Gods are watching and so what? Moralistic supernatural punishment across 15 cultures.

Psychological and cultural evolutionary accounts of human sociality propose that beliefs in punitive and monitoring gods that care about moral norms facilitate cooperation. While there is some evidence to suggest that belief in supernatural punishment and monitoring generally induce cooperative behaviour, the effect of a deity's explicitly postulated moral concerns on cooperation remains unclear. Here, we report a pre-registered set of analyses to assess whether perceiving a locally relevant deity as moralistic predicts cooperative play in two permutations of two economic games using data from up to 15 diverse field sites. Across games, results suggest that gods' moral concerns do not play a direct, cross-culturally reliable role in motivating cooperative behaviour. The study contributes substantially to the current literature by testing a central hypothesis in the evolutionary and cognitive science of religion with a large and culturally diverse dataset using behavioural and ethnographically rich methods.

Genomic analysis reveals geography rather than culture as the predominant factor shaping genetic variation in northern Kenyan human populations.

OBJECTIVES: The aim of this study was to characterize the genetic relationships within and among four neighboring ethnolinguistic groups in northern Kenya in light of cultural relationships to understand the extent to which geography and culture shape patterns of genetic variation. MATERIALS AND METHODS: We collected DNA and demographic information pertaining to aspects of social identity and heritage from 572 individuals across the Turkana, Samburu, Waso Borana, and Rendille of northern Kenya. We sampled individuals across a total of nine clans from these four groups and, additionally, three territorial sections within the Turkana and successfully genotyped 376 individuals. RESULTS: Here we report that geography predominately shapes genetic variation within and among human groups in northern Kenya. We observed a clinal pattern of genetic variation that mirrors the overall geographic distribution of the individuals we sampled. We also found relatively higher rates of intermarriage between the Rendille and Samburu and evidence of gene flow between them that reflect these higher rates of intermarriage. Among the Turkana, we observed strong recent genetic substructuring based on territorial section affiliation. Within ethnolinguistic groups, we found that Y chromosome haplotypes do not consistently cluster by natal clan affiliation. Finally, we found that sampled populations that are geographically closer have lower genetic differentiation, and that cultural similarity does not predict genetic similarity as a whole across these northern Kenyan populations. DISCUSSION: Overall, the results from this study highlight the importance of geography, even on a local geographic scale, in shaping observed patterns of genetic variation in human populations.

Human large-scale cooperation as a product of competition between cultural groups.

A fundamental puzzle of human evolution is how we evolved to cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers in transient interactions. Group-level selection on culturally differentiated populations is one proposed explanation. We evaluate a central untested prediction of Cultural Group Selection theory, by assessing whether readiness to cooperate between individuals from different groups corresponds to the degree of cultural similarity between those groups. We documented the normative beliefs and cooperative dispositions of 759 individuals spanning nine clans nested within four pastoral ethnic groups of Kenya-the Turkana, Samburu, Rendille and Borana. We find that cooperation between groups is predicted by how culturally similar they are, suggesting that norms of cooperation in these societies have evolved under the influence of group-level selection on cultural variation. Such selection acting over human evolutionary history may explain why we cooperate readily with unrelated and unfamiliar individuals, and why humans' unprecedented cooperative flexibility is nevertheless culturally parochial.

Moralizing gods, impartiality and religious parochialism across 15 societies.

The emergence of large-scale cooperation during the Holocene remains a central problem in the evolutionary literature. One hypothesis points to culturally evolved beliefs in punishing, interventionist gods that facilitate the extension of cooperative behaviour toward geographically distant co-religionists. Furthermore, another hypothesis points to such mechanisms being constrained to the religious ingroup, possibly at the expense of religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we administered two behavioural experiments and a set of interviews to a sample of 2228 participants from 15 diverse populations. These populations included foragers, pastoralists, horticulturalists, and wage labourers, practicing Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, but also forms of animism and ancestor worship. Using the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG) in which individuals allocated money between themselves, local and geographically distant co-religionists, and religious outgroups, we found that higher ratings of gods as monitoring and punishing predicted decreased local favouritism (RAGs) and increased resource-sharing with distant co-religionists (DGs). The effects of punishing and monitoring gods on outgroup allocations revealed between-site variability, suggesting that in the absence of intergroup hostility, moralizing gods may be implicated in cooperative behaviour toward outgroups. These results provide support for the hypothesis that beliefs in monitoring and punitive gods help expand the circle of sustainable social interaction, and open questions about the treatment of religious outgroups.