Does effort increase or decrease reward valuation? Considerations from cognitive dissonance theory.

The present research tested the effect of manipulated perceived control (over obtaining the outcomes) and effort on reward valuation using the event-related potential known as the Reward Positivity (RewP). This test was conducted in an attempt to integrate two research literatures with opposite findings: Effort justification occurs when high effort leads to high reward valuation, whereas effort discounting occurs when high effort leads to low reward valuation. Based on an examination of past methods used in these literatures, we predicted that perceived control and effort would interactively influence RewP. Consistent with the effort justification literature (cognitive dissonance theory), when individuals have high perceived control, high effort should lead to more reward valuation than low effort should. Consistent with the effort discounting literature, when individuals have low perceived control, low effort should lead to more reward valuation than high effort should. Results supported these interactive and integrative predictions.

Individual differences in dissonance arousal/reduction relate to physical exercise: Testing the action-based model.

INTRODUCTION: The present research was designed to test predictions derived from the action-based model of cognitive dissonance theory. These predictions were that dissonance arousal would be negatively related to effective behavior, and that dissonance reduction would be positively related to effective behavior. METHOD: Dissonance arousal and reduction were measured using an individual differences questionnaire. Effective behavior was measured as amount of physical exercise obtained from an exercise app that measures exercise using GPS (cycling kilometers over one year; Study 1) and from self-reports (number of days during the previous week; Study 2-3). RESULTS: Results suggested that individual differences in dissonance arousal relate to less exercise and that individual differences in dissonance reduction relate to more exercise. Statistically controlling for trait approach and avoidance motivation as well as satisfaction with life revealed that dissonance processes predicted exercise behavior over these traits. This pattern of results was generally consistent across the three studies. Moreover, results from Studies 2-3 suggested possible statistical mediators from the exercise commitment literature of the relationship between trait dissonance arousal/reduction and exercise behavior. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: These results highlight the importance of considering dissonance processes as adaptive ones, and they suggest possible ways of increasing exercise behavior.

The Effect of Perceived Effort on Reward Valuation: Taking the Reward Positivity (RewP) to Dissonance Theory.

The present research was designed to test whether the subjective experience of more effort related to more reward valuation as measured by a neural response. This prediction was derived from the theory of cognitive dissonance and its effort justification paradigm. Young adult participants (n = 82) engaged in multiple trails of a low or high effort task that resulted in a loss or reward on each trial. Neural responses to the reward (loss) cue were measured using EEG so that the event-related potential known as the Reward Positivity (RewP) could be assessed. Results revealed no significant differences between low and high effort conditions on the RewP. However, within the high effort condition, a more subjective experience of effort was associated with a larger RewP. This research extends past research on the effort justification paradigm of cognitive dissonance theory by suggesting that effort justification is associated with an implicit measure of reward valuation. It, therefore, challenges recent perspectives on dissonance processes that posit that these evaluative changes should only occur on explicit but not implicit measures.

The effect of perceived effort and perceived control on reward valuation: Using the reward positivity to test a dissonance theory prediction.

Past psychological theory and research suggest two opposing relationships between effort and reward valuation. Cognitive dissonance theory and research suggest that increased effort is associated with increased reward valuation, whereas theory and research on effort discounting suggest that increased effort is associated with decreased reward valuation. The present study was designed to test these two opposing perspectives, by examining a potential moderator of the relationship between effort and reward valuation - the belief that the effort was necessary to obtain the reward. Results (n = 44) suggested that increased perceptions of effort following a task were associated with larger neural responses to rewards (as assessed by the event-related potential referred to as the reward positivity) when individuals believed that their effort led to the reward but not when they believed that their effort did not lead to the reward. Discussion considers the implications of these results.

Cognitive dissonance processes serve an action-oriented adaptive function.

The action-based model of cognitive dissonance proposes an adaptive function for rationalization that differs from the one offered by Cushman. The one proposed by Cushman is concerned more with the cold construction of cognitions, whereas the one proposed by the action-based model is a motivated protection of a strongly held cognition.

Pain offset reduces rumination in response to evoked anger and sadness.

