Repositioning Construct Validity Theory: From Nomological Networks to Pragmatic Theories and Their Evaluation by Explanatory Means.

In this article, I argue for a number of important changes to the conceptual foundations of construct validity theory. I begin by suggesting that construct validity theorists should shift their attention from the validation of constructs to the process of evaluating scientific theories. This shift in focus is facilitated by distinguishing construct validation (understood as theory evaluation) from test validation, thereby freeing it from its long-standing focus on psychological measurement. In repositioning construct validity theory in this way, researchers should jettison the outmoded but superficially popular notion that theories are nomological networks in favor of a more plausible pragmatic view of their natures, such as the idea that theories are explanatorily coherent networks. Consistent with this shift in understanding the nature of theories, my recommendation is that construct validation should embrace an explanationist perspective on the theory evaluation process to complement its focus on hypothetico-deductive theory testing. On this view, abductive research methods have an important role to play. The revisionist perspective on construct validity proposed here is discussed in light of relevant developments in scientific methodology and is applied to an influential account of the validation process that has shaped research practice.

Theory Construction Methodology: A Practical Framework for Building Theories in Psychology.

This article aims to improve theory formation in psychology by developing a practical methodology for constructing explanatory theories: theory construction methodology (TCM). TCM is a sequence of five steps. First, the theorist identifies a domain of empirical phenomena that becomes the target of explanation. Second, the theorist constructs a prototheory, a set of theoretical principles that putatively explain these phenomena. Third, the prototheory is used to construct a formal model, a set of model equations that encode explanatory principles. Fourth, the theorist investigates the explanatory adequacy of the model by formalizing its empirical phenomena and assessing whether it indeed reproduces these phenomena. Fifth, the theorist studies the overall adequacy of the theory by evaluating whether the identified phenomena are indeed reproduced faithfully and whether the explanatory principles are sufficiently parsimonious and substantively plausible. We explain TCM with an example taken from research on intelligence (the mutualism model of intelligence), in which key elements of the method have been successfully implemented. We discuss the place of TCM in the larger scheme of scientific research and propose an outline for a university curriculum that can systematically educate psychologists in the process of theory formation.

Tests of Statistical Significance Made Sound.

This article considers the nature and place of tests of statistical significance (ToSS) in science, with particular reference to psychology. Despite the enormous amount of attention given to this topic, psychology's understanding of ToSS remains deficient. The major problem stems from a widespread and uncritical acceptance of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), which is an indefensible amalgam of ideas adapted from Fisher's thinking on the subject and from Neyman and Pearson's alternative account. To correct for the deficiencies of the hybrid, it is suggested that psychology avail itself of two important and more recent viewpoints on ToSS, namely the neo-Fisherian and the error-statistical perspectives. The neo-Fisherian perspective endeavors to improve on Fisher's original account and rejects key elements of Neyman and Pearson's alternative. In contrast, the error-statistical perspective builds on the strengths of both statistical traditions. It is suggested that these more recent outlooks on ToSS are a definite improvement on NHST, especially the error-statistical position. It is suggested that ToSS can play a useful, if limited, role in psychological research. At the end, some lessons learnt from the extensive debates about ToSS are presented.

Detecting psychological phenomena: taking bottom-up research seriously.

For more than 50 years, psychology has been dominated by a top-down research strategy in which a simplistic account of the hypothetico-deductive method is paired with null hypothesis testing in order to test hypotheses and theories. As a consequence of this focus on testing, psychologists have failed to pay sufficient attention to a complementary, bottom-up research strategy in which data-to-theory research is properly pursued.This bottom-up strategy has 2 primary aspects: the detection of phenomena, mostly in the form of empirical generalizations, and the subsequent understanding of those phenomena through the abductive generation of explanatory theories. This article provides a methodologically informative account of phenomena detection with reference to psychology. It begins by presenting the important distinctions between data, phenomena, and theory. It then identifies a number of different methodological strategies that are used to identify empirical phenomena. Thereafter, it discusses aspects of the nature of science that are prompted by a consideration of the distinction between data, phenomena, and explanatory theory. Taken together, these considerations press for significant changes in the way we think about and practice psychological research. The adoption of these changes would help psychology correct a number of its major current research deficiencies.

Extending the network perspective on comorbidity.

Cramer et al. make a good case for reconceptualizing comorbid psychopathologies in terms of complex network theory. We suggest the need for an extension of their network model to include reference to latent causes. We also draw attention to a neglected approach to theory appraisal that might usefully be incorporated into the methodology of network theory.

