of fairness. Furthermore, we argue that the use of genomic data for the advancement of medical knowledge should be permitted without explicit consent and that international and other bodies should be granted access to these data, provided certain conditions are satisfied.