Four studies examined whether pain offset reduces rumination in response to anger or sadness. Past research has demonstrated that, following the offset of pain, individuals show a distinct state of relief involving both reduction in negative affect and an increase in positive affect. This response may help to explain why people sometimes seek out pain and discomfort (e.g., vigorous exercise, self-harm) to regulate negative emotion and suggests that following pain people should recover better from negative emotional states. To test this, we examined ruminative responses to anger and sadness. These negative, approach-related emotions often produce rumination; a response that is generally considered maladaptive. In Study 1, pain was manipulated through a cold pressor task, and participants were induced to experience anger through autobiographical recall. In Study 2, pain was also manipulated pain via a cold pressor task, and anger and sadness were induced through social exclusion using the Cyberball paradigm. In Study 3, pain was manipulated by squeezing exercise handgrips, and sadness was induced with imagery from a sad video. Study 4 replicated the methods of Study 3 and added measures of relief and distraction to examine whether these moderated the effect. A minimeta-analysis showed that, across all studies, individuals engaged in less rumination in the pain conditions as measured by a thought-listing task and a self-reported rumination questionnaire. These results suggest that the regulation of anger and sadness are improved following pain offset. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Does Cognitive Broadening Reduce Anger?

Past theory and research have suggested that motivationally intense affective states narrow cognitive scope. Research has also suggested manipulations that broaden cognitive scope reduce responses to appetitive positive affective stimuli and disgusting stimuli, thus suggesting that cognitive broadening reduces motivational intensity. This led to the hypothesis that cognitive broadening would reduce the approach-motivated negative emotion of anger. Seven studies assessed the effect of cognitive broadening on reported trait anger, state anger, attitudes toward anger, attributions of anger to ambiguous pictures, and accessibility of aggressive words. Results from individual studies found mixed support for these predictions. A meta-analysis, however, suggested a small but significant effect on trait anger/aggression and attitudes toward anger across studies. These results may indicate that cognitive scope, as manipulated in these studies, has a small effect on anger-related responses. Discussion speculates on potential explanations of these findings, and their importance for informing future research.

On the Importance of Both Dimensional and Discrete Models of Emotion.

We review research on the structure and functions of emotions that has benefitted from a serious consideration of both discrete and dimensional perspectives on emotion. To illustrate this point, we review research that demonstrates: (1) how affective valence within discrete emotions differs as a function of individuals and situations, and how these differences relate to various functions; (2) that anger (and other emotional states) should be considered as a discrete emotion but there are dimensions around and within anger; (3) that similarities exist between approach-related positive and negative discrete emotions and they have unique motivational functions; (4) that discrete emotions and broad dimensions of emotions both have unique functions; and (5) evidence that a "new" discrete emotion with discrete functions exists within a broader emotion family. We hope that this consideration of both discrete and dimensional perspectives on emotion will assist in understanding the functions of emotions.

Perceived control increases the reward positivity and stimulus preceding negativity.

The reward positivity (RewP) and the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN), two ERPs associated with reward delivery and reward anticipation, are modulated by motivational intensity. Motivational intensity is the effort organisms would make to exert behaviors, and it varies with the difficulty of exerting that behavior. If a task is perceived as impossible, which means that one does not have control over own outcomes, motivational intensity is low. In the current study, we tested the prediction that perceiving control over one's outcomes increases both the RewP to feedback and the SPN prior to feedback compared to perceiving no control. We also examined whether P300 and LPP amplitudes to reward and nonreward images were similarly modulated. Twenty-five female participants completed a gambling task in which correct choices were followed by pictures of attractive men and incorrect choices were followed by pictures of rocks. To manipulate perceived control, participants were told that, in one block of trials, they could learn a mouse-click rule in order to see only pictures of men (high perceived control condition), while in the other block, the pictures would appear randomly (low perceived control condition). However, in both conditions, feedback appeared randomly. Although the RewP was elicited in both blocks, the RewP and SPN were higher in the high perceived control condition (i.e., when participants thought that they could influence their outcomes). Perceived control did not modulate the P300 and LPP to pictures. The results suggest that approach motivation and its intensity modulate the processing of performance feedback.

Skin-transmitted pathogens and the heebie jeebies: evidence for a subclass of disgust stimuli that evoke a qualitatively unique emotional response.