Inference to the best explanation: a neglected approach to theory appraisal in psychology.

Explanatory theories in psychology usually are evaluated by using the hypothetico-deductive method and testing them for their predictive adequacy. This article brings the alternative idea of inference to the best explanation to the attention of psychologists and suggests that it provides them with a set of methodological resources for evaluating the explanatory worth of their theories. I present 3 characterizations of the notion of inference to the best explanation. The strengths and limitations of inference to the best explanation are then considered, as is its relationship to the hypothetico-deductive and Bayesian approaches to theory appraisal. Thereafter, I suggest a proper scope for inference to the best explanation as a scientific method, make recommendations for using the approach in psychology, and recommend its adoption in the appraisal of psychological theories.

Scientific method, abduction, and clinical reasoning.

This special issue of the Journal of Clinical Psychology comprises six theoretical papers that are concerned with the interconnected topics of scientific method, abductive inference, and clinical reasoning. The first four papers deal with the nature and limitations of a broad abductive theory of scientific method, and its application to clinical reasoning and case formulation. These are followed by three papers which in turn consider the prospects of using explanatory criteria to appraise competing models of psychopathy, examine the merits of a number of different psychometric perspectives on the assessment of psychopathology, and reject a core supposition of the orthodox approach to hypothesis testing.

Précis of 'an abductive theory of scientific method'.

This short article is a précis of the author's (2005a) abductive theory of scientific method. This theory of method assembles a complex of specific strategies and methods of relevance to psychology that are employed in the detection of empirical phenomena and the subsequent construction of explanatory theories. A characterization of the nature of phenomena is given, and the process of their detection is briefly described in terms of a multistage model of data analysis. The construction of explanatory theories is shown to involve their generation through abductive, or explanatory, reasoning, their development through analogical modeling, and their fuller appraisal in terms of judgments of the best of competing explanations. The nature and limits of this theory of method are discussed in the light of relevant developments in scientific methodology.

On the permissiveness of the abductive theory of method.

In this article, the author examines Romeijn's (2008) contention that the account of theory construction in the abductive theory of scientific method suffers from the problem of the underdetermination of theories by empirical evidence. Following Romeijn, the author focuses on the issue of underdetermination as it affects the method of exploratory factor analysis, the strategy of analogical modeling, and the theory of explanatory coherence. The author argues that in each case there are sufficient methodological resources available to researchers to use these methods to good effect. Additionally, he comments on the normative force of the abductive theory of method.

An abductive perspective on clinical reasoning and case formulation.

Clinical reasoning has traditionally been understood in terms of either hypothetico-deductive or Bayesian methods. However, clinical psychology requires an organizing framework that goes beyond the limits of these methods and characterizes the full range of reasoning processes involved in the description, understanding, and formulation of the difficulties presented by clients. In this article, the authors present a framework for clinical reasoning and case formulation that is largely based on a broad abductive theory of scientific method (Haig, 2005b). The abductive theory articulates and combines the processes of phenomena detection and theory construction. Both of these processes are applied to clinical reasoning and case formulation, and a running case example is provided to illustrate the application.

Exploratory Factor Analysis, Theory Generation, and Scientific Method.

This article examines the methodological foundations of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and suggests that it is properly construed as a method for generating explanatory theories. In the first half of the article it is argued that EFA should be understood as an abductive method of theory generation that exploits an important precept of scientific inference known as the principle of the common cause. This characterization of the inferential nature of EFA coheres well with its interpretation as a latent variable method. The second half of the article outlines a broad theory of scientific method in which abductive reasoning figures prominently. It then discusses a number of methodological features of EFA in the light of that method. Specifically, it is argued that EFA helps researchers generate theories with genuine explanatory merit; that factor indeterminacy is a methodological challenge for both EFA and confirmatory factor analysis, but that the challenge can be satisfactorily met in each case; and, that EFA, as a useful method of theory generation, can be profitably employed in tandem with confirmatory factor analysis and other methods of theory evaluation.

An abductive theory of scientific method.

A broad theory of scientific method is sketched that has particular relevance for the behavioral sciences. This theory of method assembles a complex of specific strategies and methods that are used in the detection of empirical phenomena and the subsequent construction of explanatory theories. A characterization of the nature of phenomena is given, and the process of their detection is briefly described in terms of a multistage model of data analysis. The construction of explanatory theories is shown to involve their generation through abductive, or explanatory, reasoning, their development through analogical modeling, and their fuller appraisal in terms of judgments of the best of competing explanations. The nature and limits of this theory of method are discussed in the light of relevant developments in scientific methodology.