[Application of a critical incident reporting and analysis system in an anesthesiology department]. / Utilización de un sistema de comunicación y análisis de incidentes críticos en un servicio de anestesia.

OBJECTIVES: To ascertain the changes in anesthesia-related morbidity and mortality after application of a scheme for reporting critical incidents and to assess the effect of implementing preventive measures against the detected errors. PATIENTS AND METHODS: We defined a critical incident to be any situation in which the margin of safety for the patient was reduced or might have been reduced. We analyzed data from the period between January 1999 and December 2004. RESULTS: The number of critical incidents was 547 (0.79% of 68627 anesthetic procedures). Human error was identified in 279 incidents (51%). The most frequent factors underlying errors were wrong diagnosis of the situation, communication problems, and failure to check equipment and drugs. The patient suffered no adverse effect in 81.8% of the incidents; 78.9% were considered preventable. Introducing an equipment checklist before anesthesia reduced the number of incidents from 90 events in 21809 cases in 31 months to 34 events out of 22064 cases in 29 months; chi2 test, P < 0.05; odds ratio (OR), 2.68; 95% confidence interval (CI), 1.80-3.98). Labeling syringes reduced errors in the administration of medications from 45 errors in 21 809 cases in 31 months to 27 in 22064 cases in 29 months; chi2, P < 0.05; OR, 1.68; 95% CI, 1.04-2.72. CONCLUSIONS: Corrective measures were adopted as a result of the incident reporting scheme. Some of the measures led to a statistically significant reduction in equipment and drug administration errors.

Sistemas de comunicación de incidentes y seguridad del paciente en anestesia / Incident reporting systems and patient safety in anesthesia

Los sistemas de comunicación de incidentes recogeninformación sobre sucesos adversos, errores, complicacioneso problemas con el objetivo de analizar sus causasy sugerir cambios para evitar su repetición. Actualmenteson parte de los programas de seguridad clínica en diversospaíses. Aunque existe controversia acerca de cuálesserían las características del sistema de comunicaciónideal, para que éste tenga éxito se necesita una cultura deseguridad asentada en la organización. El planteamientode base asume que aunque los errores son inherentes alproceso humano casi siempre los propicia una cadena defallos en el sistema, por lo que los sistemas de comunicaciónse diseñan para estimular una cultura de aprendizajey no de culpabilización. Sus principales limitacionesson la posibilidad de infracomunicación, las diferentesterminologías y conceptos utilizados, la falta de recursospara su investigación y desarrollo, y la escasa o nulalegislación que permita su buen uso sin implicacioneslegales

Incident reporting schemes collect information onadverse events, errors, complications, or problems withthe aim of analyzing their causes and suggesting changesto prevent recurrence. Such schemes are currently partof clinical safety programs in various countries. Althoughthe ideal form for a reporting system is debated,an essential part of its success will be the establishmentof a culture of safety within an organization. The underlyingassumption is that even though errors are aninherent part of a process that relies on human beings, theyare nearly always favored by a chain of system failures.Therefore, reporting is intended to stimulate a culture oflearning rather than assigning blame. The main limitationsof such schemes are under reporting, the use of differentterms and concepts, the lack of resources for researchand development, and the scarcity or lack oflegislation to guarantee the proper use of informationwithout legal consequences

Utilización de un sistema de comunicación y análisis de incidentes críticos en un servicio de anestesia / Application of a critical incident reporting and analysis system in an anesthesiology department

OBJETIVOS: Conocer los cambios en la morbi-mortalidad anestésica con la utilización de un sistema de comunicación de incidentes críticos y valorar los efectos de la resolución de los factores de error detectados. PACIENTES Y MÉTODOS: Consideramos incidente crítico toda situación en la que se redujo o pudo haberse reducido el margen de seguridad del paciente. Analizamos el periodo entre enero de 1999 y diciembre de 2004. RESULTADOS: Se realizaron 68.627 procedimientos anestésicos y se comunicaron 547 incidentes críticos (0,79%). En 279 incidentes (51%) se identificó un error activo. Los factores latentes asociados con mayor frecuencia fueron el error de diagnóstico de la situación, los problemas de comunicación y la falta de comprobación del equipamiento y de los fármacos. El 81,8% de los incidentes no tuvieron ningún efecto sobre el paciente. En el 78,9% el incidente se consideró evitable. La introducción de una lista de comprobación del equipamiento antes de la anestesia redujo los incidentes de 90 por 21809 casos en 31 meses a 34 por 22.064 casos en 29 meses; χ, p<0,05; odds ratio [OR]= 2,68; intervalo de confianza [IC] del 95%= 1,80-3,9811. El etiquetado de jeringas redujo los errores en la administración de medicación de 45 por 21.809 casos en 31 meses a 27 por 22.064 casos en 29 meses; χ, p<0,05; OR= 1,68; IC del 95%= 1,04-2,72. CONCLUSIONES: Como consecuencia del análisis sistemático de los incidentes se adoptaron distintas medidas correctoras, algunas de las cuales demostraron una reducción estadísticamente significativa en los incidentes de equipamiento y los incidentes farmacológicos

OBJECTIVES: To ascertain the changes in anesthesiarelated morbidity and mortality after application of a scheme for reporting critical incidents and to assess the effect of implementing preventive measures against the detected errors. PATIENTS AND METHODS: We defined a critical incident to be any situation in which the margin of safety for the patient was reduced or might have been reduced. We analyzed data from the period between January 1999 and December 2004. RESULTS: The number of critical incidents was 547 (0.79% of 68627 anesthetic procedures). Human error was identified in 279 incidents (51%). The most frequent factors underlying errors were wrong diagnosis of the situation, communication problems, and failure to check equipment and drugs. The patient suffered no adverse effect in 81.8% of the incidents; 78.9% were considered preventable. Introducing an equipment checklist before anesthesia reduced the number of incidents from 90 events in 21809 cases in 31 months to 34 events out of 22064 cases in 29 months; χ2 test, P<0.05; odds ratio (OR), 2.68; 95% confidence interval (CI), 1.80-3.98). Labeling syringes reduced errors in the administration of medications from 45 errors in 21 809 cases in 31 months to 27 in 22064 cases in 29 months; χ2, P<0.05; OR, 1.68; 95% CI, 1.04-2.72. CONCLUSIONS: Corrective measures were adopted as a result of the incident reporting scheme. Some of the measures led to a statistically significant reduction in equipment and drug administration errors