Skin-transmitted pathogens have threatened humans since ancient times. We investigated whether skin-transmitted pathogens were a subclass of disgust stimuli that evoked an emotional response that was related to, but distinct from, disgust and fear. We labelled this response "the heebie jeebies". In Study 1, coding of 76 participants' experiences of disgust, fear, and the heebie jeebies showed that the heebie jeebies was elicited by unique stimuli which produced skin-crawling sensations and an urge to protect the skin. In Experiment 2,350 participants' responses to skin-transmitted pathogen, fear-inducing, and disgust-inducing vignettes showed that the vignettes elicited sensations and urges which loaded onto heebie jeebies, fear, and disgust factors, respectively. Experiment 3 largely replicated findings from Experiment 2 using video stimuli (178 participants). Results are consistent with the notion that skin-transmitted pathogens are a subclass of disgust stimuli which motivate behaviours that are functionally consistent with disgust yet qualitatively distinct.

Detecting transient emotional responses with improved self-report measures and instructions.

Psychological research often yields null results on self-reported emotion as measured by the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), even when using manipulations that might intuitively be expected to be emotionally impactful. Three studies reported here support the hypothesis that changes in self-reported negative emotion may be detected more sensitively when discrete emotions are measured rather than by either PANAS NA or a measure created by combining discrete emotions, and when participants were instructed to report how they felt during an emotion-eliciting event versus how they felt afterward. In Study 1, emotion was manipulated with disgusting photographs, in Study 2, with recall of social exclusion/inclusion, and in Study 3, with reminders of personal mortality. Discussion focuses on implications for detecting emotional changes in psychological research, and the inadvisability of interpreting null results on an insensitive measure as indicating that emotional changes did not occur. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Discrete Emotions Questionnaire: A New Tool for Measuring State Self-Reported Emotions.

Several discrete emotions have broad theoretical and empirical importance, as shown by converging evidence from diverse areas of psychology, including facial displays, developmental behaviors, and neuroscience. However, the measurement of these states has not progressed along with theory, such that when researchers measure subjectively experienced emotions, they commonly rely on scales assessing broad dimensions of affect (positivity and negativity), rather than discrete emotions. The current manuscript presents four studies that validate a new instrument, the Discrete Emotions Questionnaire (DEQ), that is sensitive to eight distinct state emotions: anger, disgust, fear, anxiety, sadness, happiness, relaxation, and desire. Emotion theory supporting the importance of distinguishing these specific emotions is reviewed.

Attitudes toward emotions.

The present work outlines a theory of attitudes toward emotions, provides a measure of attitudes toward emotions, and then tests several predictions concerning relationships between attitudes toward specific emotions and emotional situation selection, emotional traits, emotional reactivity, and emotion regulation. The present conceptualization of individual differences in attitudes toward emotions focuses on specific emotions and presents data indicating that 5 emotions (anger, sadness, joy, fear, and disgust) load on 5 separate attitude factors (Study 1). Attitudes toward emotions predicted emotional situation selection (Study 2). Moreover, attitudes toward approach emotions (e.g., anger, joy) correlated directly with the associated trait emotions, whereas attitudes toward withdrawal emotions (fear, disgust) correlated inversely with associated trait emotions (Study 3). Similar results occurred when attitudes toward emotions were used to predict state emotional reactivity (Study 4). Finally, attitudes toward emotions predicted specific forms of emotion regulation (Study 5).

The effect of commitment on relative left frontal cortical activity: tests of the action-based model of dissonance.

The action-based model of dissonance and recent advances in neuroscience suggest that commitment to action should cause greater relative left frontal cortical activity. Two experiments were conducted in which electroencephalographic activity was recorded following commitment to action, operationalized with a perceived choice manipulation. Perceived high as compared to low choice to engage in the action, regardless of whether it was counterattitudinal or proattitudinal, caused greater relative left frontal cortical activity. Moreover, perceived high as compared to low choice caused attitudes to be more consistent with the action. These results broaden the theoretical reach of the action-based model by suggesting that similar neural and motivational processes are involved in attitudinal responses to counterattitudinal and proattitudinal commitments.

The expression of determination: similarities between anger and approach-related positive affect.

