Analysis of Affordable Health Care.

BACKGROUND: Lack of affordable health care affects the uninsured, commercially insured, and Medicare beneficiaries. Yet, the wide variation in providers' prices and practice styles suggests that more affordable care already may be available and data on low value and wasteful care suggest that lower cost care need not come at the expense of better quality. Although price variation has received the most attention in the literature and legislation, total cost of care is a function of both unit prices (fees) and the quantity of services. OBJECTIVE: To partition provider-specific variation in total annual risk-adjusted per capita expenditures on health care services into variation in unit prices (fees) versus quantities of services, and to explore the relationship between low value, avoidable, discretionary, and recommended care to total health expenditures. The analysis is important because both prices and quantities of services can affect affordability and reductions in prices versus quantities have very different effects on providers' profits. SETTING: 2018 data from the Minnesota State Employees Group Insurance Program (SEGIP) that offers a tiered cost-sharing health insurance benefit design to 130,000 State employees and their dependents (SEGIP "members"). EXPOSURE: Each year during open enrollment, SEGIP members choose a primary care clinic (PCC). The PCC can make decisions regarding both unit prices and prescribed services. PCCs are placed in one of four cost-sharing tiers based on the total annual risk-adjusted per capita health expenditures for the SEGIP members who choose their clinic. Members choosing higher cost PCCs face higher deductibles, copayments, and maximum out-of-pocket spending limits. MEASURES: Overall prices and use of inpatient, outpatient hospital, professional, and pharmaceutical services, total and avoidable use of emergency department visits and inpatient admissions, low value care, testing for patients with pneumonia, and recommended preventive care. RESULTS: Differences in total risk-adjusted annual per capita health expenditures across the care systems were substantial. Higher cost providers had both higher unit prices and higher use of services. Variation in the quantity of health care services explained more of the variance in total spending than variation in prices. Prices for professional services and use of inpatient, outpatient hospital, and pharmaceutical services, and ambulatory care sensitive admissions, contributed significantly to high total expenditures. Lower cost PCCs in the lowest cost-sharing tier had higher rates of low value care and lower emergency department visits per capita. Neither the number of investigations for patients with pneumonia nor the receipt of recommended mammography screening varied systematically by tier. CONCLUSIONS: Efforts to identify and expand sources of affordable care, including improved information and incentives for consumers, need to account for variation in both prices and quantities of services. Efforts to encourage more efficient use of health care services by providers need to consider the effect of those efforts on the provider's internal costs and thus their profits.

Clinic price reductions in a tiered total cost benefit design.

OBJECTIVES: To understand responses of primary care clinics to inclusion in a tiered total cost of care insurance benefit design. STUDY DESIGN: We used a qualitative design beginning with longitudinal analysis of administrative data on consumer clinic choice, clinic tier placement, and clinic actions, followed by in-depth interviews with key informants from clinics, administering health plans, and program administrators. METHODS: We collected data via semistructured interviews with purposively sampled key informants selected from clinics that prospectively reduced prices to move to, or remain in, a tier with lower cost sharing. Data from interview transcripts were coded using qualitative coding software and analyzed for thematic responses. RESULTS: Our findings suggest that clinics respond to the incentives in the tiered cost-sharing benefit design. Two motivations cited by clinics are (1) concern over developing a reputation as a high-cost clinic and (2) concern about the possible loss of patients due to higher cost sharing. Some clinics have agreed to price reductions or risk-sharing arrangements to move to, or remain in, a tier with lower cost sharing. Clinic informants reported that price reductions alone are not scalable. They sought greater transparency in tier assignment and increased data sharing to help them reduce costly or unnecessary utilization. CONCLUSIONS: Managers of primary care clinics respond to a tiered benefit design that holds them accountable for total cost of care. They respond by offering price discounts and expressing interest in reducing costly referrals and unnecessary use of services.

How do insurance firms respond to financial risk sharing regulations? Evidence from the Affordable Care Act.

Many insurance markets have reinstated premium stabilization programs to ensure financial protection from market volatility. In this paper, we focus on one such regulation-risk corridors (RCs)-in the context of the Health Insurance Marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act. We develop a model to show how the program provided incentives for some insurers to lower their premiums. The RCs program was defunded unexpectedly for coverage year 2016, before its legislated end in 2016. Consistent with the model, we find that making a RCs claim before the program ended is associated with higher premium growth after the program's demise. The model and empirical evidence are consistent with the view that the end of the RCs program contributed to premium growth in the Marketplaces.

Docs with their eyes on the clock? The effect of time pressures on primary care productivity.

This paper examines how time pressure, an important constraint faced by medical care providers, affects productivity in primary care. We generate empirical predictions by incorporating time pressure into a model of physician behavior by Tai-Seale and McGuire (2012). We use data from the electronic health records of a large integrated delivery system and leverage unexpected schedule changes as variation in time pressure. We find that greater time pressure reduces the number of diagnoses recorded during a visit and increases both scheduled and unscheduled follow-up care. We also find some evidence of increased low-value care, decreased preventive care, and decreased opioid prescribing.