The economics of aging with infectious and chronic diseases.

We develop an economic model of aging in which the susceptibility and severity of infectious diseases depend on the accumulated health deficits (immunosenescence) and the life history of infections affects the accumulation of chronic health deficits (inflammaging). Individuals invest in their health to slow down health deficit accumulation and take measures to protect themselves from infectious diseases. We calibrate the model for an average American and explore how health expenditure, life expectancy, and the value of life depend on individual characteristics, medical technology, and the disease environment. We then use counterfactual computational experiments of the U.S. epidemiological transition 1860-2010 to show that the decline of infectious diseases caused a substantial decline of chronic diseases and contributed more to increasing life expectancy than advances in the treatment of chronic diseases.

The patent buyout price for human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine and the ratio of R&D costs to the patent value.

Human papillomavirus (HPV) is responsible for almost all of the 570,000 new cases of cervical cancer and approximately 311,000 deaths per year. HPV vaccination is an integral component of the World Health Organization's (WHO) global strategy to fight the disease. However, high vaccine prices enforced through patent protection are limiting vaccine expansion, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. By limiting market power, patent buyouts could reduce vaccine prices and raise HPV vaccination rates while keeping innovation incentives. We estimate the global patent buyout price as the present discounted value (PDV) of the future profit stream over the remaining patent length for Merck's HPV vaccines (Gardasil-4 and 9), which hold 87% of the global HPV vaccine market, in the range of US$ 15.6-27.7 billion (in 2018 US$). The estimated PDV of the profit stream since market introduction amounts to US$ 17.8-42.8 billion and the estimated R&D cost to US$ 1.05-1.21 billion. Thus, we arrive at a ratio of R&D costs to the patent value of the order of 2.5-6.8%. We relate this figure to typical estimates of the probability of success (POS) for clinical trials of vaccines to discuss if patent protection provides Merck with extraordinarily strong price setting power.

Do cost-sharing and entry deregulation curb pharmaceutical innovation?

This paper examines the role of both cost-sharing schemes in health insurance systems and the regulation of entry into the pharmaceutical sector for pharmaceutical R&D expenditure and drug prices. The analysis suggests that both an increase in the coinsurance rate and stricter price regulations adversely affect R&D spending in the pharmaceutical sector. In contrast, entry deregulation may lead to higher R&D spending of pharmaceutical companies. The relationship between R&D spending per firm and the number of firms may be hump-shaped. In this case, the number of rivals which maximizes R&D expenditure per firm is decreasing in the coinsurance rate and increasing in labor productivity.