In this set of studies, we examine the perceptual similarities between emotions that share either a valence or a motivational direction. Determination is a positive approach-related emotion, whereas anger is a negative approach-related emotion. Thus, determination and anger share a motivational direction but are opposite in valence. An implemental mind-set has previously been shown to produce high-approach-motivated positive affect. Thus, in Study 1, participants were asked to freely report the strongest emotion they experienced during an implemental mind-set. The most common emotion reported was determination. On the basis of this result, we compared the facial expression of determination with that of anger. In Study 2, naive judges were asked to identify photographs of facial expressions intended to express determination, along with photographs intended to express basic emotions (joy, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, neutral). Correct identifications of intended determination expressions were correlated with misidentifications of the expressions as anger but not with misidentifications as any other emotion. This suggests that determination, a high-approach-motivated positive affect, is perceived as similar to anger. In Study 3, naive judges quantified the intensity of joy, anger, and determination expressed in photographs. The intensity of perceived determination was directly correlated with the intensity of perceived anger (a high-approach-motivated negative affect) and was inversely correlated with the intensity of perceived joy (a low-approach-motivated positive affect). These results demonstrate perceptual similarity between emotions that share a motivational direction but differ in valence.

Exercising self-control increases approach motivation.

The present research tested the hypothesis that exercising self-control causes an increase in approach motivation. Study 1 found that exercising (vs. not exercising) self-control increases self-reported approach motivation. Study 2a identified a behavior--betting on low-stakes gambles--that is correlated with approach motivation but is relatively uncorrelated with self-control, and Study 2b observed that exercising self-control temporarily increases this behavior. Last, Study 3 found that exercising self-control facilitates the perception of a reward-relevant symbol (i.e., a dollar sign) but not a reward-irrelevant symbol (i.e., a percent sign). Altogether, these results support the hypothesis that exercising self-control temporarily increases approach motivation. Failures of self-control that follow from prior efforts at self-control (i.e., ego depletion) may be explained in part by increased approach motivation.

PANAS positive activation is associated with anger.

As a prototypic negative emotion, anger would seem to have little in common with positive activation, as measured by the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; D. Watson, L. A. Clark, & A. Tellegen, 1988). However, growing evidence suggests that both anger and positive affect are associated with approach motivation. This suggests the counterintuitive hypotheses that positive affect should be increased by anger-evoking situations, and that positive affect and anger should be directly correlated in such situations. Four studies tested and supported these hypotheses. Discussion focuses on the implications of these results.

Left frontal cortical activation and spreading of alternatives: tests of the action-based model of dissonance.

The action-based model of dissonance predicts that following decisional commitment, approach-oriented motivational processes occur to assist in translating the decision into effective and unconflicted behavior. Therefore, the modulation of these approach-oriented processes should affect the degree to which individuals change their attitudes to be more consistent with the decisional commitment (spreading of alternatives). Experiment 1 demonstrated that a neurofeedback-induced decrease in relative left frontal cortical activation, which has been implicated in approach motivational processes, caused a reduction in spreading of alternatives. Experiment 2 manipulated an action-oriented mindset following a decision and demonstrated that the action-oriented mindset caused increased activation in the left frontal cortical region as well as increased spreading of alternatives. Discussion focuses on how this integration of neuroscience and dissonance theory benefits both parent literatures.

The effect of personal relevance and approach-related action expectation on relative left frontal cortical activity.

Past research using a variety of methods has suggested that the frontal cortex is asymmetrically involved in the experience and expression of positive (or approach motivational) and negative (or withdrawal motivational) affects, with the left frontal region being involved in positive affects (or approach) and the right frontal region being involved in negative affects (or withdrawal). However, some studies have failed to replicate these effects, leaving many scientists questioning the meaning of the past supportive findings. To examine these inconsistencies in results, we tested the hypothesis that increasing the personal relevance of the stimuli and approach motivational intensity would increase relative left frontal activation. Results supported the predictions. Moreover, by showing the predicted effects with anger-inducing stimuli, the results demonstrated that motivational direction, rather than affective valence, accounts for asymmetrical frontal cortical activity.

The effect of manipulated sympathy and anger on left and right frontal cortical activity.

The present research extended past research demonstrating that approach-motivated anger is associated with greater left than right frontal cortical activity. Because past research had examined difference scores between left and right frontal activity, it was unable to test whether approach-motivated anger increased left activity, decreased right activity, or both. In addition, the present research examined a potential moderator of the effect of insult on left frontal activity. That is, it tested whether sympathy for an insulting person would reduce the left frontal activity that occurs following being insulted. Results indicated that left frontal activity was increased and right frontal activity was decreased by the insult. Moreover, these effects were inhibited when high levels of sympathy were first aroused.